I 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


AN  INTRODUCTION  TO  THE 
HISTORY  OF  MORALS 


BY  flA£**V 

PHILIP  VAN  NESS  MYERS 

Formerly  Professor  of  History  and  Political  Economy  in  the 

University  of  Cincinnati.  Author  of  "Ancient  History," 

"Mediaeval  and  Modern  History,"  and 

"A  General  History" 


GINN  AND  COMPANY 

BOSTON  •  NEW  YORK  •  CHICAGO  •  LONDON 


3T7\ 

MS 


COPYRIGHT,   I913,  BY 
PHILIP  VAN  NESS  MYERS 


ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED 
5*3-2 


GINN  AND  COMPANY'  PRO- 
PRIETORS •  BOSTON  •  U.S.A. 


TO 

I.  C.  M. 

My  conviction  gains  infinitely 
the  moment  another  soul  will 
believe    in    it.  —  Novalis 


284518 


PREFACE 

This  work  completes  the  series  of  historical  textbooks 
which  I  began  more  than  thirty. years  ago.  It  is  an  expan- 
sion of  a  course  of  lectures  given  for  several  years  to  my 
advanced  classes  in  history,  and  is  designed  as  a  brief  intro- 
duction to  the  history  of  morals.  In  treating  the  science  of 
morals  as  a  branch  of  history  my  thought  is,  without  trenching 
in  the  least  upon  the  domain  of  the  philosophy  of  morals,  to 
make  the  work  of  the  department  of  history  more  helpfully 
introductory  than  it  has  hitherto  been  to  that  of  the  depart- 
ment of  moral  philosophy.  The  book  is  the  outgrowth  of  a 
conviction  that  the  philosophy  of  ethics,  if  it  shall  become  a 
stimulus  and  guide  to  social  service  and  humanitarian  effort, 
—  especially  if  it  shall  bring  reenforcement  to  that  ethical 
idealism  which  so  largely  motives  the  present-day  movement 
for  world  peace,  —  must  be  based  on  a  knowledge  of  the  facts 
of  the  moral  life  of  the  race  in  all  the  various  stages  of  the 
historic  evolution,  and  that  to  gather  and  systematize  these 
facts  is  a  part  of  the  task  of  the  historian,  indeed  the  most 
important  part  of  his  task.  It  is  my  hope  that  teachers  of 
both  history  and  ethics  may  find  the  book  helpful,  whether 
made  the  basis  of  classroom  discussion  or  of  lecture  comment. 

P.  V.  N.  M. 
College  Hill 
Cincinnati,  Ohio 


Ethics  gives  to  History  its  rational  goal ;  and  all  morality  has  the  perfect 
shaping  of  universal  history  as  its  ultimate  end.  A  real  understanding  of 
history  is  not  possible  without  ethics ;  universal  history  is  the  realization 
of  the  moral  .  .  .  within  humanity.  —  Adolf  Wuttke. 

The  real  advance  made  by  Thucydides  consists,  perhaps,  in  this,  that  he 
perceived  the  motive  forces  of  human  history  to  be  in  the  moral  constitu- 
tion of  human  nature.  —  Leopold  von  Ranke. 

Ethics,  if  it  is  to  become  truly  a  science,  must  shun  the  path  of  specu- 
lation and  follow  closely  the  historical  method.  .  .  .  Range  in  fancy  over 
the  whole  circle  of  the  sciences,  and  you  will  find  there  no  place  for 
ethics  save  as  a  branch  of  human  history.  .  .  .  Given  the  earliest  morality 
of  which  we  have  any  written  record,  to  trace  from  it  through  progressive 
stages  the  morality  of  to-day ;  that  is  the  problem,  and  the  only  problem 
which  can  fall  to  a  truly  scientific  ethics.  .  .  .  Ethics  as  the  compara- 
tive history  of  universal  morality  is  the  vestibule  to  the  temple  of  moral 
philosophy. — Jacob  Gould  Schurman. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.    INTRODUCTION i 

II.    THE  DAWN  OF  MORALITY:   CONSCIENCE  IN  THE 

KINSHIP  GROUP *. 12 

I.   Institutions,    Ideas,    and    Conditions    of    Life 

DETERMINING   THE    RULES    OF    CONDUCT      ....         12 

II.   Essential    Facts    of    Kinship   or    Intratribal 

Morality 15 

III.    The  Beginnings  of  Intertribal  Morality     .    .      22 

III.  THE  MORAL  LIFE  IN  ANCIENT  EGYPT:   AN  IDEAL 

OF  SOCIAL  JUSTICE 30 

I.    Circumstances   and    Ideas  which    molded   and 

motived  Morality 30 

II.    The  Ideal 33 

IV.  THE  BABYLONIAN-ASSYRIAN  CONSCIENCE  ....      45 

V.    CHINESE  MORALS:  AN  IDEAL  OF  FILIAL  PIETY     .      53 

I.    Ideas,    Institutions,    and    Historical    Circum- 
stances  DETERMINING  THE   CAST  OF  THE   MORAL 

Ideal 53 

II.   The  Ideal 60 

III.    Effects  of  the  Ideal  upon   Chinese  Life  and 

History 69 

VI.   JAPANESE  MORALS:  AN  IDEAL  OF  LOYALTY    ...  77 

I.    Formative  and  Modifying  Influences    ....  77 

II.    The  Ideal 80 

III.    Some  Significant  Facts  in  the  Moral  History 

of  Japan Sy 

ix 


x  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

VII.   THE  ETHICAL  IDEALS  OF  INDIA    .    .  ' 95 

PART    I.     THE    ETHICS    OF    BRAHMANISM  — A    CLASS 
MORALITY 95 

I.    Historical    and    Speculative    Basis    of    the 

System 95 

II.   The  Various  Moral  Standards 101 

PART  II.   THE  ETHICS  OF  BUDDHISM;  AN  IDEAL  OF 
SELF-CONQUEST  AND   UNIVERSAL  BENEVOLENCE     106 

I.   The  Philosophical  Basis  of  the  System    ...    106 

II.   The  Ideal no 

III.    Some  Expressions    of   the    Ethical    Spirit    of 

Buddhism 115 

VIII.   THE    ETHICS   OF    ZOROASTRIANISM :    AN    IDEAL 

OF  COMBAT 123 

I.   Philosophical  and  Religious  Ideas  which  cre- 
ated the  Ethical  Type  . 123 

II.   The  Ideal 126 

III.  The  Practice 131 


IX.   THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  IN  ISRAEL:    AN  IDEAL 
OF  OBEDIENCE  TO  A  REVEALED  LAW     .    . 

I.  The  Religious  Basis  of  Hebrew  Morality 
II.   The  Evolution  of  the  Moral  Ideal  .    .    . 

1.  The  Development  up  to  the  Exile   .... 

2.  The  Morality  of  the  Prophets  of  the  Exile  . 

3.  The  Moral  Life  in  the  Postexilic  Age      .    . 


135 

135 
140 
140 

157 
162 


X.   THE    MORAL   CONSCIOUSNESS    OF    HELLAS:    AN 

IDEAL  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 169 

I.  Institutions  and  Ideas  determining  the  Moral 

Type 169 

II.  The  Ideal 174 

III.  Limitations  and  Defects  of  the  Ideal  ....  179 

IV.  The  Moral  Evolution -185 


CONTENTS  xi 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

XL    ROMAN  MORALS:  AN  IDEAL  OF  CIVIC  DUTY     .  212 

I.    Institutions    and    Conditions    of    Life    deter- 
mining the  Early  Moral  Type 212 

II.  The  Primitive  Moral  Type 214 

III.  The  Moral  Evolution  under  the  Republic  .    .  218 

IV.  The  Moral  Evolution  under  the  Pagan  Empire  231 

XII.    THE   ETHICS    OF    DOCTRINAL    CHRISTIANITY: 

AN  IDEAL  OF  RIGHT  BELIEF 255 

I.   Religious  Ideas  and  Theological  Dogmas  mold- 
ing the  Ideal 256 

II.   The  Moral  Ideal 261 

XIII.  MORAL   HISTORY    OF   THE  AGE  OF  CHRISTIAN 

ASCETICISM 267 

I.   Conceptions  of   Life  and   Historical  Circum- 
stances  THAT   PRODUCED  THE  ASCETIC   IDEAL       .  267 

II.   The  Ideal  and  its  Chief  Types 270 

III.   The  Chief  Moral  Facts  of  the  Period  ....  272 

XIV.  THE  ETHICS  OF  ISLAM:  A  MARTIAL  IDEAL  .    .  288 

I.  Religious  Basis  of  the  Moral  System     ....  288 

II.   The  Moral  Code 289 

III.   The  Moral  Life 293 

XV.   THE  MORAL  LIFE  OF  EUROPE  DURING  THE  AGE 

OF  CHIVALRY 300 

I.   The   Church    consecrates   the    Martial   Ideal 

of  Knighthood 300 

II.    The  Composite  Ideal  of  Knighthood      ....  306 

III.   The  Chief  Moral  Phenomena  of  the  Period    .  309 

XVI.    RENAISSANCE  ETHICS:  REVIVAL  OF  NATURAL- 
ISM IN  MORALS 320 

I.   Determining  Influences 320 

II.    Some  Essential   Facts   in  the   Moral   History 

of  the  Age 322 


xii  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

XVII.    ETHICS    OF   THE    PROTESTANT    REFORMATION    333 

I.   Principles    of    the    Reformation    of    Ethical 

Import 333 

II.   Some  Important  Moral  Outcomes  of  the  Six- 
teenth-Century Religious  Reform 334 

XVIII.  THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  SINCE  THE  INCOMING 
OF  DEMOCRACY:  THE  NEW  SOCIAL  AND  IN- 
TERNATIONAL CONSCIENCE 340 

I.   Forces  determining  the  Trend  of  the  Ethical 

Movement 340 

II.   Expressions  of  the  New  Moral  Consciousness 

in  Different  Domains  of  Life  and  Thought  344 

1.  The  Ethics  of  Democracy 344 

2.  The  Ethics  of  Industrialism 347 

3.  The  Ethics  of  Modern  Science    ......  353 

4.  The  Ethics  of  Theology 360 

5.  Social  Ethics :  the  New  Social  Conscience  .    .  364 

6.  International  Ethics :     the  New  International 

Conscience 371 

INDEX 383 


HISTORY  AS   PAST  ETHICS 


CHAPTER   I 
INTRODUCTION 

Professor  Freeman  denned  history  as  "  past  politics."    Mr.  The  ethical 
Buckle  argued  that  the  essence  of  the  historical  evolution  con-  tionoT  *~ 
sists  in  intellectual  progress.1    Many  present-day  economists  hlstory 
hold  that  the  dominant  forces  in  the  historical  development 
are  economic.2   Churchmen  consistently  make  the  chief  factor 
in  history  to  be  religion. 

Whether  the  upholders  of  these  several  interpretations  of 
history  would  have  us  understand  them  as  speaking  of  the 
ultimate  goal  of  the  historic  evolution,  or  merely  of  the  domi- 
nant motive  under  which  men  and  society  act,  none  of  these 
interpretations  can  be  accepted  by  the  student  of  the  facts  of 
the  moral  life  of  the  race  as  a  true  reading  of  history.  To 
him  not  only  does  moral  progress  constitute  the  very  essence 
of  the  historic  movement,  but  the  ethical  motive  presents  it- 
self as  the  most  constant  and  regulative  force  in  the  evolu- 
tion of  humanity.  His  chief  interest  in  all  the  other  factors 
of  the  historical  evolution  is  in  noting  in  what  way  and  in 
what  measure  they  have  contributed  to  the  growth  and 
enrichment  of  the  moral  life  of  mankind. 

1  Henry  T.  Buckle,  Histoty  of  Civilization  in  England  (1891),  vol.  i, 
chap.  iv.  For  a  trenchant  criticism  of  Buckle's  contention  that  there  has  been 
no  progress  in  morals  during  historic  times,  see  article  entitled  ?  The 
Natural  History  of  Morals,"  North  British  Review  for  December,  1867. 

2  For  a  discussion  of  the  economic  theory,  see  Edwin  R.  A.  Seligman? 
The  Economic  Interpretation  of  Histo?y,  2d  ed. 

1 


Jl  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

Thus  the  historian  of  morals  is  deeply  interested  in  the 
growth  of  political  institutions  among  men,  but  chiefly  in 
observing  in  what  way  these  institutions  have  affected  for 
good  or  for  evil  the  moral  life  of  the  nation.  Particularly  is 
the  progress  of  the  world  toward  political  unity  a  matter  of 
profound  concern  to  him,  not  because  he  regards  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  world  state  as  an  end  in  itself,  but  because 
the  universal  state  alone  can  furnish  those  conditions  under 
which  the  moral  life  of  humanity  can  most  freely  expatiate 
and  find  its  noblest  and  truest  expression. 

It  is  the  same  with  intellectual  progress.  The  student  of 
morals  recognizes  the  fact  that  the  progress  of  the  race  in 
morality  is  normally  dependent  upon  its  progress  in  knowl- 
edge —  that  conscience  waits  upon  the  intellect.  But  in  oppo- 
sition to  Buckle  and  those  of  his  school,  he  maintains  that, 
so  far  from  an  advance  in  knowledge  constituting  the  essence 
of  a  progressive  civilization,  this  mental  advance  constitutes 
merely  the  condition  precedent  of  real  civilization,  the  dis- 
tinctive characteristic  of  which  must  be  a  true  morality.  A 
civilization  or  culture  which  does  not  include  this  is  doomed 
to  quick  retrogression  and  decay.  As  Benjamin  Kidd  truly 
observes,  "  When  the  intellectual  development  of  any  section 
of  the  race,  for  the  time  being,  outruns  the  ethical  develop- 
ment, natural  selection  has  apparently  weeded  it  out  like  any 
other  unsuitable  product."  1 

As  with  the  political  and  intellectual  elements  of  civili- 
zation so  is  it  with  the  economic.  The  outward  forms  of  the 
moral  life  are,  it  is  true,  largely  determined  by  the  industry 
of  a  people ;  but  the  informing  spirit  of  morality  is  the  ex- 
pression of  an  implanted  faculty.  It  is  elicited  but  not  created 
by  environment.  No  industrial  order  from  which  it  is  lack- 
ing can  long  endure.  Natural  selection  condemns  it  as  unfit. 
And  this  we  are  beginning  to  recognize  —  that  economics 
and  ethics  cannot  be  divorced,  that  every  great  industrial 
1  Social  Evolution  (1894),  p.  307. 


INTRODUCTION  3 

problem  is.  at  bottomajnoral  problem.  To  the  student  of  the 
ethical  phase  of  history  all  social  reformers  from  the  old 
Hebrew  prophets  down  to  Karl  Marx  and  Henry  George 
are  primarily  moralists  pleading  for  social  justice,  equity, 
and  righteousness. 

And  preeminently  the  same  is  it  with  religion.  Religion 
has  been  a  great  part  of  the  life  of  man,  and  the  historian  of 
morals  must  be  a  diligent  student  of  the  religious  systems 
of  the  world,  but  mainly  becauj e  religion  has  been  in  general 
such  a  potent  agency  in  the  moral  education  of  mankind. 
For  it  is  the  ethical  factor  in  the  great  world  religions  which 
constitutes  their  universal  and  permanent  element.  "  It  is 
the  function  of  religion  to  kindle  moral  enthusiasm  in  society 
at  large."  1  "  Christianity  has  no  other  function  or  value  than 
as  an  aid  to  morality."2  All  the  great  religions  of  the  world  — 
Buddhism,  Confucianism,  Zoroastrianism,  Judaism  (reckoning 
historic  Judaism  as  beginning  with  the  great  prophets  of  the 
ninth  and  eighth  centuries  B.C.),  Christianity,  and  Islam  — 
began  as  moral  reforms.3 

In  short,  in  the  words  of  Wellhausen,  "  Morality  is  that 
for  the  sake  of  which  all  other  things  exist ;  it  is  the  alone 
essential  thing  in  the  world."  4  The  really  constructive  and 
regulative  forces  in  history  are  in  truth  moral  ideas  and  con- 
victions. And  there  is  vast  significance  in  this  —  that  the 
ethical  motive,  never  absent  and  always  active,  is  constantly 
becoming  more  and  more  dominant  in  the  processes  of  the 
historical  evolution.  As  the  ages  pass  there  enters  into  his- 
tory —  we  shall  see  this  to  be  so  later  —  an  ever  larger  ethical 

1  Ralph  Barton  Perry,  The  Moral  Economy  (1909),  p.  254. 

2  Immanuel  Kant,  Critique  of  the  Practical  Reason  ;  cited  by  Fisher, 
History  of  the  Christian  Church  (1888),  p.  623. 

3  "  It  is  probable  indeed  that  every  movement  of  religious  reform  has 
originated  in  some  clearer  conception  of  the  ideal  of  human  conduct,  arrived 
at  by  some  person  or  persons."  —  T.  H.  Green,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics, 
5th  ed.,  p.  361. 

4  Prolegomena  to  the  History  of  Israel,  tr.  Black  and  Menzies  (1885), 
p.  472 ;  summing  up  the  moral  teachings  of  the  prophet  Amos. 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


The  history 
of  morals  in 
the  main  a 
record  of 
the  expan- 
sion of  the 
circle  cov- 
ered by 
the  moral 
feelings 


element.   Conscience  becomes  ever  more  and  more  involved  in 
the  personal,  national,  and  international  affairs  of  the  world. 

Moral  progress  consists  not  so  much  in  changes  in  the 
quality  or  intensity  of  the  moral  emotions,  although  these 
gain  in  diversity,  purity,  and  refinement  as  time  passes,  as 
in  the  successive  enlargements  of  the  circle  of  persons  em- 
braced by  the  moral  feelings.1  "  It  is  not  the  sense  of  duty 
to  a  neighbor,  but  the  practical  answer  to  the  question,  Who 
is  my  neighbor  ?  that  has  varied."  2  As  we  shall  see  when 
we  come  to  examine  the  morality  of  primitive  man,  the  moral 
feelings  embrace  at  first  only  kinsmen,  that  is,  the  members 
of  one's  own  family,  clan,  or  social  group.  All  others  are  out- 
side the  moral  pale.  But  gradually  this  circle  grows  larger 
and  embraces  in  successive  expansions  the  tribe,  the  city,  the 
nation,  and  lastly  humanity. 

This  expansion  of  the  area  covered  by  the  moral  feelings 
is  the  dominant  fact  in  the  moral  history  of  mankind.  It  is 
the  overlooking  of  this  fact  that  has  caused  writers  like  Buckle 
to  make  their  strange  misreading  of  history  and  to  maintain 
that  though  man  during  historic  times  has  made  immense 
progress  on  material  and  intellectual  lines,  he  has  made  little 
or  no  progress  in  morality.  The  truth  is,  as  we  shall  learn,  that 
in  no  domain  has  progress  been  greater,  the  gains  larger  or 
more  precious,  than  in  the  moral.  From  clan  morality,  based 
on  physical  kinship,  mankind  has  advanced  or  is  advancing  to 
world  morality,  based  on  the  ethical  kinship  of  men.  This  is 
» the  one  increasing  purpose  running  through  all  history  —  the 
»    creation  of  a  moral  order  embracing  the  whole  human  race. 

sources  for        The  facts  for  a  history  of  morals  must  be  sought  chiefly 
of  moraisry  outside  the  literature  of  ethical  theory  and  speculation.    They 

1  Wake,  The  Evolution  of  Morality  (1878),  vol.  ii,  p.  4;  Westermarck, 
The  Origin  and  Development  of  the  Moral  Ideas  (1906),  vol.  ii,  p.  743; 
T.  II.  Green,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  5th  ed.,  p.  237  ;  George  Harris,  Moral 
/•'.volution  (1896),  p.  79. 

2  T.  H.  Green,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  5th  ed.,  p.  240. 


ideal 


INTRODUCTION  5 

must  be  looked  for  in  the  customs,  laws,  institutions,  my- 
thologies, literatures,  maxims,  and  religions  of  the  different 
races,  peoples,  and  ages  of  history.1  In  all  these  there  is 
always  an  ethical  element ;  often  this  forms  their  very  essence. 
"  In  every  sentence  of  the  penal  code,"  as  the  moralist  Wil- 
helm  Wundt  remarks,  "there  speaks  the  voice  of  an  objec- 
tive moral  conscience."  In  truth  all  law  codes,  whether  civil 
or  criminal,  are  essentially  nothing  more  nor  less  than  the 
embodiment  of  man's  conceptions  of  what  is  just  and  unjust.A 
Mythologies,  literatures,  and  philosophies  are  charged  with 
moral  sentiment  In  religion  there  struggle  for  utterance  the 
deepest  moral  feelings  and  convictions  of  the  human  soul. 

The  moral  life  fulfills  itself  in  many  ways.  Every  age  and  The  moral 
every  race  has  its  own  moral  type  or  ideal.2  This,  as  we  shall 
use  the  term,  may  be  defined  as  a  group  of  virtues  held  in 
esteem  by  a  given  people  or  a.  given  age.  It  is  the  accepted 
standard  of  conduct,  of  excellence,  of  character.  This  ideal 
may  be  a  very  simple  thing,  embracing  only  a  few  rudimen- 
tary virtues,  as  in  the  case  of  peoples  on  the  lower  levels  of 
culture  ;  or  it  may  be  a  very  complex  thing,  embracing  many 
and  refined  virtues,  as  in  the  case  of  civilized  societies  in  which 
the  mutual  relationships  of  the  members  are  many  and  various. 

1  H  We  cannot  explain  morality  without  going  to  objective  morality, 
which  is  expressed  in  the  customs  and  laws,  in  the  moral  commands  and 
judgments,  conceptions  and  ideals  of  the  race"  (Frank  Thilly,  M  Friedrich 
Paulsen's  Ethical  Work  and  Influence,"  The  International  Journal  of  Ethics 
for  January,  1909,  p.  150).  And  so  Wundt:  "  The  original  source  of  ethical 
knowledge  is  the  moral  consciousness  of  man,  as  it  finds  objective  expres- 
sion in  the  universal  perceptions  of  right  and  wrong,  and  further,  in  religious 
ideas  and  in  customs.  The  most  direct  method  for  the  discovery  of  ethical 
principles  is,  therefore,  the  anthropological  method.  We  use  this  term  in 
a  wider  sense  than  is  customary,  to  include  ethnic  psychology,  the  history 
of  primitive  man  and  the  history  of  civilization,  as  well  as  the  natural  history 
of  mankind"  (Ethics:  the  Facts  of  the  Moral  Life,  tr.  Gulliver  and  Titchener 
(1908),  p.  19).  Cf.  also  Westermarck,  The  Origin  and  Development  of  the 
Moral  Ideas  (1906),  vol.  i,  pp.  158  ff. 

2  "An  ideal  is  essential  to  the  very  existence  of  morality."  —  George 
Harris,  Moral  Evolution  (1896),  p.  54. 


6  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

The  history  of  morals  is  in  the  main  an  account  of  moral 

ideals  or  types.1    Indeed  so  large  is  the  part  that  these  have 

played  in  the  growth  and  decay  of  races  and  civilizations  that 

ujiiversal  history  may  be  denned  quite  accurately  as  "  the 

jpa]ecjitQlogy_oi  moraMdeals."  2 

There  is  one  thing  about  a  moral  ideal  which  sets  it  apart 
from  all  other  ideals.  It  possesses  a  jmjgue_dyjiamjc_force. 
All  ideals,  it  is  true,  have  in  them  the  impulsion  to  their  em- 
bodiment in  reality.  But  in  a  moral  ideal  there  is  the  added 
imperative  of  conscience.  There  speaks  from  it  the  majestic 
voice  of  duty,  demanding  that  the  ideal  be  made  actual  in  the 
life  of  the  individual  and  of  society.  It  is  this  that  has  made 
moral  ideals  such  molding  and  constructive  forces  in  history. 

composite  There  is  a  striking  analogy  between  the  different  types  of 
or  types  moral  character  and  the  different  types  of  human  beauty. 
Thus  corresponding  to  the  great  types  of  masculine  and  femi- 
nine beauty  there  are  masculine  and  feminine  types  of  moral 
excellence.  And  then,  just  as  the  elements  of  the  two  chief 
types  of  feminine  beauty,  the  blond  and  the  brunette,  com- 
bine to  form  a  great  variety  of  mixed  or  composite  types,  so 
do  the  elements  of  the  chief  types  of  goodness  blend  into 
many  composite  types  of  character.3 

There  is  no  more  instructive  chapter  in  the  history  of 
morals  than  that  which  has  to  do  with  the  formation  of  these 
composite  ethical  types,  since  these  are  often  the  most  sig- 
nificant results  of  those  great  race  collisions  and  comminglings 

1  "  The  history  of  moral  ideals  and  institutions,  though  hitherto  ignored 
by  moralists,  seems  to  me  the  most  important  topic  in  the  whole  realm  of 
ethics."  —  Schurman,  The  Ethical  Import  of  Darwinism  (1887),  p.  201. 

2  S.  Alexander,  Moral  Order  and  Progress  (1889),  p.  354.  The  same  thought 
is  expressed  by  the  writer  of  w  The  Natural  History  of  Morals,"  North 
British  Revieiv  for  December,  1867  :  M  The  earth  is  a  moral  graveyard  .  .  . 
and  our  virtues  and  vices  will,  in  turn,  be  but  fossils  which  the  eye  of  science 
shall  curiously  scan,  and  they  will  finally  crumble  into  dust,  from  which  the 
moral  harvests  of  the  future  shall  spring." 

8  Lecky,  History  of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  i,  p.  154. 


INTRODUCTION  7 

which  make  up  so  much  of  the  history  of  the  past ;  for  when 
races  meet  and  mingle  they  blend  not  only  their  blood  but 
also  their  consciences.  There  appears  not  only  a  new  physical 
man  but  also  a  new  moral  man.     ■ 

Thus  the  fusion  of  races  in  Europe  has  resulted  in  a  great 
fusion  of  moralities.  The  conscience  of  Europe  is  a  very  com- 
posite one,  including  Greek,  Roman,  Hebraic,  Celtic,  Gothic, 
and  Slavonic  elements.  This  heterogeneous  conscience,  so 
different,  for  instance,  from  the  comparatively  homogeneous 
conscience  of  ancient  Egypt  and  of  China,  has  been  the  most 
important  factor  in  the  life  and  civilization  of  the  European 
people.  It  is  largely  because  Europe  has  been  constantly  get- 
ting a  new  conscience  that  its  history  has  been  so  disturbed 
and  so  progressive,  just  as  it  is  largely  because  China  has  had 
the  same  Confucian  conscience  for  two  thousand  years  and 
more,  that  her  history  has  been  so  uneventful  and  unchanging. 

Though  every  race  and  every  age,  since  man  is  by  nature  a  causes 
moral  being,  must  have  some  type  or  standard  of  moral  good-  Tetermine 
ness,  still  the  cast  and  content  of  this  type  is  determined  by  a  modiTy  the 
great  variety  of  circumstances,  such  as  the  stage  of  intellectual  moral  t**0 
development,  the  physical  environment,  social  and  political  i 
institutions,  occupation,  and  speculative  and  religious  ideas.1  J 

The  stage  of  intellectual  development  of  a  given  society 
determines  in  general  whether  the  moral  standard  shall  be 
high  or  low.  Peoples  still  on  the  level  of  savagery  must 
necessarily  have  a  very  simple  moral  code,  embracing  only  a 
few  rudimentary  virtues. .  As  a  people  or  race  progresses  in 
intelligence  and  the  mental  horizon  widens,  the  moral  sense 
becomes  clarified  and  the  moral  standard  comes  to  embrace 
new  and  refined  virtues,  corresponding  to  the  larger  and  truer 


1  M  Effective  ideals  are  elicited  by  circumstances.  But  they  are  not  created 
by  them.  It  is  a  prejudice  of  modern  sociology,  a  prejudice  which  sociology 
has  taken  over  from  biology,  to  try  to  explain  the  inner  by  the  outer."  — 
G.  Lowes  Dickinson,  *  Ideals  and  Facts,"  Hibbert  Journal  for  January, 
191 1,  p.  266. 


8  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

(mental  life ;  for,  speaking  broadly,  there  is  a  general  coinci- 
Idence  between^jnleile^tual^n^jn^raL-gniwth.  To  create  a 
pew  intellectual  life  is  to  create  a  new  moral  life.1 

vPlvys^cal^nidrormient  is- also  a  potent  agency  in  determin- 
ing the  cast  oPthe  moral  type.  Thus  the  hot  depressing 
climate  and  the  prodigality  of  nature  in  the  tropics  foster 
the  passive,  quietistic  virtues ;  while  the  harsher  and  more 
grudging  nature  of  the  temperate  regions  favors  the  develop- 
ment of  the  active,  industrial  virtues.  The  strongly  contrasted 
moral  types  of  the  peoples  of  the  tropic  regions  of  the  earth 
and  those  of  the  temperate  lands  may  without  reasonable  doubt 
be  ascribed,  in  part  at  least,  to  differences  in  the  climatic  and 
other  physical  influences  to  which  these  peoples  have  been 
subjected  through  long  periods  of  time. 

More  positively  influential  in  the  formation  of  moral  ideas 
and  feelings  are^social  institutions.  Thus  the  place  which  a 
whole  group  of  moral  qualities  that  we  designate  as  domestic 
virtues  are  assigned  in  the  ethical  standard  is  determined  by 
the  place  which  circumstances  may  have  given  the  family  in 
the  social  organism.  In  ancient  Sparta,  for  example,  where 
certain  influences  subordinated  the  family  in  an  unusual  degree 
to  the  state,  the  family  virtues  held  a  very  low  place,  indeed 
scarcely  any  place  at  all,  in  the  moral  ideal ;  while  in  China, 
where  certain  notions  of  the  relation  of  the  spirits  of  the  dead 
members  of  the  family  to  its  living  members  created  a  remark- 
able solidarity  of  the  family  group,  the  domestic  virtues,  and 
among  them  preeminently  the  virtue  of  filial  piety,  came  to 
determine  the  entire  cast  of  the  general  ideal  of  goodness. 

Government  is  another  potent  agency  in  molding  the  moral 
fype.  Patriarchal  monarchy  and  popular  government  tend 
each  to  nourish  a  distinct  morality,  so  that  we  speak  of  the 

1  "  The  growth  of  intellectuality,  considered  as  breadth  of  view  and 
competence  of  personal  judgment,  carries  with  it  normally  growth  in  sen- 
sitiveness of  feeling  and  Tightness  of  ethical  attitude."  —  BALDWIN,  Social 
OHd  Ethical  Interpretation  in  Mental  Development  (1897),  p.  397. 


INTRODUCTION  9 

ethics  of  monarchy  and  the  ethics  of  democracy.  As  time 
passes,  governments,  speaking  broadly,  become  constantly 
more  and  more  ethical  in  aim  and  purpose,  and  hence  act 
more  and  more  dynamically  upon  the  moral  evolution.  The 
greatest  force  making  for  a  truer  and  higher  morality  in  the 
world  to-day  is  political  democracy.1 

More  effective  than  any  of  the  agencies  thus  far  mentioned 
in  determining  the  moral  code  of  a  people  is  occupatioru- 
M  Man's  character,"  as  the  economist  Alfred  Marshall  truly 
affirms,  "  has  been  molded  by  his  everyday  work  .  .  .  more 
than  by  any  other  influence  unless  it  be  that  of  his  religious 
ideals."2  Every  occupation  develops  a  characteristic  group 
of  virtues.  This  is  especially  true  of  agriculture.  M  The  cul- 
tivation of  the  soil,"  says  Wedgwood,  "  cultivates  much 
besides  —  it  molds  ideals,  implants  aspirations,  creates  per- 
manent tendencies.  It  gives,  where  it  is  the  predominant 
industry,  to  the  character  of  a  people  its  moral  stamp."3 

Finally  we  mentioruigjigion  as  the  most  potent  of  all  agen- 
cies in  the  molding  of  the  moral  type.4  Religion  has  been  the 
great  schoolmaster  in  the  moral  education  of  the  race.  It  is 
true  that  religion  has  to  go  to  school  itself  in  morals  before  it 

1  See  Chapter  XVIII.  "The  activity  of  a  free  people  creates  a  great 
number  of  social  relations  from  which  arise  new  duties  and  new  rights ; 
so  that  liberty  is  not  less  favorable  to  the  development  of  morality  than  to 
that  of  letters,  arts,  and  sciences,  of  all  the  noble  interests  and  high  facul- 
ties of  our  nature."  —  Denis,  Histoire  des  theories  et  des  idies  morales  dans 
Pantiquite  (1879),  *•  *»  P-  IO- 

2  Principles  of  Economics,  2d  ed.,  p.  I.  "It  is  not  Christianity  but  in- 
dustrialism that  has  brought  into  the  world  that  strong  sense  of  the  moral 
value  of  thrift,  steady  industry,  punctuality  in  observing  engagements,  con- 
stant forethought  with  a  view  to  providing  for  the  contingencies  of  the 
future,  which  is  now  so  characteristic  of  the  moral  type  of  the  most  civilized 
nations."  —  Lecky,  The  Map  of  Life  (1900),  pp.  53  f. 

3  The  Moral  Ideal,  new  and  revised  edition,  p.  19. 

4  M  Doubtless  the  ethical  life  of  the  world  has  suffered  much  from  reli- 
gion, but  it  owes  to  religion  immeasurably  more  than  it  has  suffered  from 
it.  Faulty  enough  indeed  the  influence  has  been,  but  the  ethical  life  of  the 
world  has  on  the  whole  been  greatly  reenforced  and  purified  by  its  religions." 
—  William  Newton  Clarke,  The  Christian  Doctrine  of  God  (1909),  p.  13. 


IO 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


In  what 
virtue  or 
moral 
goodness 
consists 


Every  age 
must  be 
judged  by 
its  own 
moral 
standard 


can  become  a  schoolmaster.  That  is  to  say,  religion  in  its  be- 
ginnings is  in  the  main  unethical.  In  its  lower  manifestations 
it  is  hardly  more  than  a  system  of  incantations  and  sorcery. 
One  of  the  most  important  facts  of  the  moral  history  of  the 
race  is  the  gradual  moralization  of  man's  at  first  unethical 
conception  of  the  gods,  and  the  rise  out  of  the  unethical  reli- 
gions of  primitive  times  of  the  great  ethical  world  religions. 

Having  defined  ethical  ideals  and  noted  the  agencies  deter- 
mining their  cast  and  content,  we  may  now  seek  an  answer, 
in  terms  of  the  ethical  ideal,  to  the  question,  In  what  does 
moral  goodness  consist  ?  All  the  truly  great  seers  and  moral 
teachers  of  the  race  have  here  the  same  word  for  us,  and  it  is 
this  :  Do  the  thing  thou  seest  to  be  good ;  realize  thy  ideal. 
In  the  words  of  Sabatier,  "  The  essential  thing  in  the  world  is 
not  to  serve  this  ideal  or  that,  but  with  all  one's  soul  to  serve 
the  ideal  which  one  has  chosen."  Such  loyalty  to  one's  ideal 
is  moral  goodness.1  This  imperative  of  conscience  that  one 
be  true  and  loyal  to  the  best  one  knows  is  the  only  thing  ab- 
solute and  categorical  in  the  utterance  of  the  moral  faculty. 

"A  man  must  learn  a  great  deal,"  says  Marcus  Aurelius, 
V  to  enable  him  to  pass  a  correct  judgment  on  another  man's 
acts."2  And  among  the  things  which  he  must  first  learn  is 
this  —  that  the  men  of  every  age  have  their  own  standard  of 
excellence  and  that  they  can  be  judged  fairly  only  by  their  own 
code  of  morals.3  It  is  largely  because  of  the  general  ignorance 

1  H  Morality  is  the  endeavor  to  realize  an  ideal "  (George  Harris,  Moral 
Evolution  (1896),  p.  54).  Not  to  miss  the  import  of  this  dictum  emphasis 
must  be  laid  on  the  word  w  endeavor" ;  for,  in  the  words  of  Professor  Green, 
morality  must  be  regarded  "  as  an  effort,  not  an  attainment "  (Prolegomena 
to  Ethics,  5th  ed.,  p.  301). 

2  Meditations,  tr.  Long,  xi,  18. 

8  "  There  is  nothing  more  modern  than  the  critical  spirit  which  dwells 
upon  the  difference  between  the  minds  of  men  in  one  age  and  in  another; 
which  endeavors  to  make  each  age  its  own  interpreter,  and  judge  what  il 
did  or  produced  by  a  relative  standard." — James  Bryce,  The  Holy  Roman 
Empire,  8th  ed.,  p.  261. 


INTRODUCTION  1 1 

of  the  history  of  moral  ideals  that  there  is  so  much  unchari- 
tableness  in  the  world,  so  much  intolerance,  so  much  race 
prejudice  and  hatred.  As  one's  intellectual  outlook  broadens, 
as  he  becomes  acquainted  with  the  various  types  of  goodness 
of  different  peoples  and  different  ages,  he  becomes  more  lib- 
eral and  charitable  in  his  moral  judgments,  since  he  comes 
to  understand  that  moral  character  is  determined  not  by  the 
ideal  of  conduct  but  by  the  way  in  which  this  ideal  is  lived 
up  to.  "  There  may  be  as  genuine  self-devotion,"  declares  the 
moralist  Professor  Green,  "  in  the  act  of  the  barbarian  war- 
rior who  gives  his  life  that  his  tribe  may  win  a  piece  of  land 
from  its  neighbors,  as  in  that  of  the  missionary  who  dies  in 
carrying  the  gospel  to  the  heathen."  * 

Studying  the  ideals  of  races  and  epochs  in  the  spirit  of 
these  words,  we  shall  make  some  fruitful  discoveries.  We 
shall  learn  for  one  thing  that  since  the  beginning  of  the  truly 
ethical  age  there  has  ever  been  about  the  same  degree  of  con- 
scientiousness in  the  world  ;  that  the  different  ages,  viewed  in 
respect  to  their  moral  life,  have  differed  chiefly  in  the  degree 
of  light  they  have  enjoyed,  and  consequently  in  their  concep- 
tions of  what  is  noblest  in  conduct,  of  what  constitutes  duty, 
not  in  their  fealty  or  lack  of  fealty  to  their  chosen  standard 
of  excellence.  That  is  to  say,  speaking  broadly,  the  majority 
of  men  in  every  age  and  in  every  land  have  ever  followed 
loyally  the  right  as  they  have  been  given  to  see  the  right.2 
"  If  men  and  times  were  really  understood,"  the  historian 
Von  Hoist  truly  observes,  "  the  moral  fault  of  their  follies 
and  crimes  will  almost  always  appear  diminished  by  one  half." 

1  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  5th  ed.,  p.  291. 

2  After  long  observation  of  the  life  of  the  uncivilized  races  of  Polynesia, 
Alfred  Russel  Wallace  records  as  his  opinion  that  "  savages  act  up  to  their 
simple  code  at  least  as  well  as  we  act  up  to  ours  "  ( The  Malay  Archipelago, 
vol.  i,  p.  139).  w  Many  strange  customs  and  laws  obtain  in  Zululand,  but 
there  is  no  moral  code  in  all  the  world  more  rigidly  observed  than  that  of 
the  Zulus  "  (Russell  Hastings  Millward  in  National  Geographic  Magazine 
for  March,  1909,  p.  287). 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  DAWN  OF  MORALITY:  CONSCIENCE  IN  THE 
KINSHIP  GROUP 

I.  Institutions,  Ideas,  and  Conditions  of  Life 

DETERMINING    THE    RULES    OF    CONDUCT 

The  kin-  The  most  important  social  product  of  the  human  evolution 

s  ip  group  on  ^e  lower  levels  of  civilization  was  the  patriarchal  family  or 
clan.  This  community  of  kinsfolk  is  the  great  history-making 
group.  It  was  the  seed  plot  and  nursery  not  only  of  almost 
every  social  and  political  institution  of  the  historic  peoples, 
but  of  their  morality  as  well.  In  the  bosom  of  this  group  were 
born  and  nurtured  the  chief  of  those  affections  and  sentiments 
into  which  enters  an  ethical  element  and  which  form  the  basis 
/  of  the  moral  life.1 
^  The  fundamental  bond  uniting  this  group  was  the  bond  of 
blood.  The  members  of  the  group  were,  or  believed  themselves 
to  be,  the  actual  descendants  of  a  common  ancestor.  It  was 
this  tie  of  blood,  this  physical  relationship  real  or  assumed, 
that  rendered  the  clan  such  a  closely  knit  body. and  created 
its  feeling  of  corporate  oneness.  "  The  members  of  one  kin- 
dred," says  W.  Robertson  Smith  in  describing  this  charac- 
teristic of  the  Semitic  clan,  "  looked  on  themselves  as  one  liv- 
ing whole,  a  single  animated  mass  of  blood,  flesh,  and  bones, 
of  which  no  member  could  be  touched  without  all  the  mem- 
bers suffering.  ...    If  one  of  the  clan  has  been  murdered, 

1  "  The  larger  morality  which  embraces  all  mankind  has  its  basis  in  habits 
of  loyalty,  love,  and  self-sacrifice  which  were  originally  formed  and  grew 
strong  in  the  narrow  circle  of  the  family  or  the  clan."  —  W.  Robertson 
Smith,  The  Religion  of  the  Semites,  2d  ed.,  p.  54. 

12 


THE  DAWN  OF  MORALITY  13 

they  say  '  Our  blood  has  been  shed.'  "  *  Compared  with  this 
sense  of  solidarity  as  it  is  found  among  certain  of  the  negro 
clans  in  Africa,  the  feeling  of  solidarity  of  the  family  among 
European  peoples  "  is  thin  and  feeble."2 

It  was  this  corporate  consciousness  of  the  primitive  clan 
that  created  its  moral  solidarity.  It  naturally  called  into  exist- 
ence those  altruistic  sentiments  that  formed  the  ground  out 
of  which  grew  man's  earliest  feelings  of  moral  obligation. 

There  was  a  second  bond  uniting  the  members  of  the  kin-  The  reii- 
ship  group.  They  were  united  not  only  by  the  ties  of  physical  Ancestor 
kinship  but  also  by  the  bonds  of  a  common  cult.  This  was  worshlP 
the  worship  of  ancestors.  To  realize  the  ethical  educative 
value  of  this  worship  we  must  recall  the  remarkable  constitu- 
tion of  the  clan.  This  group  of  kinsmen  has  a  visible  and  an 
invisible  side.  There  are  the  earthly  members  of  the  group 
and  the  spirit  members  —  the  souls  of  the  dead.  These 
spirit  members  are  the  protectors  of  the  little  group,  the  pun- 
ishers  of  wrongdoing,  the  conservators  of  morals.  Among 
the  most  sacred  duties  of  the  earthly  members  are  the  duties 
they  owe  to  these  spirit  members  ;  for  these  spirits  have  need 
of  many  things,  especially  of  meat  and  drink  at  the  grave,  and 
it  is  the  duty  of  their  earthly  kinsmen  to  supply  all  these  wants. 
The  earth  group  is  thus  enveloped  in  a  sort  of  sacred  atmos- 
phere, and  in  this  atmosphere  are  nurtured  those  ethical 
sentiments  which  form  the  most  precious  product  of  history. 

As  an  agency  in  the  moralizing  of  the  life  of  the  race  it 
would  be  difficult  to  exaggerate  the  importance  of  ancestor 
worship.  To  no  other  form  of  religion,  save  ethical  mono- 
theism, does  morality  owe  so  large  a  debt.  In  this  cult  religion 
and  morality  are  at  one  almost  at  the  outset,3  whereas  in 

1  The  Religion  of  the  Semites,  2d  ed.,  p.  274.  Cf.  Judges  ix.  2  ;  2  Sam.  v.  1. 

2  Dudley  Kidd,  Savage  Childhood {1906),  p.  74.  See  also  Clifford,  Lectures 
and  Essays  (1901),  vol.  ii,  p.  79,  on  the  "tribal  self." 

3  W.  Robertson  Smith,  The  Religion  of  the  Semites,  2d  ed.,  p.  267.  See 
also  Coulanges,  The  Ancient  City,  bk.  ii,  chap.  ix. 


14 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


Conceptions 
of  the 
god  world 


The  fact 
that  compe- 
tition is 
between 
communi- 
ties and  not 
between 
individuals 


nature  cults,  or  the  cults  of  nature  gods,  it  is  generally  only  at 
a  late  period  that  these  elements  are  united.  It  was  this  cult 
of  ancestors  which  formed  the  basis  of  an  essential  part  of 
the  morality  of  the  Greeks  and  Romans,  particularly  the  latter, 
at  the  first  appearance  of  these  peoples  in  history,  and  which 
to-day,  as  the  chief  religion  of  the  Chinese,  Japanese,  and 
other  peoples  of  the  Far  East,  fosters  the  best  virtues  of  a 
third  of  the  human  race. 

Another  influence  determining  the  moral  code  of  primitive 
man  is  his  ideas  of  the  god  world.  It  is  true  that  the  con- 
ceptions formed  of  the  gods  by  the  untutored  mind  are  for 
the  most  part  crude  and  unethical.  But  man  ever  makes  and 
remakes  his  gods  in  his  own  image ;  therefore  as  soon  as  an 
ethical  element  begins  to  enter  into  his  own  life  he  begins  to 
moralize  the  character  of  his  gods.  At  this  stage  the  god  world 
begins  to  react  favorably  upon  the  moral  life  of  man.  The  gods 
are  now  conceived  as  taking  notice  of  the  conduct  of  men  and 
as  approving  certain  acts  as  right  and  disapproving  certain 
other  acts  as  wrong.  Especially  are  they  believed  to  punish 
atrocious  crimes,  such  as  the  slaying  of  a  kinsman  and  the 
breaking  of  the  word  sworn  by  the  oath-god.  In  this  way  primi- 
tive man's  ideas  of  deity  react  favorably  upon  his  morality. 

The  gods  further  advance  morality  by  being  invoked  as  the 
witnesses  and  guardians  of  treaties  between  clans  and  tribes. 
By  thus  giving  an  added  sanctity  to  solemn  engagements 
mutually  entered  into  by  communities  they  widen  the  moral 
domain  and  become  the  promoters  of  intertribal  morality.1 

In  nothing  perhaps  does  primitive  society  differ  more 
widely  from  modern  than  in  the  fact  that  the  competition 

1  Before  this  stage  in  civilization  has  been  reached,  religion  is  a  hindrance 
to  the  widening  of  the  moral  sympathies  ;  for  in  earlier  stages  "  a  man  is 
held  answerable  to  his  god  [only]  for  wrong  done  to  a  member  of  his  own 
kindred  or  political  community ;  ...  he  may  deceive,  rob,  or  kill  an  alien 
without  offense  to  religion ;  the  deity  cares  only  for  his  own  kinsfolk " 
(W.  Robertson  Smith,  The  Religion  of  the  Semites,  2d  ed.,  pp.  53  f.). 


THE  DAWN  OF  MORALITY  1 5 

or  struggle  for  existence  is  between  communities  and  not 
between  individuals.  Within  the  kinship  group  life  is  almost 
wholly  communistic.  There  is  practically  no  competition  be- 
tween the  individuals  of  the  community  such  as  characterizes 
societies  advanced  in  civilization.  The  only  real  competi- 
tion is  that  between  communities.  And  here  the  struggle  for 
existence  or  for  superiority  is  generally  habitual  and  ruthless, 
often  being  carried  to  the  point  of  the  complete  destruction 
of  one  of  the  competing  communities. 

These  conditions  of  existence  have  vast  significance  for 
morality.  Just  as  the  individual  competition  in  cultured  so- 
cieties molds  an  essential  part  of  their  moral  code,  so  does 
the  group  competition  of  races  still  in  the  clan  or  tribal  stage 
of  civilization  determine  what  qualities  of  character  shall  be 
developed  among  them.  As  we  shall  see  in  a  moment,  it 
makes  them  strong  in  the  clan  virtues. 

II.  Essential  Facts  of  Kinship  or  Intratribal 
Morality 

As  students  of  morals  our  chief  interest  in  primeval  man  The  life  of 
as  he  emerges  from  the  obscurity  of  prehistoric  times  is  not  peoples 
concerning  the  degree  of  skill  he  has  developed  in  making  J2E£ai 
his  weapons  or  in  constructing  for  himself  a  shelter,  nor 
concerning  what  advance  he  has  made  in  the  arts  of  weaving 
and  pottery,  nor  yet  concerning  what  kind  of  social  arrange- 
ments he  has  worked  out ;  our  main  interest  in  this  primeval 
man  as  he  appears  on  the  threshold  of  the  historic  day  is  not 
concerning  these  or  any  like  things,  but  rather  respecting  what 
kind  of  a  conscience  has  grown  up  within  him  during  those 
long  prehistoric  ages  of  struggle,  privation,  watch  and  ward. 

The  first  fact  that  compels  our  notice  here  is  that  the  life 
of  the  savage  is  largely  unmoral.1    His  activities  to  secure 

1  It  should  be  carefully  noted  that  this  is  very  different  from  saying  that 
his  life  is  immoral.  To  pronounce  it  immoral  would  be  like  pronouncing 
immoral  the  life  of  the  child,  in  whom  the  sense  of  right  and  wrong  has 


i6 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


The  "good- 
ness "  of 
uncivilized 
races 
largely  a 
negative 
goodness 


food,  shelter,  and  clothing  arise  from  purely  animal  impulses, 
such  as  hunger  and  cold.  Into  all  of  these  activities,  how- 
ever, there  enters  as  time  passes  an  ethical  element.1  The 
economic  life,  in  a  word,  comes  more  and  more  under  the 
dominance  of  moral  feelings  and  motives.2  Conscience  be- 
comes more  and  more  involved  in  all  these  matters.  This 
gradual  moralization  of  these  at  first  nonmoral  activities  of 
primitive  man  constitutes  one  of  the  most  important  phases 
of  the  moral  evolution  of  the  race. 

A  second  fact  in  the  moral  life  of  savages  that  claims  our 
attention  is  that  much  that  is  counted  unto  them  for  "  good- 
ness "  is  a  purely  negative  goodness.  Failure  in  discrimina- 
tion here  often  results  in  a  wrong  estimate  of  their  morality 
as  compared  with  that  of  advanced  communities.  Thus  in 
portraying  the  manners  and  customs  of  primitive  peoples, 
some  writers,  like  Tacitus  in  his  account  of  the  early  Ger- 
man folk,  laud  their  morals  as  superior  to  those  of  civilized 
men.  This  opinion  is  based  rather  on  the  absence  among 
such  peoples  of  the  usual  vices  and  crimes  of  civilized  so- 
cieties than  on  the  practice  by  them  of  the  higher  positive 
virtues.3  But  the  absence  of  the  vices  which  characterize 
civilization  is  to  be  explained,  of  course,  by  the  simpler  organ- 
ization of  society  and  the  fewer  temptations  to  wrongdoing. 

not  yet  arisen.  The  savage  is  a  child  not  only  in  intellect  but  also  in  moral 
feeling.  As  Bagehot  says,  "  We  may  be  certain  that  the  morality  of  pre- 
historic man  was  as  imperfect  and  as  rudimentary  as  his  reason  "  {Physics 
and  Politics  (1873),  P-  I:5)- 

1  "At  the  beginning  of  the  developmental  series  stands  the  bare  animal 
impulse,  stripped  of  all  moral  motives  ;  at  the  end  we  have  the  complete 
interpenetration  of  organic  requirement  and  moral  idea."  —  Wundt,  Ethics : 
the  Facts  of  the  Moral  Life  (1908),  p.  191. 

2  See  II,  The  Ethics  of  Industrialism,  Chapter  XVIII. 

8  Respecting  certain  Brazilian  tribes  the  naturalist  Bates  remarks  :  "The 
goodness  of  these  Indians,  like  that  of  most  others  amongst  whom  I  lived, 
consisted  perhaps  more  in  the  absence  of  active  bad  qualities  than  in  the 
possession  of  good  ones  ;  in  a  word,  it  was  negative  rather  than  positive  " 
{The  Naturalist  on  the  River  Amazon).  Cf.  Edward  Howard  Griggs,  The 
New  Humanism,  6th  ed.,  pp.  103  f. 


THE  DAWN  OF  MORALITY  17 

Thus  the  single  circumstance  that  the  institution  of  individual 
property  has  not  yet  come  into  existence,  or  at  least  has  not  as 
yet  received  any  great  extension,  accounts  for  the  comparative 
absence  of  crimes  against  property,  which  constitute  probably 
the  greater  number  of  criminal  acts  in  civilized  society. 

But  notwithstanding  that  so  much  of  the  life  of  primitive  The  true 
man  is  lived  on  the  nonmoral  plane,  and  that  much  which  is  pfatafthe 
reckoned  unto  him  for  goodness  is  merely  negative  goodness,  etniclude- 
still  in  certain  of  his  activities  growing  out  of  his  clan  rela-  veiopment 
tionships  we  discover  the  beginnings  of  all  human  morality. 
For  as  we  have  already  said,  the  true  starting  point  of  the 
moral  evolution  of  mankind  is  to  be  sought  in  the  altruistic 
sentiments  nourished  in  the  atmosphere  of  the  kinship  group. 
There  is  scarcely  an  ethical  sentiment  which  does  not  appear 
here  at  least  in  a  rudimentary  form.  Out  of  the  most  sacred 
and  intimate  relationships  of  the  group  we  find  springing  up 
the  maternal  virtues  of  patience,  tenderness,  and  self-denial,1 
and  the  filial  virtues  of  love,  obedience,  and  reverence ;  out 
of  the  fellowship  of  the  men  in  hunting  and  in  war 2  we  see 
developing  the  manly  virtues  of  courage,  fortitude,  self-control, 
and,  above  all,  self-devotion  to  the  common  good  ;  out  of  the 
hearth  worship  of  ancestors  3  we  observe  springing  up  many 
of  those  religious-ethical  feelings  and  sentiments  which  form 
one  of  the  chief  moral  forces  in  civilization  ;  out  of  the  sac- 
rificial meal  shared  with  the  gods  and  the  spirits  of  the  dead 
through  offerings  of  portions  of  the  food  and  drink,  we  see 

1  For  the  relation  of  motherhood  and  infancy  to  the  beginnings  of  mo- 
rality, see  Fiske,  Cosmic  Philosophy  (1875),  v°l-  u>  PP-  34°  ^* 

2  "  The  spring  of  virtuous  action  is  the  social  instinct,  which  is  set  to 
work  by  the  practice  of  comradeship."  —  Clifford,  Lectitres  and  Essays 
(1901),  vol.  ii,  p.  253.  Cf.  Peabody,  The  Approach  to  the  Social  Question 
(1909),  p.  149. 

8  "  This  family  worship  (long-forgotten  precursor  of  our  modern  family 
prayers)  was  always  offered  to  the  ancestors  at  the  domestic  hearth."  — 
Helen  Bosanquet,  The  Family  (1906),  p.  18.  Cf.  Wundt,  Ethics :  the  Facts 
of  the  Moral  Life  (1908),  p.  171. 


18 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


Custom  as 
the  maker 
of  group 
morality 


Collective 
responsi- 
bility 


forming  customs  of  incalculable  moral  value  in  the  ethical 
training  of  the  race.1  A  great  part  of  the  history  of  morals 
consists  in  the  record  of  how  these  earliest  forms  of  social 
virtues,  first  nourished  by  the  customs,  habits,  and  practices  of , 
the  kinship  group,  have  been  gradually  refined  and  developed 
into  wider  and  richer  forms  of  ethical  sentiment  and  feeling. 

There  is  one  special  feature  of  this  germinal  morality  to 
which  our  attention  must  now  be  directed.  It  is  what  is  often 
called  customary  morality.  That  is  to  say,  the  standard  of 
right  and  wrong  in  the  kinship  community  is  custom.  Cus- 
tom is  the  lawgiver,  and  morality  consists  in  following  custom. 
The  individual,  in  a  word,  follows  the  tribal  or  group  con- 
science rather  than  the  dictates  of  his  own  conscience.  Indeed 
there  is  practically  no  such  thing  here  as  a  private  conscience. 
Individualism  has  not  yet  arisen.  No  one  ordinarily  has  private 
notions  of  right  and  wrong  which  he  feels  impelled  to  set  up 
against  the  immemorial  customs  and  usages  of  the  community.2 

But  there  is  really  nothing  in  this  fact  which  sets  this  nascent 
morality  apart  from  our  own.  It  differs  from  ours  not  in  kind 
but  only  in  degree.  The  morality  of  the  masses  is  still  largely 
customary  morality.  Most  persons  in  their  social  relations,  in 
business,  and  in  religion,  follow  unthinkingly  the  tribal  con- 
science, that  is,  the  conventional  morality  of  the  society  of  which 
they  are  members,  rather  than  their  own  individual  sense  of  right 
and  wrong.  "Reflective  morality"  is  still  the  morality  of  the 
few.  The  ever-renewed  moral  task  of  man  is  to  change  the  cus- 
tomary tribal  conscience  into  a  reflective  individual  conscience. 

There  is  still  another  phase  of  the  incipient  morality  of 
the  kinship  group  which  claims  our  attention  because  of  its 

1  The  blessing  offered  at  the  daily  family  meal  is  presumptively  a  survival 
from  the  consecrated  communal  meal  of  the  primitive  kinship  group. 

2  When  such  an  individual  arises  he  becomes,  if  circumstances  favor, 
a  lawgiver,  and  the  age  of  law  supersedes  the  age  of  custom.  Morality  now 
consists  in  obedience  to  the  law. 


THE  DAWN  OF  MORALITY  19 

significance  for  the  history  of  the  evolution  of  morals.  It  is 
a  group  morality,  that  is,  a  morality  based  on  the  idea  of  col- 
lective responsibility. 

This  conception  presents  one  of  the  most  striking  phenom- 
ena in  the  history  of  the  moral  evolution  of  mankind.  Among 
peoples  in  the  earlier  stages  of  moral  development  the  family 
or  clan  group  rather  than  the  individual  is  regarded  as  the  ethi- 
cal unit,  and  the  act  of  any  member  of  this  group,  when  such 
act  concerns  a  member  or  members  of  another  social  group, 
is  looked  upon  as  the  act  of  the  whole  body  to  which  he  be- 
longs.1   For  the  wrongdoing  of  one  all  are  held  responsible.2 

This  group  morality,  with  which  the  true  history  of  the  un- 
folding moral  consciousness  of  the  race  begins,  we  shall  meet 
with  as  a  sort  of  survival  in  every  stage  of  the  moral  progress 
of  humanity  from  the  lowest  to  the  highest  level  of  culture. 
V  It  is,"  in  the  words  of  Hobhouse,  "one  of  the  dominant 
facts,  if  not  the  dominant  fact,  ethically  considered,  in  the 
evolution  of  human  society." 3  The  account  of  that  slow 
change  in  the  moral  consciousness  of  man  which  has  gradu- 
ally caused  group  morality,  in  most  spheres  of  life  and  thought, 
to  give  place  to  individual  morality,  that  is,  to  that  conception 
of  moral  responsibility  which  holds  every  man  responsible  for 
his  own  act,  and  only  for  his  own  act,  makes  up  one  of  the 
most  instructive  chapters  in  the  moral  history  of  the  world.4 

1  Westermarck,  The  Origin  and  Development  of  the  Moral  Ideas  (1906), 
vol.  i,  chap,  ii,  and  passim. 

2  M  In  early  times  the  solidarity  of  the  kinship  is  such  that  it  does  not 
occur  to  the  individual  to  regard  as  unjust  a  suffering  which  he  endures  in 
behalf  of,  or  along  with,  his  people."  —  Edward  Caird,  The  Evolution  of 
Religion  (1894),  p.  2,7- 

3  Hobhouse,  Morals  in  Evolution  (1906),  vol.  i,  p.  283. 

4  The  system  of  collective  responsibility  arises  in  part,  it  is  true,  from 
the  belief  that  sin  is  contagious  and  infects  all  persons  related  to  the  trans- 
gressor. Therefore  the  innocent  members  of  the  family  or  group  of  the 
transgressor  may  be  put  out  of  the  way  as  a  merely  preventive  measure  — 
riot  as  a  measure  of  justice  or  punishment.  But  the  ethical  element  is  seldom 
or  never  absent  and  it  is  this  which  gives  the  conception  its  importance  for 
the  student  of  morals. 


20  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS, 

We  shall  find  significant  survivals  of  this  idea  of  collective 
responsibility,  particularly  in  the  religious  domain.  In  truth, 
a  large  part  of  religious  history  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than 
an  account  of  the  influence  and  outworkings  of  this  notion. 
Men  making  their  gods  like  unto  themselves  have  imagined 
them  as  acting  on  this  principle  of  communal  responsibility, 
and  as  bringing  upon  a  whole  people  pestilence,  famine,  war, 
or  other  calamity  in  revenge  or  punishment  for  some  neglect 
in  worship  or  act  of  sacrilege  on  the  part  of  perhaps  a  single 
member  of  the  tribe  or  nation. 

By  the  early  Fathers  of  the  Church  this  idea  of  collective 
responsibility,  embodied  in  the  doctrine  of  the  imputation  of 
the  guilt  of  the  transgression  of  the  first  man  Adam  to  all 
his  descendants  to  the  end  of  the  world,  was  given  a  promi- 
nent place  in  Christian  theology  and  has  been  a  great  force 
in  molding  the  morality  of  the  Western  world. 

Again,  we  find  this  idea  of  group  morality  embodied  in  the 
war  ethics  of  the  modern  nations,  which,  regarded  from  one 
point  of  view,  is  largely  group  ethics,  that  is  to  say,  the  sur- 
vival in  the  domain  of  international  relations  of  ethical  ideas 
that  had  their  birth  on  the  low  intellectual  and  moral  levels 
of  barbarism. 

As  we  follow  the  upward  trend  of  the  lines  of  the  moral 
evolution  of  the  race  we  shall  hear  louder  and  louder  protests 
against  this  notion  of  communal  responsibility,  especially 
when  this  form  of  human  morality  has  been  transferred  to 
the  heavens  and  made  a  fundamental  principle  of  the  divine 
government. 

The  duty  of       In  primitive  society  if  a  man  slay  a  kinsman,  he  is  pun- 

revenue  * 

the  blood      ished  by  outlawry,  that  is,  by  expulsion  from  the  family  or 


feud 


clan.1   The  story  of  Cain,  the  first  murderer  of  a  kinsman  in 

1  w  Outlawry  from  the  clan  is  the  most  effective  of  all  weapons,  because 
in  primitive  society  the  exclusion  of  a  man  from  his  kinsfolk  means  he  is 
delivered  over  to  the  first  comer  absolutely  without  protection."  —  Hob- 
housk,  Morals  in  Evolution  (1906),  vol.  i,  p.  90. 


THE  DAWN  OF  MORALITY  21 


Hebrew  legend,  is  typical.1  If,  however,  a  member  of  a  clan 
is  slain  by  an  outsider,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  nearest  kinsman 
of  the  person  killed,  or  of  the  collective  body  of  his  kinsfolk, 
to  kill  in  revenge  the  slayer  or  some  relative  of  his.2  To 
ignore  this  obligation  or  to  forgive  the  slayer  of  one's  kinsman 
is  regarded  as  base  and  cowardly. 

As,  through  the  advance  of  society,  the  ties  of  the  clan 
become  relaxed  and  this  group  becomes  more  and  more  per- 
fectly merged  with  the  larger  group  of  the  tribe  or  state  of 
which  it  has  become  a  part,  and  justice  comes  to  be  adminis- 
tered by  the  tribal  head  or  by  regular  tribunals,  then  blood  re- 
venge on  the  part  of  the  kinsmen  of  the  slain  gradually  ceases 
to  be  a  duty  and  private  vengeance  becomes  a  crime.  But  this 
is  a  slow  evolution,  and  within  societies  far  advanced  in  civi- 
lization we  often  find  belated  groups  still  following  with  good 
conscience  the  ancient  custom  of  blood  revenge.  The  vendetta 
in  Italy  and  the  feud  in  some  sections  of  our  Southern  states  3 
are  survivals  or  degenerate  forms  of  this  primitive  virtue. 

Closely  related  to  the  punishment  of  homicide  in  primitive  The  Lex 
society  is  punishment  of  lesser  offenses,  especially  the  inflic-  tahonts 
tion  of  bodily  injury,  within  the  social  group.  Here,  too,  pri- 
vate vengeance  rules.  The  person  wronged  or  injured  inflicts 
such  punishment  upon  the  offender  as  passion  or  resentment 
may  dictate.  As  time  passes,  however,  and  the  sense  of  jus- 
tice grows  more  discriminating,  there  are  limits  set  to  this  pri- 
vate vengeance.  There  is  established  what  is  called  the  rule 
of  equivalence.  The  avenger  is  not  allowed  to  wreak  upon 
the  offender  indiscriminate  and  unmeasured  punishment,  but 

1  Gen.  iv.  13,  14. 

2  M  Blood  atonement  .  .  .  was  one  of  the  very  earliest  cases  we  can  find 
in  which  there  was  a  notion  of  duty  and  social  obligation."  —  Sumner,  Folk- 
ways (1907),  p.  506. 

3  M  It  [the  feud]  is  the  Southern  sense  of  the  solidarity  of  the  family  in 
opposition  to  extreme  Northern  individualism."  —  Wines,  Punishment  and 
Reformation  (1895),  p.  33. 


22  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

is  restricted  to  the  infliction  upon  him  of  exactly  such  injury 

and  pain  as  he  has  inflicted  upon  his  victim.    Hence  arose 

the  Lex  talionis,  limb  for  limb,  eye  for  eye,  and  tooth  for 

tooth.1    This  regulation  thus  registers  an  advance  in  moral 

feeling,  and  may  be  regarded  as  probably  the  first  rule  of  the 

criminal  code  of  the  nations. 

The  virtue        In  early  society  those  virtues  are  most  highly  esteemed 

toartnS-'  which  are  of  service  to  the  clan  or  tribe.    Thus  courage 

tic  element  comes  to  f^d  a  first  pjace  am0ng  the  virtues.    What  is 

especially  important  to  be  noted  here  is  that  under  courage 
is  hidden  the  virtue  of  self-sacrifice,  which  we  give  the  high- 
est place  in  our  ideal  of  character.  It  is  this  altruistic  element 
in  courage  which  lends  to  it  its  real  ethical  quality.  In  prim- 
itive society  this  virtue  finds  expression  chiefly  in  the  ready 
self-devotion  of  the  individual  in  battle  for  the  common  good. 
Throughout  pagan  antiquity  this  virtue  held  a  central  place 
in  practically  every  ideal  of  excellence.  In  the  wosds  of 
Robertson  Smith,  "  This  devotion  to  the  common  weal  was, 
as  every  one  knows,  the  mainspring  of  ancient  morality  and 
the  source  of  all  the  heroic  virtues  of  which  ancient  history 
presents  so  many  illustrious  examples."  2 

III.    The  Beginnings  of  Intertribal  Morality 

Primitive         The  accounts  given  by  travelers  and  observers  of  the  morals 

double         of  savages  often  present  a  perplexing  contrariety  of  opinion. 

morality  °f  Some  writers  represent  such  people  as  absolutely  without  a 

moral  sense,  while  others,  as  has  already  been  remarked,  hold 

them  up  as  models  for  imitation  by  ourselves. 

This  contrariety  in  view  results  in  part  from  an  overlook- 
ing of  the  fact,  just  pointed  out,  that  the  moral  goodness  of 

1  On  the  Lex  talionis  consult  Westermarck,  The  Origin  and  Development 
of  the  Moral  Ideas  (1906),  vol.  i,  pp.  177  ff . ;  Hobhouse,  Morals  in  Evohition 
(1906),  vol.  i,  pp.  84  ff. ;  Spencer,  Principles  of  Ethics  (1892),  vol.  i,  pp.  369  ff. 
The  principle  embodied  in  the  Lex  talionis  has  played  a  large  part  in  the 
jurisprudence  of  all  peoples. 

2  The  Religion  of  the  Semites  (1894),  p.  267. 


THE  DAWN  OF  MORALITY  23 

the  savage  is  largely  a  negative  goodness,  but  chiefly  from  a 
failure  to  observe  that  the  shield  has  two  sides,  that  is  to  say, 
that  savages  have  a  double  standard  of  morality  —  one  stand- 
ard regulating  conduct  within  the  social  group,  and  another 
regulating  conduct  toward  outsiders.  Thus  the  command, 
"  Thou  shalt  not  kill,"  means  to  the  savage  merely  that  he 
shall  not  kill  a  kinsman.  It  has  in  his  mind  no  application  to 
strangers,  just  as  in  our  minds  it  has  no  application  to  animals. 

It  is  the  same  in  regard  to  lying.  Savages  in  general  have 
a  high  regard  for  truthfulness,  as  they  understand  this  virtue. 
The  plighted  word  among  them  is  probably  as  sacredly  kept 
as  by  the  average  of  civilized  men.1  The  repute  of  many 
savage  folk  for  untruthfulness  comes  about  from  the  fact  that 
they  do  not  think  that  a  stranger  has  any  right  to  the  truth. 
M  Among  themselves,"  writes  Professor  Starr  of  certain  Congo 
tribes,  "  lying  is  not  commended  and  truth  is  appreciated  ;  but 
to  deceive  a  stranger  or  a  white  man  is  commendable."  2 

And  so  it  is  with  stealing.  Many  uncivilized  peoples  are 
charged,  and  in  a  certain  sense  rightly,  with  making  of  theft 
a  virtue.  But  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  to  the  savage  all 
persons  not  members  of  his  own  group  are  strangers  and 
enemies.  To  steal  from  such  is  looked  upon  as  a  most 
praiseworthy  exploit,  while  to  steal  from  the  members  of 
one's  own  group  is  regarded  as  a  crime.3 

Now  the  important  thing  to  note  here  is  that  this  double  This  dual 
morality  is  not  something  peculiar  to  the  ethics  of  savages,  turvivaiin 


civilization 


1  Seeck  (Geschichte  des  Untergangs  der  antiken  Welt  (1901),  Bd.  i,  S.  200) 
reminds  us  how  the  ancient  German  player  when  he  had  lost  in  a  game 
where  the  stake  was  his  own  liberty,  honorably  gave  himself  up  as  the  slave 
of  the  winner.  2  The  Truth  about  the  Congo  (1907),  p.  29. 

3  "  Throughout  tribal  life  the  stranger  is  a  menace ;  he  is  a  being  to  be 
plundered  because  he  is  a  being  who  plunders.  .  .  .  Native  houses  are  often 
left  for  days  or  weeks,  and  it  would  be  easy  for  any  one  to  enter  and  rob 
them.  Yet  robbery  among  themselves  is  not  common.  To  steal,  however, 
from  a  white  employer  ...  is  no  sin."  —  Starr,  The  Truth  about  the  Congo 
(1907),  pp.  28  f. 


24  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

This  dualism  runs  through  the  whole  moral  history  of  the 
race,  from  the  beginning  to  the  present  day,  and  constitutes 
one  of  the  most  important  facts  in  the  moral  evolution  of 
humanity.  We  too,  like  the  savage,  have  our  double  standard 
of  morality.  The  chief  difference  between  us  and  the  savage 
is  this :  he  puts  his  double  standard  in  practice  all  the  time, 
we  only  occasionally.  On  occasion  we  fling  aside  our  ordinary 
standard  of  morality,  lift  the  savage's  war  standard,  and  then 
like  the  savage  lie  and  steal  and  kill  —  outside  the  tribe.  To 
deceive  the  stranger  now  is  commendable  ;  to  steal  from  him 
proper  and  right ;  to  kill  him  a  glorious  exploit. 

The  great  task  of  this  century  is  to  put  an  end  to  this 
scandal  of  civilization,  to  teach  men  the  oneness  and  univer- 
sality of  the  moral  law,  to  get  them  to  understand  that  right 
and  wrong  are  right  and  wrong  everywhere — ^outside  the 
tribe  as  well  as  within. 

The  history  of  intertribal  or  international  morality,  then,  is 
the  record  of  its  gradual  assimilation  to  intratribal  morality.1 
It  is  a  record  of  how  the  stranger,  the  outsider,  has  come,  or 
is  coming,  to  be  regarded  as  a  kinsman,  as  a  neighbor. 

Hospitality,      The  duty  of  hospitality,  to  which  a  high  place  is  assigned 

orthe guest    .       .  .  ■'  .     5.         '       .  .  °      ..  .  .  & 

right;  the  in  the  code  of  primitive  peoples,  shows  morality  taking  a  step, 
beyond*  tne  first  steP>  beyond  the  narrow  circle  of  the  original  group 
morality  a  °^  kinsmen.  As  we  have  seen,  in  the  beginning  the  feeling 
of  duty  and  obligation  is  restricted  to  the  little  group  of  fellow 
clansmen  or  tribesmen."  Every  one  outside  this  social  circle 
is  an  enemy,  and  is  without  rights.  But  necessity  forces  men 
to  go  beyond  the  limits  of  their  own  clan  or  tribe,  and  in  time 
there  grows  up  a  rule  that  the  defenseless  stranger  shall  be 
kindly  received,  entertained  for  a  certain  period,  and  then 
allowed  to  depart  unharmed.    It  is  easy  to  see  how  among 

1  See  VI,  International  Ethics :  the  New  International  Conscience,  in 
Chapter  XVIII. 

2  On  this  subject  see  Westermarck,  The  Origin  and  Development  of  the 
Moral  Ideas  (1906),  vol.  i,  chap,  xxiv,  "  Hospitality." 


war 


THE  DAWN  OF  MORALITY  25 

clans  scattered  thinly  over  a  wide  territory,  and  where  the 
earlier  isolation  is  beginning  to  be  broken  by  trade  relations, 
this  duty  of  hospitality  should  come  to  be  regarded  as  a  very 
sacred  one,  and  the  person  of  the  stranger  guest  as  inviolable.1 
Thus  in  the  development  of  the  guest  right  we  see  mo- 
rality broadening,  the  circle  of  moral  obligation  enlarged,  and 
the  stranger,  ordinarily  counted  as  an  enemy  and  as  rightless, 
brought  for  a  moment  within  the  sacred  pale  of  ethical  senti- 
ment and  duty.2  A  new  ground  of  moral  obligation  other 
than  that  of  kinship  has  been  established.  Morality  is  now 
something  more  than  clan  morality.  We  witness  the  rise  of 
intertribal  morality.  The  first  step  in  the  moral  unification 
of  the  human  race  has  been  taken. 

Even  in  the  domain  of  war  we  discover  traces  of  the  Beginnings 
awakening  of  an  intertribal  conscience  in  races  that  are  ethics  of 
still  in  what  we  may  regard  as  the  kinship  stage  of  culture. 
Speaking  broadly,  primitive  man,  whose  chief  occupations 
are  hunting  and  fighting,3  makes  no  distinction  between  war 
and  the  hunt.  All  persons  not  belonging  to  his  own  group 
are  regarded  by  him  just  as  he  regards  wild  game.  In  his 
efforts  to  kill  or  capture  them,  all  means  are  right.  Once  in 
his  power,  he  may  do  with  them  as  he  likes ;  he  may  make 

1  Speaking  of  the  duty  of  hospitality  among  the  early  Greeks,  Farnell 
says,  M  The  sanctity  of  the  stranger  guest  .  .  .  was  almost  as  great  as  the 
sanctity  of  the  kinsman's  life"  {The  Cults  of  the  Greek  States  (1896),  vol.  i, 

P-  73)- 

2  Without  doubt  other  feelings  and  conceptions  than  purely  ethical  ones 
are  sometimes  operative  in  the  case  of  the  guest  right.  The  stranger  may 
be  kindly  treated  because  of  superstitious  fears.  Thus  the  primitive  man's 
notions  of  magic  and  sorcery  may  cause  him  to  be  hospitable  to  the  stranger 
through  fear  of  the  consequences  of  a  refusal,  since  untutored  people  are 
apt  to  attribute  magical  powers  to  the  stranger.  See  Westermarck,  The 
Origin  and  Development  of  the  Moral  Ideas  (1906),  vol.  i,  chap.  xxiv. 

3  Among  some  uncivilized  peoples,  however,  where  the  population  is 
thin  and  there  is  little  competition  wars  are  unknown.  "  To  the  Green- 
lander  .  .  .  war  is  incomprehensible  and  repulsive,  a  thing  for  which  their 
language  has  no  word"  (Westermarck,  The  Origin  and  Development  of  the 
Moral  Ideas  (1906),  vol.  i,  p.  334). 


26  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

slaves  of  them,  he  may  torture  them,  or  he  may  eat  their 
flesh  as  he  would  that  of  animals  taken  in  the  chase.  Con- 
science lays  upon  him  not  the  least  restraint.  Only  slowly  do 
the  moral  feelings  make  conquests  in  this  province. 

One  of  the  earliest  mitigations  of  the  barbarities  of  primi- 
tive warfare  is  probably  to  be  found  in  the  discontinuance  of 
the  practice  of  eating  the  bodies  of  the  slain.1  It  is  this  prac- 
tice of  cannibalism  as  a  concomitant  of  war  by  peoples  in  the 
earlier  stages  of  their  development  that  perhaps  more  than 
any  other  circumstance  gives  such  a  repellent  aspect  to  human 
life  on  the  lower  levels  of  culture.  But  as  Montaigne  observes, 
the  wrong  consists  in  killing  men,  not  in  eating  them  after 
they  are  dead2 — a  very  just  observation,  and  one  which  should 
awaken  reflection  in  us  who,  while  piously  abstaining  from 
eating  our  enemies,  still  persist  in  killing  them. 

The  discontinuance  of  the  practice  of  cannibalism  —  the 
practice  seems  invariably  to  be  left  behind  by  all  peoples  as 
soon  as  they  have  made  any  considerable  advance  in  civiliza- 
tion 3  —  may  with  little  hesitation  be  attributed  in  part  at  least 

1  Cannibalism  springs  from  several  roots.  Sometimes  savages  eat  the 
body  of  the  enemy  slain  in  battle  because  they  believe  that  thereby  they 
destroy  the  soul  or  double  and  thus  secure  themselves  against  its  vengeance. 
Again  the  custom  grows  out  of  the  belief  that  the  virtues  of  the  victim  pass 
into  him  who  eats  the  flesh.  But  the  most  common  motive  is  the  subsistence 
motive.  Indeed,  many  of  the  incessant  wars  waged  by  primitive  tribes  are 
nothing  more  nor  less  than  man-hunting  expeditions  for  securing  food. 
Later  these  expeditions  became  raids  for  securing  slaves. 

2  Quoted  by  Letourneau,  La  guerre  dans  les  diverses  races  humaines 
(1895),  P-  vi- 

3  Often  we  find  vestiges  of  the  abandoned  practice  in  what  may  be  called 
celestial  cannibalism  (see  W.  Robertson  Smith,  The  Religion  of  the  Semites 
(1894),  p.  224).  Thus  the  god  of  war  of  the  Mexican  Aztecs  and  the  gods 
of  many  Polynesian  tribes  were  cannibals,  for  human  sacrifices  must  be 
regarded  as  a  sort  of  celestial  cannibalism,  when  the  offering  is  made  in 
the  belief  that  the  god  actually  repasts  on  the  blood  and  the  finer  essences 
of  the  sacrificial  victim.  Where  men  have  thus  made  their  gods  like  unto 
themselves,  and  the  practice  of  cannibalism  has  been  consecrated  by  reli- 
gion, the  gods,  because  religion  is  always  conservative,  are  certain  to  remain 
anthropophagi  much  longer  than  their  worshipers.    Consequently  we  find 


THE  DAWN  OF  MORALITY  27 

to  the  growth  and  refinement  of  the  moral  feelings.  In  one 
case  at  least  we  have  historical  evidence  that  among  a  wide 
reach  of  savage  tribes  the  custom  was  abolished  by  the  action 
of  a  more  civilized  people,  who  did  just  what  the  more  ad- 
vanced European  nations,  under  the  impulsion  of  moral 
feeling,  are  doing  in  regard  to  the  slave  trade  and  cannibal- 
ism in  Africa  to-day.  The  Incas  of  Peru,  before  granting  to 
conquered  tribes  terms  of  peace,  forced  them  to  abandon  the 
practice  of  cannibalism.1 

The  disuse  of  poisoned  arrows  marks  another  significant 
mitigation  of  a  common  barbarity  of  early  warfare.  We  know 
that  in  the  Greek  world  by  the  opening  of  the  historic  period 
there  were  communities  that  had  come  to  look  on  the  use  of 
poisoned  weapons  with  abhorrence,  and  to  regard  the  practice 
as  a  crime  that  aroused  the  anger  of  the  gods.  Thus  Homer 
represents  Ilus  of  Ephyra,  when  asked  by  Odysseus  for  the 
fatal  poison  wherewith  to  smear  the  tips  of  his  arrows,  as  re- 
fusing his  request  because  he  feared  the  immortal  gods.2 

In  these  mitigations  and  prohibitions  of  the  barbarities  of 
war  on  the  lower  levels  of  savagery  we  have  probably  the 
earliest  articles  of  the  war  code  of  the  nations.  They  mark 
the  first  steps  taken  in  the  humanization  of  war.  They  indi- 
cate the  birth  of  those  sympathetic  and  moral  feelings  which, 
though  of  painfully  slow  growth  and  of  intermittent  action, 
have  during  the  course  of  the  historic  ages  effected  great 
ameliorations  of  the  cruelties  of  primitive  warfare,  and  fore- 
shadow a  time  when  war  between  civilized  nations  shall  have 
become  an  inconceivable  thing. 

There  is  a  heart  of  good  in  things  evil.   Even  the  habitual  The  reac- 
intertribal  wars  of  primitive  communities  contain  a  germ  of  intertribal 

upon  intra- 
human  sacrifices  still  lingering  on  as  a  kind  of  survival  among  peoples,  as,         a!t 
for  instance,  the  Mexicans,  who  have  themselves  left  far  behind  the  practice 
of  eating  human  flesh. 

1  Letourneau,  La  guerre  dans  les  diverses  races  humaines  (1895),  p.  185. 

2  Od.  i.  260. 


28  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

good.  The  pressure  exerted  by  these  life-and-death  struggles 
upon  the  clan  or  tribe  has  a  good  effect  upon  the  inner  rela- 
tionships of  the  group.  Many  of  the  social  virtues,  such  as 
loyalty  to  comrades  and  self-devotion  to  the  common  weal, 
are  called  into  constant  and  keen  activity.  For  this  reason 
we  usually  find  these  social  virtues  well  developed  among 
peoples  in  the  clan  or  tribal  stage  of  civilization.  Such  peoples 
may  even  be  stronger  in  these  special  virtues  than  civilized 
peoples. 

But  there  is  another  side  to  this.  Intertribal  wars,  though 
they  may  in  the  very  earliest  stages  of  human  culture  be  posi- 
tively promotive  of  some  of  the  social  virtues,  in  later  and 
more  advanced  stages  exert  a  decidedly  unfavorable  influ- 
ence upon  the  moral  development.  The  low  backward  stand- 
ard of  intertribal  ethics,  reacting  upon  the  higher  and  more 
advanced  intratribal  standard,  tends  to  make  it  like  unto  it- 
self. As  Spencer  expresses  it,  the  life  of  internal  amity 
is  assimilated  to  the  life  of  external  enmity.  "  Taken  in  the 
mass  the  evidence  shows,"  he  says,  "as  we  might  expect, 
that  in  proportion  as  intertribal  and  international  antago- 
nisms are  great  and  constant,  the  ideas  and  feelings  belong- 
ing to  the  ethics  of  enmity  predominate ;  and  conflicting  as 
they  do  with  the  ideas  and  feelings  belonging  to  the  ethics  of 
amity  proper  to  the  internal  life  of  a  society,  they  in  greater 
or  less  degree  suppress  these,  or  fill  with  aggressions  the 
conduct  of  man  to  man."  x  Thus  tribes  engaged  habitually 
in  war  are  characterized  by  the  frequency  of  homicide 
within  the  group.  Tribes  that  regard  the  robbery  of  strangers 
as  honorable  come  to  regard  stealing  within  the  tribe  as 
irreproachable.2  Revengefulness,  inhumanity,  and  untruthful- 
ness within  each  tribe  characterize  warlike  communities.3  On 
the  other  hand,  peaceful  tribes  are  characterized  by  their 
superior  intratribal  morality.    Tribes  among  whom  war   is 

1  Spencer,  Principles  of  Ethics  (1892),  vol.  i,  p.  350. 

2  Ibid.  vol.  i,  pp.  355  f.  8  Ibid.  vol.  i,  pp.  368,  398,  401. 


THE  DAWN  OF  MORALITY  29 

infrequent  or  unknown  are  scrupulously  honest.1    Among 
such  people  crimes  of  violence  are  rare.2 

Thus  war,  a  heritage  (as  a  phase  of  the  "  struggle  for  ex- 
istence ")  of  the  human  from  the  lower  animal  world,  becomes 
early  in  the  human  stage  of  the  cosmic  evolution  a  drag  upon 
the  moral  progress  of  the  race.3 

1  Spencer,  Principles  of  Ethics  (1892),  vol.  i,  pp.  359  f. 

2  Ibid.  vol.  i,  p.  349. 

3  For  the  influence  of  the  war  ethics  of  the  modern  nations  upon 
their  peace  ethics,  see  VI,  International  Ethics :  the  New  International 
Conscience,  in  Chapter  XVIII. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  MORAL  LIFE  IN  ANCIENT  EGYPT: 
AN  IDEAL  OF  SOCIAL  JUSTICE 

I.  Circumstances  and  Ideas  which  molded  and 
motived  Morality 


A  homo- 
geneous 
population 
and  a  com- 
paratively 
static  civi- 
lization 


Egypt  was  the  China  of  the  ancient  Mediterranean  world. 
Like  the  Chinese,  the  Egyptians  were  a  comparatively  un- 
mixed people.  During  the  historic  period  no  new  elements 
of  importance  were  incorporated  with  the  native  population. 
Again,  like  the  civilization  of  China,  that  of  Egypt  through- 
out a  great  part  of  the  historic  age  was  singularly  static.  After 
having  made  wonderful  advance  in  early  times  the  Egyptians 
ceased  to  make  further  noteworthy  progress. 

Both  these  fundamental  facts  of  Egyptian  history  had  great 
significance  for  Egyptian  morals  ;  for  since  when  races  min- 
gle their  blood  they  mingle  also  their  moralities,  it  is  a 
matter  of  supreme  importance  to  the  moral  life  of  a  people 
whether  on  the  one  hand  it  has,  as  the  centuries  have  passed, 
undergone  a  change  in  physical  type  through  the  incorpora- 
tion of  new  racial  elements,  or  on  the  other  hand  has  preserved 
unchanged  its  racial  type  and  physical  characteristics. 

Equally  important  for  the  moral  ideal  is  it  whether  the  civ- 
ilization of  which  it  forms  one  element  is  progressive  or  un- 
progressive ;  for  changes  in  the  moral  standard  are  largely 
dependent  on  changes  in  the  other  elements  of  civilization. 
Where  the  intellectual  life  and  the  religious  ideas  remain 
unmodified,  and  where  all  political,  social,  and  industrial  in- 
stitutions remain  essentially  unchanged,  we  need  not  look  for 
fundamental  changes  in  ethical  ideas  and  convictions.    How 

30 


THE  MORAL  LIFE  IN  ANCIENT  EGYPT  31 

the  history  of  conscience  in  ancient  Egypt  illustrates  these 
truths  we  shall  see  a  little  further  on. 

We  have  seen  how  potent  an  influence  the  notion  of  a  life  The  teach- 
beyond  the  tomb  exercised  upon  the  conduct  of  the  members  Simortai- 
of  the  primitive  kinship  group,  giving  birth  to  some  of  the  £tionedn" 
noblest  virtues  of  their  simple  code  of  morals.    Now  this  idea  on  ri^ht- 

r  eousness 

of  continued  existence  after  death  dominated  the  life  of  no 
other  civilized  people  of  antiquity  so  completely  as  it  domi- 
nated the  life  of  the  Egyptians ;  and  probably  in  the  case  of 
no  other  people  ancient  or  modern  has  the  belief  exerted  so 
profound  an  influence  upon  conduct.  This  was  so  for  the 
reason  that  the  conception  was  here  early  moralized  and  rep- 
resented the  blessed  life  in  the  hereafter  as  dependent  upon 
rightdoing  in  the  present  life.  No  soul  that  had  done  evil 
was  admitted  to  the  bark  of  the  ferryman  at  the  Egyptian 
Styx.  In  this  discrimination  we  find  "  the  earliest  traces  in 
the  history  of  man  of  an  ethical  test  at  the  close  of  life."1 

It  is  the  sun-god  Ra  who  in  the  remotest  times  is  most  inti-  The  ethical 
mately  associated  with  these  moral  requirements  for  partici-  o?thVsun- 
pation  in  the  felicities  of  the  celestial  hereafter.    The  latest  god  ** 
reading  and  analysis  of  the  texts  of  the  Pyramid  Age  has 
thrown  new  light  upon  the  relations  of  the  rival  divinities  Ra 
and  Osiris  to  the  development  of  the  moral  consciousness  in 
ancient  Egypt.    In  his  latest  work  Professor  Breasted  says : 
"The  later  rapid  growth  of  ethical  teaching  in  the  Osiris  faith 
and  the  assumption  of  the  role  of  judge  by  Osiris  is  not  yet 
discernible  in  the  Pyramid  Age,  and  the  development  which 
made  these  elements  so  prominent  in  the  Middle  Kingdom  took 
place  in  the  obscure  period  after  the  development  of  the  Pyra- 
mid Age.    Contrary  to  the  conclusions  generally  accepted  at 
present,  it  was  the  sun-god  .  .  .  who  was  the  earliest  champion 
of  moral  worthiness  and  the  great  judge  in  the  hereafter."  2 

1  Breasted,  A  History  of  Egypt  (1905),  p.  65. 

2  Development  of  Religion  and  Thought  in  Ancient  Egypt  (1912),  p.  176. 


dualism 


32         HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

The  conception  of  Ra  as  the  righteous  judge,  as  the. father 
and  protector  of  the  reigning  Pharaoh,  and  as  the  guardian 
divinity  of  the  Egyptian  state,  influenced  profoundly  the  moral 
development  in  prefeudal  Egypt,  and  was  seemingly  the  in- 
spiration of  the  great  social  reform  movement  which  marked 
the  history  of  the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Dynasties.  In  the 
words  of  Professor  Breasted,  "The  moral  obligations  emerg- 
ing in  the  Solar  theology  thus  wrought  the  earliest  social 
regeneration  and  won  the  earliest  battle  for  social  justice  of 
which  we  know  anything  in  history."  * 

Religious  In  our  introductory  chapter  we  spoke  of  the  influence  of 

physical  environment  upon  the  moral  life  of  a  people.  The 
history  of  the  formation  of  the  ethical  type  of  ancient  Egypt 
affords  an  excellent  illustration  of  this;  for  it  was  probably 
out  of  the  striking  physical  dualism  of  the  Egyptian  lands  — 
the  antagonism  between  the  life-giving  Nile  and  the  ever- 
encroaching  desert  —  that  grew  Egyptian  religious  dualism, 
embodied  in  the  myth  of  the  struggle  between  Osiris  and 
Set.2  At  first  the  tale  was  a  pure  nature  myth  reflecting 
simply  the  conflict  between  two  physical  elements  ;  but  as  the 
moral  consciousness  of  the  people  who  recited  the  story  deep- 
ened, there  was  gradually  read  into  it  an  ethical  meaning. 
The  conflict  was  now  conceived  as  a  mighty  struggle  between 
the  powers  of  good  and  evil,  between  the  beneficent  Osiris 
(and  his  son  and  avenger,  Horus)  and  the  malignant  Set.3 

This  world  philosophy  reacted  powerfully  upon  Egyptian 
morality,  keeping  as  it  did  in  the  foreground  of  the  moral  con- 
sciousness the  truth  that  the  moral  life  is  a  battle  against  evil. 
"  The  triumph  of  right  over  wrong  ...  is  the  burden  of  nine 
tenths  of  the  Egyptian  texts  which  have  come  down  to  us."  4 

1  Breasted,  Development  of  Religion  and  Thought  in  Ancient  Egypt  ( 1 9 1 2 ) , 
p.  250.  2  Maspero,  The  Dawn  of  Civilization,  p.  172. 

8  This  moralization  of  pure  physical  myths  marks  the  advance  of  all 
races  in  culture  and  morality.  As  we  shall  see,  Greek  and  Hebrew 
mythologies  underwent  just  such  an  ethicalizing  process. 

4  Renouf,  The  Religion  of  Ancient  Egypt  (1884),  p.  73. 


THE  MORAL  LIFE  IN  ANCIENT  EGYPT  33 

Acted  upon  by  the  moral  feelings,  the  Osirian  myth  under-  The  osi- 
went  a  special  development.    It  came  to  represent  not  simply  jJJ  Jtfspe- 
the  eternal  opposition  between  good  and  evil,  but  the  whole  opme^1" 
moral  order  of  the  present  and  the  future  world.    It  told  of 
the  beneficent  life  of  Osiris  as  king  of  Egypt,  his  death  and 
resurrection,  and  of  his  office  as  king  and  judge  in  the  realms 
of  the  dead. 

After  having  been  given  this  rich  moral  content,  the  myth 
reacted  powerfully  upon  the  moral  consciousness  and  became 
a  chief  agency  in  the  formation  of  the  moral  character  of  the 
Egyptian  race.  Osiris,  as  reflected  in  the  Osirian  myth,  be- 
came the  incarnation  of  the  ethical  ideal.  It  is  a  great  advan- 
tage to  morality  when  the  ideal  of  goodness  is  thus  embodied 
in  a  divine  exemplar.  Osiris  held  some  such  relation  to  the 
moral  life  of  ancient  Egypt  as  Christ  holds  to  the  moral  life 
of  the  Christian  world. 

II.  The  Ideal 

By  the  dawn  of  history  there  had  been  developed  in  an-  Ahomoge- 
cient  Egypt  an  enlightened  and  discriminating  conscience.1  unchanging 
There  are  two  aspects  of  this  conscience  which  we  need  to 
note.  First,  it  was  a  comparatively  homogeneous  conscience ; 
that  is,  the  morality  of  the  ancient  Egyptians  was  not  a 
mixture  of  moralities  like  that  of  the  modern  European 
nations  whose  morality  is  a  blend  of  the  moralities  of  dif- 
ferent races  —  Greek,  Roman,  Celtic,  and  Teutonic ;  of 
different  religions — pagan  and  Christian;  and  of  different 
civilizations  —  Greek,  Latin,  Celtic,  and  German. 

Second,  it  was  a  comparatively  unchanging  conscience. 
The  moral  consciousness  which  we  find  in  pre-Christian 
Roman  Egypt  is  fundamentally  the  same  as  that  which 
emerged  in  the  Pyramid  Age  more  than  three  thousand  years 

1  "  It  has  long  been  recognized  that  the  Egyptians  had  a  much  more 
highly  organized  conscience  than  that  of  most  other  nations  of  early  times." 
—  Petrie,  Religion  and  Conscience  in  Ancient  Egypt  (1898),  p.  86. 


conscience 


34 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


Evidences 
of  moral 
progress 
during 
early  times 


Substitu- 
tion of  ka- 
statues  for 
human 
sacrifices 


before.  During  this  long  period  the  Egyptian  conscience,  al- 
though it  gained  in  depth  and  sensitiveness  as  the  millenniums 
passed,  underwent  less  change  in  its  essential  qualities  than  the 
moral  consciousness  underwent  in  less  than  ten  centuries  in 
all  the  other  great  nations,  save  China,  of  the  ancient  world. 

But  though  the  moral  development,  like  the  development 
of  all  other  phases  of  Egyptian  civilization,  was  eafly  checked 
and  thereafter  made  but  slow  progress,  the  essential  refine- 
ment and  clarification  of  the  moral  sense  during  prehistoric 
times,  or  in  the  obscure  period  of  the  earliest  dynasties,  is 
shown  by  various  testimonies,  as,  for  instance,  in  the  moral- 
ization  of  the  Osirian  myth,  to  which  we  have  already  re- 
ferred, in  the  abandonment  of  the  practice  of  human  sacrifices 
at  the  tomb,  and  in  the  transition,  concerning  the  concep- 
tion of  the  life  after  death,  from  the  continuance  to  the 
retribution  theory. 

The  early  Egyptians,  after  the  manner  of  savages,  killed 
and  buried  with  the  dead  master  a  number  of  his  slaves,  that 
their  souls  might  attend  him  in  the  spirit  land.  But  after  a 
time  the  growing  humanitarian  and  ethical  feelings  of  the 
Egyptians  forbade  human  sacrifices,  and  then  merely  the  por- 
trait-statues of  the  slaves  were  placed  in  the  tomb.1  These, 
it  was  thought,  —  in  consonance  with  the  belief  which  led  to 
the  substitution  of  pictures  or  of  clay  and  wood  models  for 
the  real  articles  at  first  buried  with  the  dead,  —  would  take 
the  place  of  the  actual  bodies  of  the  servants. 

But  as  time  passed,  the  deepening  moral  feelings  of  the 
Egyptians  would  not  permit  them  to  do  even  this  thing.  It 
did  not  now  seem  right  to  them  that  because  a  man  was  a 
slave  in  the  earthly  Egypt  he  should  be  a  slave  forever  in  the 
Osirian  fields.2    So  they  ceased  to  place  in  the  tomb  of  the 

1  Maspero,  The  Dawn  of  Civilization,  pp.  193  f. 

2  Wiedemann,  The  Ancient  Egyptian  Doctrine  of  the  Immortality  of  the 
&«/(i89S),  pp.  62  f. 


THE  MORAL  LIFE  IN  ANCIENT  EGYPT  35 

master  these  portrait-statues  of  his  servants,  and  in  their  stead 
put  in  statuettes  of  nobody  in  particular.  The  doubles  of 
these,  it  was  conceived,  would  appear  as  newly  created  souls 
in  the  underworld,  and,  being  indebted  for  life  itself  to  the 
master  of  the  tomb,  would,  it  was  naively  assumed,  gratefully 
labor  for  him  through  all  eternity.1 

The  history  of  the  ka-statues,  as  these  substitutes  are  called, 
thus  bears  testimony  similar  to  that  of  the  Osirian  myth  as 
to  the  upward  trend  of  ethical  thought  and  humanitarian 
feeling  in  prehistoric  Egypt 


2 


Still  further  evidence  of  the  advance  on  moral  lines  in  Transition 
early  Egypt  is  afforded  by  the  character  of  the  belief  held  by  continuance 
the  Egyptians  at  the  beginning  of  the  second  millennium  b.c.  retribution 
and  perhaps  earlier  respecting  the  fate  of  souls  in  the  world  theory 
beyond  the  tomb.    To  understand  this  we  need  to  cast  our 
glance  a  little  aside  and  observe  how  the  world  of  shades,  in 
its  social  and  ethical  classifications,  has  ever  been  a  register 
of  the  changing  moral  feelings  of  men.    As  Oscar  Peschel 
finely  says,  "  The  other  world  has  ever  answered  to  this  as 
spectrum  to  the  source  of  light." 

Edward  B.  Tylor  happily  names  the  two  chief  theories 
which  have  been  held  in  regard  to  the  state  of  souls  in  the 
hereafter  as  the  continuance  and  the  retribution  theory.  The 
first  theory  is  that  of  primitive  man  while  his  moral  sense  is 
yet  undeveloped.  According  to  this  theory  the  same  fate  is 
allotted  to  all  who  go  down  to  death.  There  is  no  such  thing 
as  rewards  and  punishments.  This  is  the  conception  of  the 
after-life  which  is  held  by  all  races  on  the  lower  levels  of 

1  Wiedemann,  The  Ancient  Egyptian  Doctrine  of  the  Immortality  of  the 
Soul  (1895),  P-  64. 

2  The  same  evolution  is  to  be  traced  in  China.  M  Imitations  made  of 
wood,  clay,  straw,  paper,  and  of  other  material  have  been  substituted  for 
the  real  things.  .  .  .  Slaves  and  servants,  wives  and  concubines  are  also 
burned,  i.e.,  in  paper  imitations.  They  point  back  to  the  time  when  actual 
human  sacrifices  were  the  custom"  (De  Groot,  The  Religion  of  the  Chinese 
(1910),  p.  71). 


36         HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

culture,  and  it  is  a  view  which  often  lingers  on  as  a  sur- 
vival among  peoples  far  advanced  in  civilization.  But  as  the 
moral  judgment  becomes  more  discriminating,  then  this  view 
of  the  other  world  is  very  certain  to  undergo  a  change.  The 
quickened  sense  of  justice  demands  that  the  allotments  after 
death  shall  be  in  accordance  with  merit  and  demerjt.  This 
ethical  feeling  gradually  transforms  the  topography  of  the  un- 
derworld and  organizes  the  as  yet  undivided  community  of 
shades.  The  hitherto  common  abode  of  the  dead  is  usually 
divided  into  two  distinct  compartments  or  regions,  heaven 
and  hell,  and  souls  are  separated,  according  to  their  deeds  on 
earth,  into  two  classes,  the  good  and  the  bad,  those  to  be  wel- 
comed to  the  abode  of  the  blessed  and  these  consigned  to  the 
place  of  torment.  Sometimes,  however,  the  lot  conceived  for 
the  wicked  is  simply  annihilation. 

The  incoming  of  this  theory  of  rewards  and  punishments 
after  death  constitutes  a  great  landmark  in  the  moral  evolution 
of  mankind.  In  the  words  of  Tylor,  this  transition  from  the 
continuance  to  the  retribution  theory "  for  deep  import  to 
human  life  has  scarcely  its  rival  in  the  history  of  religion."  1 
The  sanctions  of  morality  are  doubled. 

Now  in  ancient  Egypt  by  the  beginning  of  the  second  millen- 
nium b.c.  the  transition  from  the  continuance  to  the  retribution 
theory  had  already  been  effected,  as  will  appear  in  the  follow- 
ing account  of  the  Egyptian  Judgment  of  the  Dead.  Thus 
here,  as  in  the  change  of  practices  at  the  tomb,  we  have  indis- 
putable evidence  of  the  progress  of  moral  ideas  in  early  Egypt. 

The  judg-         The  Judgment  of  the  Dead  was  the  trial  which  every  soul 

ment  of  the  ,  °  .   .  .  \ 

Dead  had  to  undergo  before  Osiris  and  his  forty-two  assessors  in  the 

great  tribunal  hall  of  the  underworld.  The  astonishing  thing 
about  this  tribunal,  as  we  have  just  intimated,  is  that  at  a  time 
when  the  oldest  monuments  raised  in  Egypt  were  yet  recent 
this  whole  conception  of  the  moral  order  in  all  its  details 

1  Primitive  Culture  (1874),  vol.  ii,  p.  85. 


tive  Confes- 


THE  MORAL  LIFE  IN  ANCIENT  EGYPT  37 

was  already  fully  matured.1  Osiris  had  been  raised  to  the 
judgment  seat  in  the  other  world,  and  the  moral  standard  in 
some  departments  of  life,  particularly  in  the  relations  of  man 
to  man  in  the  everyday  social  and  business  spheres,  was  as 
high  and  true  as  is  the  standard  in  many  of  the  civilized 
nations  of  to-day.  This  admirable  code  of  social  morals  points 
unmistakably  to  long  periods  of  organized  society  and  moral 
training  in  prefeudal  Egypt. 

This  early  standard  of  goodness  is  embodied  in  the  so-called  The  Nega- 
Negative  Confession,  in  which  the  soul  before  the  Osirian  tri- 
bunal pleaded  his  innocence  of  the  forty-two  sins  condemned 
by  the  Egyptian  code  of  morality.  This  confession,  previous 
to  the  discovery  of  the  Babylonian  code  of  Hammurabi,  con- 
stituted the  oldest  known  code  of  morality  of  the  ancient 
world.  These  are  some  of  the  declarations  of  the  soul :  "  I 
did  not  steal " ;  "I  did  not  get  any  man  treacherously 
killed  "  ;  "I  did  not  utter  any  lie  "  ;2  "I  did  not  make  any 
one  weep  "  ;  "I  did  not  kill  any  sacred  animals  "  ;  "  I  did 
not  damage  any  cultivated  land  "  ;  "I  was  angry  only  when 
there  was  reason  [for  being  angry]  "  ;  "I  did  not  turn  a  deaf 
ear  to  the  words  of  truth  "  ;  "I  did  not  commit  any  act  of 
rebellion  "  ;  "I  did  not  do  any  witchcraft "  ;  "I  did  not 
blaspheme  a  god  "  ;  "I  did  not  make  the  slave  to  be  mis- 
used by  his  master  "  ;  "  I  was  not  imperious  "  ;  "I  did  not 
strip  the  mummies  of  their  stuff."  3 

After  this  confession  to  the  forty-two  assessors  in  the  hall 
of  judgment,  the  soul  made  the  following  affirmative  declara- 
tion, which  makes  a  singularly  close  approach  to  Christian 

1  Maspero,  The  Dawn  of  Civilization,  pp.  187  ff. 

2  Truthfulness  was  one  of  the  cardinal  virtues  of  the  Egyptian  ideal. 
The  requirements  here  were  very  exact :  "  I  have  not  altered  a  story  in  the 
telling  of  it ;  I  have  repeated  what  I  have  heard  just  as  it  was  told  to  me," 
are  the  words  of  one  in  the  judgment  hall  of  Osiris.  Cf.  Renouf,  The  Reli- 
gion of  Ancient  Egypt  (1884),  pp.  76  f. 

8  The  Egyptian  Book  of  the  Dead,  tr.  Davis,  chap.  cxxv. 


38 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


Comparison 
of  the  mor- 
ality of  the 
Negative 
Confession 
with  that 
of  the  He- 
brew Deca- 
logue and 
other  codes 


morality :  ,?  I  gave  bread  to  the  hungry,  water  to  the  thirsty, 
garments  to  the  naked,  a  bark  to  the  one  who  was  without 
one  [that  is,  a  boat  to  the  detained  traveler],  offerings  to 
the  gods,  and  funeral  conservations  to  the  shades."  * 

After  this  confession  and  declaration  the  heart  of  the  man 
was  placed  in  one  scale  of  a  balance  and  the  image  of  Truth 
in  the  other.  If  the  heart  was  not  found  wanting,  but 
weighed  just  equal  to  the  image,  Osiris  pronounced  the  soul 
justified,  and  it  was  welcomed  to  the  company  of  the  blessed. 
The  punishment  meted  out  to  the  soul  found  lacking  seems 
to  have  been  of  a  negative  nature  —  a  denial  of  immortality.2 

It  is  instructive  to  compare  this  ancient  code,  both  in  its 
contents  and  in  its  omissions,  with  the  moral  codes  of  other 
peoples  and  other  ages.  The  similarity  of  the  morality  of 
the  Negative  Confession  to  that  of  the  Hebrew  Decalogue 
forces  itself  at  once  upon  the  attention.3  The  Egyptian  code, 
however,  lays  less  emphasis  than  the  Hebrew  upon  religious 
duties.  In  the  forty-two  duties  named  only  seven  are  duties 
toward  the  gods,  while  of  the  Ten  Commandments  five  con- 
cern religious  duties.  As  we  have  already  observed,  the  duties 
of  the  Egyptian  code  are  those  due  from  man  to  man ;  that  is, 
they  are  social  as  opposed  to  religious  duties. 

In  striking  contrast  to  the  Confucian  code  of  the  Chinese, 
the  Egyptian  code  gives  very  little  place  to  the  duties  of  chil- 
dren to  their  parents.  These  duties  are  noticed,  it  is  true, 
by  the  Egyptian  moralists,  but  no  emphasis  is  laid  upon 


1  The  Egyptian  Book  of  the  Dead,  tr.  Davis,  chap.  cxxv. 

2  Annihilation  appears  to  have  been  the  lot  of  the  very  wicked  ;  but  the 
texts  are  not  perfectly  clear  on  this  point.  Consult  Wiedemann,  The  Ancient 
Egyptian  Doctrine  of  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul  (1895),  p.  55. 

8  Here  are  six  declarations  of  the  confession  which  correspond  almost 
exactly  with  six  of  the  Ten  Commandments:  (1)  I  have  not  blasphemed; 
(2)  I  have  not  stolen  ;  (3)  I  have  not  slain  any  one  treacherously  ;  (4)  I  have 
not  slandered  any  one,  or  made  false  accusations;  (5)  I  have  not  reviled 
the  face  of  my  father;  (6)  I  have  not  eaten  my  heart  through  with  envy. 
See  Rawlinson,  History  of  Ancient  Egypt,  2d  ed.,  vol.  i,  p.  142. 


THE  MORAL  LIFE  IN  ANCIENT  EGYPT         39 

them.  They  are  mentioned  only  once  in  the  Negative  Con- 
fession before  Osiris.  As  the  stress  laid  by  Chinese  moralists 
upon  filial  piety  came  about  largely  through  the  supposed 
need  of  the  spirits  of  the  dead  for  regular  offerings  at  the 
grave,  so  it  may  be  that  the  neglect  of  this  virtue  by  the 
Egyptian  teachers  is  to  be  explained,  as  Flinders  Petrie  sug- 
gests, by  the  circumstance  that  "  the  provision  of  offerings  in 
semblance  by  the  Egyptians  in  the  tomb  left  little  place  for 
the  urgency  of  filial  duties  in  maintaining  continual  supplies 
for  the  deceased."  x 

Another  defect  of  Egyptian  morality  is  its  lack  of  depth 
and  seriousness.  There  is  no  hungering  and  thirsting  after 
righteousness,  no  passionate  yearning  for  holiness.  There  is 
no  call  to  lofty  self-sacrifice.  It  is  a  calm,  prudent,  worldly- 
wise,  practical  morality.  Its  spirit  and  temper  are  well  set 
forth  by  Petrie  when,  in  speaking  of  its  virtues  and  vices,  he 
says  that  "  these  belong  far  more  to  the  tone  of  Chesterfield 
and  Gibbon  than  to  that  of  Kingsley  and  Carlyle."  2 

But  in  spite  of  the  limitations  and  defects  of  the  code,  it 
was  one  of  the  purest  and  loftiest  framed  by  the  moral  con- 
sciousness of  the  races  of  antiquity.  The  Negative  Confession 
shows  that  Egypt  had  early  learned  the  lesson  that  blessedness 
in  the  hereafter  is  conditioned  on  the  practice  of  justice,  truth, 
and  righteousness  in  the  present  life  on  earth.3 

1  Petrie,  Religion  and  Conscience  in  Ancient  Egypt  (1898),  p.  135. 

2  Ibid.  p.  162. 

3  M  In  this  judgment  the  Egyptian  introduced  for  the  first  time  in  the 
history  of  man  the  fully  developed  idea  that  the  future  destiny  of  the  dead 
must  be  dependent  entirely  upon  the  ethical  quality  of  the  earthly  life,  the 
idea  of  future  responsibility,  —  of  which  we  found  the  first  traces  in  the 
Old  Kingdom"  (Breasted,  A  History  of  Egypt  (1905),  p.  173).  Professor 
Breasted  suggests  a  connection  between  the  growth  of  the  ideal  of  an 
ethical  ordeal  in  the  hereafter  with  the  discontinuance  of  the  building 
of  immense  pyramids.  He  says :  "  It  is  impossible  to  contemplate  the 
colossal  tombs  of  the  Fourth  Dynasty,  so  well  known  as  the  pyramids  of 
Gizeh,  and  to  contrast  them  with  the  comparatively  diminutive  royal  tombs 
which  follow  in  the  next  two  dynasties,  without  .  .  .  discerning  more  than 
exclusively  political  causes  behind  this  sudden  and  startling  change.  .  .  . 


40 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


The  moral 
precepts  of 
Ptah-hotep; 
an  ethical 
conception 
of  kinship 


After  the  Negative  Confession  the  most  valuable  memorial 
of  the  character  of  the  Egyptian  conscience  is  found  in  the 
precepts  of  the  moralist  Ptah-hotep,1  who  lived  probably  in 
the  time  of  the  Twelfth  Dynasty.  This  moralist  laid  particular 
emphasis  upon  the  duties  of  rulers  and  of  the  rich  and  great. 
His  maxims  are  intended  as  a  sort  of  "  Manual  of  the  Per- 
fect Official."  "  If,  having  been  of  no  account,  thou  hast 
become  great,  and  if,  having  been  poor,  thou  hast  become 
rich,  and  if  thou  hast  become  governor  of  the  city,  be  not 
hard-hearted  on  account  of  thy  advancement,  because  thou 
hast  become  merely  the  guardian  of  the  things  which  God 
has  provided."2  In  like  words  emphasis  is  laid  upon  the 
duties  of  gentleness  and  considerateness  on  the  part  of  the 
administrator  and  the  judge.  In  truth  the  doctrine  of  trustee- 
ship of  wealth  and  of  office  has  never  been  more  zealously 
taught  than  in  these  precepts  of  the  early  Egyptian  moralist.3 

The  teachings  of  Ptah-hotep  respecting  the  duties  of  rulers 
would  seem  to  have  made  effective  appeal  to  the  heart  and 
conscience  of  even,  the  holders  of  the  royal  office.  In  any 
event  we  find  these  lofty  conceptions  of  the  duties  of  kingship 
incarnated  in  the  lives  and  deeds  of  several  of  the  Pharaohs 
of  the  Old  Kingdom.  The  view  held  by  these  monarchs  re- 
specting the  nature  of  the  royal  office  was  almost  exactly  like 
that  entertained  by  the  so-called  benevolent  despots  of  the 
eighteenth  century  of  our  era.    The  inscriptions  on  the  royal 


The  recognition  of  a  judgment  and  the  requirement  of  moral  worthiness 
in  the  hereafter  .  .  .  marked  a  transition  from  reliance  on  agencies  external 
to  the  personality  of  the  dead  to  dependence  on  inner  values.  Immortality 
began  to  make  its  appeal  as  a  thing  achieved  in  a  man's  own  soul"  {Develop- 
ment of  Religion  and  Thought  in  Ancient  Egypt  (1912),  pp.  178  f.). 

1  Records  of  the  Past,  New  Series,  vol.  iii.  For  extended  comments  on  the 
maxims  of  Ptah-hotep,  see  Amelineau,  Essai  sur  revolution  historique  et 
philosophique  des  idSes  morales  dans  V Egypt  ancienne  (1895),  pp.  93  ff. 

2  Budge,  Egyptian  Ideas  of  the  Future  Life  (1899),  p.  ii. 

8  For  other  documents  of  this  age  which  embody  the  same  spirit  of 
social  justice  as  the  precepts  of  Ptah-hotep,  see  Breasted,  Development  of 
Religion  and  Thought  in  Ancient  Egypt  (191 2),  lect.  vii. 


tian  con- 
science 


THE  MORAL  LIFE  IN  ANCIENT  EGYPT         41 

tomb  boast  not  alone  of  exploits  and  triumphs  in  war,  but  the 
prince  vaunts  himself  for  having  put  no  ward  in  mourning, 
for  having  made  no  distinction  between  the  great  and  the 
humble,  for  having  been  the  protector  of  the  widow  and  the 
asylum  of  the  orphan,  and  for  having  laid  no  unjust  taxes.1 

The  Egyptian  conscience,  like  the  conscience  of  the  ancient  Slavery  ap- 
world  in  general,  did  not  condemn  the  institution  of  slavery.  theVEgyp^ 
The  relation  of  master  and  slave  was  looked  upon  by  the 
Egyptians  as  perfectly  natural  and  legitimate. 

The  slave  class,  which  included  both  whites  and  blacks, 
was  recruited  not  only  from  the  prisoners  of  war  brought  back 
by  the  Pharaohs  from  their  numerous  foreign  conquests,  but 
also  from  captives  secured  on  regular  man-hunting  expeditions 
into  the  negro  regions  of  the  Upper  Nile. 

The  treatment  of  the  slave  was  usually  mild,  and  the  de- 
velopment of  the  moral  feelings  had  already  in  early  times 
placed  him  under  the  protection  of  the  gods.  Thus  in  the 
judgment  hall  of  Osiris  the  soul  repudiates  the  sin  of  oppres- 
sion by  affirming,  "  I  did  not  cause  the  slave  to  be  misused 
by  his  master."  2 

Respecting  the  moral  side,  in  general,  of  the  slave  system 
of  antiquity,  which  we  encounter  now  for  the  first  time  here 
among  the  Egyptians,  the  following  observation  may  be  made. 
If  we  except  the  Hebrews,  we  shall  not  find  among  the  peo- 
ples of  the  ancient  world  whose  ethical  standards  we  shall 
pass  in  review  any  fundamental  change  throughout  their 
history  in  the  common  conscience  regarding  the  rightfulness 
of  slavery.    Indeed  any  radical  and  permanent  change  in  the 

1  Amelineau,  Essai,  pp.  140  f. 

2  Alongside  slavery  proper  there  existed  the  system  of  serfdom,  the 
nature  of  which  is  revealed  by  the  history  of  the  Children  of  Israel  in  Lower 
Egypt.  The  status  of  the  Egyptian  serf  appears  to  have  been  somewhat  like 
that  of  the  Helots  of  Laconia  in  Greece.  If  we  rightly  interpret  the  Biblical 
account  of  the  servitude  of  the  Children  of  Israel,  the  number  of  serfs,  if 
their  increase  seemed  dangerous,  was  kept  down  by  enforced  infanticide 
(Ex.  i.  7-22). 


42  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

moral  feelings  of  men  on  this  subject  was  hardly  possible 
till  after  the  incoming  of  Christianity  with  its  teachings  of  a 
common  Father-God  and  the  brotherhood  of  man. 

The  ethics  One  of  the  most  striking  phenomena  of  the  moral  evolu- 
tion of  mankind  is  the  unequal  rate  of  movement  on  differ- 
ent lines.  Thus  while  morality  has  made  great  progress  in 
some  departments  of  life,  in  the  domain  of  war  it  has  re- 
mained comparatively  stationary  from  the  dawn  of  history 
down  almost  to  the  present  day.  The  war  code  of  the  mod- 
ern nations,  notwithstanding  improvements  and  ameliorations 
to  which  our  attention  will  be  drawn  later  in  our  study,  is 
still  in  large  part  an  unchanged  heritage  from  the  ages  of 
primitive  savagery. 

Bearing  this  in  mind,  it  will  not  be  a  matter  of  surprise 
to  us  that  the  laws  of  war  of  the  Egyptians  showed  little  ad- 
vance over  the  practices  of  the  negro  savages  of  Africa ;  in- 
deed it  seems  probable  that  this  part  of  the  moral  code  of 
Egypt  was  actually  of  African  origin.1  There  is  not  a  word 
in  Egyptian  literature  in  reprobation  of  war.2 

While  in  their  relations  to  their  own  people  the  Pharaohs 
observed  a  comparatively  enlightened  code  of  ethics,  being 
in  general  humane,  considerate,  and  clement,  still  in  their 
treatment  of  the  vanquished  they  seem  to  have  been  wholly 
insensible  to  all  humanitarian  feelings.  Like  the  Assyrian 
kings  they  "  immortalized  their  cruelty  in  their  art."  Numer- 
ous scenes  upon  the  monuments  celebrate  the   Pharaoh's 

1  Laurent,  Etudes  sur  Phistoire  de  VhumanitS,  t.  i,  p.  321. 

2  Amelineau,  Essai,  p.  344.  The  monotheist  Ikhnaton  (Amenhotep  IV), 
the  reform  Pharaoh  of  the  Eighteenth  Dynasty,  it  is  true,  pursued  through- 
out his  reign  a  peace  policy,  but  this  policy  manifestly  was  dictated  by 
temperament,  or  the  king's  preoccupation  with  religious  affairs,  and  not  by 
moral  scruples.  His  reform  was  essentially  a  religious  and  not  a  social  or 
moral  one.  Not  one  of  the  historical  documents  of  the  age  contains  a  word 
in  condemnation  of  war  as  inherently  wrong  (see  Breasted,  Ancient  Records 
of  Egypt  (1906),  vol.  ii,  pp.  382-419),  though  in  these  "the  customary  glory- 
ing in  war  has  almost  disappeared"  (Petrie,  A  History  0/  Egypt  (1896), 
vol.  ii,  p.  218). 


THE  MORAL  LIFE  IN  ANCIENT  EGYPT         43 

inhumanity ;  not  one  celebrates  his  compassion  or  mercy.  He 
is  constantly  represented  in  the  act  of  slaying  in  heaps  with 
his  own  hands  his  bound  and  suppliant  captives.1 

Taken  altogether,  the  moral  standard  of  ancient  Egypt,  as  influence  of 
disclosed  in  the  foregoing  brief  account  of  what  the  Egyptian  ideaiupon 
conscience  condemned  and  what  it  approved,  was  not  a  high  5frj£f* 
one,  but  it  was,  in  so  far  as  it  concerned  the  everyday  life  h«tory 
of  the  people,  wholly  practical,  and  probably  was  as  well  lived 
up  to  by  the  masses  as  our  higher  ideal  of  character  is  lived 
up  to  by  ourselves.    We  have  a  right  to  infer  this  from  the 
persistence  of  Egyptian  institutions  through  two  thirds  of  the 
historic  millenniums ;  for  no  nation  or  society  can  long  en- 
dure where  the  relations  of  man  to  man  and  of  subject  to 
ruler  are  not  in  substantial  agreement  with  the  real  convic- 
tions of  the  age  as  to  what  constitutes  essential  justice  and 
righteousness.    • 

The  moral  standard  of  the  Egyptians  has  been  compared 
to  that  of  the  Romans  after  it  had  felt  the  influence  of  Sto- 
icism and  Christianity.  Like  the  Roman  ideal  of  excellence 
at  its  best,  the  Egyptian  ideal  tended  to  develop  a  strong  and 
manly  type  of  character,  particularly  in  the  ruling  class.  We 
think  it  not  an  illusion  which  causes  us  to  see  the  influence 
of  the  ideal  in  the  face  of  Rameses  the  Great.  This  face  bears 
the  stamp  of  strength,  resolution,  indomitable  energy.  We 
may  believe  that  it  was  the  moral  ideal  which  had  something 
to  do  in  creating  such  a  type  of  character  as  we  see  here,  just 
as  it  was  the  primitive  Roman  ideal  which  helped  to  create 
that  admirable  type  of  character  which  lives  in  the  legends 
of  early  Rome. 

Further,  the  moral  ideal  tended  to  ameliorate  the  autocratic 
government  of  the  Pharaohs  by  holding  constantly  before  the 

1  This,  however,  must  not  be  regarded  as  wholly  an  act  of  wanton  sav- 
agery. The  killing  of  his  prisoners  by  the  king  was  probably  a  sort  of  sacrifice 
in  honor  of  the  god  who  had  given  him  victory  over  his  enemies.  See 
Amelineau,  Essai,  p.  12. 


44  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

ruler  the  example  of  the  righteous  and  beneficent  king-gods 
Ra  and  Osiris.  The  influence  of  the  ideal  in  this  relation  may 
be  likened  to  the  influence  of  the  moral  ideal  of  Christianity 
upon  the  government  of  the  later  Caesars. 

Again,  the  practical  moral  ideal  of  Egypt,  laying  its  em- 
phasis upon  the  fundamental  social  virtues,  helped  to  estab- 
lish and  maintain  relations  of  justice  and  equity  between  man 
and  man,  and  thus  contributed  to  the  general  well-being  of 
Egyptian  society  and  to  the  stability  of  Egyptian  institutions. 

Nor  was  the  influence  of  the  moral  ideal  of  Egypt  confined 
to  the  Egyptian  land.  For,  as  Amelineau  truly  says,  the 
wonderful  edifice  of  morality  is  the  collective  work  of  all 
peoples  and  all  ages.1  In  the  uprearing  of  this  edifice  Egypt 
played  a  great  role.  Her  contributions  to  the  morality  of  the 
first  nations  were  as  helpful,  we  may  believe,  as  were  those 
she  made  to  the  other  domains  —  material,  artistic,  and 
intellectual  —  of  the  civilization  of  the  early  world. 

Later  she  made  a  rich  bequest  to  European  morality,  a  be- 
quest only  less  important  perhaps  than  that  made  by  Judea. 
Her  ideas  of  the  future  life,  her  meditations  on  death  and 
the  final  judgment,  reenforced  the  teachings  of  Christianity 
and  thus  contributed  to  create  that  deep  conviction  of  a  life 
hereafter  and  a  coming  retribution  which  for  eighteen  hun- 
dred years  and  more  has  furnished  sanction  and  stimulus 
to  the  moral  life  of  Christendom.2  It  is  not  without  signifi- 
cance that  Christian  monasticism,  with  all  its  otherworldli- 
ness,  had  its  beginnings  in  Egypt.  "The  first  Christian  monk 
[Pachomius]  had  been  a  pagan  monk  of  Serapis."  3 

1  Essai,  p.  ix ;  see  also  p.  252,  n.  1. 

2  For  the  influence  of  the  moral  ideas  of  Egypt  on  Greece,  see  Amelineau, 
Essai,  chap,  xii,  pp.  359-399  ;  Wiedemann,  The  Ancient  Egyptian  Doctrine  of 
the  Immortality  of  the  Soul  (1895),  P-  x  '■>  an{*  Toy,  Judaism  and  Christianity 
(1891),  p.  387. 

8  Petrie,  Egypt  and  Israel  (191 1),  p.  133. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE   BABYLONIAN-ASSYRIAN   CONSCIENCE 

The  information  which  the  cuneiform  texts  have  yielded  Theimpor- 
concerning  the  moral  life  of  the  Babylonian  and  Assyrian  Babylonian- 
peoples,  though  scanty,  is  of  the  greatest  value  to  the  student  mwaijty 
of  comparative  morals,  not  only  because  it  casts  light  upon  J°r  the 
a  moral  development  in  some  important  respects  like  the  compara- 
moral  evolution  of  the  kindred  Semitic  people  of  Israel,  but 
also  because  that  later  evolution  was  probably  deeply  influ- 
enced by  it.    Therefore,  though  nothing  like  a  connected  ac- 
count of  the  moral  evolution  in  the  Euphratean  lands  can  be 
.attempted  till  the  thousands  of  cuneiform  tablets  recovered 
from  the  ancient  libraries  of  the  Babylonian-Assyrian  cities 
have  been  deciphered,  and  the  ethical  character  and  value 
of  their  contents  determined,  we  shall  devote  a  few  pages  to 
the  portrayal  of  such  manifestations  of  conscience  as  are 
disclosed  in  the  religious,  literary,  historical,  and  law  tablets 
whose  contents  are  already  known  to  us. 

Religion  filled  a  large  place  in  the  life  of  the  ancient  Baby-  The  general 
lonians  and  Assyrians,  especially  in  that  of  the  former ;  but  character 
religion  with  them  had  at  first  little  or  nothing  to  do  with  2*Xonla»- 
morality.    Like  the  religion  of  savage  and  barbarian  folk,  it  Assyrian 
lacked  wholly  or  almost  wholly  the  ethical  spirit.   Throughout 
the  early  period  it  was  in  the  main  simply  a  system  of  in- 
cantations and  magical  rites.    Scarcely  any  moral  element 
entered  into  the  system  until  the  later  centuries  of  Babylonian- 
Assyrian  history. 

This  religion  was  in  truth  simply  a  survival  from  primi- 
tive savage  times  when  religion  was  merely  a  belief  in  the 

45 


46  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

existence  of  evil  spirits,  and  in  their  disposition  and  power  to 
do  harm  to  men.1  In  this  stage  of  the  religious  evolution  sick- 
ness, death,  misadventure  of  every  kind  are  believed  to  be 
caused  by  some  malignant  demon  or  by  some  offended  and 
revengeful  god.  The  evil  spirits  are  supposed  to  act  from  pure 
malignancy,  while  the  great  gods  are  conceived  to  be  angered 
especially  by  the  nonobservance  of  some  religious  rite,  by  the 
violation  of  some  taboo  forbidding  the  use  of  certain  kinds  of 
food,  or  by  some  other  like  act. 

To  ward  off  the  attacks  of  the  evil  demons,  or  to  appease 
the  offended  gods,  recourse  was  had  to  the  recital  of  magical 
formulas  and  incantations.  This  was  Shamanism  in  its  lowest 
and  crudest  form,  in  which  there  was  at  work  as  a  motive  on 
the  part  of  the  suppliant  only  cringing  fear  or  a  desire  to 
get  rid  of  some  present  pain,  without  the  least  trace  of  moral 
emotions,  such  as  remorse  and  repentance. 

Ethical  ten-  But  as  time  passed,  this  earlier  nonethical  religion,  as  is 
the  religion  evidenced  by  the  texts  recovered  from  the  long-buried  tem- 
ple libraries,2  became  in  a  measure  moralized.  A  moral 
character  was  given  to  the  great  gods,  and  they  became  the 
inspirers  and  guardians  of  a  true  morality.  This  ethicalizing 
process  was  the  same  in  character  as  that  which  went  on  in 
the  religion  of  the  ancient  Hebrews,  gradually  moralizing  the 
primitive  conceptions  and  cult  of  Yahweh  until  among  that 
people  religion  and  morality  became  wholly  at  one.  The 
ethical  development,  however,  never  went  as  far  as  this  in 
Babylonia  and  Assyria,  but  the  movement  was  such  as  to  lift 
these  peoples  far  above  the  low  moral  plane  of  primitive 

1  Demonism  here  was  not,  as  it  was  and  is  in  China  (p.  55),  a  moral 
educator  of  the  people,  for  the  reason  that  the  spirits  were  not  conceived 
as  the  avengers  of  wrongdoing,  but  were  thought  to  molest  indifferently 
the  good  and  the  bad. 

2  It  is  not  possible,  however,  to  draw  a  definite  chronological  line  between 
the  nonethical  and  the  ethical  texts.  Cf.  Jastrow,  The  Religion  of  Babylonia 
and  Assyria  (1898),  p.  297. 


THE  BABYLONIAN-ASSYRIAN  CONSCIENCE      47 

society.  "  In  the  seventh  century  before  Christ,  if  not  earlier, 
the  Babylonians  and  Assyrians  possessed  a  system  of  morality 
which  in  many  respects  resembled  that  of  the  descendants 
of  Abraham."  1 

The  ethical  movement  found  its  truest  expression  in  the  Evidence 
so-called  penitential  hymns,2  which  are  in  spirit  altogether  tie  peal- 
like the  penitential  psalms  of  the  Hebrew  Scriptures.3   They  ^^s  of 
exhibit  the  same  intense  yearning  of  the  penitent  soul  for  \*eJ£?£th 
reconciliation  and  union  with  a  god  conceived  as  just  and  feeling 
holy  and  piteous. 

In  one  hymn  is  found  the  new  moral  conception  that  dis- 
ease is  the  work  of  a  good  spirit.  This  is  a  very  lofty  ethical 
idea,  and  approaches  the  Hebrew  conception  of  afflictions  as 
the  visitation  in  disguise  of  love.  But  this  idea  seems  never 
to  have  become  a  permanent  part  of  the  Babylonian  moral 
consciousness. 

In  these  psalms  and  prayers  we  have  evidence  that  at  times 
the  worshipers  of  Marduk  and  Ashur  attained  to  almost  as 
lofty  a  conception  of  deity  as  that  reached  by  the  teachers 
and  prophets  of  Israel.  The  great  gods  were  conceived  as 
the  creators,  the  sustainers  of  man  ;  as  loving,  compassionate, 

1  King,  Babylonian  Religion  and  Mythology  (1899),  P-  22°- 

2  The  nature  myths  constituting  the  epic  literature  of  the  Babylonians, 
which  consisted  largely  of  elaborate  tales  of  the  struggle  between  the 
gods  of  light  and  the  powers  of  darkness,  were  never  moralized  like  the 
Egyptian  myth  of  Osiris  and  Set,  or  the  Iranian  myth  of  Ahura  Mazda 
and  Ahriman. 

8  Here  are  a  few  lines  of  a  penitential  prayer  or  psalm : 
O  my  god  who  art  angry  with  me,  accept  my  prayer ; 


May  my  sins  be  forgiven,  my  transgressions  be  wiped  out. 

May  the  ban  be  loosened,  the  chain  broken, 

May  the  seven  winds  carry  off  my  sighs. 

Let  me  tear  away  my  iniquity,  let  the  birds  carry  it  to  heaven ; 

May  the  beasts  of  the  field  take  it  away  from  me, 
The  flowing  waters  of  the  stream  wash  me  clean. 
Let  me  be  pure,  like  the  sheen  of  gold. 

Jastrow,  The  Religion  of  Babylonia  and  Assyria  (1898),  p.  323. 


48  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

merciful,  and  forgiving.  The  religious-moral  ideal  was  here 
verging  toward  the  highest  that  man  has  ever  been  able  to 
form,  and  could  this  standard  have  been  steadily  upheld  and 
the  lower  abandoned,  then  Babylonia  and  Assyria  like  Judea 
might  have  made  precious  contributions  to  the  moral  life  of 
humanity.  But  this  was  not  done.  The  tablets  holding  mag- 
ical formulas  and  incantations,  wholly  devoid  of  all  ethical 
character,  outnumber  a  thousand  to  one  those  exhaling  the 
spiritual  perfume  of  genuine  moral  feeling  and  aspiration. 

Ethical  sig-  Respecting  the  lot  of  the  dead,  the  Babylonians  held  views 
the  concep-  like  those  of  the  early  Hebrews.  This  was  the  continuance 
afte^iif?6  as  opposed  to  the  retribution  theory.1  Arallu,  "the  land  of 
no  return,"  was  a  vast  underground  region  where  were  gath- 
ered all,  without  distinction,  who  went  down  to  the  grave.  It 
was  a  sad,  dolorous  life  that  the  drowsing  shades  lived  in 
this  dark  underworld,  where  the  bats  flitted  in  the  twilight 
and  the  dust  gathered  on  the  lintels  of  the  doors.  An  undis- 
criminating  fate  allotted  the  same  destiny  to  all.  In  so  far 
as  the  moral  consciousness  of  the  Babylonians  demanded  that 
a  distinction  be  made  between  the  good  and  the  bad,  this 
demand  was  met  by  the  assumption  —  which  was  also  that 
of  the  Hebrews  so  long  as  they  held  the  Babylonian  view  of 
the  life  after  death  —  that  the  evil  man  is  punished  in  this 
life,  and  the  good  man  rewarded  here  on  earth  with  numerous 
flocks,  reputation,  many  children,  and  long  life. 

For  four  thousand  years  the  masses  in  Babylonia  seem  to 
have  remained  satisfied  with  this  view  of  the  moral  govern- 
ment of  the  world.  In  the  later  periods  of  Babylonian  history, 
however,  we  find  in  the  literature  traces  of  a  protest  against 
this  nonethical  conception  of  life  in  the  afterworld — a  protest 
which  shows  that,  in  the  case  of  the  more  spiritually  minded 
at  least,  the  moral  consciousness  was  deepening  and  the 
ethical  judgment  becoming  clearer  and  truer. 

1  Cf.  above,  p.  35. 


THE  BABYLONIAN-ASSYRIAN  CONSCIENCE      49 

Since  the  law  code  of  a  people  embraces  all  those  duties  The  ethical 
the  performance  of  which  the  state  or  public  authority  attempts  Sws;°the e 
to  enforce,  the  ethical  spirit  of  an  age  or  people  finds  one  of  Hammurabi 
its  truest  embodiments  in  its  laws.    It  is  this  fact  which  ren- 
ders of  such  extraordinary  interest  to  the  student  of  the  history 
of  morals  the  recent  discovery  of  the  code  of  the  Babylonian 
king  Hammurabi,1  the  oldest  known  code  of  public  and  private 
morality.    This  law  system  exhibits  in  some  departments  of 
life  an  enlightened  and  advanced  morality,  yet  one  with  serious 
limitations  and  defects,  a  morality  in  many  respects  like  that 
of  the  Mosaic  code  of  the  kindred  Semitic  nation  of  Israel. 

The  code  informs  us  that  the  Babylonian  feeling  as  to 
what  is  right  and  wrong,  just  and  unjust,  in  the  ordinary 
business  relations  of  life  was  much  like  the  average  con- 
science of  to-day.  In  some  matters  the  Babylonian  law  held 
ground  morally  in  advance  of  that  held  by  modern  codes,  as, 
for  instance,  in  providing  that  in  case  of  misfortune  the 
debtor  should  have  both  his  rent  and  the  interest  on  his 
debt  remitted.2 

But  in  its  provisions  touching  the^ family  relations  the  code 
reveals  ethical  conceptions  very  different  from  our  own.  As 
in  other  Oriental  law  systems,  ancient  and  modern,  polygamy 
was  regarded  as  a  moral  institution.  A  man  in  debt  could 
bind  his  wife  and  children  out  to  service  or  sell  them  as 
slaves,  but  not  for  a  longer  period  than  three  years. 

The  punishments  meted  out  to  offenders  were  harsh  and 
cruel,  yet  not  much  more  atrociously  cruel  than  those  provided 
by  the  English  laws  of  three  hundred  years  ago.    Impaling, 

1  The  stele  which  bore  this  code  of  laws  was  discovered  at  Susa  in 
1901-1902.  The  reign  of  Hammurabi  is  placed  at  about  the  end  of  the 
third  millennium  B.C.  There  are  translations  of  the  code  by  C.  H.  W.  Johns 
(1903)  and  Robert  Francis  Harper  (1904). 

2  "  If  a  man  owe  a  debt  and  Adad  [god  of  storms]  inundate  his  field  and 
carry  away  the  produce,  or,  through  lack  of  water,  grain  have  not  grown  in 
the  field,  in  that  year  he  shall  not  make  any  return  of  grain  to  the  creditor, 
he  shall  alter  his  contract-tablet  and  he  shall  not  pay  the  interest  for  that 
year."  —  Code,  sec.  48.    [We  have  used  throughout  Harper's  translation.] 


50         HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

burning,  cutting  out  the  tongue,  gouging  out  the  eyes,  cutting 
off  the  fingers,  breaking  the  bones  of  the  hands  were  common 
penalties. 

Sometimes  the  punishment  was  measured  by  the  primitive 
principle  of  the  Lex  talionis ;  it  was  eye  for  eye,  bone  for 
bone,  tooth  for  tooth.1  This  law  of  retaliation  was  carried  out 
so  rigorously  as  to  result  in  the  punishment  of  the  innocent 
for  the  guilty.  Thus  if  a  man  caused  the  death  of  another 
man's  daughter,  the  law  required  that  his  own  daughter 
should  be  put  to  death.2  If  a  builder,  through  the  faulty 
construction  of  a  house,  caused  the  death  of  the  son  of  the 
owner  through  the  falling  of  the  house,  the  son  of  the  builder 
was  to  be  put  to  death.3  It  is  in  these  provisions  of  the  code 
that  we  find  the  greatest  divergence  between  the  Babylonian 
feeling  and  our  own  as  to  what  is  right  and  just.  Yet  this 
Babylonian  conscience  which  sanctioned  the  visiting  of  the 
iniquity  of  the  father  upon  the  children  is  a  conscience  which 
we  shall  meet  with  in  societies  much  more  advanced  than 
that  for  which  the  Hammurabi  code  was  formulated. 

The  Babylonian  conscience  in  regard  to  slavery  as  embod- 
ied in  the  code  was  about  like  our  own  conscience  respecting 
negro  slavery  of  a  generation  or  two  ago.  The  slave  was 
viewed  as  a  mere  chattel,  and  the  master  possessed  over  him 
the  power  of  life  and  death.  Kind  treatment,  however,  was 
enjoined  by  the  law.  There  was  a  fugitive-slave  law  which 
reads  curiously  like  our  negro-slave  laws  of  two  generations 
ago,  in  which  the  aiding  and  harboring  of  a  fugitive  slave  is 
made  a  crime  punishable  with  death.4 

1  Cade,  sees.  196,  197,  200.  Cf.  similar  provisions  of  the  Mosaic  code : 
Ex.  xxi.  23-25;  Deut.  xix.  21. 

2  Ibid.  sees.  209,  210.  3  Ibid.  sees.  229,  230. 

4  The  provisions  read :  "  If  a  man  aid  a  male  or  female  slave  of  the 
palace,  or  a  male  or  female  slave  of  a  freeman  to  escape  from  the  city 
gate,  he  shall  be  put  to  death." 

"  If  a  man  harbor  in  his  home  a  male  or  female  slave  who  has  fled  from 
the  palace  or  from  a  freeman,  and  do  not  bring  him  [the  slave]  forth  at  the 


tional  mo- 
war 
ethics 


THE  BABYLONIAN-ASSYRIAN  CONSCIENCE      51 

The  slave  class  was  recruited,  as  in  other  lands  of  the 
ancient  world,  from  prisoners  of  war,  foundlings,  debtors, 
criminals,  and  through  the  sale  by  fathers  and  husbands  of 
their  children  and  wives.  The  system  seems  to  have  under- 
gone no  essential  changes  or  ameliorations,  such  as  we  shall 
see  effected  in  the  Hebrew  system,  by  growth  in  ethical  feel- 
ing during  the  four  thousand  years  of  Babylonian  history.  It 
is  true  that  enfranchisement  of  slaves  was  not  uncommon, 
the  freed  man  becoming  the  dependent  of  his  old  master, 
but  it  does  not  appear  that  moral  sentiment  .afforded  the 
motive  for  manumission.1 

The  international  ethics  of  the  Babylonians  and  Assyrians  interna 
was  in  every  essential  respect  the  international  ethics  of  their  amy 
age  in  the  Semitic  world.  It  was  the  character  of  the  religion 
of  these  peoples  which  determined  in  large  measure  inter- 
national relations  in  the  Mesopotamian  lands  throughout  the 
period  of  Semitic  ascendancy.  "  The  conception  of  religion  as 
an  alliance  between  God  and  man  against  other  peoples  and 
their  gods  never  ceased  in  Mesopotamia."  2  This  conception 
was  essentially  the  same  as  that  held  by  the  Hebrews  down 
to  the  time  of  the  great  prophets.  "  Let  us  go  up  against 
them,  for  our  god  is  greater  than  their  god,"  is  the  war  cry 
of  four  thousand  years  of  history  of  the  Semitic  world. 

The  Assyrians  far  surpassed  the  Babylonians  in  their  fero- 
cious cruelty  in  the  treatment  of  war  captives.  Notwithstand- 
ing their  advanced  morality  in  some  departments  of  life,  in 
this  domain  they  stood,  if  we  except  the  practice  of  cannibal- 
ism, on  practically  the  same  level  as  savages.  Witness  the 
following  inscription  of  Assur-natsir-pal,  in  which  he  tells  of 
his  treatment  of  certain  prisoners  of  war :  M  The  nobles,  as 
many  as  had  revolted,  I  flayed ;  with  their  skins  I  covered 

call  of  the  commandant,  the  owner  of  that  house  shall  be  put  to  death  " 
(Code,  sees.  15,  16). 

1  Maspero,  The  Dawn  of  Civilization,  p.  744. 

2  Taylor,  Ancient  Ideals  (1896),  vol.  i,  p.  41. 


52  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

the  pyramid.  Some  [of  these]  I  immured  in  the  midst  of  the 
pyramid ;  others  above  the  pyramid  I  impaled  on  stakes.  .  .  . 
Three  thousand  of  their  captives  I  burned  with  fire.  I  left 
not  one  alive  among  them  to  become  a  hostage.  ...  I  cut 
off  the  hands  [and]  feet  of  some ;  I  cut  off  the  noses,  tfye  ears 
[and]  the  fingers  of  others  ;  the  eyes  of  the  numerous  soldiers 
I  put  out.  In  the  middle  [of  them]  I  suspended  their  heads 
on  vine  stems  in  the  neighborhood  of  their  city.  Their  young 
men  [and]  their  maidens  I  burned  as  a  holocaust."  1 

The  significant  thing  here  is  not  so  much  the  fact  that 
these  things  were  done,  as  the  fact  that  the  king  exults  in 
having  done  them  and  thinks  to  immortalize  himself  by 
portraying  them  upon  imperishable  stone.  The  careful  way 
in  which  to-day  all  reference  to  atrocities  of  this  character, 
when  in  the  fury  of  battle  they  are  inflicted  upon  a  savage 
enemy,  are  suppressed  by  those  responsible  for  them,  and  the 
indignant  condemnation  of  them  by  the  public  opinion  of  the 
civilized  world,  measures  the  moral  progress*  humanity  has 
made  even  along  those  lines  on  which  progress  has  been  so 
painfully  slow  and  halting.2 

1  Records  of  the  Past,  New  Series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  143  ff. 

2  "  The  white  man  has  no  doubt  committed  great  barbarities  upon  the 
savage,  but  he  does  not  like  to  speak  of  them,  and  when  necessity  compels 
a  reference  he  has  always  something  to  say  of  manifest  destiny,  the  advance 
of  civilization  and  the  duty  of  shouldering  the  white  man's  burden  in  which, 
he  pays  tribute  to  a  higher  ethical  conscience"  (Hobhouse,  Morals  in  Evo- 
lution (1906),  vol.  i,  p.  27).  King  Leopold  may  have  been  responsible  for 
barbarities  committed  against  the  natives  of  the  Kongo  as  atrocious  as 
those  of  the  Assyrians,  but  he  paid  tribute  to  the  modern  conscience  by 
refraining  from  portraying  them  in  imperishable  marble  at  The  Hague. 


CHAPTER  V 

CHINESE  MORALS:    AN   IDEAL  OF  FILIAL  PIETY 
I.  Ideas,  Institutions,  and  Historical  Circumstances 

DETERMINING   THE   CAST    OF  THE   MORAL   IDEAL 

With  the  exception  of  the  teachers  of  the  ancient  Hebrews,  introduc- 
the  leaders  of  thought  of  no  people  have  so  insistently  inter-  ory 
preted  life  and  history  in  terms  of  ethics  as  have  the  sages 
of  the  Chinese  race.  And,  excepting  the  Hebrew  teachers,  no 
moralists  have  so  emphasized  duties  while  leaving  rights  — 
upon  which  the  Western  world  in  modern  times  has  laid 
such  stress  —  to  take  care  of  themselves.1 

It  cannot  fail  to  enhance  our  interest  in  a  study  of  the  ideal 
upheld  by  these  teachers  of  morality,  if  we  recall  that  this 
ideal  of  character  has  for  upwards  of  three  thousand  years  ex- 
ercised an  incalculable  influence  upon  the  moral  life  of  prob- 
ably a  fourth  of  the  human  race  and  is  the  cement  of  a  social 
structure  that  has  outlasted  all  others  of  the  ancient  world. 

The  cast  of  this  moral  ideal  affords  a  good  illustration  of  the 
way  in  which  the  moral  type  of  a  people  is  molded  by  religious 
and  philosophical  ideas,  social  institutions,  race  experiences, 
and  physical  environment.  Following  our  usual  method  of  ex- 
position we  shall  begin  our  examination  of  Chinese  morality  by 
first  casting  a  glance  at  some  of  the  agencies  which  have  been 
especially  influential  in  the  creation  of  the  ethical  standard. 

There  are  two  religious  elements  in  Confucianism  which  have  Confucian- 
special  significance  for  Chinese  morality.   These  are,  first,  the  stat'e  wor- 
state  worship  of  Heaven  and  of  the  lesser  gods  of  the  sky  and  Heaven  and 
earth  ;  and  second,  the  popular  cult  of  ancestral  spirits.  SwsSpof 

ancestors 
1  Cf.  Martin,  The  Lore  of  Cathay  (1901),  p.  226. 

53 


54  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

The  worship  of  Heaven,  the  supreme  deity,  is  a  state 
function ;  that  is,  it  is  a  matter  which  is  left  entirely  to  the 
Emperor  and  the  magistrates.  Consequently  those  duties  to 
God,  that  is,  to  a  being  looked  upon  as  Creator  and  Father, 
—  duties  of  reverence,  love,  and  worship,  which  fill  so  large 
a  place  in  the  moral  ideals  of  Judaism  and  Christianity, — 
find  scarcely  any  place  among  the  duties  enjoined  upon  the 
multitude  by  Confucianism.1 

The  worship  of  ancestors  is  the  essential  and  popular  ele- 
ment of  Confucianism.  Commenting  on  the  ethical  value  of 
this  cult,  Dr.  Martin  affirms  that  "  in  respect  to  moral  effi- 
ciency, it  would  appear  to  be  only  second  to  that  of  faith  in 
the  presence  of  an  all-seeing  Deity."  2  The  constant  and  rev- 
erent dwelling  upon  the  virtues  of  their  ancestors  has  exalted 
the  virtue  of  filial  piety  among  the  Chinese  to  the  highest 
place  in  their  ideal  of  character  and  has  helped  to  make  re- 
spect for  what  is  old,  for  what  has  been  handed  down  from 
ancestral  ages,  a  highly  prized  virtue  and  a  distinguishing 
trait  of  the  race  character. 

In  an  indirect  way  also  ancestor  worship  has  exerted  a 
great  influence  upon  the  moral  life  of  the  Chinese  people, 
for  this  worship  is  necessarily  a  family  cult  and  must  be 
cared  for  by  the  head  of  the  family.  This  has  prevented  the 
growth  of  a  priestly  caste  in  Confucian  China.  The  absence 
of  a  powerful  national  priesthood  has  been  a  great  boon  to 
Chinese  morality.  The  place  thus  left  vacant  has  been  filled 
by  the  literati,  or  learned  class,3  whose  influence  upon  the 

1  Though  the  people  are  shut  out  from  participation  in  the  state  worship, 
they  have  set  up  for  themselves  a  multitude  of  local  shrines  where  they 
worship  the  spirits  of  almost  every  earthly  thing,  such  as  mountains,  rivers, 
trees,  and  rocks.  w  Men  debarred  from  communion  with  the  Great  Spirit 
resorted  more  eagerly  to  inferior  spirits,  to  spirits  of  the  fathers,  and  to 
spirits  generally.  .  .  .  The  accredited  worship  of  ancestors,  with  that  of 
the  departed  great  added  to  it,  was  not  enough  to  satisfy  the  cravings  of 
men's  minds"  (Legge,  The  Religions  of  China  (1881),  p.  176). 

2  The  Lore  of  Cathay  (1901),  p.  274. 

8  Williams,  The  Middle  Kingdom  (1883),  vo1-  "1  P-  239- 


CHINESE  MORALS  55 

ethical  life  of  the  people  has,  without  question,  been  more 
beneficent  than  that  of  a  priestly  class  would  have  been.1 

Besides  peopling  the  invisible  world  with  beneficent  ances-  Demonism: 
tral  spirits,  the  Chinese  have  filled  heaven  and  earth  with  thenri2£ 
innumerable  demons  or  evil  spirits.    Even  the  souls  of  dead  Retributive 
men,  if  they  have  been  wronged  on  earth  or  if  their  wants  iustice 
since  death  have  been  undutifully  neglected,  may  become 
malignant,  revengeful  spirits.    These  demons  are  believed  to 
be  the  cause  of  all  kinds  of  diseases,  of  blight  and  famine, 
and  of  every  misfortune  befalling  men.2 

The  thing  about  this  Chinese  demonism  which  is  of  inter- 
est to  the  student  of  morals  is  that,  unlike  the  demonism  of 
Babylonia  (p.  46),  or  that  of  the  Middle  Ages  in  Europe,  it 
contains  a  distinct  ethical  element.  There  was  little  or  noth- 
ing ethical  in  the  Babylonian  or  the  medieval  belief  in  the 
existence  of  evil  spirits  because  the  good  man  and  the  bad 
were  indifferently  the  victims  of  their  malignant  activity.  But 
the  Chinese  have  moralized  their  demonism  and  conceive 
these  spirits  as  under  the  control  of  Heaven  and  without 
power  to  do  harm  without  Heaven's  commission  or  consent. 
They  thus  represent  retributive  justice  and  become  the  min- 
isters of  the  Supreme  Power  to  punish  evildoers,  like  Nem- 
esis and  the  Erinyes  of  the  Greeks.  It  is  this  ethical  side 
of  the  Chinese  belief  in  evil  spirits  which  causes  De  Groot, 
in  emphasizing  the  import  of  this  demonism  for  Chinese 
morality,  to  say  that  "  it  occupies  the  rank  of  moral  educator 

1  We  do  not  mention  Buddhism  in  this  connection  for  the  reason  that 
it  is  not  possible  to  trace  any  decisive  influence,  save  in  the  promotion  of 
toleration,  that  this  system  has  exercised  upon  Chinese  morality.  Bud- 
dhism enjoins  celibacy,  and  this,  like  Christian  asceticism,  is  in  radical  oppo- 
sition to  the  genius  of  Confucianism.  For  this  reason,  in  conjunction  with 
others,  —  among  these  its  early  degeneracy,  —  Buddhism  has  remained 
practically  inert  as  an  ethical  force  in  Chinese  society.  What  little  influ- 
ence it  has  exerted  has  been  confined  almost  wholly  to  the  monasteries. 

2  "  The  dread  of  spirits  is  the  nightmare  of  the  Chinaman's  life."  — 
Legge,  The  Religions  of  China  (1881),  p.  197. 


56  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

of  the  people,  and  has  fulfilled  a  great  mission  to  many  thou- 
sands of  millions  who  have  lived  and  died  on  Asiatic  soil. 
Demonism,  the  lowest  form  of  religion,  in  China  a  source  of 
ethics  and  moral  education  —  this  certainly  may  be  called  a 
singular  phenomenon,  perhaps  the  only  one  of  its  kind  to  be 
found  on  this  terrestrial  globe."  ! 

Taoism:  Next  to  Confucianism  and  demonism,  Taoism  has  been 

exemplar  the  most  important  moral  force  in  the  life  of  the  Chinese 
people.  Taoism  was  originally  a  lofty  philosophical  ethical 
system  out  of  which  was  developed  later  a  religion.2  The 
philosophy,  however,  has  always  remained  something  quite 
distinct  from  the  religious  system. 

The  essence  of  Taoism  is  the  pantheistic  doctrine  that  the 
universe,  or  nature,  is  God.  The  ethical  character  of  the  uni- 
verse is  revealed  in  its  way  or  method,  which  is  Tao.  Now 
the  characteristics  of  nature  as  disclosed  in  its  method  of 
operation  are  constancy — "heaven  never  diverges  from  its 
course  "  ;  unselfishness  —  "  the  earth  nourishes  all  things  "  ; 
impartiality — "the  earth  brings  forth  its  fruits  for  all  alike" ; 
placidity  —  "  heaven  is  calm,  serene,  passionless  "  ;  humility 
— the  sun  which  "after  shining  sets,"  the  moon  which  "after 
fullness,  wanes,"  the  warmth  of  summer  which  "  when  it 
has  finished  its  work  retires,"  water  which  "seeks  the  lowest 
place,"  all  these  are  symbols  of  "  nature's  humility."  3 

What  gives  these  interpretations  of  the  ethical  qualities 
of  nature  their  importance  for  human  morality  is  that  man's 
highest  duty  is  to  imitate  the  universe,  to  behave  as  nature 
behaves.4    "Taoism  is  the  exhibition  of  a  way  or  method  of 

1  The  Religion  of  the  Chinese  (1910),  p.  34. 

2  The  Taoist  doctrines  are  contained  in  the  Tao-teh-king,  supposed  to 
have  been  written  by  Lao-tsze,  a  sage  who  lived  in  the  fifth  century  B.C. 
The  religion  which  grew  out  of  his  philosophy  became  in  time  degenerate, 
absorbed  the  worst  elements  of  Buddhism,  and  is  to-day  a  system  of  gross 
superstitions,  magic,  and  sorcery,  which  has  undeniably  a  blighting  -effect 
upon  morality. 

8  De  Groot,  The  Religion  of  the  Chinese  (1910),  pp.  139  ff.       4  Ibid.  138. 


CHINESE  MORALS  57 

living  which  frien  should  cultivate  as  the  brightest  and  purest 
development  of  their  nature."1  "  The  true  Taoist  then  is 
the  man  who  unites  in  himself  [the]  virtues  or  qualities  of  the 
universe,  including  the  constant  virtues."2  Man's  way  must 
be  nature's  way  (Tao).  The  perfect  man  must  cultivate  con- 
stancy, unselfishness,  impartiality,  benevolence,  impassibility, 
serenity,  humility,  and  quietness,  for  these  are  the  character- 
istics of  the  universe.3 

This  Taoist  code  is  designed  especially  for  rulers.4  He 
who  has  assimilated  all  his  virtues  to  the  virtues  of  nature  is 
qualified  to  administer  government.5  It  is  in  the  qualities  of 
character  cultivated  by  the  highest-minded  ministers  and  man- 
darins, and  in  the  state  worship  and  official  customs  that  we 
are  to  look  for  the  main  ethical  influence  of  the  doctrines 
of  Taoism.6 

"The  tendency  of  man's  nature  to  good,"  says  Mencius,  The  concep- 
ts like  the  tendency  of  water  to  flow  downwards."  7   Just  as  human 
the  theological  dogma  that  man's  nature  is  hereditarily  cor- 
rupt, with  a  proneness  to  evil,  has  shaped  and  colored  a  large 
part  of  Christian  ethics,  so  has  this  opposing  conception  of 
human  nature  as  good  exercised  a  tremendous  influence  upon 

1  Legge,  The  Religions  of  China  (1881),  p.  229. 

2  De  Groot,  The  Religion  of  the  Chinese  (1910),  p.  143. 

3  Nietzscheism  is  in  essence  at  one  with  Taoism.  Nietzsche  insists  that 
man  should  behave  as  Nature  behaves ;  for  instance,  that  the  strong  should 
prey  upon  the  weak.  The  difference  between  Lao-tsze  and  Nietzsche  lies 
in  their  different  readings  of  the  essential  qualities  of  the  universe. 
See  below,  p.  355. 

4  Taoism  is  too  lofty  a  doctrine  for  the  multitude.  They  are  enjoined 
to  imitate  the  ancient  sages,  and  as  these  imitated  the  way  of  heaven  and 
earth,  in  imitating  them  they  are  really  imitating  the  universe. 

6  De  Groot,  The  Religion  of  the  Chinese  (1910),  p.  143. 

6  The.  imitation  of  the  qualities  of  nature  "  have  given  existence  to 
important  state  institutions,  considered,  to  be  for  the  nation  and  rulers 
matters  of  life  and  death"  (De  Groot,  The  Religion  of  the  Chinese  (1910), 

P-  139)- 

7  The  Works  of  Mencius  (The  Chinese  Classics,  2d  ed.,  vol.  ii),  bk.  vi, 

pt.  i,  chap,  ii,  2. 


nature  as 
good 


58  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

the  ethical  ideal  of  the  Chinese  race.1  For  if  man's  nature 
is  good,  then  for  him  to  live  conformably  to  his  nature  is  to 
live  rationally,  that  is,  morally.  "  To  nourish  one's  nature," 
declared  Mencius,  "  is  the  way  to  secure  heaven."  2 

Objections  to  this  view  of  human  nature,  based  on  the  fact 
that  men  are  actually  very  different  in  moral  character,  are 
met  by  saying  that  this  difference  is  the  effect  of  environ- 
ment, just  as  the  inequalities  in  the  yield  of  barley  seed  are 
due  not  to  a  difference  in  the  nature  of  the  grain  but  to  the 
different  qualities  of  the  soil.3  In  a  word,  it  is  the  social  envi- 
ronment —  instruction  and  example  —  which  determines  the 
character  of  men.  "By  nature,"  says  Confucius,  "men  are 
nearly  alike ;  by  practice  they  get  to  be  far  apart."  4 

As  we  shall  see,  it  makes  a  vast  difference  in  a  man's  con- 
ception as  to  what  he  ought  to  do, —  as  to  how  he  should  reg- 
ulate his  life, — whether  he  believes  his  nature  to  be  inclined 
to  virtue  and  all  his  instincts,  impulses,  and  appetites  to  be 
good,  or  believes  his  nature  to  be  corrupt  and  all  his  instincts 
and  appetencies  to  be  evil. 

conception        Another  conception  that  has  had  a  molding  influence  upon 
L  perfect     the  moral  ideal  of  China  is  the  conception  of  the  past  as  per- 
fect without  any  historic  lapse  from  this  perfection.   To  under- 
stand the  import  of  this  in  the  ethical  history  of  China  we 

1  B  This  inference  [that  man  is  naturally  good]  comes  into  prominence 
in  the  classics  as  a  dogma,  and  therefore  has  been  the  principal  basis  of  all 
Taoistic  and  Confucian  ethics  to  this  day"  (De  Groot,  The  Religion  of  the 
Chinese  (1910),  p.  137).  Every  schoolboy  is  taught  this  doctrine:  "Man 
commences  life  with  a  virtuous  nature"  (Martin,  The  Lore  of  Cathay  (1901), 
p.  217). 

2  The  Works  of  Mencius,  bk.  vii,  pt.  i,  chap,  ii,  2.  And  so  Confucius : 
"  An  accordance  with  this  nature  [man's]  is  called  the  Path  of  Duty  "  ( The 
Doctrine  of  the  Mean,  chap,  i ;  The  Chinese  Classics,  2d  ed.,  vol.  i). 

8  The  Works  of  Mencius,  bk.  vi,  pt.  i,  chap,  vii,  2,  3. 

4  Confucian  Analects  (The  Chinese  Classics,  2d  ed.,  vol.  i),  bk.  xvii, 
chap.  ii.  The  student  of  biology  will  see  in  this  view  an  anticipation  of 
the  latest  teaching  of  modern  science  in  respect  to  the  relative  importance 
of  heredity  and  education  in  the  determining  of  character. 


CHINESE  MORALS  59 


must  compare  it  with  the  theological  conception  of  the  fall 
of  man.  This  conception  determined  what  should  be  the  sav- 
ing virtues  of  the  historic  ethical  ideal  of  the  Western  world, 
making  them  to  be  theological  in  character  and  having  to 
do  with  man's  restoration  from  an  hereditary  fallen  state. 

Now  the  Chinese,  instead  of  believing  in  the  lapse  of  man 
from  a  state  of  original  innocence,  conceive  the  past  as  per- 
fect. This  interpretation  of  history  has  had  the  effect  of  mak- 
ing reverence  for  the  past,  for  the  customs,  institutions,  and 
teachings  of  the  fathers,  a  chief  virtue  of  the  moral  ideal.1 
The  far-reaching  consequences  for  Chinese  life  and  history 
which  the  emphasis  laid  upon  this  virtue  has  had  will  be  the 
subject  of  remark  a  little  further  on. 

Again,  the  moral  development  of  the  Chinese  people  has  Geograph- 
been  profoundly  influenced  by  the  geographical  isolation  of  JSrteuectuai 
China.   From  the  earliest  times  down  almost  to  the  present  1S0latl0n 
day  China  was  shut  out  from  intercourse  with  the  civilized 
and  progressive  nations  of  the  West,  and  was  surrounded  by 
neighbors  greatly  her  inferior  in  intellectual,  social,  and  moral 
culture.    The  effect  of  this  isolation  upon  the  Chinese  was 
to  foster  in  them  an  exaggerated  self-esteem  and  a  feeling  of 
contempt  for  foreigners.    In  this  respect  the  masses  are  still 
ethically  in  that  stage  of  development  that  the  Greeks  were 
in  when  they  looked  contemptuously  upon  all  non-Greeks  as 
"barbarians." 

In  still  another  way  has  the  physical  and  intellectual  isola- 
tion of  the  Chinese  people  reacted  upon  their  ethical  life. 
This  isolation  has  prevented  progress  beyond  a  certain  stage, 
and  where  there  is  no  progress  or  very  slow  progress  there 
is  likely  to  grow  up  an  undue  attachment  to  ways  and  customs 
that  are  old.    This  is  what  has  happened  in  China,  and  this 

1  n  There  is  nothing  in  this  world  so  dangerous  for  the  national  safety, 
public  health  and  welfare  as  heterodoxy,  which  means  acts,  institutions, 
doctrines  not  based  upon  the  classics."  —  De  Groot,  The  Religion  of  the 
Chinese  (1910),  p.  48. 


6o 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


The  appear- 
ance of 
great  men: 
Confucius 

and  Men- 
cius 


has  worked  together  with  the  worship  of  ancestors  to  create 
one  of  the  main  requirements  of  the  ideal  of  character,  namely, 
reverence  for  the  past. 

Besides  the  various  agencies  already  passed  under  review, 
the  teachings  of  two  great  moralists,  Confucius  and  Mencius, 
have  been  a  vital  force  in  the  shaping  of  the  moral  ideal  of 
China.  The  greater  of  these  sages  was  Confucius  (55 1- 
478  b.c.)  He  was  unimaginative  and  practical.  He  was  not 
an  original  thinker.  His  mission  was  not  to  found  a  new  re- 
ligion or  hold  up  a  new  ideal  of  character,  but  to  give  new 
force  and  effectiveness  to  the  already  existing  moral  code  of 
his  time  and  people.1  His  teachings  were  especially  effective 
in  giving  filial  piety  the  fixed  place  it  holds  in  the  moral  ideal 
of  his  countrymen. 

The  influence  of  Mencius  (371-288  B.C.),  whose  teachings 
are  characterized  by  an  emphatic  denunciation  of  the  wicked- 
ness of  war,  is  to  be  traced  particularly  in  the  low  place  which 
is  assigned  in  the  Chinese  standard  of  character  to  the  mar- 
tial virtues,  and  the  general  disesteem  in  which  the  military 
life  is  held. 


The  four 
cardinal 
virtues 


II.  The  Ideal 

Chiefly  under  the  molding  influence  of  the  agencies  no- 
ticed in  the  preceding  sections,  there  was  shaped  in  early 
times  in  China  one  of  the  most  remarkable  moral  ideals  of 
history,  an  ideal  which  has  been  a  guiding  and  controlling 
force  in  the  moral  life  of  probably  more  of  the  human  race 
than  any  other  of  the  ethical  ideals  of  mankind. 

The  duties  given  the  highest  place  in  this  standard  of 
character  are  filial  obedience,  reverence  for  superiors,  a  con- 
forming to  ancient  custom,  and  the  maintenance  of  the  just 
medium.   The  man  who  is  carefully  observant  of  these  duties 


1  Confucius  thus  describes  himself :  "  A  transmitter  and  not  a  maker, 
believing  in  and  loving  the  ancients  "  {Confucian  Analects,  bk.  vii,  chap.  i). 


CHINESE  MORALS  61 

is  looked  upon  in  China  as  a  man  of  superior  excellence.  In 
the  following  pages  we  shall  speak  with  some  detail  of  each 
of  these  requirements  of  the  ethical  ideal. 

In  an  analysis  of  the  symbols  used  in  the  Chinese  system  Filial  obe- 
of  writing  Dr.  Legge  points  out  the  significant  fact  that  one  pjgty6  °r 
of  the  oldest  of  these  characters,  the  one  standing  for  filial 
piety,  was  originally  the  picture  of  a  youth  upholding  on  his 
shoulders  an  old  man.1  In  this  worn-down  symbol  is  embodied 
the  fundamental  fact  in  the  moral  life  of  the  Chinese  people. 
It  tells  us  that  the  first  of  family  virtues,  filial  piety,  the  virtue 
that  formed  the  basis  of  the  strength  and  greatness  of  early 
Rome,  constituted  also  the  firm  foundation  upon  which  the 
enduring  fabric  of  Chinese  society  was  raised.  The  whole 
framework  of  the  social  structure  is  modeled  on  the  family, 
and  all  relations  and  duties  are  assimilated,  in  so  far  as 
possible,  to  those  of  the  domestic  circle. 

In  no  other  of  the  moral  ideals  of  history  do  we  find  a 
more  prominent  place  given  the  duties  of  children  toward 
their  parents.  It  was  ancestor  worship,  doubtless,  as  we  have 
already  said,  which  gave  these  duties  this  foremost  place  in 
the  moral  code,  and  which  through  all  the  millenniums  of 
Chinese  history  has  maintained  for  them  the  highest  place 
in  the  Chinese  standard  of  moral  excellence.2  The  Classic 
of  Filial  Piety  declares  :  "The  services  of  love  and  reverence 
to  parents  when  alive,  and  those  of  grief  and  sorrow  to  them 
when  dead  —  these  completely  discharge  the  fundamental  duty 
of  living  men."3  "The  Master  said  :  *  There  are  three  thou- 
sand offenses  against  which  the  five  punishments  are  directed, 
and  there  is  not  one  of  them  greater  than  being  unfilial.'  "  4 

1  The  Religions  of  China  (1881),  p.  255. 

2  Chinese  literature  bears  unique  testimony  to  the  high  consideration  in 
which  the  virtue  of  filial  devotion  and  reverence  is  held.  It  abounds  in  anec- 
dotes exalting  this  virtue,  holding  up  great  exemplars  of  it  for  imitation  by 
the  Chinese  youth.    See  Doolittle,  Social  Life  of  the  Chinese. 

3  The  Hsiao  King  (Sacred  Books  of  the  East,  vol.  iii),  chap,  xviii. 

4  Ibid.  chap.  xi. 


62 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


Reverence 

toward 

superiors 


A  conform- 
ing to 
ancient 
custom 


The  punishments  which  the  Chinese  laws  enjoin  for  un- 
filial  conduct  bear  witness  to  the  high  estimation  in  which 
the  Chinese  moralists  and  rulers  hold  the  virtue  of  filial 
obedience  and  reverence.  Thus  a  parent  may,  with  the  con- 
sent of  the  maternal  uncle,  require  a  magistrate  to  whip  to 
death  an  unfilial  son.1  A  parricide  is  beheaded,  his  body  cut 
in  pieces,  his  house  torn  down,  his  neighbors  are  punished, 
his  chief  teacher  is  put  to  death,  and  the  magistrates  of  the 
district  in  which  he  lived  are  degraded  or  deposed.2 

Filial  piety  is  regarded  by  Chinese  moralists  as  the  root 
out  of  which  grow  all  other  virtues.  Immediately  out  of  this 
root  springs  the  duty  of  obedience  and  reverence  toward  all 
superiors.  This  is  the  corner  stone  of  the  Chinese  system  of 
political  ethics.  "  In  the  family  life,"  in  the  words  of  Jernigan, 
"  may  be  seen  the  larger  life  of  the  empire."  3 

We  have  here  the  third  of  the  cardinal  duties,  the  duty 
which  in  practice  constitutes  the  heart  and  core  of  Chinese 
morality.4  The  commandment  is,  Follow  the  ancients ;  walk 
in  the  trodden  paths ;  let  to-day  be  like  yesterday.  This  duty, 
as  we  have  already  noticed,  springs  from  the  Chinese  con- 
ception of  the  past  as  perfect.  If  that  past  be  perfect,  then 
of  course  it  becomes  the  duty  of  living  men  to  make  the  pres- 
ent like  unto  it,  and  in  no  case  to  depart  from  the  customs 
and  practices  of  the  fathers. 

We  can  easily  make  the  Chinese  view  in  this  matter  intel- 
ligible to  ourselves  by  recalling  how  we  have  been  wont  to 
regard  the  religious  past  of  that  Hebrew  world  of  which  we 
are  the  heirs.  Sanctity  in  our  minds  has  attached  to  it  all, 
and  we  regard  any  departure  from  the  teachings  and  com- 
mandments of  that  past  to  be  a  fault,  even  a  species  of 
wickedness  deserving  eternal  punishment. 

1  Doolittle,  Social  Life  of  the  Chinese  (1868),  p.  103. 

2  Ibid.  p.  103.  8  China  in  Law  and  Commerce  (1905),  p.  34. 

4  "  The  chief  characteristic  of  Chinese  society  and  the  essence  of  Chinese 
morality  is  reverence  for  the  past."  —  Reinsch,  World  Politics  (1900),  p.  90. 


medium 


CHINESE  MORALS  63 

Now  in  China  this  idea  of  sanctity,  which  among  ourselves 
attaches  only  to  the  religious  side  of  life,  has  attached  to  all 
phases  of  life,  to  government,  to  society,  to  art,  to  science, 
to  trade  and  commerce  —  to  all  of  the  ideas,  ways,  and  cus- 
toms of  antiquity.  As  their  fathers  did,  so  must  the  children 
do.  They  must  deem  worthy  what  their  fathers  deemed  worthy 
and  love  what  their  fathers  loved.1  He  who  departs  from  the 
beliefs  and  practices  of  the  ancients  is  regarded  as  irrever- 
ent and  immoral,  just  as  he  who  with  us  departs  from  the 
beliefs  and  customs  of  the  fathers  in  religion  is  looked  upon 
as  presumptuous  and  irreligious. 

The  virtue  with  which  we  here  have  to  do  is  akin  to  the  The  main- 
Greek  virtue  of  moderation.  It  consists  in  never  going  to  thrust  ° 
extremes,  in  avoiding  excess  in  everything,  in  being  always 
well  balanced,  standing  in  the  middle,  and  leaning  not  to 
either  side ;  "  to  go  beyond  is  as  wrong  as  to  fall  short."  2 
One  of  the  sacred  books  of  the  Chinese,  called  Chung  Yung, 
which  is  ascribed  to  a  grandson  of  Confucius,  and  in  which  is 
portrayed  an  ideally  perfect  character,  The  Princely  Man, 
celebrates  this  virtue  of  the  just  medium.3  This  portraiture 
of  the  perfect  man,  held  up  as  a  pattern  for  imitation  to  the 
successive  generations  of  Chinese  youth,  has  been  a  molding 
force  in  the  moral  life  of  the  Chinese  race.4 

1  The  Great  Learning  (The  Chinese  Classics,  2d  ed.,  vol.  i),  chap,  iii,  5. 

2  Confucian  Analects,  bk.  xi,  chap,  xv,  3. 

3  It  is  interesting  to  compare  the  portraiture  of  The  Princely  Man,  as 
depicted  by  the  pagan  Chinese  moralist,  with  that  of  The  Prince,  as  por- 
trayed by  Machiavelli. 

4  w  The  standard  of  excellence  [in  The  Princely  Man]  is  placed  so  high 
as  to  be  absolutely  unattainable  by  unaided  human  nature ;  and  though 
[the  author]  probably  intended  to  elevate  the  character  of  his  grandfather 
[Confucius]  to  this  height,  and  thus  hand  him  down  to  future  ages  as  a 
shingj'in,  or f  perfect  and  holy  man,'  he  has  in  the  providence  of  God  done 
his  countrymen  great  service  in  setting  before  them  such  a  character  as  is 
here  given  in  the  Chung  Yung.  By  being  made  a  text-book  in  the  schools 
it  has  been  constantly  studied  and  memorized  by  generations  of  students 
to  their  great  benefit."  —  Williams,  The  Middle  Kingdom  (1883),  vol.  i, 
PP-  655  f- 


64 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


The  duty 
of  intellec- 
tual self- 
culture   . 


The  duties 
of  rulers 


Having  now  spoken  of  the  four  cardinal  virtues  of  the  Chi- 
nese standard  of  excellence,  we  shall  next  proceed  to  speak 
more  briefly  of  several  other  virtues,  which,  though  not  given 
the  most  prominent  place  in  the  ideal,  are  nevertheless 
assigned  a  high  place  among  the  virtues  exemplified  by  the 
perfect  man. 

First  among  these  we  note  that  of  intellectual  self-culture. 
Concerning  this  virtue  and  duty  the  Chinese  sages  have 
thoughts  like  those  of  the  Greek  teachers.  Confucius  taught 
that  true  morality  is  practically  dependent  upon  learning.  "  It 
is  not  easy,"  he  says,  "  to  find  a  man  who  has  learned  for  three 
years  without  coming  to  be  good."  1  Here  we  have,  as  in  the 
teachings  of  the  Greek  philosophers,  knowledge  made  almost 
identical  with  goodness.  Intellectual  culture  and  good  morals 
run  together.  Again  the  Master,  speaking  of  the  ancients,  says  : 
"  Their  knowledge  being  complete,  their  thoughts  were  sincere ; 
their  thoughts  being  sincere,  their  hearts  were  then  rectified."2 
"  How  would  it  be  possible,"  asks  Lao-tsze,  V  to  go  forward  in 
one's  knowledge  and  go  backward  in  one's  morals  ?  "  3 

This  commendation  of  learning  by  the  sages,  as  we  shall 
see  further  on,  gave  a  great  impulse  to  the  educational  system 
of  China. 

The  teachings  of  Chinese  moralists  are  especially  marked 
by  the  emphasis  laid  upon  the  duties  of  rulers.  In  the  times 
of  Confucius  there  was  lack  of  union  between  the  different 
provinces,  and  China  was  in  a  state  bordering  on  political 
anarchy.  A  chief  aim  of  the  teachings  of  the  Master  was  to 
correct  this  condition  of  things  by  laying  stress  upon  the 
duties  of  those  in  authority.  Never  have  the  duties  of  rulers 
been  more  insistently  inculcated. 

In  the  first  place  Confucius  set  a  high  aim  for  the  state, 
an  aim  altogether  like  that  set  by  Plato  for  the  ideal  Greek 


1  Confucian  Analects,  bk.  viii,  chap.  xii. 

2  The  Great  Learning  (text),  par.  5. 

8  Quoted  by  Pfleiderer,  Religions  and  Historic  Faiths, 


p.  96. 


CHINESE  MORALS  65 

city.  He  makes  the  end  of  government  to  be  virtue  and 
not  wealth.  Its  aim  should  be  to  promote  goodness  and  not 
merely  material  prosperity :  "In  a  state,  pecuniary  gain  is 
not  to  be  considered  to  be  prosperity,  but  prosperity  will  be 
found  in  righteousness."1 

The  indispensable  qualification  in  the  ruler  is  goodness. 
"  The  love  of  what  is  good,"  declares  Mencius,  M  is  more 
than  a  sufficient  qualification  for  the  government  of  the  em- 
pire." 2  The  ruler  should  be  a  father  to  his  people,  kind  and 
benevolent,  should  instruct  them,  should  follow  the  laws  of 
the  ancient  kings,  should  be  a  model  for  his  subjects,  should 
leave  a  good  example  to  future  ages. 

Much  is  said  by  the  Master  respecting  the  influence  of 
the  example  set  by  the  ruler :  "When  the  ruler  as  a  father, 
a  son,  a  brother,  is  a  model,  then  the  people  imitate  him."3 
The  relation  between  superior  and  inferior  is  like  that  be- 
tween the  wind  and  the  grass  :  "The  grass  must  bend  when 
the  wind  blows  across  it."4  "  Never  has  there  been  a  case  of 
the  sovereign  loving  benevolence  and  the  people  not  loving 
righteousness."  5  "If  good  men  were  to  govern  a  country  in 
succession  for  a  hundred  years,  they  would  be  able  to  transform 
the  violently  bad  and  dispense  with  capital  punishment."  6 

But  there  has  never  been  such  a  succession  of  good  rulers 
in  China.  Respecting  the  influences  and  circumstances  which 
have  brought  about  a  great  discrepancy  between  the  ideal  and 
practice  we  shall  have  something  to  say  in  the  last  division 
of  this  chapter. 

The  Chinese  ideal  of  goodness  and  nobility  allows  no  place  Disesteem 
among  its  virtues  to  the  qualities  of  the  warrior,  which  have  heroic  or 

martial 
.  _     _  ,  virtues 

1  The  Great  Learning,  chap,  x,  22. 

2  The  Works  of  Mencius,  bk.  vi,  pt.  ii,  chap,  xiii,  6. 

3  The  Great  Learning,  chap,  ix,  8. 

4  Confucian  Analects,  bk.  xii,  chap.  xix. 
6  The  Great  Learning,  chap,  x,  21. 

6  Confucian  Analects,  bk.  xiii,  chap.  xi. 


66  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

in  general  been  given  such  a  prominent  place  in  the  moral 
ideals  of  almost  all  other  peoples  throughout  all  periods  of 
history.  Soldiers  hold  a  very  low  place  in  the  social  scale ;  they 
are  looked  upon  as  a  "pariah  class,"  and  their  life  is  re- 
garded as  degrading.  The  Emperor  of  China,  "  alone  among 
the  great  secular  rulers  of  the  world,  never  wears  a  sword."  * 

This  spirit  of  opposition  to  militarism  is  embodied  in  the 
teachings  of  the  great  moralist  Mencius.  "  The  warlike 
Western  world  has  scarcely  known  a  more  vigorous  and  sweep- 
ing protest  against  warfare  and  everything  connected  with 
it  and  every  principle  upon  which  it  is  based."  2  To  gain 
territory  by  the  slaughter  of  men  Mencius  declared  to  be 
contrary  to  the  principles  of  benevolence  and  righteousness.3 
He  speaks  as  follows  of  the  military  profession  :  "  There  are 
men  who  say,  I  am  skillful  at  marshaling  troops.  I  am  skill- 
ful in  conducting  a  battle.  They  are  great  criminals."  4  In 
Spring  and  Autumn,  a  chronicle  of  early  Chinese  history, 
he  declares,  "There  are  no  righteous  wars,"  though  he 
admits  that  one  might  be  better  than  another.5 

Confucius  also,  though  he  did  not  lay  the  stress  upon  the 
inherent  wickedness  of  war  that  was  placed  upon  it  by 
Mencius,  maintained  that  the  same  rules  of  morality  apply 
in  the  relations  of  nations  as  in  those  of  individuals,  and 
taught  that  differences  between  nations  should  be  settled  by 
arbitration  and  by  considerations  of  equity  and  justice,  not 
by  brute  force. 

Principles         It  is  often  affirmed  that  the  teachings  of  Chinese  moralists 
disposition    are  defective  in  that  they  consist  in  moral  precepts  rather 

1  Okakura-Kakuzo,  The  Ideals  of  the  East  (1905),  p.  239. 

2  Hobhouse,  Morals  in  Evolution  (1906),  vol.  i,  p.  265. 
8  The  Works  of  Mencius,  bk.  vi,  pt.  ii,  chap,  viii,  8. 

4  Ibid.  bk.  vii,  pt.  ii,  chap,  iv,  1. 

6  Ibid.  bk.  vii,  pt.  ii,  chap,  ii,  1.  While  denouncing  the  essential  wicked- 
ness of  war,  Mencius  sanctioned  rebellion  against  a  tyrannical  and  wicked 
ruler. 


CHINESE  MORALS  67 

than  in  moral  principles,  that  they  lay  stress  upon  the  observ- 
ance of  minute  rules  of  conduct  rather  than  upon  the  inner 
disposition.  There  is,  however,  in  the  body  of  ethical  teach- 
ings of  the  sages  no  lack  of  insistence  upon  principles  of 
conduct  and  upon  states  and  dispositions  of  mind  and  heart. 
All  must  be  right  within  the  heart,  says  Confucius,  for  "  what 
truly  is  within  will  be  manifested  without."1  "  Let  the  prince 
be  benevolent,"  says  Mencius,  "and  all  his  acts  will  be  benev- 
olent ;  let  the  prince  be  righteous  and  all  his  acts  will  be 
righteous."  2  Have  no  depraved  thoughts,  sums  up  the  con- 
tents of  the  three  hundred  pieces  in  the  Book  of  Poetry. 
"In  the  ceremony  of  mourning,"  says  Confucius  again,  "  it 
is  better  that  there  be  deep  sorrow  than  a  minute  attention 
to  observances."  3 

And  it  is  the  same  teaching  as  to  what  constitutes  true 
morality  which  we  find  in  such  sayings  as  these :  M  The  doc- 
trine of  our  Master  is  to  be  true  to  the  principles  of  our 
nature."4  "Man  is  born  for  uprightness,"5  and  he  should 
love  virtue  as  he  loves  beauty,6  for  its  own  sake. 

In  reciprocity  Confucius  found  that  same  comprehensive 
rule  of  conduct  which  is  rightly  regarded  as  one  of  the  noblest 
principles  of  Christian  morality.  Being  asked  if  there  was  one 
word  which  may  serve  as  a  rule  of  practice  for  all  one's  life,  the 
Master  said  :  "  Is  not  reciprocity  such  a  word  ?  What  you  do 
not  want  done  to  yourself,  do  not  do  to  others."  7 

And  surely  nothing  could  be  farther  from  mere  preceptorial 
teaching  than  these  words  of  Mencius  :  "  Let  a  man  not  do 
what  his  own  sense  of  righteousness  tells  him  not  to  do ;  .  .  . 

1  The  Great  Learning,  chap,  vi,  2. 

2  The  Works  of  Mencius,  bk.  iv,  pt.  i,  chap.  xx. 
8  Confucian  Analects,  bk.  iii,  chap,  iv,  3. 

4  Ibid.  bk.  iv,  chap,  xv,  2. 

5  Ibid.  bk.  vi,  chap.  xvii. 

6  Ibid.  bk.  ix,  chap.  xvii. 

7  Ibid.  bk.  xv,  chap,  xxiii.  The  same  precept  is  found  in  bk.  xii, 
chap,  ii,  of  the  Analects,  and  also  in  The  Doctrine  of  the  Mean,  chap,  xiii,  3. 


68  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

To  act  thus  is  all  he  has  to  do."  *  And  in  the  following 
utterances  the  sages  of  China  speak  with  an  accent  strangely 
like  that  of  the  Great  Prophet  of  Israel :  u  The  great  man  is 
he  who  does  not  lose  his  child  heart."2  Again,  "  I  like  life  ;  I 
also  like  righteousness.  If  I  cannot  keep  the  two  together,  I 
will  let  life  go  and  choose  righteousness."  3  Still  again :  "  With 
coarse  rice  to  eat,  with  water  to  drink,  and  my  bended  arm  for 
a  pillow —  I  have  still  joy  in  the  midst  of  these  things."  4 

In  the  following  Mencius  shows  that  he  understood  the 
moral  use  of  dark  things:  "When  Heaven  is  about  to  confer 
a  great  office  on  any  man,  it  first  exercises  his  mind  with  suf- 
fering and  his  sinews  and  bones  with  toil.  It  exposes  his 
body  to  hunger  and  subjects  him  to  extreme  poverty.  It  con- 
founds his  undertakings.  By  all  these  methods  it  stimulates 
his  mind,  hardens  his  nature,  and  supplies  his  incompeten- 
cies."5 And  again:  "  Life  springs  from  sorrow  and  calamity, 
and  death  from  ease  and  pleasure."  6  "Men  who  are  possessed 
of  intelligent  virtue  and  prudence  in  affairs  will  generally  be 
found  to  have  been  in  sickness  and  trouble."  7 

Defects  of  Regarded  from  our  point  of  view  the  Confucian  ideal  of 
no^utiesto  moral  character  has  serious  limitations  and  defects.  First,  it 
duties^ the  omits  practically  all  duties  to  God.  In  the  words  of  Dr.  Legge, 
parents  to     "man's  duty  to  God  is  left  to  take  care  of  itself."    God  or 

children  not-  J 

emphasized  Heaven  was  a  subject  of  which  Confucius  seldom  spoke,  and 
the  Chinese  have  in  this  matter  followed  the  example  of  the 
Master.    Heaven  is  not  in  all  their  thoughts. 

If  we  recall  what  an  influence  the  conception  of  a  supreme 
being  as  Creator  and  Father  has  exerted  upon  the  morality 
of  all  the  races  that  have  accepted  as  their  creed  the  ethical 

1  The  Works  of  Mencius,  bk.  vii,  pt.  i,  chap.  xvii. 

2  Ibid.  bk.  iv,  pt.  ii,  chap.  xii. 
8  Ibid.  bk.  vi,  pt.  i,  chap,  x,  i. 

4  Confucian  Analects,  bk.  vii,  chap.  xv. 

5  The  Works  of  Mencius,  bk.  vi,  pt.  ii,  chap,  xv,  2. 

6  Ibid.  bk.  vi,  pt.  ii,  chap,  xv,  5.  7  Ibid.  bk.  vii,  pt.  i,  chap,  xviii,  I. 


CHINESE  MORALS  69 

monotheism  of  the  Hebrew  teachers,  we  shall  realize  how 
fundamentally  the  Chinese  ideal  of  excellence  has  been  mod- 
ified by  the  omission  of  all  those  duties  which  have  entered 
into  our  own  moral  code  as  duties  owed  to  God.1 

Second,  while  laying  such  stress  upon  the  duties  of  chil- 
dren to  their  parents,  Confucianism  is  almost  silent  regarding 
the  duty  of  parents  to  their  children.  At  this  point  there  is 
a  wide  divergence  between  the  Christian  and  the  Chinese 
conception  of  duty.  Commenting  upon  this  matter,  Dr.  Legge 
says :  V  I  never  quoted  in  a  circle  of  Chinese  friends  the 
words  of  Paul  in  Corinthians  — '  The  children  ought  not  to 
lay  up  for  the  parents,  but  the  parents  for  the  children '  — 
without  their  encountering  a  storm  of  opposition.  When  I 
tried  to  show  that  the  sentiment  was  favorable  to  the  progress 
of  society,  and  would  enable  each  generation  to  start  from  a 
higher  standpoint,  I  found  it  difficult  to  obtain  a  hearing."  2 

The  effects  of  the  family  ethics  of  Confucianism  upon  the 
moral  practice  of  the  Chinese  in  the  domestic  sphere  will  be 
noted  in  the  following  division  of  this  chapter. 

III.    Effects  of  the  Ideal  upon  Chinese  Life 
and  History 

No  people  have  ever  lived  up  to  their  ideal  of  moral  excel-  Degree  of 
lence.  The  Chinese  like  others  have  obviously  fallen  far  short  between0 
of  embodying  in  actual  practice  the  high  standard  of  their  £Jacticeand 
sages.    But  it  is  certainly  a  gross  misjudgment  of  Chinese  JJJJSK? 
morality  to  say,  as  some  writers  on  things  Chinese  have  said, 
that  the  ideal  and  the  standard  maintained  are  wholly  discon- 
nected.3  This  depreciatory  opinion,  however,  admits  of  little 
dispute  if  its  application  be  confined  to  the  mandarin  class.   In 

1  The  Chinese  pay  worship,  it  is  true,  to  the  multitude  of  inferior  gods 
of  Buddhism,  but  there  is  little  in  these  cults  calculated  to  awaken  and 
discipline  the  moral  feelings. 

2  The  Religions  of  China  (1881),  p.  256. 

8  See  Colquhuon,  China  in  Transformation  (1898),  p.  189. 


70         HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

public  or  official  morality  there  is  a  deplorable  divergence 
between  theory  and  practice.  Probably  the  Chinese  official 
class,  in  spite  of  the  stress  which  is  laid  by  moralists  upon  the 
duties  of  magistrates  and  rulers,  is  the  most  corrupt  in  the 
world.  Peculation  in  office  is  universal.  Bribery  is  as  rife  as 
it  was  in  Rome  under  the  later  Republic.  Justice  is  almost 
universally  bought  and  sold.  This  very  general  lack  of  integ- 
rity in  office  is  attributable  in  part  at  least  to  the  inadequate 
salaries.  This  inevitably  calls  into  existence  a  system  of  fees 
and  presents,  which  as  inevitably  grows  into  a  system  of  ex- 
tortion, oppression,  and  corruption.  But,  as  a  well-informed 
writer  affirms,  "  Whatever  laxity  Chinese  morality  may  permit 
in  official  relations,  from  the  workingman,  the  tradesman,  and 
the  servant  it  exacts  most  scrupulous  honesty."  1  The  average 
man  in  China,  it  may  be  confidently  affirmed,  is  as  moral  — 
defining  morality  as  loyalty  to  an  ideal  —  as  the  average  man 
in  any  other  country  of  the  world. 

Favorable         But  this  general  loyalty  to  the  ideal,  since  this  has  serious 
theCideai      defects,  has  brought  it  about  that  the  ideal  has  been  an  effi- 
cient force  for  evil  as  well  as  for  good.    In  some  respects  it 
has  promoted  a  true  morality,  while  in  others  it  has  marred 
and  cramped  the  moral  life  of  the  Chinese  people. 

Prominent  among  the  favorable  effects  of  the  ideal  is  its 
exaltation  of  the  family  life.  Through  the  emphasis  laid  upon 
special  domestic  virtues,  particularly  that  of  filial  piety,  the 
ideal  has  given  the  family  such  a  place  in  the  fabric  of  Chi- 
nese society  as  has  probably  been  given  it  in  no  other  society 
ancient  or  modern,  except  in  that  of  early  Rome.  As  the 
family  is  the  connecting  link  between  the  generations,  and 
consequently  as  a  true  family  life  must  characterize  every 
society  that  shall  live  long  on  the  earth,  we  may  without 

1  Reinsch,  World  Politics  (1900),  p.  98.  In  their  relations  with  foreigners 
1  the  Chinese  bankers  have  won  an  enviable  reputation  for  integrity  and 
the  scrupulous  observance  of  engagements.  The  word  of  a  Chinaman  in 
financial  matters  is  his  bond. 


CHINESE  MORALS-  71 

reserve  accept  that  interpretation  of  Chinese  history  which 
finds  in  the  exaltation  of  filial  virtue  by  the  sages  of  China 
one  secret  of  that  longevity  of  the  Chinese  nation  which 
makes  it  the  sole  survivor  among  the  nations  from  the 
ancient  world  of  culture. 

Like  the  maxim  of  filial  piety,  the  Confucian  teaching 
which  makes  virtue  and  not  material  prosperity  the  aim  and 
end  of  government  has  been  a  conservative  force  in  Chinese 
life  and  society.  "  It  would  be  hard  to  overestimate,"  says 
Dr.  Martin,  "  the  influence  which  has  been  exerted  by  this 
little  schedule  of  political  ethics  [the  Great  Study],  occupy- 
ing, as  it  has,  so  prominent  a  place  in  the  Chinese  mind  for 
four  and  twenty  centuries,  teaching  the  people  to  regard  the 
Empire  as  a  vast  family,  and  the  Emperor  to  rule  by  moral 
influence,  making  the  goal  of  his  ambition  not  the  wealth 
but  the  virtue  of  his  subjects.  It  is  certain  that  the  doctrines 
which  it  embodies  have  been  largely  efficient  in  rendering 
China  what  she  is,  the  most  ancient  and  the  most  populous 
of  existing  nations."  1 

In  still  another  way  has  the  moral  ideal  reacted  favorably 
upon  Chinese  civilization.  We  have  noted  the  high  place 
in  the  standard  of  excellence  assigned  by  the  Chinese  sages 
to  the  duty  of  intellectual  self -culture.  It  is  scarcely  to  be 
doubted  that  this  emphasis  laid  upon  learning  as  an  important 
factor  in  the  formation  of  moral  character  has  greatly  fostered 
learning  and  has  been  a  chief  agency  in  the  creation  of  the 
Chinese  educational  system  with  its  competitive  literary  exam- 
inations, which- from  the  earliest  times  down  almost  to  the 
present  day  formed  the  sole  gateway  to  public  office. 

But  Confucius,  while  inculcating  the  duty  of  seeking  wis-  unfavor- 
dom,  taught  his  people  to  look  for  it  in  the  past.    He  en-  of  the  ideal 
joined  them  to  seek  the  moral  ideal  in  the  life  and  deeds 
of  the  ancients. 

1  The  Lore  of  Cathay  (1901),  p.  214. 


72  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

Never  in  the  moral  history  of  the  world  has  the  inculcation 
of  a  specific  duty  had  a  profounder  influence  upon  the  des- 
tinies of  a  people  than  this  requirement  of  conformity  to  the 
ways  of  the  fathers  has  had  upon  the  destinies  of  the  Chinese 
race.  It  has  been>one  of  the  chief  causes  of  the  unchanging, 
stereotyped  character  of  Chinese  civilization.  In  obedience 
to  the  requirements  of  this  ideal  of  goodness  the  Chinese  for 
two  millenniums  and  more  have  made  to-day  like  yesterday. 
Hence  the  cycling,  goalless  movement  of  Chinese  history. 

Just  as  the  undue  emphasis  laid  by  the  Chinese  moralists 
upon  the  duty  of  conforming  to  the  ways  of  the  ancients  has 
reacted  in  some  respects  unfavorably  upon  Chinese  life,  so  has 
the  exaggerated  stress  laid  by  them  upon  the  doctrine  of  the 
just  medium  exerted  a  similar  unfavorable  influence.  This 
has  tended  to  produce  a  dull  uniformity  in  Chinese  life  and 
thought.  The  lack  of  lofty  ideal  aims  has  caused  Chinese  his- 
tory to  be  singularly  barren  in  chivalric  and  heroic  elements. 
The  everlasting  round  of  routine  makes  life  a  treadmill.  It 
is  "  the  prose  of  existence." 

Again,  the  Confucian  system  tends  to  produce  a  formal 
morality.  While  it  is  not  true,  as  we  have  seen,  that 
Confucianism  neglects  to  deal  with  general  principles,  right 
feelings,  and  motives  of  action,  still  it  is  true  that  instead 
of  relying  upon  these  there  is  an  immense  multitude  of 
precepts  and  minute  rules  covering  the  smallest  details  of 
conduct.  There  are  three  thousand  rules  of  deportment. 
This  has  resulted,  and  naturally,  in  the  substitution  of  the 
letter  for  the  spirit.  Even  the  Master  has  come  to  serve 
as  a  pattern  rather  in  the  outer  form  of  his  life  than  in  its 
informing  spirit.1 

1  Froebel  has  an  illuminating  comment  on  the  danger  to  true  morality 
that  lurks  here :  M  A  life  whose  ideal  value  has  been  perfectly  established 
in  experience  never  aims  to  serve  as  a  model  in  its  form,  but  only  in  its 
essence,  in  its  spirit.  It  is  the  greatest  mistake  to  suppose  that  spiritual, 
human  perfection  can  serve  as  a  model  in  its  form.  This  accounts  for  the 
common  experience  that  the  taking  of  such  external  manifestations  of 


CHINESE  MORALS  73 

Never  was  there  a  better  illustration  of  how  the  letter 
killeth;  for  a  reliance  on  exact  rules  and  instructions  as  to 
conduct  in  all  conceivable  relations  and  situations  has  made 
much  of  Chinese  morality  a  formal  and  lifeless  thing.  The 
Chinese  are  governed  by  a  sense  of  propriety  rather  than  by 
a  sense  of  duty.  Their  morality  is  largely  etiquette.1  It  has 
justly  been  likened  to  the  morality  of  the  ancient  Romans  in 
that  it  makes  manners  and  morals  to  be  almost  interchange- 
able terms.  Especially  have  the  hundreds  of  rules  prescribed 
for  the  expression  of  reverence  for  superiors  tended  to  empty 
this  part  of  Chinese  morality  of  reality  and  sincerity,  and  to 
make  Chinese  official  ceremonialism  one  of  the  most  curious 
phases  of  Chinese  life. 

It  would  seem,  further,  that  the  very  great  emphasis  laid 
by  the  Chinese  moralists  upon  the  duties  of  children  toward 
their  parents  has  prevented  the  normal  development  among 
the  Chinese  of  that  ethical  sentiment  which  among  ourselves 
assigns  the  duties  of  parents  to  infant  children  an  important 
place  in  the  code  of  domestic  morality.  This  lack  among  the 
Chinese  of  any  deep  feeling  of  parental  obligation  results  in 
a  widespread  practice  condemned  by  the  conscience  of  Chris- 
tian nations.  The  exposure  or  destruction  of  infants  prevails 
in  almost  every  province  of  the  Republic.  It  is  the  girl  babies 
that  are  the  victims  of  this  practice.2  They  are  often  drowned 
or  buried  alive. 

In  this  practice  the  subsistence  motive  of  course  is  active. 
It  is  in  general  the  extreme  poverty  of  the  people  which 
causes  them  thus  to  destroy  their  offspring.    But  what  renders 

perfection  as  examples,  instead   of  elevating  mankind,  checks,  nay,  re- 
presses, its  development"  (The  Education  of  Man,  pt.  i,  sec.  io). 

1  Etiquette  has  been  well  defined  as  "  the  formal  expression  of  courtesy," 
and  courtesy  as  "  morality  in  trifles."  In  Japan,  as  Kikuchi  informs  us, 
etiquette  forms  a  part  of  the  moral  instruction  in  the  schools.  See  Sadler, 
Moral  Instruction  and  Training  in  Schools,  vol.  ii,  p.  342. 

2  Edward  A.  Ross  (The  Changing  Chinese  (191 1),  p.  193)  says  native 
authorities  admit  that  from  one  tenth  to  one  twentieth  of  the  £irl  infants 
are  abandoned  or  made  away  with. 


74  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

this  practice  significant  for  the  student  of  morality  is  the  fact 
that  these  things  are  done  with  little  or  no  scruple  of  con- 
science,1 showing  that  acts  respecting  which  the  conscience 
of  Christian  nations  has  become  very  sensitive  have  not  yet 
among  the  Chinese  been  brought  generally  within  the  circle 
covered  by  the  moral  feelings. 

impending  We  have  seen  how  the  moral  ideal  of  a  people  is  modified 
the  morain  by  all  the  changing  circumstances  of  their  life  and  history. 
ideal  -pjie  morai  jdg^  0f  j-hg  Chinese  has  undergone  little  modifica- 

tion for  upward  of  two  millenniums,  such,  for  instance,  as  the 
ideal  of  the  European  peoples  has  undergone  in  a  like  period, 
because  throughout  this  long  term  the  influences  acting  upon 
the  national  life  have  been  practically  unchanged.  There  have 
been  in  Chinese  history  no  such  interminglings  of  races, 
revivals  in  learning,  religious  reformations,  and  political  and 
industrial  revolutions  as  mark  the  history  of  the  Western 
nations,  and  responding  to  which  the  moral  evolution  of 
these  peoples  has  gone  on  apace. 

But  now  that  the  long-continued  isolation  of  China  has 
been  broken,  and  she  is  being  subjected  to  all  the  potent  in- 
fluences of  the  civilization  of  the  West,  it  is  certain  that  her 
social  and  mental  life  will  be  remolded  and  cast  in  new  forms. 
Sooner  or  later  constitutional  government  must  supersede,  has 
already  superseded,  the  patriarchal  government  of  the  past ; 
the  whole  social  fabric  must  necessarily  be  reconstructed  and 
the  individual  instead  of  the  family  or  clan  be  made  the  social 
and  ethical  unit ; 2  the  science  of  the  Western  nations  will 

1  M  Female  infanticide  in  some  parts  is  openly  confessed  and  divested 
of  all  disgrace  and  penalties  everywhere  "  (Williams,  The  Middle  Kingdom 
(1883),  vol.  i,  p.  836).  Jernigan,  however,  says,  "When  carried  to  the  ex- 
treme there  is  a  public  sentiment  in  China  which  condemns  it,  and  there 
are  official  proclamations  against  infanticide"  [China  in  Law  and  Com- 
merce (1905),  p.  123). 

2  The  primitive  kinship  group  is  a  characteristic  feature  of  Chinese 
society.  M  Thousands  of  Chinese  villages  comprise  exclusively  persons 
having  the  same  surname  and  the  same  ancestors  "  (A.  II.  Smith,  Chinese 


CHINESE  MORALS  75 

displace,  is  already  displacing,  the  obsolete  learning  of  the 
Four  Classics  ;  Christianity  will  quicken  the  atrophied  reli- 
gious consciousness  of  the  race  ;  and  in  place  of  the  isolation 
of  the  past  there  will  be  established  those  international  rela- 
tions and  intellectual  exchanges  which  perhaps  more  than 
all  other  agencies  combined  have  been  the  motive  force  of 
European  civilization  and  progress. 

This  new  environment,  these  new  influences  molding  afresh 
Chinese  social,  intellectual,  and  religious  life  and  institutions, 
cannot  fail  to  react  powerfully  upon  the  moral  ideal  of  the 
nation.  It  too  must  inevitably  undergo  a  great  change.  There 
will  be  a  shifting  in  the  standard  of  character  of  the  different 
virtues,  for  the  moral  ideal  of  a  simple  patriarchal  community 
cannot  serve  as  the  model  for  a  complex  modern  society,  and 
doubtless  some  of  those  virtues  —  as,  for  instance,  reverence 
for  the  past  —  which  now  hold  the  highest  rank  in  the  code 
will  exchange  places  with  others  at  present  held  in  little 
esteem.  Changes  in  the  feelings  and  beliefs  of  the  people 
in  regard  to  ancestor  worship,  which  changes  are  inevitable, 
will  effect  important  modifications  in  family  ethics.  The  sub- 
stitution of  Western  science  for  the  lore  of  the  classics  will 
introduce  evolutionary  ethics  and  the  philosophical  virtues  of 
the  Western  world  ;  while  the  substitution  of  popular  govern- 
ment for  the  patriarchal  autocracy  will  necessarily  bring  in  the 
ethics  of  democracy. 

These  certain  changes  in  the  form  and  content  of  the  an- 
cestral ideal  of  goodness  will  not  only  assimilate  it  to  the 

Characteristics  (1894),  p.  226).  "I  have  seen  a  town  of  25,000  people,  all 
belonging  to  the  same  clan  and  bearing  the  same  family  name"  (Martin, 
The  Lore  of  Cathay  (1901),  p.  272).  Along  with  this  clan  constitution  of 
society  goes  the  principle  of  collective  responsibility.  The  group  is  to  a 
great  degree  held  responsible  for  the  conduct  of  each  of  its  members.  In 
case  of  serious  crime,  as,  for  instance,  treason,  all  the  male  adult  members 
of  the  criminal's  family  are  punished  along  with  the  offender  (Westermarck, 
The  Origin  and  Development  of  the  Moral  Ideas  (1906),  vol.  i,  p.  45).  Re- 
cently the  punishment  of  relatives  of  the  offender  has  been  abolished  in 
certain  cases. 


76  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

ethical  standard  of  the  Western  world,  but,  correcting  some 
of  its  obvious  shortcomings,  will  render  it  a  still  more  effective 
force  in  the  guidance  and  control  of  the  moral  life  of  a  great 
and  ancient  people,  whose  day  apparently  is  still  in  the  future.1 

1  The  efforts  of  the  Chinese  government  to  put  an  end  to  the  use  of 
opium  among  its  subjects  —  the  anti-opium  decree  was  issued  in  1906  —  is 
the  most  noteworthy  matter  in  the  recent  moral  history  of  China.  This 
movement  is  motived  by  moral  feeling  as  truly  as  is  the  movement  among 
ourselves  for  the  suppression  of  the  liquor  traffic.  It  is,  in  the  words  of 
Professor  Edward  A.  Ross,  "  the  most  extensive  warfare  on  a  vicious  private 
habit  that  the  world  has  ever  known"  {The Changing  Chinese  (191 1),  p.  146). 


CHAPTER  VI 

JAPANESE  MORALS:    AN  IDEAL  OF  LOYALTY 

I.  Formative  and  Modifying  Influences 

In  their  moral  evolution  the  Japanese  people  have  devel-  intro- 
oped  a  system  of  morals  which,  notwithstanding  certain  de-  a^actl- 
fects  and  limitations,  is  one  of  the  noblest  created  by  any  of  JJJfJeJJI.*6" 
the  great  races.  A  study  of  this  system  is  especially  interest-  evolution 
ing  and  instructive  for  the  reason  that  it  shows  how  a  very 
admirable  moral  ideal  may  be  created  by  a  people  in  compara- 
tive isolation  and  under  influences  wholly  different  from  those 
which  have  shaped  and  molded  our  own  ideal  of  moral  good- 
ness.  This  compels  a  recognition  of  the  fact  that  the  historian 
of  morals  can  no  longer  overlook  or  ignore  the  moral  phe- 
nomena of  the  Far  East. 

A  second  reason  that  a  study  of  the  Japanese  code  of  morals 
is  important  and  interesting  is  because  this  ideal  of  worthiness 
and  duty  has  been  indubitably  a  main  factor  in  lifting  the 
Japanese  nation  to  the  high  place  it  holds  to-day  among  the 
great  nations  of  the  earth. 

In  our  examination  of  this  system  of  morality  we  must  first 
note  the  nature  of  the  agencies  which  lent  to  the  moral  ideal 
its  characteristic  cast.  Among  the  various  forces  molding  and 
modifying  the  ethical  type  we  shall  find  the  most  important 
to  have  been  the  family  and  clan  system,  ancestor  worship, 
the  monarchy  of  supposed  divine  origin,  feudalism,  Con- 
fucianism, Buddhism,  and  Western  civilization. 

As  in  China,  so  in  Old  Japan  the  family  rather  than  the  The  family 
individual  was  the  social  unit.    Through  the  expansion  of  the  system 
family  arose  the  clan,  which  in  the  sentiments  and  feelings 

77 


78 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


Shinto,  or 

ancestor 

worship 


The  mon- 
archy of 
divine 
origin 


which  governed  its  members  was  simply  a  large  patriarchal 
household.  This  organization  of  early  Japanese  society,  with 
the  family  and  its  outgrowth,  the  clan,  forming  the  basis  of 
the  fabric,  was,  as  we  shall  learn,  a  potent  force  in  the  cre- 
ation of  the  moral  type  of  the  nation.  The  relationships  of 
the  kinship  group  determined  the  duties  and  virtues  of  its 
members  and  constituted  the  chief  sphere  of  their  moral 
activity.    Here  was  the  nursery  of  Japanese  morality. 

The  influence  of  religion  has  mingled  with  that  of  the 
family  sentiment.  Throughout  all  the  past  the  vital  religious 
element  in  the  life  of  the  Japanese  peoples  has  been  the 
Shinto  cult,  and  this  is  now  the  established  religion  of  the 
state.  The  system  in  its  essence  is  ancestor  and  hero  worship, 
the  spirits  of  the  dead  being  revered  as  guardian  divinities. 
This  cult  has  created  moral  feelings  and  family  duties  like 
those  called  into  existence  by  the  same  cult  in  China.  Out 
of  these  rudimentary  family  virtues,  as  from  a  central  root, 
have  sprung  many  of  those  virtues  of  wider  relationships 
which  have  helped  to  give  to  the  Japanese  type  of  moral 
excellence  its  essential  features. 

The  central  teaching  of  Shinto  is  that  the  Emperor  is  of 
divine  descent  and  that  his  person  is  sacred  and  inviolate.1 
This  doctrine  of  the  divine  nature  of  the  monarchy2  has 
exerted  a  profound  influence  upon  the  moral  ideal  of  Japan 
and  has  had  consequences  of  great  moment.  It  has  made 
unquestioning  obedience  and  absolute  loyalty  to  the  Emperor 
the  religious  duties  and  preeminent  virtues  of  the  subject. 


1  "  The  Emperor  is  sacred  and  inviolable."  — Japanese  Constitution, 
art.  iii. 

2  The  state  in  Japan  occupies  the  place  of  the  Church  with  us.  "  To  look 
up  to  the  state  as  a  sacred  institution  has  always  been  characteristic  of  the 
people,  and  from  the  great  work  of  the  recent  reformation  onward  there 
has  not  been  a  single  event  of  national  consequence  which  has  not  origi- 
nated in  this  peculiar  turn  of  mind"  (Count  Okuma,  Fifty  Years  of  ATew 
Japan  (1909),  vol.  ii,  p.  559). 


JAPANESE  MORALS  79 

In  times  preceding  the  twelfth  century  there  grew  up  in  Feudalism  I 
Japan  a  feudal  system  which  in  many  respects  was  remark- 
ably like  the  feudal  system  of  medieval  Europe.  The  unit 
of  the  system  was  the  clan,  the  members  of  which,  form- 
ing a  close  brotherhood,  were  bound  to  their  lord  by  ties  of 
affection  and  fidelity  like  those  which  in  Europe  theoretically 
bound  the  retainer  to  his  lord.1  This  system  exerted  a  great 
influence  upon  the  moral  type.  It  developed  a  martial  ideal 
of  character  known  as  Bushido,  many  of  the  virtues  of  which 
are  almost  identical  with  corresponding  virtues  in  the  Euro- 
pean ideal  of  chivalry.  Probably  this  system  has  had  more 
to  do  with  creating  in  Japan  a  moral  consciousness  in  many 
respects  like  our  own  than  has  any  other  single  agency.  To 
the  lack  in  the  Chinese  social  system  of  any  institution  like 
Japanese  feudalism  may  be  ascribed  in  part  at  least  the  wide 
difference  which  exists  between  the  moral  ideals  of  the  two 
peoples,  especially  in  regard  to  the  rank  assigned  the  mili- 
tary virtues. 

Along  with  the  Chinese  classics  Confucianism  was  intro-  confucian- 
duced  into  Japan  about  the  middle  of  the  sixth  century  of  *  m 
our  era,  and  being  in  perfect  accord  with  the  native  system 
of  Shinto  and  with  the  Japanese  ways  of  thinking,  this  cult 
of  ancestors  tended  to  reenforce  native  ethical  tendencies 
and  thus  contributed  essentially  to  make  the  virtues  of  filial 
obedience  and  reverence  for  superiors  prominent  in  the  grow- 
ing type  of  character. 

•  Buddhism  was  introduced  into  Japan  in  the  sixth  century  Buddhism 
of  our  era.  Its  incoming  had  deep  import  for  the  moral  life 
of.  the  Japanese  people.  It  inculcated  the  gentler  virtues,  ex- 
erting here  in  this  respect,  as  elsewhere  in  the  Far  East,  — 
save  in  China,  where  it  too  quickly  became  shockingly  de- 
generate, —  an  influence  like  that  exerted  by  Christianity  in 

1  Corresponding  to  the  knights  in  European  feudalism  were  the  samurai, 
above  them  the  daimios,  and  at  the  head  of  the  system  the  Shogun. 


80         HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

the  Western  world.  It  helped  to  make  gentleness,  courtesy, 
and  tenderness  distinctive  traits  of  the  Japanese  character. 
Through  the  regard  which  it  instilled  for  dumb  animals  it 
placed  the  whole  lower  world  of  animal  life  under  the  protec- 
tion of  the  moral  sentiment.1 

western  A  little  more  than  a  generation  ago  the  civilization  of 

Japan  came  into  vital  contact  with  the  civilization  of  the  West. 
Almost  every  element  of  the  old  Japanese  culture  has  felt 
the  modifying  effect  of  this  contact.  The  political,  the  eco- 
nomic, the  social,  the  domestic,  and  the  religious  institutions 
have  undergone  or  are  undergoing  great  changes.  These 
changes  in  these  departments  of  life  and  thought  have  caused, 
as  such  changes  always  do,  important  modifications  in  ethical 
sentiments  and  convictions.  Of  all  the  influences  which  for 
more  than  two  thousand  years  have  been  at  work  shaping  and 
molding  the  moral  ideal  of  the  Japanese  nation,  those  now 
entering  from  the  Occidental  world  will  doubtless  leave  the 
deepest  impress  upon  the  ethical  type. 

In  a  still  more  direct  way  is  this  contact  of  Japan  with 
Western  civilization  resulting  in  important  consequences  for 
Japanese  morality.  Christian  ethics,  like  Buddhist  ethics,  is 
making  a  strong  appeal  to  certain  classes  of  Japanese  society. 
The  result  is  what  in  an  earlier  chapter  was  designated  as 
a  "  mingling  of  moralities  "  and  the  creation  of  a  new  com- 
posite conscience. 

II.  The  Ideal 

Busnido  The  heart  of  Japanese  morality  is  to  be  sought  in  Bushido,2 

the  ethics  of  the  samurai.  We  shall  best  understand  this 
moral  code  by  thinking  of  it  as  the  Japanese  ideal  of  chivalry 

1  Japanese  boys  and  men,  Dr.  William  Elliot  Griffis  affirms,  are  "  more 
tender  and  careful  with  all  living  creatures  than  are  those  of  Christendom  " 
{The  Religions  of  Japan  (1895),  p.  294).  Buddhism  caused  in  large  measure 
the  disuse  of  flesh  for  food. 

2  This  word  means  "  the  way  of  the  warrior,"  or  w  the  rule  of  knighthood." 


JAPANESE  MORALS  8 1 

or,  perhaps  better,  as  a  blending  of  the  Western  chivalric, 
Spartan,  and  Stoic  ideals  of  goodness  and  nobility,  since  in 
the  list  of  virtues  making  up  the  Bushido  ideal  we  find  sev- 
eral of  the  cardinal  virtues  entering  into  each  of  these  three 
distinct  types  of  character. 

As  we  have  already  intimated,  Bushido  is  an  ideal  of  ex- 
cellence which  grew  up  out  of  the  root  of  Japanese  feudalism, 
just  as  the  Western  ideal  of  chivalry  developed  out  of  European 
feudalism.  It  was  essentially  an  ideal  of  knighthood,  the  prime 
virtue  of  which  was  personal  loyalty  to  one's  superior.  Fealty 
to  one's  chief  was  made  so  dominant  a  virtue  that  it  over- 
shadowed all  other  virtues.  In  the  defense  or  in  the  service  of 
his  lord  a  samurai  might  commit,  without  offense  to  his  sense 
of  moral  right,  practically  any  crime,  such  as  blackmailing, 
lying,  treachery,  or  even  murder. 

Grouped  about  this  cardinal  virtue  of  loyalty  were  the 
other  knightly  virtues  of  courage,  fidelity  to  the  plighted 
word,  liberality,  self-sacrifice,  gratitude,  courtesy,  and  benev- 
olence. Liberality,  or  free-hartdedness,  was  carried  to  such 
an  extreme  as  to  become  a  defect  of  character.  The  true 
samurai  must  have  no  thought  of  economy  and  money-making. 
"  Ignorance  of  the  value  of  different  coins  was  a  token  of 
good  breeding."  1   To  handle  money  was  thought  degrading. 

In  one  respect  the  code  of  honor  of  the  Japanese  knight 
was  wholly  unlike  that  of  the  Western  knight.  It  did  not 
include  any  special  duty  to  woman.  "  Neither  God  nor  the 
ladies  inspired  any  enthusiasm  in  the  samurai's  breast." 

The  Spartan  element  in  the  samurai  code  appears  particu- 
larly in  the  training  of  the  youth.  The  boy  was  taught  always 
to  act  from  motives  of  duty.  He  was  denied  every  comfort. 
His  clothing  and  his  diet  were  coarse.  He  was  allowed  no 
fire  in  the  winter.    "  If  his  feet  were  numbed  by  frost,  he 

1  Nitobe,  Bushido :  the  Soul  of  Japan,  p.  98.  The  edition  cited  through- 
out this  chapter  is  that  of  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  1905.  The  Introduction 
is  by  William  Elliot  Griffis. 


82 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


The  virtue 
of  loyalty 
to  the  Em- 
peror, or 
patriotism 


would  be  told  to  run  about  in  the  snow  to  make  them  warm." 
To  accustom  him  to  the  sight  of  blood,  he  was  taken  to  see 
the  execution  of  criminals ;  and  to  banish  foolish  fear  from 
his  mind,  he  was  forced  to  visit  alone  at  night  the  place  of 
execution.1 

The  Stoic  element  in  the  ideal  appears  in  the  high  place 
assigned  to  the  virtue  of  self-control.  The  samurai,  like  the 
Stoic,  must  suppress  all  signs  of  his  emotions.  Like  the  Stoic, 
too,  he  must  have  courage  to  live  or  courage  to  die,  as  enjoined 
by  duty.  And  his  code  of  honor  taught  him  what  true  courage 
is  :  "  It  is  true  courage  to  live  when  it  is  right  to  live,  and  to 
die  only  when  it  is  right  to  die."  2 

This  samurai  ideal  of  character  constitutes,  as  we  shall  see, 
a  molding  force  in  the  moral  life  of  Japan.  Bushido,  it  is 
true,  died  with  the  passing  of  feudalism,3  but  the  spirit  of 
Bushido  lived  on.  The  samurai's  sense  of  honor  and  of  duty 
became  the  inheritance  of  the  Japanese  people.  This  great 
bequest  of  honor  and  valor  and  of  all  samurai  virtues  is,  in 
the  words  of  the  author  of  the  Soul  of  Japan,  but  "a  trust 
to  the  nation,  and  the  summons  of  the  present  is  to  guard 
this  heritage,  nor  to  bate  one  jot  of  the  ancient  spirit ;  the 
summons  of  the  future  will  be  so  to  widen  its  scope  as  to 
apply  it  in  all  walks  and  relations  of  life."  4 

The  belief  in  the  divine  origin  of  the  imperial  house  of 
Japan  makes  loyalty  to  the  Emperor  the  supreme  duty.5  Dur- 
ing the  ascendancy  of  feudalism  this  duty,  in  so  far  as  the 
samurai  class  was  concerned,  was,  it  is  true,  overshadowed  by 
the  duty  of  loyalty  to  one's  immediate  feudal  superior.  The 
sentiment  due  the  Emperor  was  intercepted  by  the  daimyos. 


1  Nitobe,  Bushido,  p.  32.  2  Ibid.  p.  30. 

8  For  the  subject  of  the  downfall  of  feudalism  and  the  Restoration,  see 
Count  Okuma,  Fifty  Years  of  New  Japan  (1909),  vol.  i,  chap.  ii. 

4  Nitobe,  Bushido,  p.  189. 

6  Baron  Kikuchi,  in  Sadler,  Moral  Instruction  and  Training  in  Schools 
(1908),  vol.  ii,  p.  323. 


JAPANESE  MORALS  83 

But  in  theory  loyalty  to  the  imperial  house  has  ever  been  the 
paramount  virtue  of  the  Japanese.  The  Emperor's  command 
is  to  his  subjects  as  the  command  of  God  to  us,  and  obedience 
must  be  perfect  and  unquestioning.  So  dominant  is  the  place 
assigned  this  virtue  of  loyalty  to  the  head  of  the  nation  that 
the  Japanese  moralist  seems  almost  to  make  morality  consist 
in  this  single  virtue,  as  if  "to  fear  the  Emperor  and  to  keep 
his  commandments  "  were  the  full  duty  of  man.1 

This  sentiment  of  the  people  toward  the  imperial  family 
renders  the  government  a  sort  of  theocracy.  Hence  patriot- 
ism with  the  Japanese  is  in  large  measure  a  religious  feeling. 
Indeed,  patriotism  has  been  called  the  religion  of  the  Japanese. 
It  is  this  virtue,  exalted  to  a  degree  which  the  world  has  never 
seen  surpassed,  which  has  contributed  more  than  any  other 
quality  of  the  Japanese  character  to  make  Japan  a  great  nation 
and  to  give  her  the  victory  over  a  powerful  foe  in  one  of  the 
most  gigantic  wars  of  modern  times. 

If  the  first  duty  of  the  Japanese  is  to  his  Emperor,  his  Family 
second  is  to  his  parents.  In  Japanese  phrase,  the  two  vir-  etblcs 
tues  of  loyalty  and  filial  piety  are  "  the  two  wheels  of  the 
chariot  of  Japanese  ethics."  2  Shinto  and  Confucianism,  as  we 
have  seen,  have  both  contributed  to  the  fostering  in  children 
of  the  moral  sentiments  of  grateful  love,  reverence,  and  obedi- 
ence toward  parents  and  all  ancestors  living  and  dead.  The 
Japanese  regard  the  high  place  assigned  to  these  filial  duties 
in  the  standard  of  character  as  a  mark  of  the  vast  superiority 
of  their  morality  to  ours.3    The  sentiments  of  filial  affection 

and  reverence,  coloring  as  they  do  the  whole  moral  life,  lend 

* 

1  Scherer,  What  is  Japanese  Morality?  (1906),  p.  10. 

2  Nitobe,  Bushido,  p.  vi. 

3  The  works  of  Moliere,  it  is  said,  have  been  put  under  the  ban  of  the 
censor  in  Japan  and  their  circulation  forbidden,  for  the  reason  that  Moliere 
ridicules  old  age,  and  constantly,  like  the  comic  supplement  of  the  news- 
papers, H  makes  some  father  the  butt  of  jokes  and  gross  wit  by  his  child 
or  children." 


84  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

to  Japanese  society  an  ethical  cast  which  places  it  in  many 
respects  in  strong  contrast  to  the  social  order  of  the  Western 
nations,  and  makes  it  difficult  for  the  Japanese  to  understand 
us  and  for  us  to  understand  them.1 

woman  as  As  respects  the  position  of  woman  the  family  ethics  of 
mother1  '  Japan  are  the  family  ethics  of  the  East.  In  a  work  from 
every  page  of  which  breathes  the  spirit  of  the  Orient,  a  Jap- 
anese writer,  dwelling  upon  the  difference  between  the  ethical 
sentiments  respecting  family  relationships  which  have  been 
evoked  by  the  different  social  environments  of  the  East  and 
the  West,  says  :  "  In  the  East  woman  has  always  been  wor- 
shiped as  the  mother,  and  all  those  honors  which  the  Christian 
knight  brought  in  homage  to  his  ladylove,  the  samurai  laid 
at  his  mother's  feet."  2 

Lafcadio  Hearn,  touching  upon  this  same  feature  of  the 
family  ethics  of  the  Japanese,  declares  that  the  Bible  text, 
"  For  this  cause  shall  a  man  leave  his  father  and  mother  and 
shall  cleave  unto  his  wife,"  is,  to  their  way  of  thinking  and 
feeling,  "  one  of  the  most  immoral  sentences  ever  written."  3 
In  another  important  respect  does  the  domestic  morality 
of  the  Japanese  differ  essentially  from  that  of  the  Christian 
West.    The  family  is  not  strictly  monogamous,  as  with  us. 

1  "  Any  social  system  of  which  filial  piety  is  not  the  moral  cement ;  any 
social  system  in  which  children  leave  their  parents  in  order  to  establish 
families  of  their  own ;  any  social  system  in  which  it  is  considered  not  only 
natural  but  right  to  love  wife  and  child  more  than  the  author  of  one's  being ; 
any  social  system  in  which  marriage  can  be  decided  independently  of  the 
will  of  parents,  by  the  mutual  inclination  of  the  young  people  themselves ; 
any  social  system  in  which  the  mother-in-law  is  not  entitled  to  the  obedient 
service  of  the  daughter-in-law,  appears  to  him  [the  Japanese]  of  necessity 
a  state  of  life  scarcely  better  than  that  of  the  birds  of  the  air  and  the  beasts 
of  the  field,  or  at  best  a  sort  of  moral  chaos." —  Lafcadio  Hearn,  Out  of 
the  East  (1895),  p.  89. 

2  Okakura-Kakuzo,  The  Awakening  of  Japan  (1904),  p.  179.  Romantic 
love  is  almost  unknown  in  Japan.  B.  H.  Chamberlain  affirms  that  in  a  resi- 
dence of  twenty-eight  years  he  heard  of  only  one  love  match,  and  then  the 
young  people  had  been  brought  up  in  America. 

8  Out  of  the  East  (1895),  p.  80.  , 


JAPANESE  MORALS  85 

The  moral  sense  of  the  Japanese  discerns  nothing  wrong  in 
polygamy  or  concubinage.1  As  respects  the  whole  relation  of 
marriage,  the  Japanese  appear  to  be  in  about  the  same  stage 
of  evolution  as  had  been  reached  by  the  Hebrews  at  the  time 
of  Abraham. 

A  chief  virtue  of  the  Japanese  women  in  all  their  relations  is 
obedience  to  the  one  —  whether  father,  or  husband,  or  son  — 
to  whom  obedience  is  due.  It  is  the  setting  of  this  duty  before 
all  other  duties  that  causes  the  Japanese  women  sometimes 
to  do  what  appears  to  us  immoral,  but  which  seems  to  them 
truest  piety  and  noblest  self-sacrifice.2  In  loyalty  to  duty,  as 
they  interpret  duty,  they  maintain  a  standard  rarely  surpassed 
by  the  women  of  any  land.3 

Suicide  is  infrequent  among  savage  and  barbarian  races,  suicide 
but  is  common  among  all  peoples  in  an  advanced  stage  of  civ-  ^virtuous*3 
ilization.    It  is  not  so  much  the  fact  itself  of  self-destruction  act 
that  claims  the  attention  of  the  historian  of  morals,  as  the 
light  in  which  the  act  is  viewed  ;  that  is,  whether  it  is  consid- 
ered a  virtuous  or  a  reprehensible  deed. 

Now  the  Japanese  regard  suicide,  if  prompted  by  a  good 
motive,  as  a  justifiable  and  noble  act.  The  motives  with  them 
for  the  deed  are  various,  as  in  the  case  of  other  peoples,  but 
among  these  motives  is  one  which  discloses  the  existence 
among  the  Japanese  of  a  sentiment  unknown  or  almost  un- 
known among  ourselves.  The  deed  is  often  committed  in 
the  way  of  making  a  solemn  protest  against  something  dis- 
approved of  in  the  conduct  or  acts  of  others.  Thus  when  the 

1  Five  per  cent  of  the  men  have  concubines. 

2  "  The  central  idea  in  Japanese  life  is  obedience  to  parents  and  rever- 
ence for  ancestors.  Should  a  Japanese  father  have  misfortunes,  his  daughter 
would  think  it  her  filial  duty  to  sell  her  body.  She  would  not  be  regarded  as 
fallen  and  disgraced,  but  as  having  done  a  right  and  noble  deed,  and  might 
afterwards  be  restored  to  her  place  in  society.  But,  though  it  is  hard  to 
explain,  the  Japanese  woman  is  as  chaste  and  pure  and  exalted  in  her  ideas 
of  womanhood  as  any  woman  on  the  globe." —  Sir  Edwin  Arnold  (in  an 
interview).  3  Bacon,  Japanese  Girls  and  Women  (1891),  p.  121. 


86 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


Low  esti- 
mation of 
the  virtue 
of  truth- 
fulness 


Japanese  government  after  war  with  China  in  1 898  acceded 
to  the  demands  of  Russia,  France,  and  Germany  respecting 
the  recession  to  China  of  certain  territories  on  the  Continent, 
forty  men  in  the  Japanese  army,  by  way  of  protest,  committed 
suicide  "  in  the  ancient  way."  x 

Tyrannicide  is  also  looked  upon  by  the  Japanese  as  an 
heroic  and  praiseworthy  deed,  provided  the  person  com- 
mitting the  act  makes  clear  the  self-sacrificing  and  patriotic 
character  of  his  motives  by  at  once  taking  his  own  life. 

A  marked  defect  of  the  moral  standard  of  the  Japanese  is 
the  low  place  assigned  to  the  virtue  of  truthfulness.  Among 
the  Japanese,  to  call  a  person  a  liar  is  not  to  apply  to  him  a 
term  of  reproach,  but  rather  to  pay  him  a  pleasant  compliment 
as  a  person  of  tact  and  shrewdness. 

This  lack  of  reverence  for  truth  probably  springs  in  part 
from  the  virtue  of  politeness  as  a  root.  The  extreme  empha- 
sis laid  upon  courtesy  as  the  sign  and  expression  of  reverence 
and  loyalty  toward  superiors  fosters  the  general  habit  of  say- 
ing things  which  are  pleasant  and  agreeable  whether  they 
are  true  or  not.  This  complacent  disregard  of  truth  in  social 
intercourse  would  seem  to  have  dulled  the  sense  of  obligation 
of  truth-speaking  in  other  relations. 

1  Chamberlain,  Things  Japanese,  4th  ed.,  p.  220.  By  w  the  ancient  way" 
is  meant  hara-kiri,  or  disemboweling.  The  death  by  his  own  hand  of 
General  Nogi,  the  herO  of  Port  Arthur,  during  the  funeral  of  his  departed 
sovereign  Mutsuhito  (September  13,  1912),  reveals  another  motive  for 
suicide  which  is  wholly  foreign  to  our  modes  of  thought  and  feeling.  "  In 
very  early,  almost  prehistoric,  times  the  custom  of  jun-ski,  or  dying  with 
the  master,  led  to  the  interment  of  living  Japanese  retainers  with  their  dead 
lord.  The  custom  gradually  died  out,  but  voluntary  suicide  as  a  means  of 
showing  personal  devotion  or  attachment  to  a  master  or  superior  persisted 
for  many  centuries"  (George  Kennan,  "The  Death  of  General  Nogi," 
New  York  Outlook  for  October  5,  191 2).  It  was  this  ancient  custom  that 
Count  Nogi  followed.  "When  all  was  over"  —  such  is  Mr.  Kennan's  in- 
terpretation of  his  act  —  "he  ended  his  own  life  as  an  expression  of  his 
boundless  devotion  to  the  man  whom  he  had  loved.  It  was  in  the  spirit  of 
Old  Japan,  but  Nogi  was  a  man  of  that  era,  and  lived  in  the  mental  and 
moral  atmosphere  of  that  time." 


Bushido 


JAPANESE  MORALS  87 

III.  Some  Significant   Facts   in  the  Moral  History 

of  Japan 

The  Japanese  knightly  ideal,  which,  as  we  have  said,  con-  General 
stitutes  the  heart  and  core  of  theoretical  Japanese  morality,  theTdeai  of 
has  a  history  somewhat  like  that  of  the  ideal  of  European 
knighthood.  It  was  a  lofty  ideal  very  imperfectly  realized, 
yet  realized  to  such  a  degree  as  to  make  it  a  chief  motive 
force  in  the  political  and  social  life  of  Japan  for  several  cen- 
turies.1 It  left  a  permanent  impress  upon  the  moral  con- 
sciousness of  the  Japanese  nation,  an  impress  certainly  deeper 
and  more  enduring  than  that  left  by  the  ideal  of  European 
chivalry  upon  the  moral  consciousness  of  the  peoples  of 
Western  Europe.  New  Japan  is  directly  or  indirectly  the 
creation  of  Japanese  knighthood. 

We  have  seen  that  loyalty  to  his  chief  was  the  preeminent 
virtue  of  the  samurai.  Upon  the  downfall  of  feudalism  this 
loyalty  was  transferred  to  the  Emperor.  The  spirit  of  the 
samurai  came  to  inspire  the  Japanese  nation.  Since  the  time 
when  the  loyalty  of  Scottish  clansmen  to  their  chief  was  trans- 
ferred to  Scottish  royalty,  there  has  not  been  seen  a  more  re- 
markable example  of  the  absolute  devotion  of  a  people  to  their 
sovereign  than  that  exhibited  to-day  by  the  people  of  Japan. 

The  samurai  were  taught  to  despise  the  love  of  gain,  and 
thus  these  knights  of  Japan  were  strangers  to  those  vices 
which  spring  from  the  love  of  money.  To  this  circumstance 
may  be  ascribed  the  fact  that  the  statesmen  of  Japan,  who 
almost  invariably  are  of  the  samurai  class,  have  been  so  nota- 
bly free  from  venality  and  corruption.2 

Finally,  Bushido  held  aloft  a  high  standard  of  truthfulness. 
The  true  samurai  regarded  an  oath  as  a  derogation  of  his 
honor.    It  cannot  be  affirmed  that  this  Bushido  virtue  of 

1  Japanese  feudalism  began  about  the  eleventh  century.  The  year  1868 
saw  its  final  downfall.  ' 

2  Nitobe,  Bushido,  p.  99. 


88  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

veracity  has  yet  become  the  inheritance  of  the  mercantile  and 
peasant  classes  of  Japan,  but  it  has  at  least  been  retained  by 
the  samurai  as  a  class,  and  is  working  to-day  like  leaven  in 
the  mass  of  Japanese  society. 

TheBu-  There  are  two  remarkable  passages   in  recent  Japanese 

inaction6  history  which  well  illustrate  in  what  way  and  to  what  degree 
the  spirit  of  the  samurai,  "  the  spirit  of  not  living  unto 
one's  self,"  has  become  an  inspiration  to  the  whole  Japanese 
nation.  The  first  passage  has  to  do  with  the  Russo-Japanese 
War  of  1 904-1 905,  which  on  the  part  of  Japan  was  a  struggle 
for  national  existence.  It  was  the  samurai  morality,  a  moral- 
ity of  loyalty,  of  valor,  of  selflessness,  of  fidelity  to  duty,  that 
formed  a  chief  element  of  the  strength  of  Japan  in  that  crit- 
ical juncture  of  the  nation's  life.  The  Bushido  code  of  honor 
showed  itself  equal  to  the  Spartan  code  in  creating  a  race  of 
invincible  warriors.  Since  the  Spartan  Leonidas  and  his  com- 
panions died  for  Greece  in  the  pass  of  Thermopylae  there 
has  been  no  sublimer  exhibition  of  fortitude  and  self-devo- 
tion in  a  great  cause  than  that  shown  by  Japanese  soldiers 
in  the  trenches  before  Port  Arthur  and  on  the  battlefields  of 
Manchuria. 

This  war  for  national  independence  also  afforded  proof  of 
how  the  gentle  virtue  of  Japanese  knighthood,  courteous  gen- 
erosity to  the  vanquished,  has  passed  as  a  noble  legacy  to 
the  nation  at  large ;  for  as  an  eminent  Japanese  statesman 
affirms,  "  In  the  tender  care  bestowed  upon  our  stricken  ad- 
versary of  the  battlefield  will  be  found  the  ancient  courtesy 
of  the  samurai."  1 

1  Okakura-Kakuzo,  The  Awakening  of  Japan  (1904),  p.  175.  Count  Okuma 
makes  a  similar  assertion  :  M  The  humanitarian  efforts  which  in  the  course 
of  the  recent  war  were  so  much  in  evidence,  and  which  so  much  surprised 
Western  nations,  were  not,  as  might  have  been  thought,  the  products  of  the 
new  civilization,  but  survivals  of  our  ancient  feudal  chivalry  "  {Fifty  Years 
of  New  Japan  (1909),  vol.  i,  p.  124).  By  no  people  has  the  Red  Cross  move- 
ment been  taken  up  with  greater  enthusiasm  than  by  the  Japanese. 


JAPANESE  MORALS  89 

The  second  passage  shows  the  morality  of  the  samurai  in  The  moral 
competition  with  the  morality  of  the  common  Japanese  shop-  the  samurai 
man.    Now  the  morality  of  the  plebeian  Japanese  trader  is  ^with*" 
about  on  a  level  with  that  of  the  ancient  Greek  shopkeeper.1  JJJ^Jm* 
And  a  chief  cause  of  his  low  moral  standard  is  the  same,  trader 
namely,  the  general  disesteem  in  which  the  trader's  business 
has  been  held.    This  social  stigma  has  resulted  in  the  mer- 
cantile business  being  left  in  the  hands  of  the  lowest  class 
socially,  intellectually,  and  morally.2    The  great  mass  of  the 
people  have  from  time  immemorial  been  engaged  in  the  hon- 
orable business  of  agriculture  ;  while  the  samurai  class,  as  we 
have  seen,  regarded  it  as  degrading  to  engage  in  trade  or 
even  to  handle  money.    In  these  circumstances  it  was  in- 
evitable that  the  mercantile  class  should  evolve  a  very  low 
code  of  business  ethics ;  for,  as  the  author  of  Bushido  very 
justly  observes,  M  put  a  stigma  on  a  calling  and  its  followers 
adjust  their  morals  to  it." 

The  strictly  class  character  of  this  loose  commercial  moral- 
ity is  shown  by  the  experience  of  the  samurai  after  the  aboli- 
tion of  feudalism  in  1868.  Upon  that  event  many  of  them 
engaged  in  mercantile  business,  carrying  with  them  their 
high  moral  standard,  with  results  pathetically  depicted  by 
Nitobe  in  these  words :  "  Those  who  had  eyes  to  see  could 
not  weep  enough,  those  who  had  hearts  to  feel  could  not 
sympathize  enough,  with  the  fate  of  many  a  noble  and  honest 
samurai  who  signally  and  irrevocably  failed  in  his  new  and 
unfamiliar  field  of  trade  and  industry,  through  sheer  lack  of 
shrewdness  in  coping  with  his  artful  plebeian  rival.  ...  It 

1  Consult  Count  Okuma,  Fifty  Years  of  New  Japan  (1909),  vol.  ii,  pp.  566  f. 

2  "  The  obloquy  attached  to  the  calling  brought  within  its  pale  such  as 
cared  little  for  social  repute"  (Nitobe,  Bushido,  p.  66).  "The  trades- 
people," writes  Chamberlain,  "  stood  at  the  very  bottom  of  the  scale.  The 
hucksters  or  traders  were  a  degraded  class  in  old  Japan,  and  degraded 
their  business  morals  remain,  which  is  the  principal  cause  of  the  difficul- 
ties experienced  by  European  merchants  in  dealing  with  them"  {Things 
Japanese,  4th  ed.,  p.  93). 


QO         HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

will  be  long  before  it  will  be  recognized  how  many  fortunes 
were  wrecked  in  the  attempt  to  apply  Bushido  ethics  to  busi- 
ness methods,  but  it  was  soon  apparent  to  every  observing 
mind  that  the  ways  of  wealth  were  not  the  ways  of  honor."  * 
About  ninety-nine  out  of  every  hundred  samurai  who  ventured 
into  business  are  said  to  have  failed. 

This  passage  out  of  the  history  of  New  Japan  carries  with 
it  various  lessons,  but  particularly  does  it  teach  how  unjust  it 
is  to  judge  the  morality  of  a  people  by  the  morality  of  a  class.2 

1  Nitobe,  Bushido,  p.  67. 

2  The  statement  has  obtained  wide  currency  that  all  the  banks  in  Japan 
employ  only  Chinese  as  cashiers  because  they  cannot  find  honest  Japanese 
for  these  positions  of  trust.  Chinese  are  sometimes  employed  in  Japanese 
banks,  but  the  true  reason  for  their  employment  is  not  the  one  here  as- 
signed.   One  well  qualified  to  speak  authoritatively  on  this  subject  says  : 

Chinese  bankers  and  cashiers  are  largely  Shansi  men,  that  is,  men  from  the 
province  of  Shansi,  where  the  profession  of  banking  has  become  hereditary  in  a 
large  number  of  families.  They  are  all,  or  nearly  all,  members  of  the  powerful 
organization  known  as  the  Bankers'  Guild,  which  has  branches  in  every  part  of  the 
Empire.  The  Bankers'  Guild  has  discovered  that  it  is  practically  impossible  to  con- 
duct large  financial  operations  without  honesty ;  and  it  therefore  enforces  honesty 
by  means  of  a  discipline  that  is  as  rigorous  ...  as  that  of  the  New  York  Stock 
Exchange.  ...  If  a  Chinese  banker  breaks  faith,  violates  a  contract,  or  betrays  a 
trust,  he  is  expelled  from  his  guild  and  the  doors  of  banks  are  closed  against  him  for 
all  time.  In  the  first  place,  therefore,  the  Chinese  cashier  is  honest  because  honesty 
is  a  condition  of  his  business  existence.  He  may  not  be  honest  in  other  respects, — 
often  he  is  not,  —  but  he  is  absolutely  honest  in  the  handling  of  money.  In  the  second 
place,  he  is  probably  the  most  expert  man  living  in  the  rapid  calculation  of  exchanges. 
The  monetary  system  of  his  country  is  the  most  confused,  chaotic,  and  complicated 
system  in  the  world.  There  are  fifteen  or  twenty  different  kinds  of  taels,  no  one  of 
which  bears  a  fixed  relation  to  any  other,  or  to  any  established  monetary  standard.  .  .  . 
The  necessity  of  dealing  in  some  way  with  this  great  mass  of  unstable  and  fluctuating 
currency  and  of  earning  a  subsistence  from  it  has  made  the  Chinese  cashier  one  of 
the  most  expert  of  living  accountants.  He  will  solve  difficult  monetary  problems  by 
short  cuts  of  mental  arithmetic,  and  he  calculates  exchanges  to  eight  points  of  deci- 
mals. In  the  third  place,  the  Chinese  cashier  counts  and  manipulates  bank  bills  and 
coins  with  extraordinary  skill  and  accuracy.  I  have  had  dealings  with  him  in  many 
parts  of  the  Far  East,  but  I  cannot  remember  ever  to  have  seen  him  count  a  sum  of 
money  twice,  and  I  have  never  caught  him  in  an  error.  .  .  . 

Now,  when  you  get  a  man  whose  honesty  is  guaranteed  by  his  guild,  whose 
manipulation  of  money  is  phenomenally  dexterous,  and  who  can  calculate  exchanges 
to  eight  points  of  decimals,  you  have  an  ideal  cashier ;  and  if  Japanese  bankers  em- 
ploy him,  it  shows  their  good  business  sense  rather  than  their  distrust  of  their  own 
people.  But  all  Japanese  bankers  do  not  employ  him.  In  some  of  the  largest  banks 
in  Tokyo,  Kioto,  and  Osaka  there  are  no  Chinese  at  all — or  at  least  I  have  never 
seen  any.  This  explanation  would  not  be  worth,  perhaps,  the  space  that  I  have  given 


JAPANESE  MORALS  91 

Notwithstanding  the  disastrous  outcome  of  their  first  ven- 
ture into  the  mercantile  field,  the  samurai  still  remain  in 
business,  so  that  there  is  going  on  to-day  in  Japan  in  the 
commercial  domain  a  competition  between  two  moral  stand- 
ards. The  triumph  of  the  standard  of  the  samurai  over  that 
of  the  plebeian  trader  would  mean  the  development  in  Japan 
of  a  matchless  business  morality,  which,  in  the  increasing 
closeness  of  commercial  relations  between  the  East  and  the 
West,  might  well  act  cleansingly  on  our  own  business  ethics.1 

The  rapid  transformation  in  the  institutions  and  ideas  of  Moral  edu- 
Old  Japan  after  the  revolution  of  1868  created  a  crisis  in  the  schools; 
the  moral  life  of  the  Japanese  people.  The  old  basis  of  the  SSSXipt 
national  morality  was  destroyed.   Reverence  for  the  Confucian 
teachings  was  lost.    Respect  for  ancestral  customs  was  seri- 
ously impaired.    Moral  anarchy  impended.    In  this  critical 
juncture  some  proposed  that  Buddhism,  others  that  Chris- 
tianity, should  be  made  the  basis  of  the  moral  code. 

Especially  in  the  schools  was  the  urgency  of  the  need  of 
some  new  sanction  for  morality  felt,  because  moral  instruction 
and  training  have  always  formed  an  essential  part  of  the  edu- 
cation of  the  youth  of  Japan.  The  Japanese  have  ever  believed 
that  it  is  possible  to  mold  the  character  of  the  nation  by  edu- 
cation. "  With  us,"  says  a  native  writer,  "  education  has  meant 
moral  education  more  than  anything  else  for  centuries." 2 
"  The  object  of  teaching,"  says  the  official  regulations  for 
teaching  in  elementary  schools,   "is  to  cultivate  the  moral 

to  it,  if  the  story  of  the  Chinese  cashier  had  not  been  so  widely  circulated,  and  if  it 
were  not  typical  of  a  whole  class  of  cases  in  which  the  Japanese  are  misjudged 
on  the  basis  of  a  single  incident  or  a  solitary  fact.  —  George  Kennan,  "Are  the 
Japanese  Honest?  "  the  New  York  Outlook  for  August  31,  1912. 

1  M  If  the  descendants  of  the  samurai  can  erect  a  standard  of  commercial 
integrity  at  all  comparable  to  their  fine  record  for  courage  and  loyalty,  we 
shall  be  their  debtors,  not  they  ours."  —  The  New  York  Nation  for  July  30, 
1908,  p.  90. 

2  Baron  Kikuchi,  in  Sadler,  Moral  Instruction  and  Training  in  Schools 
(1908),  vol.  ii,  p.  343. 


92  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

nature  of  children  and  to  guide  them  in  the  practice  of  vir- 
tues." *  Because  of  this  central  place  assigned  moral  educa- 
tion in  the  work  of  the  schools,  the  necessity  for  removing 
all  uncertainty  as  to  what  should  be  inculcated  was  all  the 
more  exigent. 

To  meet  the  crisis  the  following  imperial  rescript  was 
issued  —  certainly  one  of  the  most  remarkable  state  papers 
ever  promulgated : 

"  Know  ye,  our  subjects : 

"  Our  imperial  ancestors  have  founded  our  Empire  on  a  basis  broad 
and  everlasting  and  have  deeply  and  firmly  implanted  virtue ;  our  subjects, 
ever  united  in  loyalty  and  filial  piety,  have  from  generation  to  generation 
illustrated  the  beauty  thereof.  This  is  the  glory  and  the  fundamental 
character  of  our  Empire,  and  herein  also  lies  the  source  of  our  education. 
Ye,  our  subjects,  be  filial  to  your  parents,  affectionate  to  your  brothers 
and  sisters ;  as  husbands  and  wives  be  harmonious ;  as  friends  true ; 
bear  yourselves  in  modesty  and  moderation ;  extend  your  benevolence  to 
all ;  pursue  learning  and  cultivate  arts,  and  thereby  develop  intellectual 
faculties  and  perfect  moral  powers ;  furthermore,  advance  public  good 
and  promote  common  interests ;  always  respect  the  Constitution  and  ob- 
serve the  laws ;  should  emergency  arise,  offer  yourselves  courageously 
to  the  state ;  and  thus  guard  and  maintain  the  prosperity  of  our  impe- 
rial throne  coeval  with  heaven  and  earth.  So  shall  ye  not  only  be  our 
good  and  faithful  subjects,  but  render  illustrious  the  best  traditions  of 
your  forefathers. 

"  The  way  here  set  forth  is  indeed  the  teaching  bequeathed  by  our 
imperial  ancestors,  to  be  observed  alike  by  their  descendants  and  the 
subjects,  infallible  for  all  ages  and  true  in  all  places.  It  is  our  wish  to 
lay  it  to  heart  in  all  reverence,  in  common  with  you,  our  subjects,  that 
we  may  all  thus  attain  to  the  same  virtue. 

"  The  30th  day  of  the  10th  month  of  the  23d  year  of  Meiji  "  [1890].2 

It  would  be  almost  impossible  to  exaggerate  the  influence 
of  this  imperial  edict.  "Our  whole  moral  education,"  affirms 
Baron  Kikuchi,  "  consists  in  instilling  into  the  minds  of  our 
children  the  proper  appreciation  of  the  spirit  of  this  rescript."  3 

1  Baron  Kikuchi,  in  Sadler,  Moral  Instruction  and  Training  in  Schools 
(1908),  vol.  ii,  p.  331. 

2  Ibid.  vol.  ii,  p.  319.  8  Ibid.  vol.  ii,  p.  230. 


JAPANESE  MORALS  93 

The  children  learn  it  by  heart  just  as  the  Roman  children 
committed  to  memory  the  Twelve  Tables  of  the  laws. 

Japanese  believe  that  the  effect  of  this  instruction  upon  the 
national  character,  reenforcing  the  ancestral  virtues  of  loyalty 
and  devotion  to  duty,  was  exhibited  in  the  recent  war  with 
Russia.1 

A  noteworthy  feature  of  the  rescript  is  that  it  is  simply 
a  reaffirmation  of  the  teachings  of  the  ancient  moralists 
and  the  ethical  traditions  of  the  fathers  —  an  inculcation  of 
those  virtues  of  loyalty  and  filial  piety  which  the  Japanese 
people  have  held  in  esteem  and  practiced  from  generation 
to  generation. 

A  second  feature  of  the  edict  which  arrests  attention  is 
the  universalistic  and  secular  character  of  the  morality  incul- 
cated. The  virtues  enjoined  are  universal  benevolence,  loyalty 
to  duty,  and  self-devotion  to  the  common  good  —  a  morality 
of  the  universal  human  heart  and  conscience,  a  morality,  as 
the  edict  declares,  good  for  all  ages  and  for  all  places. 

The  foregoing  anticipates  and  gives  answer  to  the  ques-  Japanese 
tions  :   What  will  be  the  effect  upon  Japanese  morality  of  western 
those  changes  now  going  on  in  the  life  and  thought  of  Japan  clvlhzatlon 
through  contact  with  the  civilization  of  the  West  ?   What  will 
be  the  effect  upon  Japanese  public  morality  when  the  com- 
mon belief  in  the  divine  descent  of  the  Emperor,  which  is 
the  root  from  which  springs  the  primal  duty  of  loyalty,  is 
undermined,  as  modern  science  is  certain  to  undermine  it  ? 
What  will  be  the  effect  upon  Japanese  domestic  morality  when 
Occidental  conceptions  of  the  family  and  of  woman's  place  in 
it  come  to  modify,  as  they  seem  likely  to  do,  those  ideas  and 
sentiments  which  from  time  immemorial  have  formed  the 
basis  of  the  family  ethics  of  the  East?    What  will  be  the 

1  "  I  certainly  consider  that  the  courage  and  devotion  of  the  Japanese 
soldiers  during  the  late  war  was  to  a  great  extent  the  result  of  this  system- 
atic moral  instruction  and  training  in  schools." —  Baron  Kikuchi,  in  Sadler, 
Moral  Instruction  and  Training  hi  Schools  (1908),  vol.  ii,  p.  344. 


94  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

ethical  consequences  when  Western  science  renders  obsolete 
the  Shinto  learning  and  the  Confucian  classics,  which  have 
hitherto  formed  the  basis  of  so  large  a  part  of  Japanese 
morality  ?  What  will  be  the  effect  upon  the  ancient  ideal 
of  character  of  the  adoption  of  Christian  ideas  and  teachings 
in  place  of  those  which  have  so  long  nourished  the  ethical 
feelings  and  sentiments  of  the  Japanese  people  ? 

That  the  intrusion  into  the  ancient  culture  of  Japan  of 
these  various  elements  of  Western  civilization  has.  deep  im- 
port for  Japanese  morality  cannot  be  made  a  matter  of  doubt. 
In  the  new  environment,  so  different  from  that  in  the  midst 
of  which  the  ancient  ideal  of  goodness  was  developed,  this 
ideal  must  inevitably  undergo  important  changes.  Some  of 
those  qualities  of  character  which  have  so  long  held  high 
places  in  the  ideal  of  excellence  will  cease  to  evoke  the  old- 
time  homage,  while  other  qualities  at  present  assigned  low 
places  in  the  standard  will  be  exalted.  Virtues  now  practi- 
cally unrecognized  by  the  Japanese  as  virtues,  but  which  among 
us  are  highly  esteemed  moral  qualities,  will  certainly  be  in- 
corporated in  the  modified  ideal,  giving  it  a  new  cast,  yet 
probably  without  changing  fundamentally  the  type ;  for  the 
moral  life  of  the  Japanese  people  is  too  virile  and  too  essen- 
tially sound  to  permit  us  to  think  that  the  new  influences  now 
coming  in  will  produce  such  radical  changes  in  the  ethical  feel- 
ings and  convictions  of  the  race  as  to  result  in  a  repetition  of 
what  happened  upon  the  entrance  of  Christianity  into  the  mor- 
ally decadent  Greco- Roman  world  —  the  displacement  of  the 
old  ideal  of  character  by  a  new  and  essentially  different  ideal. 


CHAPTER  VII 
THE   ETHICAL  IDEALS   OF  INDIA 

PART  I.    THE  ETHICS  OF  BRAHMANISM  — A  CLASS 
MORALITY 

I.  Historical  and  Speculative  Basis  of  the  System 

As  in  Judea  so  in  India  the  conception  formed  of  the  The  con- 
Supreme  Being  reacted  potently  upon  morality.    Hence  in  thirst 
naming  the  influences  under  which  the  moral  ideal  of  Brah-  Brahma" 
manism  was    molded  we    must   speak  first  of  the   Indian 
conception  of  the  First  Cause. 

The  Aryan  conquerors  of  India  originally  held  notions  of 
the  gods  in  general  like  those  held  by  their  kinsmen,  the  early 
Greeks  and  Romans.  When  they  entered  India  they  were 
ancestor  worshipers  and  polytheists.  They  had  earth  gods 
and  sky  gods.  The  gods  of  the  celestial  phenomena  gradu- 
ally acquired  ascendancy.  Then,  as  in  Egypt,  there  came  a 
tendency  toward  unity.  The  various  gods  came  to  be  looked 
upon  by  the  loftier  minds  as  merely  different  manifestations 
of  one  primal  being.1 

It  is  right  at  this  point  that  we  find  the  great  antithesis 
between  Indian  modes  of  thought  and  those  of  all  or  almost 

1  Wedgwood  {The  Moral  Ideal,  3d  ed.,  p.  22)  suggestively  likens  the 
reduction  to  unity  of  the  various  gods  of  polytheism  to  the  correlation  of 
the  physical  forces  —  light,  heat,  electricity,  and  magnetism.  Just  as  all  these 
are  found  to  be  merely  different  manifestations  of  a  single  force  or  energy, 
so  are  all  the  deified  phenomena  of  nature  at  last  discovered  to  be  but  dif- 
ferent manifestations  of  a  single  primal  power — the  One,  the  Supreme, 
the  Eternal.  This  correlation  of  the  gods,  this  reduction  of  polytheism  to 
monotheism,  holds  the  same  place  in  the  records  of  the  religious  and  moral 
evolution  of  the  race  that  the  correlation  of  the  physical  forces  holds  in 
the  records  of  the  progress  of  science. 

95 


96  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

all  other  peoples.  When  the  thinkers  of  Egypt,  of  the  Sem- 
itic lands,  of  Persia,  of  Greece  and  Rome,  had  at  last  through 
reflection  evolved  the  lofty  conception  of  a  single  great  First 
Cause,  they  endowed  this  cause  with  conscious  personal  life. 
This  mode  of  thought  is  our  heritage'  from  the  past.  It  is  to 
us  almost  or  quite  impossible  to  conceive  of  conscious  per- 
sonal life  as  springing  from  an  unconscious  impersonal  cause. 
Hence  we  place  behind  the  manifold  phenomena  of  the  uni- 
verse a  conscious  personal  being  as  the  origin  and  source  of 
all  things  and  all  life.1 

It  is  wholly  different  with  the  thinkers  of  India.  They 
seem  to  be  able  to  postulate  as  the  beginning  of  things 
an  impersonal  cause,  a  cause  without  perception,  thought,  or 
consciousness.  They  affirm  that  out  of  unconsciousness  con- 
sciousness arises.  They  teach  that  out  of  Brahma,  the  un- 
conscious, impersonal,  passionless  One,  emanate  all  material 
worlds  and  sentient  beings,  gods  as  well  as  men. 

How  profoundly  this  conception  of  the  First  Cause  has 
reacted  on  the  ethical  speculations  of  the  Hindu  sages  and 
on  the  moral  life  of  India  will  appear  a  little  further  on. 

The  god  But  this  incomprehensible,  unconscious,  passionless  Brahma 

^Brahman)  is  not  the  Brahma  of  the  popular  faith.  The  masses  and 
even  the  philosophers  themselves  must  have  something  more 
concrete.  So  this  impersonal,  neuter  Brahma  is  conceived 
as  giving  existence  to  the  personal,  masculine  God  Brahma 
(Brahman),  "  the  progenitor  of  all  worlds,  the  first-born 
among  beings."  2 

It  is  very  necessary  for  the  student  of  Brahmanic  ethics  to 
keep  in  mind  the  distinction  between  the  uncreated,  uncon- 
ditioned, impersonal  Brahma  and  the  created,  conditioned, 

1  There  may  be  some  philosophers  and  scientists  who  profess  material- 
ism, and  who  make  an  infinite  and  eternal  unconscious  energy  the  primal 
cause  of  all  things.  But  this  is  a  philosophy  of  the  universe  which  has  never 
secured  a  wide  acceptance  in  the  West. 

2  Oldenberg,  Buddha  (1882),  p.  59. 


THE  ETHICAL  IDEALS  OF  INDIA  97 


personal  Brahma,  since  there  is  here  laid  the  foundation  of 
a  double  goal  for  rational  moral  striving :  the  goal  of  the  ascetic 
whose  ultimate  aim  is  deliverance  from  individual  existence 
and  absorption  into  the  absolute,  unchangeable,  impersonal 
Brahma,  which  means  a  state  of  eternal  unconsciousness  — 
dreamless  sleep  ;  and  the  goal  of  the  multitude,  whose  hope 
and  aim  is  blissful,  though  temporary,  union  with  the  per- 
sonal Brahma  in  the  heaven  of  the  mortal,  conditioned  gods.1 

The  ethical  evolution  in  India  was  also  profoundly  influ-  The  system 
enced  by  a  prehistoric  event,  namely,  the  subjection  of  the 
original  non-Aryan  population  of  the  land  by  an  intruding 
Aryan  people.  As  a  result  of  the  long  and  bitter  struggle  the 
two  races  became  separated  by  a  sharp  line  of  race  prejudice 
and  hatred.  The  dark-skinned  natives  were  reduced  to  a  state 
of  servitude  or  dependence  upon  their  conquerors.  Intermar- 
riages between  the  two  races  were  strictly  prohibited,  and  thus 
the  population  of  the  conquered  districts  of  the  peninsula  be- 
came divided  into  two  sharply  defined  classes.  These  consti- 
tuted a  model  upon  which  Indian  society  was  framed.  Other 
classes  were  formed,  and  these  gradually  hardened  into  castes, 
that  is,  into  classes  between  which  marriages  were  prohibited. 
Four  great  castes  arose :  namely,  priests  or  Brahmans,  war- 
riors and  rulers,  peasants  and  merchants,  and  sudras.  Below 
these  castes  were  the  pariahs,  or  outcasts,  made  up  of  the 
most  degraded  of  the  natives.  As  time  passed,  still  other 
divisions  were  formed,  every  occupation  coming  to  constitute 
the  basis  of  a  new  caste,  till  society  was  stratified  like  a 
geologic  deposit. 

Religion  came  in  to  consecrate  this  division  of  the  people 
into  privileged  and  nonprivileged  classes.2  The  sacred  scrip- 
tures declare  that  the  Brahmans  sprang  from  the  mouth  of 

1  Hopkins,  The  Religions  of  India  (1895),  P-  35^- 

2  This  was  the  work  of  the  Brahmans,  who,  to  secure  the  ascendancy  of 
their  own  class,  falsified  and  misinterpreted  the  sacred  books. 


98  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

Brahma,  the  warriors  from  his  arms,  the  peasants  and  traders 
from  his  thighs,  and  the  sudras  from  his  feet.1 

No  institution  known  among  men  ever  exercised  a  more 
fateful  and  sinister  influence  upon  morality  than  this  caste 
system  has  exercised  upon  the  morality  of  the  peoples  of 
India.  The  rooted  belief  and  dogma  of  the  natural  inequality 
of  men  has  made  Brahmanic  ethics  a  thing  of  grades  and 
classes,  and  has  thus  rendered  impossible  the  evolution  of  a 
true  morality,  which  requires  for  its  basis  genuine  sentiments 
of  equality  and  brotherhood. 

The  doc-  We  easily  realize  the  importance  for  morality  of  a  belief 

transmi-  in  a  life  after  death.  But  a  belief  in  preexistence  may  exert 
gration  an  even  greater  influence  upon  the  moral  code  of  a  people 
than  a  belief  in  post-existence.2  Now  the  morality  of  the 
Hindus  has  been  molded  by  both  these  doctrines,  for  ac- 
cording to  the  teachings  of  Brahmanism  a  man  has  lived 
through  many  lives  before  his  "birth,"  and  may  wander 
through  "  ten  thousand  millions  of  existences  "  after  death 
has  freed  him  from  his  present  body.3  The  class  and  the  con- 
dition into  which  he  is  born  here  on  earth  is  believed  to  be 
determined  by  the  sum  total  of  his  merits  or  demerits  earned 
in  preceding  existences.  As  a  result  of  sin  he  may  in  his  next 
birth  be  reborn  in  a  lower  caste,  or  may  be  imprisoned  in 
some  animal  or  vegetable  form.  He  may  pass  a  thousand 
times  through  the  bodies  of  spiders,  snakes,  and  lizards,  and 
hundreds  of  times  through  the  forms  of  grasses,  shrubs,  and 
creepers.  And  all  this  experience  may  come  after  the  soul 
has  passed  through  dreadful  and  innumerable  hells  for  vast 
cycles  of  years.4 

'    1  Laws  of  Manu  (Sacred  Books  of  the  East,  vol.  xxv),  i.  31,  87. 

2  Cf.  Hearn,  Kokora,  chap.  xii.  3  Laws  of  Manu,  vi.  63. 

4  Lbid.  xii.  9,  53-58.  The  germs  out  of  which  this  system  was  developed 
by  the  Brahmans  formed  a  part  of  the  animistic  conception  of  the  world 
held  by  the  conquered  natives.  By  the  sixth  century  B.C.  the  system  had 
been  fully  elaborated.    See  Rhys  Davids,  Llibbert  Lectures  (1881),  pp.  16  f. 


THE  ETHICAL  IDEALS  OF  INDIA  99 

This  transmigration  theory  was  framed  by  the  thinkers  of  \ 
India  to  explain  among  other  things  the  seemingly  unjust 
inequalities  of  human  life.1  It  afforded  an  explanation  why 
one  man  should  be  born  a  Brahman  and  another  a  sudra, 
one  born  in  a  hovel  and  another  in  a  palace,  by  conceiving 
the  place  of  every  person  born  into  the  world  as  being  deter- 
mined by  the  manner  of  his  life  in  former  existences.2 

It  is  unnecessary  to  dwell  upon  the  profound  influence 
which  this  doctrine  of  transmigration,  or  round  of  births, 
has  exerted  upon  the  moral  life  of  India.  The  tendency  of 
this  theory,  as  soon  as  elaborated,  was  to  render  still  more 
intolerable  the  position  of  the  lower  castes,  particularly  that 
of  the  sudras,  since  it  made  their  low  place  and  hard  lot  to 
be  the  merited  punishment  of  crimes  and  misdoings  in  previ- 
ous lives  ;  while  at  the  same  time  it  fed  the  pride  and  enhanced 
the  arrogance  of  the  Brahmans,  since  their  superior  lot  was, 
according  to  the  theory,  attributable  to  merit  acquired  in  other 
existences.  Thus  did  the  theory  tend  to  give  a  more  sinister 
aspect  to  the  baneful  caste  system,  to  make  it  appear  a  part 
of  the  unchangeable, order  of  things,  and  to  render  impossible 
the  growth  of  any  other  than  a  class  morality. 

Hardly  less  important  than  the  doctrine  of  transmigration  Indian 
for  Hindu  morality  is  the  Indian  conception  of  life  —  of  all  in-  pessimism 
dividual,  conscious  existence  whether  here  on  earth  or  in  other 
worlds  —  as  inseparable  from  misery,  pain,  decay,  and  death. 

The  Aryan  immigrants  into  India  seem  to  have  been,  like 
their  kinsmen  the  Greeks,  a  light-hearted  folk,  filled  with  a 
strong  joy  in  life.    But  as  in  their  journeyings  they  pressed 

1  The  theory  was  also  undoubtedly  in  part  the  creation  of  the  same  ethi- 
cal necessity  that  called  into  existence  the  purgatory  of  the  medieval  Church. 
The  reincarnations  have  for  aim  and  purpose  not  merely  retribution,  but 
expiation  and  purification. 

2  The  reader  of  Edward  Beecher's  The  Conflict  of  Ages,  wherein  the 
author  attempts  to  explain  the  inequalities  of  earthly  life  by  the  theory  of 
preexistence,  will  be  able  to  appreciate  this  effort  of  Indian  philosophers 
to  solve  the  same  problem. 


IOO  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

southward  into  the  valleys  of  the  Indus  and  the  Ganges  and 
came  under  the  influences  of  the  hot,  depressing  climate,  and 
of  an  oppressive  social  and  political  system,1  they  appeared 
to  have  lost  their  buoyant  spirits.  The  skies  seemed  less 
bright  and  life  less  worth  living,  and,  weary  of  it  all,  they  at 
last  came  to  regard  eternal  death,  annihilation,  as  the  greatest 
of  boons. 

This  pessimistic  view  of  the  world  and  of  life,  as  we  shall 
see  a  little  further  on,  forms  the  basis  of  large  sections  of 
Indian  ethics,  since  it  makes  the  ultimate  goal  of  rational  or 
moral  effort  to  be  the  getting  rid  of  conscious  existence. 

The  concep-  Another  conception  which  has  exerted  a  profound  influence 
sacrifice  upon  the  religious  ethics  of  Brahmanism  is  that  respecting 
sacrifice.  This  conception  is  that  the  gods  need  sustenance, 
and  can  only  exist  through  the  gifts  and  offerings  made  to 
them  by  men.2  "  The  gods  live  by  sacrifice  "  say  the  sacred 
scriptures ;  "  the  sun  would  not  rise  if  the  priests  did  not 
make  sacrifice." 

To  understand  this  teaching  we  must  connect  it  with  the 
belief  of  primitive  man  that  the  spirits  of  the  dead  have  ab- 
solute need  of  meat  and  drink  offerings  at  the  hands  of  the 
living,  and  remember  that  in  India  there  is  no  sharp  distinc- 
tion drawn  between  the  gods  and  the  souls  of  men.  The  gods, 
like  the  spirits  of  the  dead,  are  dependent  for  life  and  strength 
upon  the  offerings  laid  on  their  altars.  Without  these  gifts 
they  would  die  or  pine  away,  and  all  the  movements  of  the 
universe  controlled  by  them  would  cease.3 

1  Indian  pessimism  is  doubtless  to  be  attributed  in  part  to  the  hot,  de- 
pressing climate,  but  more  largely  to  the  burdensome  caste  system  and  an 
oppressive  government,  which  made  free  and  joyous  life  impossible  to  the 
masses,  shutting  them  up,  without  hope,  to  an  existence  of  ache  and  pain 
and  wretchedness.  "  Politics  and  society,  in  our  opinion,"  says  Dr.  Hopkins, 
"  had  more  to  do  with  altering  the  religion  of  India  than  had  a  higher 
temperature  and  miasma"  {The  Religions  of  India  (1895),  p.  199).  But 
cf.  Bloomfield,  The  Religion  of  the  Veda  (1908),  pp.  263  ff. 

2  Hopkins,  The  Religions  of  India  (1895),  p.  149.  8  Ibid.  p.  187. 


THE  ETHICAL  IDEALS-  OF  INDIA  102 

From  this  conception  of  the  gods  came  the  emphasis  laid 
by  Brahmanism  upon  sacrifice,  and  the  prominence  given  the 
religious  duty  of  bringing  rich  gifts  to  the  priests  and  keeping 
the  altars  of  the  gods  heaped  with  food.1 

II.  The  Various  Moral  Standards 

The  fundamental  fact  of  Brahmanic  morality  is  that  as  a  re-  a  class 
suit  of  the  caste  system  it  is  a  class  morality  ;  that  is,  there  is  a  morallty 
different  moral  standard  or  code  for  each  of  the  different  castes. 

In  the  account  given  in  the  Laws  of  Manu  of  the  origin 
of  the  four  chief  castes,  the  occupation  and  the  duties  of  each 
class  are  carefully  prescribed.  To  the  Brahman  was  assigned 
teaching  and  offering  sacrifice  ;  to  the  warriors  and  rulers  the 
protection  of  the  people  ;  to  the  peasants  and  merchants  the 
tilling  of  the  ground  and  trading  ;  and  to  the  sudras —  "  One 
occupation  only,"  reads  the  sacred  law,  M  is  prescribed  to  the 
sudra,  to  serve  meekly  the  other  three  castes."  2 

The  Brahman  is  by  right  the  lord  of  the  whole  creation.3 
His  name  must  express  something  auspicious,  but  the  first  part 
of  the  sudra's  name  must  express  something  contemptible, 
and  the  second  part  must  be  a  word  denoting  service.4 

1  This  Brahmanic  notion  of  sacrifice,  that  the  gods  need  food,  is  the 
underlying  notion  in  all  religions  of  which  sacrifices  form  a  part.  "  That 
the  purpose  of  sacrifice  was  simply  to  feed  the  gods  was  admitted  on  all 
sides  in  the  controversy  which  accompanied  the  diffusion  of  Christianity 
in  the  ancient  world.  .  .  .  The  altar,  in  the  words  of  Dean  Spenser,  was 
merely  the  table  on  which  food  and  drink  were  set  before  the  languishing 
deity"  (Payne,  History  of  the  New  World  called  America  (1892),  vol.  i, 
pp.  xi  f.).  "  It  is  on  precisely  the  same  principle  that  the  Mexicans  kept 
their  great  war-gods  .  .  .  alive  and  vigorous  by  the  blood  of  young  human 
victims  selected  from  their  tributaries,  and  the  Peruvians  maintained  the 
Creator,  Sun,  Moon,  and  Thunder,  on  whose  favor  their  crops  depended, 
in  youth  and  vigor  by  the  continual  smoke  of  burnt  llamas  "  {Ibid.  vol.  i, 
p.  484).  Consult  also  Frazer,  Adonis,  Attis,  and  Osiris.  All  these  were 
divinities  of  vegetation,  which  were  believed  to  die  and  to  come  to  life  again, 
as  with  the  revolution  of  the  seasons  vegetation  died  and  was  renewed.  Along 
with  this  belief  went  the  notion  that  by  magical  ceremonies  the  worshipers 
of  the  gods  could  aid  them  in  recovering  their  wasted  energies. 

2  Laws  of  Manu,  i.  88-91.  3  Ibid.  i.  93.  4  Ibid.  ii.  32,  35. 


iC)2 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


The  high- 
est moral 
excellence 
attainable 
in  general 
only  by 
Brahmans 


For  a  man  of  a  lower  caste  to  affect  equality  with  a  person 
of  a  higher  caste  is  a  crime  :  "  If  a  man  of  an  inferior  caste, 
proudly  affecting  an  equality  with  a  man  of  superior  caste, 
should  travel  by  his  side  on  the  road,  or  sit  or  sleep  upon  the 
same  carpet  with  him,  the  magistrate  shall  take  a  fine  from 
the  man  of  inferior  caste  to  the  extent  of  his  ability."  1 
|  For  a  Brahman  to  explain  to  a  sudra  the  sacred  Vedas  is 
a  sin  :  M  Let  him  [the  Brahman]  not  give  to  a  sudra  advice 
nor  the  remnants  of  his  meal  .  .  . ;  nor  let  him  explain  the 
sacred  law  to  such  a  man  ;  ...  for  he  who  explains  the  sacred 
law  to  such  .  .  .  will  sink  together  with  that  man  into  hell."  2 

In  the  matter  of  punishments  for  crimes  the  laws  are 
grossly  unequal,  the  punishment  of  a  person  of  inferior  caste 
being  always  more  severe  than  that  of  a  person  of  a  superior 
caste  for  the  same  offense.  Thus  for  a  crime  punishable  with 
death  if  committed  by  a  person  of  an  inferior  caste,  tonsure 
only  is  ordained  if  committed  by  a  Brahman  ; 3  for  a  Brahman 
must  never  be  slain,  "  though  he  have  committed  all  horrible 
crimes."  4  There  is  no  crime  in  all  the  world  as  great  as  that 
of  slaying  a  Brahman.5 

A  knowledge  of  the  inequality  of  these  sacred  laws  of  the 
Brahmans  and  the  burdensomeness  of  this  caste  morality  as 
it  pressed  upon  the  lower  classes  is  necessary  to  an  under- 
standing of  the  rise  and  rapid  spread  of  Buddhism,  and  the 
fervor  with  which  its  teachings  of  equality  and  brotherhood 
were  embraced  by  the  masses  of  Brahmanic  India. 

Of  the  different  standards  of  morality  of  the  several  castes 
that  of  the  Brahman  is  of  course  the  highest.  The  study  of 
the  sacred  books  is  for  him  the  chief  duty.  "  Let  him," 
says  the  sacred  law,  "  without  tiring  daily  mutter  the  Veda 
at  the  proper  time ;  for  that  is  one's  highest  duty ;  all  other 
observances  are  secondary  duties."  6   Knowledge  of  the  Veda 


1  The  Gentoo  Code  (1776),  xvi. 

2  Laws  of  M ami,  iv.  80,  81. 
8  Ibid.  viii.  379. 


4  Ibid.  viii.  380. 
8  Ibid.  viii.  381. 
6  Ibid.  iv.  147. 


THE  ETHICAL  IDEALS  OF  INDIA  103 

destroys  guilt  as  fire  consumes  fuel.1  Among  the  secondary 
duties  are  observance  of  the  rules  of  purification,  the  practice 
of  austerities,  and  doing  no  injury  to  created  beings.2 

By  austerities,  that  is,  by  ascetic  practices,  by  hideous  self- 
torture,  the  Brahman  may  atone  for  all  sins  of  whatsoever 
kind  and  may  become  so  holy  that  at  death,  having  conquered 
all  desires,  save  only  the  desire  for  union  with  the  Universal 
One,  he  may  hope  to  fall  away  into  unawakening  unconscious- 
ness and  be  absorbed  into  the  absolute,  impersonal  Brahma, 
and  thus  escape  forever  from  the  weary  round  of  births.  This 
way  of  full  salvation,  and  it  is  the  only  one,  is  open  only  to 
Brahmans  and  to  the  chosen  few  from  other  castes  who, 
having  gone  forth  "from  home  into  homelessness,"  as  men- 
dicants or  forest  hermits,  follow  this  life  of  complete  renuncia- 
tion of  all  that  is  earthly. 

The  duties,  the  faithful  performance  of  which  avail  most  The  moral 
for  persons  of  inferior  castes,  are  those  that  have  to  do  with  Sferior 
religion,  and  chiefly  with  sacrifice.    These  duties  are  the  castes 
bringing  of  gifts  and  offerings  for  the  sacrifices  and  the 
giving  of  generous  fees  to  the  priests.  Through  the  faithful 
performance  of  his  assigned  duties  the  man  of  inferior  caste 
can  make  sure  of  salvation — not  the  full  and  perfect  salvation 
attained  by  the  Brahman  through  his  austerities,  but  a  quali- 
fied salvation.    He  may  hope  for  rebirth  in  some  higher  caste 
or  in  some  better  state  either  on  earth  or  in  some  other  world.3 

Duty  to  animals  seems  to  have  formed  no  part  of  the  moral  Animal 
code  of  the  early  Indian  Aryans.   But  chiefly  through  the  in- 
fluence of  the  doctrine  of  transmigration  respect  for  every 
living  thing  became  a  high  moral  requirement.    To  take  life 
wantonly  became  a  crime.   To  kill  a  kine,  a  horse,  a  camel, 

1  Laws  of  Manu,  xi.  247.  2  Ibid.  iv.  148. 

8  Even  the  sudra  is  not  shut  out  from  this  hope.  If  he  be  pure,  the 
faithful  servant  of  his  betters,  gentle  in  his  speech  and  free  from  pride,  he 
will  at  death  be  reborn  into  a  higher  caste  (Laws  of Manu,  ix.  335). 


104  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

a  deer,  an  elephant,  a  goat,  a  sheep,  a  fish,  a  snake,  a  buffalo, 
insects,  or  birds  is  an  offense  which  must  be  expiated  by 
penances.1 

In  order  that  he  may  not  harm  any  living  creature,  the 
ascetic  is  enjoined  "  always  by  day  and  by  night,  even  with 
pain  to  his  body,  to  walk  carefully,  scanning  the  ground."  2 
Should  he  unintentionally  injure  any  creature  he  must  expiate 
its  death  by  penitent  austerities.3 

Animals  may,  however,  be  slain  for  food4  and  for  sacrifices, 
since  they  were  created  for  these  special  purposes.  And  then 
there  is  compensation  for  the  victims  of  the  altars  :  "  Herbs, 
trees,  cattle,  birds,  and  all  animals  that  have  been  destroyed 
for  sacrifices  receive,  being  reborn,  higher  existences."5 

The  killing  of  animals  for  sport  is  an  inexpiable  sin  :  "  He 
who  injures  innoxious  beings  from  a  wish  to  (give)  himself 
pleasure  never  finds  happiness,  neither  living  nor  dead."  6 

Under  the  influence  of  Buddhism  we  shall  see  this  con- 
sideration for  animal  life  deepening  into  a  genuine  tenderness 
for  every  living  creature,  and  duties  toward  the  inferior  ani- 
mals becoming  one  of  the  most  beautiful  and  characteristic 
features  of  the  ethical  ideal. 

war  ethics  In  Brahmanic  as  in  Confucian  ethics  the  military  virtues 
are  assigned  a  low  place.  Brahmanism,  however,  concedes 
the  legitimacy  of  war  and  permits  the  employment  of  force 
by  the  king  in  augmenting  his  possessions,7  even  enjoining 
•  upon  him  to  be  ever  ready  to  strike ;  for  "  of  him  who  is 
always  ready  to  strike,  the  whole  world  stands  in  awe."  8 

1  Laws  of  Manu,  xi.  60,  69,  71,  72,  132-138,  140-142,  144.  Especially 
severe  is  thepenance  imposed  for  killing  a  cow.    See  Ibid.  xi.  109-117. 

2  Ibid.  vi.  68.  8  Ibid.  vi.  69. 

4  It  is  better,  however,  to  abstain  wholly  from  the  use  of  meat,  since  this 
can  be  obtained  only  through  pain  to  sentient  beings  {Laws  of  Manu, 
v.  48).  There  is  no  sin  in  eating  meat,  "but  abstention  brings  great 
rewards"  (Ibid.  v.  56). 

6  Laws  of  Manu,  v.  40.  7  Ibid.  vii.  101. 

6  Ibid.  v.  45.  8  Ibid.  vii.  103. 


ritualism 


THE  ETHICAL  IDEALS  OF  INDIA  105 

But  the  genuine  spirit  of  Brahmanism  is  opposed  to  the 
fierce  war  spirit  of  the  Aryan  conquerors  of  India,  and  the 
sacred  law  attempts  to  ameliorate  the  cruelties  and  atrocities 
of  primeval  warfare,  instilling  in  the  warrior  a  spirit  of  mag- 
nanimity and  chivalry.  Thus  the  "  blameless  law  for  the  war- 
rior "  forbids  to  him  the  use  of  barbed  or  poisoned  weapons ; 
he  must  spare  the  suppliant  for  mercy ;  he  must  not  strike 
an  enemy  who  has  lost  his  armor  or  whose  weapons  are 
broken,  or  who  has  received  a  wound,  or  who  has  turned  in 
flight.  He  must  do  no  harm  to  the  onlooker.  The  king  must 
conduct  war  without  guile  or  treachery.1 

At  the  heart  of  Brahmanism,  as  at  the  heart  of  every  other  Natural 
great  religion  of  the  world,  there  is  a  core  of  lofty  spiritual  ™°rsus  Y 
teachings  and  true  morality.    The  sacred  scriptures  of  the 
Brahmans  declare,   "  The  soul  itself  is  the  witness  of  the 
soul,  and  the  soul  is  the  refuge  of  the  soul ;  despise  not  thy 
own  soul,  the  supreme  witness  of  men."  2 

The  sacred  law  teaches  that  he  is  pure  who  is  pure  in 
thought  and  in  deed :  "Among  all  modes  of  purification,  purity 
in  (the  acquisition  of)  wealth  is  declared  to  be  the  best ;  for 
he  is  pure  who  gains  wealth  with  clean  hands,  not  he  who 
purifies  himself  with  earth  and  water."  3 

Repentance  and  resolutions  of  amendment  free  the  soul 
from  its  transgressions  :  "  He  who  has  committed  a  sin  and 
has  repented,  is  freed  from  that  sin,  but  he  is  purified  only 
by  the  resolution  of  ceasing  to  sin  and  thinking  I  will  do  so 
no  more."  4 

Brahmanism  teaches  the  duty  of  forgiving  injuries  and  of 
returning  blessings  for  curses :  "  Against  an  angry  man  let 
him  [the  ascetic]  not  in  return  show  anger;  let  him  bless  when 
he  is  cursed."  6  "  A  king  must  always  forgive  litigants,  infants, 
aged  and  sick  men,  who  inveigh  against  him."  6    M  He  who, 

1  Laws'  of  Mann,  vii.  90-93,  104.         3  Ibid.  v.  106.         5  Ibid.  vi.  48. 

2  Ibid.  viii.  84.  4  Ibid.  xi.  231.         6  Ibid.  viii.  312. 


106  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

being  abused  by  men  in  pain,  pardons  them,  will  in  reward 
of  that  act  be  exalted  in  heaven."  1 

Here  is  a  morality  as  pure  and  lofty  as  any  taught  by  Hebrew 
prophets.  But  as  in  Judaism,  so  in  Brahmanism,  such  was 
the  stress  laid  by  the  priests  upon  sacrifice,  upon  the  observ- 
ance of  the  rites  and  ceremonies  of  the  temple,  and  upon  the 
performance  of  a  thousand  and  one  morally  indifferent  acts, 
that  as  time  passed  there  resulted  an  almost  complete  over- 
shadowing of  natural  by  ritual  morality.  It  was  such  a  triumph 
of  ritualism  as  marked  the  post-exilic  period  in  the  history  of 
Israel.  As  there  came  a  protest  and  reaction  in  Judea  issuing 
in  Christianity,  so  did  there  come  a  protest  and  reaction  in 
Brahmanic  India  issuing  in  Buddhism. 


PART  II.    THE   ETHICS   OF  BUDDHISM;  AN  IDEAL   OF 
SELF-CONQUEST  AND  UNIVERSAL  BENEVOLENCE 

I.  The  Philosophical  Basis  of  the  System 

The  four  Four  tenets  or  principles,  called  the  four  truths,  sum  up 

the  essentials  of  Buddhism.2  These  are  the  truth  of  pain,  the 
origin  of  pain,  the  destruction  of  pain,  and  the  eightfold  way 
that  "  leads  to  the  quieting  of  pain."  3 

The  first  three  of  these  truths  form  the  philosophical  basis 
of  Buddhist  ethics,  and  to  a  brief  exposition  of  these  tenets  we 
shall  devote  the  immediately  following  sections.  The  fourth 
truth  is  a  summary  of  the  ethics  of  Buddhism,4  and  therefore 

1  Laws  of  Manu,  viii.  313. 

2  Gautama  or  Buddha,  "  The  Enlightened,"  the  founder  of  Buddhism, 
died  about  B.C.  480.  Long  before  he  began  his  teachings  moral  reform  was 
in  the  air  in  India.  Many  reforming  sects  came  into  existence.  The  most 
important  of  these  was  the  sect  of  the  Jains.  The  central  teaching  of  Jain- 
ism  is  the  sacredness  of  all  life,  and  its  first  and  chief  commandment,  Do 
no  harm  to  any  living  thing.  Its  spirit  of  universal  benevolence  left  a  deep 
impress  not  only  upon  Buddhism  but  also  upon  later  Hinduism. 

8  Dhammapada  (Sacred  Books  of  the  East,  2d  ed.,  vol.  x),  xiv.  190,  191. 
Cf.  Oldenberg,  Buddha  (1882),  p.  209. 
4  Oldenberg,  Buddha,  p.  286. 


THE  ETHICAL  IDEALS  OF  INDIA  1 07 

what  we  shall  have  to  say  about  it  will  appropriately  find  a 
place  under  the  next  subdivision  of  this  chapter  when  we 
come  to  speak  of  the  moral  ideal  of  Buddhism. 

The  truth  of  pain,  in  the  language  of  the  sacred  scriptures,  The  truth 
is  this  :  "  Birth  is  pain,  death  is  pain,  clinging  to  earthly  °  pain 
things  is  pain." 

This  is  simply  an  expression,  with  added  emphasis,  of  that 
world-weariness,  of  that  despair  of  life,  which  we  have  seen 
pressing  like  an  incubus  upon  the  spirit  of  Brahmanic  India. 
Buddhism  teaches  that  life  is  an  evil,  that  misery  and  sorrow 
and  pain  are  inseparable  from  all  modes  of  existence.  We 
shall  be  able  to  get  the  Buddhist's  point  of  view  if  we  bear 
in  mind  how  we  ourselves  sometimes  look  upon  this  earthly 
life.  In  despondent  moods  we  ask,  "  Is  life  worth  living? " 
and  make  answer  ourselves  by  declaring  that  if  this  earthly 
life  is  all,  then  there  is  in  it  nothing  worth  while.  If  now  we 
extend  this  gloomy  view  so  as  to  make  it  embrace  the  life  to 
come  as  well  as  the  life  that  now  is,  we  shall  have  the  view- 
point of  the  true  Buddhist.  To  him  life  not  only  in  this  world 
but  in  all  other  possible  worlds  is  transitory,  illusive,  and  pain- 
ful, and  in  utter  despair  and  weariness  he  longs  to  be  through 
with  it  all  and  to  lay  down  forever  the  intolerable  burden  of 
existence.1  "  As  the  glow  of  the  Indian  sun  causes  rest  in 
cool  shades  to  appear  to  the  wearied  body  the  good  of  goods, 
so  also  with  the  wearied  soul,  rest,  eternal  rest,  is  the  only 
thing  for  which  it  craves."  2 

The  truth  of  the  origin  of  pain  is  this :  "  It  is  the  thirst  The  origin 
for  life,  together  with  lust  and  desire,  which  causes  birth  and  °  pain 
rebirth." 

It  should  be  noted  here  that  there  are  different  interpreta- 
tions given  to  this  tenet.  Some  understand  by  it  not  that  all 
desires,  but  simply  evil  desires,  cause  and  feed  the  flame  of 

1  Cf.  Rhys  Davids,  Hibbert  Lectures  (1881),  p.  21  ;  Hopkins,  The  Reli- 
gions of  India  (1895),  PP-  3x6f-  2  Oldenberg,  Buddha  (1882),  p.  220. 


108  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

life ;  others  interpret  it  as  teaching  that  desires  or  longings 
of  every  kind  whatsoever  possess  this  sinister  potency  of  re- 
creating life  and  keeping  one  entangled  in  the  meshes  of  the 
net  of  existence. 

The  truth  of       The  truth  of  the  destruction  of  pain  is  this  :  "  Pain  can 
tionof  pain  be  ended  only  by  the  complete  extinction  of  desire."    Desire 
being  the  root  which  feeds  life  and  causes  the  round  of  births, 
existence  can  be  ended  only  by  getting  rid  of  desire. 

Here  again  there  are  different  acceptations  of  the  dogma. 
To  most  it  means  simply  the  getting  rid  of  all  unholy  passions 
and  desires,  while  to  the  thoroughgoing  Buddhist  it  means 
freedom  from  every  desire  of  whatsoever  kind  :  "  Not  a  few 
trees  but  the  whole  forest "  of  desires  must  be  cut  down, 
together  with  all  "  the  undergrowth."  x 

The  doc-  Besides  these  three  philosophical  principles,  —  the  truth  of 

kanna  pain,  the  origin  of  pain,  and  the  extinction  of  pain, — there  are 
two  other  speculative  doctrines  of  orthodox  Buddhism,  a  com- 
prehension of  which  is  necessary  to  an  understanding  of  the 
ethics  of  the  system.  The  first  of  these  is  the  doctrine  of 
karma.  This  is  a  denial  of  the  soul  theory.  Orthodox  Bud- 
dhism denies  that  man  has  a  soul  separable  from  the  body. 
It  teaches  that  when  a  person  dies  there  does  not  go  out  of 
his  body  a  spirit  which  lives  elsewhere  a  conscious  life,  a 
continuation  of  the  life  just  ended,  but  that  all  that  goes  out 
is  karma,  that  is,  something  which  is  the  net  product  of  all 
the  good  and  evil  acts  of  the  person  in  all  his  various  exist- 
ences—  a  sort  of  seed  or  germ  from  which  will  spring  up  here 
on  earth  or  in  some  heaven  or  hell  another  being.2   There  is 

1  Dhammapada,  xx.  283.  This  doctrine  that  peace  and  contentment  of 
mind  come  through  suppression  of  desire  was  also  the  teaching  of  the  Greek 
Cynics. 

2  *'  No  sentient  being  can  tell  in  what  state  the  karma  that  he  possesses 
will  appoint  his  next  birth,  though  he  may  be  now,  and  continue  to  be  until 
death,  one  of  the  most  meritorious  of  men.  In  that  karma  may  be  the  crime 
of  murder,  committed  many  ages  ago,  but  not  yet  expiated ;  and  in  the  next 


THE  ETHICAL  IDEALS  OF  INDIA  109 

no  conscious  identity,  however,  between  the  two  beings.  They 
stand  related  to  each  other  as  father  to  son. 

Some  illustrations  will  help  us  to  seize  the  thought.  The 
Buddhist  teacher  likens  the  relation  of  the  life  going  out 
here  to  the  new  life  beginning  elsewhere,  to  the  relation  of 
two  candle  flames,  the  second  of  which  has  been  lighted  from 
the  first.  Through  the  transmission  of  karma  the  flame  of 
life  is  passed  on  from  one  being  to  another ;  but  all  these 
life  flames  are  different.  No  abiding  self-consciousness  binds 
them  together  and  makes  them  one.  Again,  this  succession 
of  lives  is  likened  to  the  undulations  of  a  wave  in  the  ocean. 
The  successive  undulations  are  not  the  same,  yet  the  first 
causes  the  second,  the  second  the  third,  and  so  on. 

Notwithstanding  the  important  place  this  doctrine  holds  in 
Buddhist  speculative  philosophy  and  theoretical  ethics,  it  was 
neither  understood  nor  adopted  by  the  masses.  It  was  devel- 
oped in  the  schools,  but  the  people  in  general  held  to  their 
old  Brahmanic  belief  in  the  soul  and  its  transmigrations,  so 
that  in  most  Buddhist  lands  to-day  belief  in  a  conscious  per- 
sonal existence  after  death  is  the  prevailing  one.1 

The  other  philosophical  doctrine  of  which  we  have  to  speak  Nirvana 
is  that  of  Nirvana.     This  term  is  used  with  many  different  different 
meanings.    Often  it  denotes  merely  the  extinguishment  in  the  JJJJJ  J£e 
soul  of  lust  and  hate  and  ignorance,  and  the  state  of  quiet  term  is  used 
contentment  and  blissful  repose  which  results  from  such  self- 
mastery.    Buddha  himself,  says  Rhys  Davids,  meant  by  the 

existence  its  punishment  may  have  to  be  endured.  There  will  ultimately  be 
a  reward  for  that  which  is  good,  but  it  may  be  long  delayed.  It  acts  like  an 
hereditary  disease."  —  Hardy,  Manual  of  Buddhism  (1880),  p.  411. 

1  M  The  difficulties  attendant  upon  this  peculiar  dogma  [karma]  may  be 
seen  in  the  fact  that  it  is  almost  universally  repudiated.  ...  In  historical 
composition,  in  narrative,  and  in  conversation,  the  common  idea  of  trans- 
migration is  continually  presented"  (Hardy,  Manual  of  Buddhism  (1880), 
p.  412).  By  250  B.C.  w  in  the  North  and  also  in  the  South  the  old  heresy  of 
the  soul-theory  had  crept  back  by  side  issue  into  the  doctrine  from  which 
it  had  been  categorically  and  explicitly  excluded  by  Gautama  and  his  earlier 
followers"  (Rhys  Davids,  Buddhism  (1896),  p.  198). 


no  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

term  just  what  Christ  meant  by  the  kingdom  of  God,  that 
kingdom  within  the  soul  of  calm  and  abiding  peace.1 

Again,  it  is  used  to  express  a  state  of  eternal,  unchang- 
ing, blissful  rest  and  ineffable  peace  beyond  all  the  realms  — 
heavens  and  hells  —  of  transmigration. 

Still  again  the  term  is  used  to  denote  the  absolute  extinc- 
tion of  existence,  annihilation.  This  is  the  view  of  Nirvana 
held  to-day  by  the  Buddhists  of  Ceylon,  Siam,  and  Burma 
who  claim  to  hold  the  ancient  faith  in  its  primitive  purity.2 

II.  The  Ideal 

The  truth  The  ethics  of  Buddhism  is  summed  up  in  the  formula 
fold  pith  of  the  truth  of  the  eightfold  path.3  The  truth  of  the  eight- 
membered  way  is  this  :  the  only  path  which  leads  to  the  quiet- 
ing of  pain  is  the  eightfold  holy  path  —  right  belief,  right 
resolve,  right  speech,  right  behavior,  right  occupation,  right 
effort,  right  thought,  right  concentration.4 

The  essence  of  all  this  expressed  in  familiar  ethical  phrase 
is  that  the  demands  of  morality  are  right  thoughts,  right 
words,  and  right  deeds.  As  the  eight  requirements  are  inter- 
preted and  expounded  by  Buddhist  teachers,  they  demand 

1  Hibbert  Lectures  ( 188 1 ),  pp.  3 1 ,  206.  Cf .  Hopkins,  The  Religions  of  India 
(1895),  p.  321. 

2  But  this,  as  we  have  just  seen,  is  not  the  Buddhism  of  the  Buddhist 
world  in  general.  The  masses  in  Buddhist  lands  have  never  accepted  the 
doctrine  of  Nirvana  in  the  sense  of  extinction  of  existence.  The  following 
conversation  between  Moncure  Conway  and  a  Singhalese  priest  discloses 
the  meaning  of  the  term  to  an  orthodox  Buddhist  of  Ceylon :  M  I  asked, 
'  Have  those  who  are  in  Nirvana  any  consciousness  ? '  I  was  then  informed 
that  there  is  no  Singhalese  word  for  consciousness.  Sumangala  said,  '  To 
reach  Nirvana  is  to  be  no  more.'  I  pointed  to  a  stone  step  and  said,  '  One 
is  there  only  as  that  stone  is  here  ? '  '  Not  so  much,'  answered  the  priest ; 
'  for  the  stone  is  actually  here,  but  in  Nirvana  there  is  no  existence  at  all ' " 
{My  Pilgrimage  to  the  Wise  Men  of  the  East  (1906),  p.  134). 

8  These  eight  requirements  are  often  condensed  into  four,  and  then  the 
formula  is  called  the  fourfold  path  to  deliverance. 

4  Cf.  Oldenberg,  Buddha  (1882),  p.  211  ;  Hopkins,  The  Religions  of  India 
(1895),  p.  305. 


the  ideal 


THE  ETHICAL  IDEALS  OF  INDIA  III 

a  mind  free  from  all  evil  passions  and  unholy  desires  (and, 
according  to  the  thoroughgoing  Buddhist,  of  every  desire 
whatsoever)1  and  "  a  heart  of  love  far-reaching,  grown  great, 
and  beyond  measure."  This  is  the  path  leading  to  deliver- 
ance from  transmigration,  this  the  path  leading  to  the  quieting 
of  pain,  this  the  path  leading  to  the  sweet  rest  and  peace 
of  Nirvana. 

It  will  be  worth  our  while  to  note  with  some  attention 
some  of  the  special  primary  duties  and  virtues  which  are 
included  in  these  general  demands  of  self-conquest  and 
unmeasured  love. 

One  of  the  primary  duties  of  the  true  Buddhist  is  to  seek  Particular 
knowledge,  for  true  knowledge,  insight,  is  the  cure  for  desire,  dutiesof n 
This  knowledge  which  quenches  all  craving  thirst  is  best  at- 
tained, so  Buddha  taught,  through  meditation.2  One  must 
meditate  on  the  transitoriness  of  life,  on  pain,  on  death,  on 
truth,  on  gentleness,  on  love.  It  was  through  profound  medi- 
tation under  the  Bo  tree  that  Gautama  became  the  Buddha, 
"  The  Enlightened." 

Another  cardinal  virtue  of  the  Buddhist  ideal  of  character 
is  universal  benevolence.  By  no  other  ethical  system  has 
such  stress  been  laid  upon  the  duty  of  gentleness  to  every- 
thing that  has  life.    The  animal  world  is  here  brought  within 

1  There  is  in  this  teaching  respecting  desirelessness  an  apparent  incon- 
sistency, for  with  all  other  desires  suppressed,  there  remains  the  desire  for 
Nirvana.  But  the  difficulty  here  is  only  apparent.  A  Buddhist  priest,  ques- 
tioned respecting  this,  replied  as  follows  :  "  The  desire  for  Nirvana  escapes 
from  the  mesh  that  entangles  all  other  desires,  because  it  is  not  desire  for 
any  object  at  all "  (Conway,  My  Pilgrimage  to  the  Wise  Men  of  the  East 
(1906),  p.  134).  But  all  other  desires  aside  from  this  desire  for  Nirvana  are 
in  a  sense  sins  of  covetousness.  And  this  is  the  cardinal  sin  in  the  view  of 
the  true  Buddhist,  for  covetousness  "  is  a  strong  desire  for  something,  and 
all  desire  is  a  hindrance  in  one's  way  to  Nirvana." 

2  This  teaching  that  mental  illumination  comes  through  contemplation 
is  the  doctrine  in  general  of  the  religious  and  moral  teachers  of  the  East, 
and  of  all  mystics.  It  differs  fundamentally  from  the  scientific  view,  which 
makes  observation  and  study  the  means  of  enlightenment. 


1 12  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

the  sanctuary  of  morality  and  safeguarded  by  ethical  sentiment. 
It  is  of  course  the  doctrine  of  transmigration,  which  Buddhism 
inherits  from  Brahmanism,  which  gives  animal  ethics  the 
prominent  place  it  holds  in  Buddhist  morality.1 

Still  a  third  requirement  of  the  true  Buddhist  is  toleration, 
which  follows  as  a  corollary  from  the  virtue  of  universal  be- 
nevolence. In  the  prominent  place  assigned  this  virtue  in  the 
ideal  of  character,  Buddhism  stands  alone  among  the  great 
world  religions. 

A  fourth  cardinal  duty  of  the  ideal  is  to  make  known  to  all 
men  the  eightfold  way  to  salvation.  Buddha's  command  to 
his  disciples  was,  "  Go  ye  now  and  preach  the  most  excellent 
Law,  explaining  every  point  thereof,  unfolding  it  with  dili- 
gence and  care."  This  is  a  duty  which  brings  its  own  reward ; 
for  the  exercise  of  compassion  and  charity  produces  that  seren- 
ity of  spirit  which  is  the  aim  of  moral  striving;  and  hence 
nothing  advances  one  more  rapidly  on  the  way  to  salvation 
than  preaching  the  good  tidings  and  laboring  to  lessen  the 
sorrows  and  lighten  the  burdens  of  one's  fellow  creatures. 
The  moral  requirement  to  preach  to  all  the  most  excellent 
way  made  of  Buddhism  a  missionary  religion.  In  a  few 
centuries  after  the  death  of  Buddha  devoted  missionaries 
had  spread  the  new  faith  throughout  the  Far  East. 

The  differ-        There  are  in  Buddhism  three  grades  of  moral  attainment. 

of  morfireeS  The  lowest  is  that  which  may  be  reached  by  any  one  in  the 
ordinary  life.  Through  purity  of  thought  and  word  and  deed, 
through  the  exercise  of  universal  kindliness,  and  by  the  fulfill- 
ment of  every  duty  pertaining  to  his  station  in  life,  one  attains 
such  a  degree  of  moral  excellence  that  he  may  at  least  hope 
at  death  to  avoid  painful  rebirth. 

The  second  degree  of  moral  excellence  is  that  attained  by 
the  monk  of  Gautama's  Order.    The  idea  of  the  Buddhist 

1  Buddhism  limits  transmigration  to  the  animal  creation ;  Brahmanism, 
it  will  be  recalled,  supposes  the  soul  to  transmigrate  into  vegetable  as  well 
as  into  animal  forms. 


attainment 


THE  ETHICAL  IDEALS  OF  INDIA  113 

here  is  like  that  of  the  Christian  respecting  the  monastic  life. 
For  centuries  in  the  West  the  ascetic  life  was  looked  upon  as 
more  perfect  than  the  ordinary  life,  and  as  the  better  and 
surer  way  to  salvation.  It  is  the  same  in  Buddhist  lands. 
The  goal  striven  after,  the  extinction  of  unholy  desires,  the 
Buddhist  believes  is  most  quickly  and  surely  reached  by  him 
who  has  rid  himself  of  the  cares  and  worries  of  domestic  life, 
and  withdrawn  from  all  the  distractions  of  the  world. 

The  prime  duty  of  the  Buddhist  monk  is  meditation,  which 
takes  the  place  of  prayer  in  the  code  of  the  Christian  recluse. 
Through  following  faithfully  and  patiently  all  the  rules  of  the 
Order  he  may  hope  to  attain  such  comparative  perfection 
that  at  his  death  he  will  be  reborn  in  some  better  state. 

The  third  and  highest  degree  of  moral  attainment  can  be 
reached  only  in  the  Arhatship.  The  Arhat  is  what  we  would 
call  the  perfect  man.  He  is  one  who,  like  the  Buddha,  reaches 
a  state  of  perfect  insight  or  mental  illumination  and  of  perfect 
freedom  from  all  desires  1  save  the  desire  for  Nirvana.  This 
state  is  reached  only  through  absolute  renunciation  of  the 
world.  He  who  would  be  perfect  must  leave  all  earthly  pleas- 
ures behind,  and  calling  nothing  his  own,  with  all  appetites 
stilled,  passionless  and  desireless,  go  out  from  home  into 
homelessness.2  In  such  a  one  karma  becomes  extinct,  and 
for  him  there  are  no  new  births.  "  The  living,  moving  body 
of  the  perfect  man  is  visible  still,"  says  Rhys  Davids  in  ex- 
plaining this  state,  ..."  but  it  will  decay  and  die  and  pass 
away,  and  as  no  new  body  will  be  formed,  where  life  was, 
will  be  nothing."  3 

1  *  To  be  a  true  Buddhist,  one  must  renounce,  as  lust,  all  desire  of  evil, 
which  brings  evil ;  and  must  live  without  other  hope  than  that  of  extin- 
guishing all  desire  and  passion,  believing  that  in  so  doing  he  will  at  death 
be  annihilated." — Hopkins,  The  Religions  of  India  (1895),  p.  564. 

2  Dhammapada,  vii.  90-99. 

3  But —  and  differing  in  this  from  Dr.  Hopkins  —  Professor  Rhys  Davids 
makes  this  perfection  which  results  in  annihilation  to  consist  not  in  the 
extinction  of  every  desire,  but  only  of  craving  desire  and  evil  passions. 


H4 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


The  gen- 
uine altru- 
ism of 
Buddhist 
ethics 


It  is  impossible  to  conceive  a  higher  altruism  than  that  in- 
culcated by  the  higher  thoroughgoing  Buddhism.  Since  it 
denies  the  existence  of  the  soul,  —  nothing  save  the  seed 
(karma)  of  another  but  different  life  remaining  at  death,  — 
when  one  strives  to  break,  the  chain  of  existence,  to  make  an 
end  of  the  weary  cycle  of  births,  such  a  one  is  seeking  good 
not  for  himself  but  for  another.  In  the  words  of  Dr.  Hopkins, 
"It  is  to  save  from  sorrow  this  son  of  one's  acts  that  one 
should  seek  to  find  the  end."  1  Thus  orthodox  Buddhism 
alone,  of  all  the  great  ethical  systems  of  history,  refuses  to 
sully  virtue  with  promises  of  reward.  Its  morality  stands  ab- 
solutely alone,  unsupported  by  the  hope  of  recompense  either 
in  this  world  or  in  the  world  to  come.  "  Buddhism  alone 
teaches  that  to  live  on  earth  is  weariness,  that  there  is  no 
bliss  beyond,  and  that  one  should  yet  be  calm,  pure,  loving, 
and  wise."  2 

Another  thing  especially  noteworthy  regarding  the  ethics 
of  Buddhism  is  that  it  is  the  ethics  of  naturalism.  "  For  the 
first  time  in  the  history  of  the  world,"  in  the  words  of  Rhys 
Davids,  "  Buddhism  proclaimed  a  salvation  which  each  man 
could  gain  for  himself  and  by  himself  in  this  world,  during 
this  life,  without  the  least  reference  to  God  or  the  gods,  either 
great  or  small."  In  this  respect  Buddhism  is  somewhat  like 
the  present-day  socialism  of  the  materialistic  school,  which 
ardently  proclaims  justice,  equity,  and  universal  brotherhood, 
but  says  nothing  about  God. 


1  The  Religions  of  India  (1895),  p.  322. 

2  Hopkins,  The  Religions  of  India  (1895),  p.  317.  Stoicism  indeed  ap- 
proaches Buddhism  in  this  respect;  but  its  attitude  toward  the  doctrine 
of  a  future  life  was  in  general  merely  agnostic  —  it  made  no  positive  denial 
of  immortality. 


THE  ETHICAL  IDEALS  OF  INDIA  1 15 

III.  Some  Expressions  of  the  Ethical 
Spirit  of  Buddhism 

Buddhism  has  been  called  the  Christianity  of  the  Orient,  mtroduc- 
Like  Christianity,  it  has  been  a  great  moralizing  force  in  his-    ory 
tory.    Its  ethical  ideal  has  been  just  such  a  factor  in  the  moral 
life  of  the  East  as  the  ethical  ideal  of  Christianity  has  been 
in  the  moral  life  of  the  West. 

To  portray  even  in  scantiest  outline  the  influence  of  this 
ideal  upon  the  different  peoples  who  have  accepted  it  as  their 
standard  of  goodness,  or  whose  moral  codes  have  felt  its  modi- 
fying effects,  would  lead  us  far  beyond  the  limits  of  our  work. 
In  what  follows  we  shall  aim  at  nothing  more  —  after  hav- 
ing first  remarked  the  ethical  kinship  of  the  Buddhist  reform 
with  other  contemporary  reform  movements  —  than  to  note 
briefly  the  practical  outworkings  of  the  ideal  in  three  or  four 
departments  of  the  moral  domain. 

We  shall  understand  best  the  import  for  the  moral  evolution  The  ethical 
of  humanity  of  that  remarkable  revolution  in  Brahmanic  India  ships  of" 
which  resulted  in  the  establishment  of  Buddhism  through-  dhisf^orm 
out  the  peninsula  and  in  other  countries  of  the  Far  East,  if 
we  fifst  notice  its  ethical  kinship  with  other  reform  move- 
ments which,  about  the  close  of  the  sixth  pre-Christian  cen- 
tury, make  a  dividing  line  in  the  inner  histories  of  so  many 
of  the  progressive  societies  and  cultures  of  that  age.1 

In  Greece  Pythagoreanism  was  rising.  This  movement  was 
in  its  essential  spirit  a  social  and  moral  reform.  It  was  an  at- 
tempt to  introduce  a  true  ethics  in  Greek  city  life,  and  to  find  a 
basis  for  morality  in  the  deep  intuitions  of  the  human  soul.2 

1  Cf.  Rhys  Davids,  Hibbert  Lectures  (1 881),  p.  123. 

2  Zeller  represents  Pythagoreanism  as  springing  from  an  effort  to  give 
an  ethical  content  to  life.  ""We  may  consider  it  proved,"  he  says,  "that 
the  school  of  Pythagoras,  believing  in  the  almighty  favor  of  the  gods,  and 
in  future  retribution,  enforced  purity  of  life,  moderation  and  justice,  minute 
self-examination  and  discretion  in  all  actions,  and  especially  discouraged 


Ii6  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

In  Israel  the  Isaiah  of  the  Exile  was  proclaiming  the  loftiest 
ethical  doctrines  ever  taught  by  Hebrew  prophet,  and  in  his 
interpretation  of  the  moral  government  of  Yahweh  was  scat- 
tering the  seed  from  which  was  to  spring  up  a  new  ethical 
life  among  men. 

In  Persia  the  great  teacher  Zarathustra  (Zoroaster),  with 
like  vision  of  moral  things,  was  declaring  to  the  followers  of 
Ahura  Mazda  that  what  God  requires  of  men  is  purity  of 
purpose,  truthfulness  in  word  and  act,  and  unceasing  warfare 
against  evil  within  and  without. 

In  China  the  Master,  Confucius,  reaffirming  the  teachings  of 
antiquity,  was  inculcating  essentially  the  same  truth  —  that  the 
sum  of  true  morality  is  reverence,  obedience,  and  right  living. 

It  probably  would  be  unhistorical  to  suppose  that  there 
was  any  actual  connection  between  these  several  ethical  or 
religious  reform  movements  in  these  widely  separated  lands. 
They  are  brought  together  here  merely  that  they  may  be  used 
to  interpret  one  another  in  terms  of  ethical  progress,  and  that 
they  may  bear  witness  to  the  substantial  oneness  of  the  ex- 
pressions of  the  moral  faculty  of  man  in  response  to  the  same 
or  similar  intellectual  and  social  stimulus. 

The  ethical  The  question  naturally  arises,  How  could  Buddha's  dis- 
mal doctrine  of  annihilation  as  the  ultimate  aim  and  end  of 
moral  striving  —  for  this  dogma  was  undoubtedly  one  of  the 
fundamental  principles  of  primitive  Buddhism  —  ever  have 
been  received  by  the  multitude  as  a  word  of  consolation  and 
hope  ?  What  is  there  of  ethical  authority  or  appeal  in  such 
a  doctrine  to  constitute  it  the  motive  force  in  a  great  popular 
moral  reform  ?  The  answer  is  that  although  Buddha  himself 
probably  believed  that  death  for  the  perfect  man  meant  abso- 
lute extinction  of  being,  nevertheless  he  lay  no  emphasis  upon 

self-conceit"  {History  of  Philosophy  (1881),  vol.  i,  p.  496).  Oldenberg  {An- 
cient India  (1896),  p.  87)  conceives  Pythagoreanism  —  together  with  the 
Orphic  worship  —  as  "  a  bit  of  Buddhism  in  the  midst  of  Greek  civilization." 


content  for 
the  masses 
of  Buddha's 
message 


THE  ETHICAL  IDEALS  OF  INDIA  1 17 

this  part  of  his  world  philosophy.  He  knew  very  well  that  it 
would  be  a  hard  doctrine  for  many  to  receive,  and  when  ques- 
tioned about  it  he  was  reticent.  It  was  his  other  doctrine,  the 
way  in  which  one  may  escape  painful  rebirths,  upon  which 
Buddha  laid  the  stress  of  his  teaching.  And  here  his  simple 
word  to  the  people  was  this  :  Be  gentle  and  merciful  and 
just ;  get  rid  of  all  impure  and  craving  desires,  and  then  at 
death,  instead  of  suffering  some  painful  rebirth,  you  will  be 
reborn  into  a  happier  condition  here  on  earth  or  in  some  other 
world.  In  a  word,  he  said,  Follow  after  goodness  and  it  will 
be  well  with  you. 

To  be  able  to  understand  how  this  simple  word  should  be 
received  with  such  enthusiasm  by  the  multitude,  we  need  to 
bear  in  mind  how  hard  the  way  of  escape  from  painful  rebirths 
had  been  made  by  the  Brahmans.  They  had  taught  the  people 
that  salvation  was  possible  only  through  ritual  and  ceremony, 
through  costly  offerings  to  the  gods,  through  the  payment  of 
liberal  fees  to  the  priests,  through  penances  and  ascetic  prac- 
tices.1 Thus  the  way  of  deliverance  had  been  made  so  hard 
that  few  could  follow  it,  and  so  unethical  that  it  left  the  heart 
cold  and  the  conscience  unsatisfied. 

The  situation  was  like  that  in  Judea  when  the  greatest  of 
the  prophets,  in  opposition  to  the  teachings  of  the  scribes  and 
Pharisees  who  were  laying  upon  men's  shoulders  a  burden 
of  ritualism  too  heavy  to  be  borne,  declared  that  man  finds 
salvation  not  through  ritual  or  sacrifice,  but  through  humility, 
obedience,  and  love  —  and  the  people  heard  him  gladly  and 
followed  him,  because  his  yoke  was  easy  and  his  burden  light. 

So  was  it  in  India.  Buddha  interprets  anew  to  men  the 
divine  message  that  all  which  is  required  of  them  is  purity 
and  justice  and  tenderness  toward  all  creatures.   The  spirit 

1  Gautama's  attitude  toward  ascetic  practices  is  shown  by  the  following  : 
"  Not  nakedness,  not  platted  hair,  not  dirt,  not  fasting,  or  lying  on  the  earth, 
not  rubbing  with  dust,  not  sitting  motionless,  can  purify  a  mortal  who  has 
not  overcome  desires"  {Dhammapada,  x.  141). 


n8 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


of  the  heavy-burdened  multitude  witnesseth  with  the  spirit 
of  the  Prophet  that  this  is  indeed  a  true  and  divine  Word ; 
and  Buddhism,  with  its  ethical  enthusiasms  and  fresh  hopes, 
marks  a  new  era  in  the  moral  evolution  of  the  peoples  of 
the  Eastern  world. 


Monasti- 
cism  as  an 
ethical  ex- 
pression of 
Buddhism 


In  explaining  the  different  degrees  of  moral  attainment 
possible  to  the  Buddhist,  we  spoke  of  the  monastic  ideal  of 
virtue.  This  part  of  Buddhist  ethical  theory  has  left  a  deep 
impress  upon  practical  morality  in  all  those  lands  into  which 
the  faith  of  the  Buddha  has  spread.  Monasticism  has  been, 
and  is  still  to-day,  just  such  a  dominant  factor  in  the  moral 
life  of  all  Buddhist  communities  of  eastern  Asia  as  it  was  in 
the  moral  life  of  medieval  Christian  Europe. 

The  causes  that  fostered  the  upgrowth  of  the  system  in 
the  East  were  essentially  the  same  as  those  that  fostered  its 
development  in  the  West.  Among  these  causes  a  promi- 
nent place  must  be  assigned  that  feeling  of  world-weariness 
to  which  we  have  already  more  than  once  referred,  a  feeling 
evoked  by  the  burden  and  ache  of  existence.  It  was  this 
predisposition  of  spirit  that  caused  the  doctrine  of  renuncia- 
tion of  the  world  preached  by  the  disciples  of  Buddha  to 
appeal  with  such  persuasion  to  multitudes  throughout  all  the 
Eastern  lands. 

We  may  stop  to  note  but  one  of  various  points  of  differ- 
ence between  Buddhist  and  Christian  monasticism.  The  latter, 
in  general,  recognized  the  ethical  value  of  labor.  This  feeling 
found  expression  in  various  forms  of  activity  among  the  monks, 
particularly  in  agricultural  labor  and  in  the  work  of  the  scrip- 
torium. It  was  this  which  not  only  helped  to  keep  life  in 
the  Western  monasteries  morally  wholesome  for  a  period,  but 
which  also  made  the  monastic  system  such  an  efficient  force 
in  the  conquest  and  redemption  of  the  waste  lands  of  Europe 
and  in  the  upbuilding  of  Western  civilization  in  the  early 
medieval  age.    Now  Buddhist  monasticism  never  recognized 


THE  ETHICAL  IDEALS  OF  INDIA  119 

the  moral  value  of  work.1  Useful  labor  had  no  place  among 
the  requirements  of  the  monastic  ideal.  Here  doubtless  is  to 
be  sought  one  cause  of  that  lamentable  moral  degeneracy 
into  which  the  monastic  communities  soon  fell  in  almost  all 
the  lands  whither  Buddhism  was  carried  by  the  missionary 
zeal  of  its  early  converts. 

We  have  seen  that  under  the  Buddhist  system  the  whole  practical 
animal  and  insect  world  is  brought  within  the  domain  of  theanimai 
ethics.  Buddhist  morality  has  gone  to  a  greater  extreme  g^fem 
here  than  any  other  ethical  system,  excepting  that  of  Jainism. 
The  inculcating  of  this  sympathy  with  all  living  creatures  has 
developed  one  of  the  most  attractive  traits  of  the  Hindu 
character.2  But  the  extreme  emphasis  laid  upon  this  branch 
of  ethics  by  Buddhism,  Jainism,  and  modern  Brahmanism  or 
Hinduism  has  had  practical  consequences  of  a  very  serious 
nature.  The  scruple  in  regard  to  killing  animals,  even  harm- 
ful creatures,  has  cost  India  millions  of  human  lives.  It  has 
been  a  contributory  cause  of  the  country  being  overrun  with 
dangerous  animals,  such  as  tigers  and  venomous  snakes,  which 
destroy  many  thousands  of  human  beings  annually,  and  has 
even  fostered  the  propagation  of  forms  of  life  which  are  now 
known  to  be  effective  agents  in  the  spread  of  infectious  dis- 
eases like  the  bubonic  plague.3  Nothing  is  surer  than  that 
at  this  point  the  ethics  of  Buddhism  must  sooner  or  later  feel 
the  modifying  influence  of  Western  science. 

1  Oldenberg,  Buddha  (1882),  p.  366. 

2  This  is  well  illustrated  in  the  following  incident  related  by  Moncure 
Conway.  In  the  island  of  Ceylon  he  was  visited  by  an  aged  Buddhist 
priest,  who  came  in  a  sedan  borne  by  men.  Asked  why  he  did  not  use  a 
carriage  drawn  by  horses,  the  priest  replied  that  "  he  was  afraid  a  horse 
might  be  vitally  injured  by  carrying  him."  "  But,"  said  Mr.  Conway,  M  might 
it  not  be  the  same  with  one  of  those  men  while  he  is  carrying  you  ?  "  After 
a  moment's  silence  the  priest  answered,  w  But  a  man  can  tell  me  if  he  is 
suffering"  {My  Pilgrimage  to  the  Wise  Men  of  the  East  (1906),  pp.  u6f.). 

3  Thousands  of  rats  were  formerly  kept  at  public  expense  in  a  hospital 
at  the  Indian  town  of  Kutel. 


120 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


The  Bud- 
dhist spirit 
of  tolera- 
tion 


Disesteem 
of  the 
military 
life 


As  an  efficient  force  in  promoting  a  spirit  of  the  broadest 
toleration,  Buddhism  holds  a  unique  place  among  the  great 
religious  and  ethical  systems  of  the  world.1  An  edict  of  the 
Buddhist  Emperor  Asoka,  dating  from  the  third  century  B.C., 
inculcates  the  practice  of  toleration  in  these  words  :  "A  man 
must  not  do  reverence  to  his  own  sect  by  disparaging  that 
of  another  man  for  trivial  reasons.  Depreciation  should  be 
for  adequate  reasons  only,  because  the  sects  of  other  people 
deserve  reverence  for  one  reason  or  another." 

The  spirit  of  this  imperial  edict  has  been  obeyed  wherever 
the  word  of  the  Buddha  has  prevailed.  "There  is  no  rec- 
ord known  to  me,"  writes  Rhys  Davids,  "  in  the  whole  long 
history  of  Buddhism,  throughout  the  many  centuries  where 
its  followers  have  been  for  such  lengthened  periods  supreme, 
of  any  persecution  by  the  Buddhists  of  the  followers  of  any 
other  faith."2 

Like  Confucianism,  Buddhism  in  its  spirit  and  its  ethical 
teachings  is,  as  we  have  seen,  absolutely  opposed  to  the  spirit 
of  militarism  in  every  form.  Doubtless  it  has  been  a  potent 
force  in  fostering  among  the  peoples  of  eastern  Asia  an  anti- 
military  spirit  and  in  creating  a  disesteem  for  the  warlike 
qualities  of  character.3  From  one  land  —  the  Tartar  land  of 
Thibet  —  it  has  banished  absolutely  the  war  spirit  and  prac- 
tically war  itself.4  "  It  has  taken  all. the  fierceness  out  of  the 
Mongols,"  and  thus  rendered  useless  the  Great  Wall  built  to 
check  their  raids  into  China.5 

1  Toleration  is  not  even  recognized  as  a  virtue  in  the  moral  codes  of 
ancient  Judaism,  dogmatic  Christianity,  and  Islam. 

2  Hibbert  Lectures  (1881),  p.  231. 

8  Under  Asoka,  it  is  true,  Buddhism,  like  Christianity  under  Constantine 
the  Great,  became  militant.  But  Asoka  was  a  gentle  warrior  and  made 
war  gently.  He  neither  killed  his  prisoners  nor  tortured  them,  a  common 
practice  with  Oriental  conquerors,  nor  did  he  sell  them  as  slaves. 

4  M  Les  paisibles  sujets  du  Grand-Lama  thibetain  ont  cesse  d'aimer  la 
guerre  et  presque  de  la  faire  "  (Letourneau,  La  guerre  dans  les  diverges  races 
humaines  (1895),  p.  213). 

6  Edward  A.  Ross,  The  Changing  Chinese  (191 1),  p.  29. 


THE  ETHICAL  IDEALS  OF  INDIA  121 

Buddhism  has  been  well  characterized  as  the  incarnation  softening 
of  sympathy  with  suffering.    Inculcating  a  morality  of  gentle-  national11 
ness,  instilling  tenderness  toward  every  living  thing,  it  has  JJJJJuJJ01 
exercised  a  softening  influence  upon  the  spirit  and  temper  of  teachings 
every  race  that  has  received  its  teachings.    We  have  in  the 
preceding  chapter  noted  its  humanizing  effects  upon  Japanese 
morality.1    Even  in  India,  where  after  a  comparatively  short 
period  of  supremacy  it  yielded  sway  again  to  Brahmanism,  it 
left  significant  traces  of  its  brief  dominance  in  the  deepened 
humanitarianism  of  the  restored  creed  of  the  Brahmans,  and 
in  certain  of  those  traits  and  dispositions  of  the  native  races 
which  render  truthfully  descriptive  the  term  "  gentle  Hindu." 
"  The  land  of  meekness  and  gentleness,"  were  the  words 
used  by  a  native  Hindu2  at  a  recent  Lake  Mohonk  Confer- 
ence to  express  the  ethical  character  of  India. 

There  is  deep  significance  for  the  moral  evolution  of  the  Historical 
human  race  in  this  ethical  propaganda  of  Buddhism.     For  aftht  etki- 
just  as  Christianity  has  created  an  ethical  unity  among  the  ^eatedby 
nations  of  the  Western  world,  so  has  Buddhism  created  a  Buddhism 
certain  ethical  unity  among  the  races  of  the  Eastern  world. 
The  historical  importance  of  this  lies  in  the  fact  that  these 
two  ethical  systems,  though  differing  in  form  and  content, 
are  in  spirit  essentially  the  same  :  both  are  moralities  of  uni- 
versalism  ;  both  teach  the  brotherhood  of  man  ;  both  exalt  the 
gentle3  and  self-denying  virtues;  both  enjoin  self-conquest; 
both  inculcate  the  duty  of  universal  benevolence. 

Because  of  this  moral  kinship,  the  ethical  conquests  of 
Buddhism  —  and  there  is  not  a  land  in  the  Far  East  that  has 
not  felt  its  influence  —  are  in  a  degree  supplemental  to  those 

1  See  above,  p.  79. 

2  Mozoomdar,  a  leader  of  the  Brahmo-Somaj. 

3  Buddhism,  like  Christianity,  teaches  that  hatred  must  be  overcome  by 
love  :  w  Let  a  man  overcome  anger  by  love,  let  him  overcome  evil  by  good  " 
(Dkammapada,  xvii.  223).  w  For  hatred  does  not  cease  by  hatred  at  any 
time ;  hatred  ceases  by  love,  this  is  an  old  rule  "  {Ibid.  i.  5). 


122  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

of  Christianity  in  the  West,  and  are  thus  an  important  step 
in  the  creation  of  the  ethical  unity  of  the  world.  India  and 
Japan  are  both  nearer  to  us  ethically  to-day  than  they  would 
be,  were  it  not  for  the  modifying  influence  of  Buddhist  teach- 
ings upon  the  ethical  spirit  and  temper  of  their  peoples.1 

1  For  the  influence  of  Buddhism  on  the  Japanese  character,  see  Count 
Okuma,  Fifty  Years  of  New  Japan  (1909),  vol.  ii,  chap,  iv,  "Japanese  Reli- 
gious Beliefs :  Buddhism." 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  ETHICS  OF  ZOROASTRIANISM :    AN   IDEAL 
OF  COMBAT 

I.  Philosophical  and  Religious  Ideas  which  created 
the  Ethical  Type 

In  view  of  the  mixed  good  and  evil  in  the  world,  thinkers  Religious 
of  antiquity,  outside  of  Israel  and  before  the  rise  of  the  Stoic  ua  sm 
philosophy  in  Greece,  could  not  conceive  the  universe  as 
being  set  in  motion  and  directed  by  one  God  infinite  at  once 
in  power  and  goodness.  Even  the  most  penetrating  intellect 
of  Greece  faltered  in  his  search  for  unity  :  "  We  cannot  sup- 
pose," says  Plato,  "  that  the  universe  is  ordered  by  one  soul ; 
there  must  be  more  than  one,  probably  not  less  than  two  — 
one  the  author  of  good,  and  the  other  of  evil."  1  The  seers 
of  Israel  alone  reached  with  perfect  conviction  the  height  of 
the  great  argument,  and  announced  confidently  that  He  who 
is  the  author  of  the  good  in  the  world  is  the  author  likewise 
of  the  evil :  M  I  form  the  light  and  create  the  darkness ;  I 
make  peace  and  create  evil,"  are  the  words  which  the  prophet 
Isaiah  puts  in  the  mouth  of  Yahweh.2 

The  religious  thinkers  of  Persia  never  reached  this  lofty 
viewpoint.  It  seemed  to  them,  as  it  seemed  to  the  Greek 
philosopher,  that  at  least  two  deities  must  have  been  con- 
cerned in  the  creation  and  ordering  of  the  universe.  They 
believed  in  the  existence  of  two  great  powers  :  a  good  being, 

1  Laws,  tr.  Jowett,  x.  896.  And  the  thought  is  near  even  in  the  latest 
philosophy  :  w  But  it  feels  like  a  real  fight,"  says  Professor  William  James, 
"  as  if  there  were  something  really  wild  in  the  universe  which  we,  with  all 
our  idealities  and  faithfulness,  are  needed  to  reform." 

2  Is.  xlv.  7. 

123 


124  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

Ahura  Mazda,  the  creator  of  light  and  of  all  beneficent  things  ; 
and  an  evil  being,  Ahriman,  the  author  of  darkness  and  of 
all  baneful  creatures.  Between  these  two  powers  they  con- 
ceived to  be  going  on  a  fierce  struggle  for  the  mastery,  in 
which  ultimate  victory  was  assured  to  the  good  Ahura.1 

This  Persian  world  philosophy  reacted  favorably  upon  the 
moral  character,  and,  as  we  shall  see  further  on,  contributed 
to  create  in  ancient  Persia  a  deep  consciousness  of  the  eter- 
nal distinction  between  good  and  evil,  a  profound  sentiment  of 
duty,  and  an  active,  strenuous  morality.2  It  is  when  contrasted 
with  the  world  philosophy  of  Brahmanism  and  Buddhism 
that  the  ethical  value  of  this  dualistic  philosophy  of  the  old 
Persian  thinkers  is  best  disclosed. 

conception        While  it  is  true  that  the  moral  qualities  attributed  by  a  peo- 

acterofthe  pie  to  their  gods  are  nothing  more  nor  less  than  the  moral 

god^Ahura   qualities  possessed  or  revered  by  this  people  themselves,  still 

Mazda         jt  js  aiso  true  fast  the  moral  nature  thus  given  to  the  gods 

reacts  powerfully  upon  the  ethical  life  of  their  worshipers  and 

tends  to  mold  their  moral  character  after  the  heavenly  type. 

In  a  word,  celestial  morality  is  at  once  effect  and  cause. 

1  This  dualistic  world  philosophy  is  regarded  by  some  students  of  the 
Zend-Avesta  as  being  in  the  nature  of  a  protest  against  n  the  inert  asceti- 
cism of  Buddhism  and  the  ethical  indifference  of  Brahmanism  "  (Darme- 
steter,  "  Introduction,"  Sacred  Books  of  the  East,  2d  ed.,  vol.  iv,  p.  lxviii). 
Ranke  views  it  as  the  product  of  environment :  M  If  we  keep  well  in  view 
the  contrasts  between  the  various  districts  and  nations  included  within  the 
limits  of  Persia  and  her  provinces,  the  incessant  struggle  between  the  settled 
populations  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  steppes,  between  the  cultivated 
regions  and  the  desolation  of  the  desert,  thrust  back,  indeed,  yet  ever 
resuming  its  encroachments,  the  ideas  of  the  Zend-Avesta  will  appear  to 
us  natural  and,  as  we  may  term  it,  autochthonic  "  ( Universal  History,  vol.  i 
(1885),  p.  105). 

2  The  way  in  which  such  a  conception  acts  upon  the  moral  life  is  well 
illustrated  in  the  history  of  English  Puritanism.  The  ethical  strenuousness 
of  the  Puritan  was  the  outcome  of  his  deeply  felt  consciousness  of  the 
ineradicable  antagonism  between  good  and  evil.  It  is  all  brought  vividly 
before  us  in  Bunyan's  Holy  War,  in  the  struggle  between  Immanuel  and 
Diabolus  —  of  which  the  myth  of  Ahura  and  Ahriman  was  the  prototype. 


THE  ETHICS  OF  ZOROASTRIANISM  1 25 

In  the  case  of  no  other  people  of  antiquity,  except  the 
people  of  Israel,  did  the  conception  of  deity  exercise  a  greater 
influence  upon  morality  than  in  that  of  -the  ancient  Persians. 
The  supreme  being,  Ahura  Mazda,  was  conceived,  as  we  have 
already  noted,  as  the  creator  of  the  light  and  of  all  good  things, 
as  the  god  of  righteous  order  and  benevolence.  He  was  the 
lover  of  truth.  Truth  was  the  innermost  essence  of  his  being, 
as  love  is  the  innermost  essence  of  the  God  of  Christian- 
ity. Farther  on  we  shall  see  how  this  conception  of  deity 
formed  the  mold  in  which  was  cast  the  Persian  ideal  of 
moral  excellence. 

Ahura  Mazda  was  the  god  of  the  sky.  As  time  passed,  The  ethical 
Mithra,  the  god  of  the  sun,  gradually  came  into  greater  Mithra"  °f 
prominence  and  finally  quite  eclipsed  the  at  first  supreme 
deity,  Ahura.  As  the  solar  god  he  appropriated  the  ethical 
attributes  of  the  sky  god  and  became  preeminently  the  god 
of  light,  the  champion  of  truth,  and  the  avenger  of  lies.  He 
it  is  who,  when  not  deceived,  establisheth  nations  in  victory 
and  strength.1 

It  was  from  this  solar  deity  that  Zoroastrianism  in  the  later 
pre-Christian  centuries  was  called  Mithraism,  under  which 
name,  as  we  shall  see,  it  entered  the  Greco- Roman  world  and 
there  became  a  chief  competitor  with  Christianity  for  the  con- 
trol and  guidance  of  the  moral  life  of  the  European  nations. 

The  principle  of  Persian  world  philosophy  which,  next  after  Doctrine  of 
that  of  the  divided  government  of  the  universe,  had  probably  net*  of  the 
the  greatest  consequences,  and  those  not  wholly  favorable,  for  flreemearth~ 
Persian  morality,  was  the  principle  of  the  purity  and  sacred-  and  water 
ness  of  the  elements  —  fire,  earth,  and  water.     From  this 
principle  or  belief  were  deduced  endless  ritual  requirements 
whose  aim  was  to  preserve  these  elements  from  pollution,  or 
to  restore  their  purity  after  defilement,  and  thus  one  large 

1  MihirYasht  (Sacred  Books  of  the  East,  vol.  xxiii),  vii.  26. 


126 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


The  person 
ality  of  a 
great  re- 
former, 
Zarathus- 
tra 


division  of  the  moral  code  embraced  mainly  artificial  duties, 
duties  which  had  no  vital  relation  to  natural  morality,  that 
is,  to  conduct  deriving  its  sanction  from  the  natural  feelings 
of  moral  right  and  wrong. 

As  the  great  moral  systems  of  Confucianism,  Buddhism, 
Christianity,  and  Mohammedanism  bear  each  the  impress  of 
the  moral  consciousness  of  some  great  teacher,  so  is  it  with 
Zoroastrianism.  For  the  moral  ideal  of  Persia,  while  doubt- 
less largely  the  creation  of  the  ethical  feelings  and  convictions 
of  the  Iranian  race,  developed  through  many  centuries  of  race 
experiences,  nevertheless  bears  the  unmistakable  imprint  of  a 
unique  personality.  That  the  Zarathustra  of  tradition  repre- 
sents a  real  historical  personage,  there  can  hardly  be  longer  a 
reasonable  doubt.1 

The  time  of  Zarathustra 's  mission  probably  falls  in  the  first 
half  of  the  sixth  century  B.C.  He  thus  belongs  to  that  era  in 
the  history  of  antiquity  when,  at  various  centers  of  culture, 
reform  movements  announced  the  opening  of  a  new  epoch 
in  the  moral  evolution  of  the  human  race.2  The  sum  of  what 
we  may  believe  to  have  been  his  moral  teachings  was  that 
man's  full  duty  is  purity  and  sincerity  in  thought,  word,  and 
deed,  and  an  untiring  warfare  against  evil. 


The  essence 
of  the 
moral  life 


II.  The  Ideal 

The  distinctive  character  of  the  Persian  moral  ideal  was 
determined  by  the  Persian  dualistic  world  philosophy.  The 
essence  of  the  moral  life  is  a  struggle  against  evil.  The  good 
man  is  the  strong  fighter  with  Ahura  against  Ahriman  and 
all  his  creations.  There  was  no  place  in  the  ideal  for  those 
ascetic  virtues  —  celibacy,  fasting,  self-mortification — which 
conferred  sainthood  in  India.3 

1  See  Jackson,  Zoroaster,  the  Prophet  of  Ancient  Iran. 

2  See  above,  p.  115. 

8  Zoroastrian  ethics,  as  Wedgwood  says,  is  best  understood  when  viewed 
as  a  protest  against  the  Hindu  conception  of  the  universe  and  life.    n  The 


THE  ETHICS  OF  ZOROASTRIANISM  127 

The  married  state  was  regarded  as  superior  to  the  un- 
married :  "  He  who  has  children,"  says  the  Zend-Avesta, 
"  is  far  above  the  childless  man."  1  Fasting  was  condemned 
as  ungodly,  for  "  no  one  who  does  not  eat  has  strength  to  do 
heavy  work  of  holiness";2  the  well-fed  man  can  fight  better 
than  the  one  who  lessens  his  vitality  by  fasting,  can  with- 
stand the  cold  better,  "  can  strive  against  the  wicked  tyrant 
and  smite  him  on  the  head."  3  The  Zoroastrians  regarded 
Christianity,  in  the  form  in  which  they  knew  it,  with  disap- 
proval, because  it  exalted  celibacy  and  made  fasting  a  virtue. 

This  moral  ideal  which  made  life  a  strenuous  battling  for 
the  right  was,  after  the  ideal  of  the  Hebrew  prophets,  the 
loftiest  developed  by  the  ancient  world.  As  we  shall  see 
immediately,  it  tended  to  make  the  morality  of  the  ancient 
Persians  M  a  morality  of  vigor  and  manliness." 

Among  the  special  virtues  making  up  the  moral  ideal,  the  Truthful- 
highest  place  was  assigned  the  virtue  of  veracity.    It  is  note-  paramount 
worthy  how  this  virtue  was,  if  not  created,  at  least  fostered  by  Vlrtue 
the  Persian  conception  of  the  supreme  god,  Ahura  Mazda, 
whose  symbol  was  the  light.4   As  Ahriman  was  the  god  of 
deceit  and  lies,  so  was  Ahura  the  god  of  sincerity  and  truth. 
This  thought  of  deity  made  truthfulness  a  supreme  virtue,  for 
man  must  in  all  things  take  for  his  model  the  good  spirit 
on  whose  side  he  battles. 

Various  testimonies  bear  witness  to  the  high  place  assigned 
in  the  scale  of  virtues  to  veracity.  There  was  to  be  no  liar 
among  those  persons  whom  the  Persian  Noah  (Yima)  was 
commanded  to  bring  into  the  great  underground  abode,  that 

injunction  to  industry,  the  elaborate  provisions  for  agriculture,  the  constant 
stimulus  to  exertion  of  every  kind,  are  most  intelligible  when  we  see  in  them 
a  recoil  from  the  faith  which  appeared  to  this  active  race  [the  Iranian]  a 
confusion  of  good  and  evil "  ( The  Moral  Ideal,  3d  ed.,  p.  59). 

1  Vendidad  (Sacred  Books  of  the  East,  2d  ed.,  vol.  iv),  Farg.  iv.  47. 

2  Ibid.  Farg.  iii.  33.  8  Ibid.  Farg.  iv.  49. 

4  "Aryan  morality  came  down  from  the  heavens  in  a  ray  of  light" 
{Selected  Essays  of  James  Darmesteter,  ed.  Morris  Jastrow,  p.  304). 


128  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

the  earth  might  be  repeopled  with  a  superior  race  after  the 
deadly  cold  of  the  long  winter.1  The  punishment  provided 
in  the  Zend-Avesta  for  false  swearing  was  terrible.  The  very 
first  time  one  knowingly  tells  a  lie  unto  Mithra  (the  god 
adjured  in  taking  an  oath),  •'  without  waiting  until  it  is  done 
again,"  he  shall  be  beaten  on  earth  with  twice  seven  hundred 
stripes,  and  below  in  hell  shall  receive  punishment  harder 
than  the  pain  from  the  cutting  off  of  limbs,  from  falling 
down  a  precipice,  from  impalement.2 

What  is  especially  noteworthy  here  is  that  Zoroastrian 
morals  recognize  the  universality  of  the  law  of  truthfulness 
and  require  that  contracts  made  even  with  the  unfaithful  be 
faithfully  kept:  "Break  not  the  contract,"  says  the  sacred 
law ;  .  .  .  "for  Mithra  stands  for  both  the  faithful  and  the 
unfaithful."  3  Even  more  sacred  than  the  engagements  of 
kinsman  with  kinsman  are  the  engagements  between  nations, 
for  while  a  contract  between  members  of  the  same  group  is 
thirtyfold  more  binding  than  one  between  two  strangers,  a 
contract  between  two  nations  is  a  thousandfold  more  binding.4 
Here  is  raised  a  standard  of  international  morality  to  which 
modern  statesmen  and  diplomatists  have  not  yet  attained. 

The  duty  of  Industry  was  another  cardinal  virtue  of  the  Zoroastrian 
th/ethlcs  ideal  of  character.  Labor  was  enjoined  not  only  as  honorable 
but  as  a  sacred  duty.  Wedgwood  endeavors  to  show  how  this 
virtue  was  the  outgrowth  of  the  Persian  conception  of  the 
origin  of  the  universe.  In  Indian  thought  the  world  is  not  a 
creation,  the  work  of  a  divine  Creator ;  it  is  an  emanation 
from  an  impersonal,  unconscious,  primal  principle.  But  in 
the  Persian  world-view  the  universe  is  conceived  as  the  work 
of  a  deity  who  labors  to  give  it  form  and  shape.  This  con- 
ception of  God  as  a  worker  reacted  powerfully  upon  the  ideal 
of  human  excellence.    Man  must  imitate  this  divine  virtue  of 

1  Vendiddd,  Farg.  ii.  29.  3  Mihir  Yasht,  i.  2. 

2  Ibid.  Farg.  iv.  49  (bis)  -55.  4  Ibid.  xxix.  116,  117. 


of  labor 


ethics 


THE  ETHICS  OF  ZOROASTRIANISM  129 

labor.  He  must  become  a  co-worker  with  the  good  Ahura 
Mazda.  Thus  was  labor  idealized,  and  all  work,  even  the 
most  lowly,  made  a  sacred  thing.1 

There  is  in  this  view  doubtless  an  element  of  truth,  but 
it  is  probable  that  this  duty  of  industry  and  thrift  upon  which 
such  emphasis  is  laid  in  the  Zend-Avesta  was  in  the  begin- 
ning taught  and  enforced  by  the  limited  area  of  fruitful  soil 
and  the  necessity  of  careful  irrigation  and  tillage,  and  that 
only  later  the  virtue  thus  engendered  received  the  sanction 
and  support  of  religion.  We  may  infer  this  from  the  fact  that 
agriculture  was  the  most  sacred  of  occupations.  "He  who 
sows  corn,"  says  the  Zend-Avesta,  M  sows  righteousness."  2 
To  sow  corn,  grass,  and  fruit ;  to  water  dry  ground  and  to 
drain  ground  that  is  too  wet  —  this  is  the  duty  of  man.3 

The  Zoroastrian  code,  like  the  Laws  of  Manu,  gives  a  large  Animal 
place  to  man's  duties  toward  the  lower  animal  creation.  But 
the  animal  ethics  of  the  Iranian  lawgiver  are  much  more  rea- 
sonable than  those  of  the  Hindu  legislator.  The  Buddhist, 
as  we  have  seen,  is  enjoined  to  spare  every  living  thing; 
there  is  no  distinction  made  between  useful  animals  and  dan- 
gerous beasts  and  noxious  reptiles.  To  such  an  extreme  is 
this  regard  for  all  life  carried  that  agriculture,  though  a  per- 
missible because  a  necessary  occupation,  still  is  looked  upon 
with  disfavor  for  the  reason  that  the  plow  injures  the  beings 
living  in  the  earth.4 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Zoroastrian  code  distinguishes  be- 
tween beneficent  and  baneful  creatures,  declares  the  first  to 
have  been  created  by  the  good  Ahura  and  the  latter  by  the 
evil  Ahriman,  and  makes  it  the  duty  of  the  good  man  to  pro- 
tect and  treat  kindly  all  useful  animals,  and  to  destroy  all  bane- 
ful creatures,  including  noxious  plants,  such  as  weeds  and 

1  The  Moral  Ideal,  3d  ed.,  pp.  71  ff.  It  is  significant  that  the  sacred 
standard  of  the  early  Persians  was  the  apron  of  a  blacksmith. 

2  Vendidad,  Farg.  iii.  31.        3  Ibid,  Farg.  iii.  4.        4  Laws  of  Manu,  x.  84, 


130  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

brambles.  Hence  tilling  the  soil  is  praised  as  an  especially 
holy  occupation,  since  the  plow  destroys  the  thistles  and  weeds 
sown  by  the  evil-disposed  Ahriman. 

Duty  of  pro-  Another  important  department  of  Persian  ethics  was  based 
purity  of  on  the  idea  of  the  holiness  of  the  elements  —  fire,  earth,  and 
ments6"  water.  Any  defilement  of  these  was  a  sin,  in  some  cases  an 
unpardonable  sin.  For  instance,  burying  the  corpse  of  a  man 
or  of  an  animal  in  the  earth,  and  not  disinterring  it  within  two 
years  —  "  for  that  deed  there  is  nothing  that  can  pay  ;  .  .  . 
it  is  a  trespass  for  which  there  is  no  atonement  for  ever  and 
ever."  *  Equally  stringent  were  the  prohibitions  against  the 
pollution  of  the  holy  elements  fire  and  water,  through  casting 
into  them  any  unclean  matter.2 

We  shall  perhaps  best  understand  the  moral  value  of  such 
duties  as  we  have  to  do  with  in  this  division  of  Persian  ethics, 
if  we  compare  them  with  those  duties  of  the  Christian  code  — 
Sabbath  observances  —  which  are  based  on  the  idea  of  the 
holiness  of  a  certain  portion  of  time.  The  ethical  feelings 
evoked  in  the  one  case  are  akin  to  those  evoked  in  the  other. 

Thejudg-  In  the  Persian  judgment  of  the  soul  after  death  we  have 
dead;  the  the  most  profound  and  spiritual  conception  of  the  rewards 
Strife  of  and  punishments  of  the  hereafter  that  has  found  expression 
the  soul  m  j-he  ethical  teachings  of  any  people.  The  soul  is  conceived 
as  being  judged  by  itself.  Upon  its  departure  from  this  life 
the  soul  of  the  faithful  is  met  by  a  beautiful  maiden,  "  fair  as 

1  Vendiddd,  Farg.  iii.  38,  39. 

2  The  king  who  reigned  in  Persia  at  the  time  of  Nero,  going  from  Asia 
to  Italy,  traveled  by  land  along  the  shore  instead  of  going  by  ship,  "be- 
cause the  Magi  are  forbidden  to  defile  the  sea"  (James  Darmesteter,  Sacred 
Books  of  the  East,  vol.  iv,  p.  xl).  But  the  anxious  observance  by  the  Persians 
of  the  requirements  of  the  code  is  best  disclosed  in  the  disposition  which 
they  made  of  their  dead.  Since  corpses  could  neither  be  burned  nor  buried 
nor  thrown  into  the  water  without  defiling  a  sacred  element,  they  were  ex- 
posed on  the  summits  of  mountains  or  on  the  top  of  low  towers  (dakhmas), 
the  so-called  w  Towers  of  Silence,"  that  the  flesh  might  be  eaten  by  birds 
of  prey. 


THE  ETHICS  OF  ZOROASTRIANISM  1 31 

the  fairest  thing,"  who  says  to  him  :  "  I  am  thy  own  con- 
science ;  I  was  lovely  and  thou  madest  me  still  lovelier  ;  I  was 
fair  and  thou  madest  me  still  fairer,  through  thy  good  thought, 
thy  good  speech,  and  thy  good  deed."  And  then  the  soul  is  led 
into  the  paradise  of  endless  light.  But  the  soul  of  the  wicked 
one  is  met  by  a  hideous  old  woman,  "  uglier  than  the  ugliest 
thing,"  who  is  his  own  conscience.  She  says  to  him  :  "I  am 
thy  bad  actions,  O  youth  of  evil  thoughts,  of  evil  words,  of 
evil  deeds,  of  evil  religion.  It  is  on  account  of  thy  will  and 
actions  that  I  am  hideous  and  vile."  And  then  the  soul  is  led 
down  into  the  hell  of  endless  darkness.1 

The  remarkable  thing  about  all  this  is  that  this  profound 
and  spiritual  conception  of  "  a  mental  heaven  and  hell  with 
which  we  are  now  familiar  as  the  only  future  state  recognized 
by  intelligent  people  "  should  have  found  expression  at  the 
early  period  when  the  faith  of  the  Zend-Avesta  was  formu- 
lated. "  While  mankind  were  delivered  up  to  the  childish 
terrors  of  a  future  replete  with  horrors  visited  upon  them 
from  without,  the  early  Iranian  sage  announced  the  eternal 
truth  that  the  rewards  of  Heaven  and  the  punishments  of 
Hell  can  only  be  from  within.  He  gave  us,  we  may  fairly 
say,  through  the  systems  which  he  has  influenced,  that  great 
doctrine  of  subjective  recompense,  which  must  work  an  essen- 
tial change  in  the  mental  habits  of  every  one  who  receives  it."2 

III.  The  Practice 

In  setting  for  man  as  his  chief  moral  task  a  courageous  Effects  of 
warfare  against  evil,  the  Zoroastrian  ethics  produced  a  cer-  ideaiTupon 
tain  exaltation  of  character,  and  inspired  strenuous  activity 
motived  by  a  deep  sense  of  duty.  It  created,  or  concurred 
with  other  causes  in  creating,  "  a  race  of  zealous  Puritans," 

1  Zend-Avesta,  pt.  ii,  Yasht  xxii  (Sacred  Books  of  the  East,  vol.  xxiii, 
pp.  314  ff.). 

2  Sacred  Books  of  the  East,  vol.  xxxi,  "  Introduction,"  p.  xx. 


the  Persian 
character 


132 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


Persian 
veneration 
for  the 
truth 


a  strong,  self-reliant  people,  who  disdained  all  asceticism  and 
indolence.1  Fasting,  as  we  have  seen,  was  regarded  as  a  crime 
because  it  weakens  the  body  and  unfits  one  for  active  exertion. 
It  is  instructive  to  place  the  masculine  ideal  of  Persia 
alongside  the  feminine  ideal  of  Buddhist  India  and  note  the 
different  effects  of  these  strongly  contrasted  standards  of 
goodness  upon  the  races  accepting  them  as  the  measure  and 
rule  of  rational  conduct  and  duty.  The  Buddhist  ideal,  as  we 
have  seen,  is  made  up  largely  of  the  gentler,  contemplative, 
passive  virtues,  the  virtues  of  the  recluse  and  the  ascetic.  Its 
issue  in  character  is  quietism.  In  opposition  to  this,  the  Zoro- 
astrian  ideal  inspires  sturdy,  virile,  active  virtues,  the  moral 
qualities  of  the  reformer,  of  the  toiler  and  the  fighter.  The 
natural  effect  of  the  ideal  was  to  confirm  in  the  Persians  all  the 
seemingly  original  strong  ethical  qualities  of  the  Iranic  race. 

We  have  seen  that  one  of  the  chief  requirements  of  the 
Zoroastrian  code  was  truthfulness ;  man  must  be  veracious 
even  as  Ahura  Mazda  is  veracious.  Various  testimonies  assure 
us  that  in  respect  to  this  virtue  there  was  in  ancient  Persia  a 
commendable  conformity  of  practice  to  theory.  The  feeling 
for  the  beauty  and  nobility  of  truthfulness  was  much  more 
fully  developed  among  the  Persians  than  among  any  other 
people  of  ancient  or  modern  times.  They  were  a  truth- 
revering  and  a  truth-speaking  people.  Lying  was  the  great 
crime.  To  lie,  to  deceive,  was  to  be  a  follower  of  Ahriman, 
the  god  of  lies  and  deceit.  Hence  lying  was  regarded  as  a 
species  of  treason  against  Ahura  Mazda.  "  The  most  dis- 
graceful thing  in  the  world,"  affirms  Herodotus,  in  his  account 
of  the  Persians,  M  they  think,  is  to  tell  a  lie  ;  the  next  worse 
is  to  owe  a  debt,  because,  among  other  reasons,  the  debtor  is 
obliged  to  tell  lies."  2    In  his  report  of  the  Persian  system  of 

1  "  Their  [the  servitors  of  Mithra]  dualistic  system  was  particularly 
adapted  to  fostering  individual  effort  and  to  developing  human  energy." 
—  Cumont,  The  Mysteries  of  Mithra  (1903),  p.  141. 

2  Herod,  i.  139.    We  quote  Rawlinson's  version. 


THE  ETHICS  OF  ZOROASTRIANISM  133 

education  he  says,  "  The  boys  are  taught  to  ride,  to  draw  the 
bow,  and  to  speak  the  truth."  1  I  was  not  wicked,  nor  a  liar, 
is  the  substance  and  purport  of  many  a  record  of  the  ancient 
kings.  Rawlinson  adduces  this  as  evidence  of  their  venera- 
tion for  truthfulness.  "  The  special  estimation  in  which  truth 
was  held  among  the  Persians,"  he  says,  "  is  evidenced  in  a 
remarkable  manner  by  the  inscriptions  of  Darius,  where  lying 
is  taken  as  the  representative  of  all  evil.  It  is  the  great  calam- 
ity of  the  usurpation  of  the  pseudo-Smerdis,  that  '  then  the 
lie  became  abounding  in  the  land.'  '  The  Evil  One  (?)  in- 
vented lies  that  they  should  deceive  the  state.'  Darius  is 
favored  by  Ormazd,  '  because  he  was  not  a  heretic,  nor  a 
liar,  nor  a  tyrant.'  His  successors  are  exhorted  not  to  cherish, 
but  to  cast  into  utter  perdition,  '  the  man  who  may  be  a  liar, 
or  who  may  be  an  evildoer.'  His  great  fear  is  lest  it  may  be 
thought  that  any  part  of  the  record  which  he  has  set  up  has 
been  ' falsely  related,'  and  he  even  abstains  from  relating 
certain  events  of  his  reign  '  lest  to  him  who  may  hereafter 
peruse  the  tablet,  the  many  deeds  that  have  been  done  by 
him  may  seem  to  be  '  falsely  recorded.'  "  2 

The  Persian  kings,  shaming  in  this  all  other  nations  ancient 
and  modern,  kept  sacredly  their  pledged  word ; 3  only  once 
were  they  ever  even  charged  with  having  broken  a  treaty 
with  a  foreign  power.4 

That  truthfulness  was  a  national  virtue  of  the  Persians  is 
further  attested  by  the  fact  that  Herodotus  represents  them 
as  always  relying  implicitly  upon  every  tale  told  them  by 
the  lying  Greeks  whom  they  had  taken  captive.  It  never 
seemed  to  occur  to  them  that  even  an  enemy  could  be  guilty 
of  so  awful  a  blasphemy  as  lying.    It  was  this  trait  which 


1  Herod,  i.  136. 

2  Rawlinson's  Herodotus,  vol.  i,  p.  214,  n.  10.    We  omit  the  references. 

3  Cf.  Herod,  ix.  109. 

4  Rawlinson,  The  Five  Great  Monarchies  (1871),  vol.  iii,  p.  170.   The  ex- 
ception was  the  case  of  the  Barcasans.    Cf.  Herod,  iv.  201. 


134  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

led  to  their  undoing  at  Salamis  by  the  unscrupulous  and 
mendacious  Themistocles.1 

influence  of  That  exaltation  of  character  which  we  have  remarked  as 
upon  per-  springing  naturally  from  the  moral  dignity  with  which  man 
sian  history  wag  jnvesteci  ^y  being  made  an  associate  of  the  good  Ahura 
in  his  struggle  with  the  wicked  Ahriman  may  be  noticed 
especially  in  the  aims  and  undertakings  of  the  Persian  mon- 
archs  in  the  period  before  the  moral  decadence  of  the  Ira- 
nian civilization  set  in,  and  while  the  strength  of  the  ethical 
appeal  of  the  Zoroastrian  ideal  was  yet  unimpaired.  This 
appears  in  all  their  records,  which  make  the  aim  of  their 
conquests  to  be  the  overthrow  of  the  powers  of  evil  and  dis- 
order and  the  setting  up  of  a  kingdom  of  righteousness  in 
the  world.  The  inscriptions  of  Darius  I  read  like  the  letters 
of  the  Puritan  Cromwell.  Indeed,  just  as  it  was  the  mascu- 
line moral  ideal  of  English  Puritanism  which  helped  to  make 
England  great,  and  strong  to  play  her  part  in  the  transactions 
of  modern  times,  so  we  may  believe  it  was  the  strenuous 
moral  ideal  of  Zoroastrianism  that  helped  to  make  Persia 
great,  and  strong  to  play  her  great  role  in  the  affairs  of  the 
ancient  world.  In  truth,  the  ideal  is  still  an  unexpended  force 
in  history.  It  seems  to  have  given  immortality  to  the  people 
that  it  inspired  ;  for  it  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  it  is  largely 
owing  to  their  active  practical  morality  that  the  Parsees  in 
India,  the  representatives  to-day  of  the  old  Zoroastrian  faith, 
constitute  such  a  dominant  element  in  the  Indian  communi- 
ties of  which  they  form  a  part.2 

1  The  modern  Persians,  who  have  exchanged  the  truth-impelling  creed 
of  Zoroaster  for  that  of  Mohammed,  seem  to  have  lost  this  ancestral  virtue. 
It  is  noteworthy,  however,  that  the  Indian  Parsees,  the  inheritors  and  pre- 
servers of  the  faith  of  ancient  Persia,  are  noted  for  their  uprightness  and 
veracity. 

2  "  They  [the  Parsees]  form  one  of  the  most  esteemed,  wealthy,  and 
philanthropic  communities  on  the  west  coast  of  India,  notably  in  the  city 
of  Bombay."  —  Bloomfield,  The  Religion  of  the  Veda  (1908),  p.  15. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  IN  ISRAEL:  AN  IDEAL 
OF  OBEDIENCE  TO  A  REVEALED  LAW 

I.  The  Religious  Basis  of  Hebrew  Morality 

To  the  pious  Hebrew  the  rainbow,  which  to  the  esthetic  introduc- 
Greek  was  merely  the  beautiful  pathway  of  Iris,  the  messen-  Israel's  ms- 
ger  of  Olympus,  was  Yahweh's  bow  hung  out  from  the  dark  ^SoraTone 
retreating  thundercloud  as  a  sign  of  righteous  anger  spent 
and  the  pledge  of  a  divine  covenant  and  promise.    In  this 
ethical  interpretation  by  the  Hebrew  spirit  of  this  portent  is 
foretokened  the  history  and  mission  of  ancient  Israel.   It  was 
her  allotted  task  to  interpret  in  ethical  terms  the  phenomena 
of  the  world  of  nature  and  the  drama  of  human  life  and 
history.    And  it  was  her  happy  lot  to  become  the  teacher  to 
mankind  of  the  truth  of  an  alone  and  righteous  God,  and  to 
be  the  creator  of  a  moral  ideal  which  is  to-day  the  highest 
.ethical  standard  of  all  the  races  of  the  Western  world,  and 
the  most  vital  moral  force  at  work  in  universal  history. 

In  the  short  account  which  we  shall  give  of  Hebrew  mo- 
rality we  shall  adopt  a  mode  of  treatment  somewhat  different 
from  that  followed  in  describing  the  moral  systems  of  the 
peoples  already  passed  in  review,  for  the  reason  that  in  the 
case  of  the  ancient  Hebrews  the  historical  material  is  suf- 
ficiently abundant  to  enable  us  to  trace  step  by  step  the 
development  of  the  ethical  ideal  and  to  watch  the  gradual 
clarification  of  the  moral  consciousness  of  the  race.1   Hence, 

1  w  The  whole  history  of  the  religion  of  Israel  is  a  history  of  the  develop- 
ment of  the  moral  consciousness,  and  consequently  of  the  deepening  and 
widening  of  the  opposition  between  that  which  ought  to  be  and  that  which 
is." — Edward  Caird,  The  Evolution  of  Religion  (1894),  vol.  ii,  p.  92. 

*35 


136 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


The  con- 
ception of 
deity  ; 
monolatry 
and  mono- 
theism 


after  speaking  of  the  religious  ideas  which  formed  the  basis 
of  the  moral  code,  we  shall  sketch  briefly  the  evolution  of  the 
rudimentary  morality  of  the  tribal  age  of  the  nation  into  the 
high  ideal  of  the  prophets  of  the  later  time. 

We  have  seen  how  the  Persian  view  of  deity  molded  Per- 
sian morality.  In  a  still  more  decisive  way  did  the  Hebrew 
idea  of  God,  of  his  character  and  his  relation  to  Israel  and 
the  world,  shape  and  mold  the  moral  ideal  of  the  race.1 

When  the  Hebrews  in  the  second  millennium  before 
Christ  appeared  in  history,  they  were  in  possession  of  a 
stock  of  ideas  concerning  the  gods  which  was,  in  all  essen- 
tials save  one,  altogether  like  that  held  by  their  Semitic 
kinsmen  of  the  various  lands  of  southwestern  Asia.  The 
single  essential  point  of  difference  between  their  religious 
belief  and  that  of  their  neighbors  was  this  :  the  nations  about 
them  were  polytheists  ;  they  were  monolatrists  ;  that  is,  the 
Hebrews,  while  they  believed  in  many  gods,  worshiped  only 
one  god,  their  tribal  god  Yahweh.  As  Stade  expresses  it, 
"  the  old  Israelite  was  a  theoretical  polytheist,  but  a  practical 
monotheist."  2 

There  is  .scarcely  need  that  we  add  in  qualification  of  this, 
that  when  the  Hebrews  first  appeared  in  history  they  were 
not  all  monolatrists.  The  multitude  were  then,  and  for  a  long 
time  thereafter,  polytheists.  All  that  can  be  affirmed  is  that  in 
the  earliest  times  of  their  history  there  were  among  them  teach- 
ers of  monolatrism,  teachers  who  inculcated  the  duty  of  wor- 
shiping a  single  god,  the  patron  and  champion  of  the  nation. 

Through  what  experiences  and  under  what  tuition  these 
teachers  of  Israel  made  the  passage  in  thought  from  polythe- 
ism to  monolatrism  we  need  not  now  inquire.   For  our  purpose 

1  It  may  be  urged  that  the  moral  character  given  to  Yahweh  was  the 
creation  of  the  moral  consciousness  of  his  worshipers ;  but  even  so,  this 
conception  of  deity  once  formed  would  inevitably  react  upon  the  moral 
sense  to  deepen  and  purify  the  feelings  that  gave  it  birth. 

2  Geschichte  des  Volkes  Israel  (1889),  Bd.  i,  S.  429. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  IN  ISRAEL  137 

we  need  simply  note  the  fact  and  emphasize  its  supreme  his- 
torical importance.  It  marks  the  beginning  of  a  divergent 
evolution  in  religious  belief  and  ethical  conviction  which  in 
the  lapse  of  time  was  to  lead  Israel  far  apart  from  her  Semitic 
kinsmen,  and  make  her  the  standard  bearer  of  a  universal 
religion  and  a  universal  morality.  For  monolatry  was  with 
the  prophets  and  seers  of  Israel  only  the  first  step  toward 
monotheism,  the  doctrine  that  there  is  only  one  God,  the 
Universal  Father.  This  idea  of  deity  was  not  reached  much 
before  the  time  of  the  Second  Isaiah.  Along  with  this  later 
view  of  Yahweh  there  came  the  thought  and  conviction  that 
he  is  a  God  of  absolute  righteousness.  This  conception  of 
God  and  of  his  character  was,  as  we  shall  see,  an  idea  charged 
with  the  deepest  significance  not  only  for  the  ethical  develop- 
ment in  Israel  but  for  the  moral  life  of  all  mankind. 

After  this  conception  of  Yahweh,  first  as  a  jealous  tribal  The  belief 
deity  and  later  as  the  sole  God  and  Universal  Father,  the  LaturaSy" 
belief  in  a  supernaturally  revealed  law  wherein  all  the  duties  £™aled 
of  man  were  made   known  was  the  most  potent  force  in 
molding  the  moral  'ideal  of  Israel.    It  was  this  belief  which 
made  the  chief  duty  of  man  to  be  unquestioning  obedience 
to  the  divine  commandments ;  for  the  revealed  law  was  the 
measure  of  duty — what  it  enjoined  was  right,  what  it  forbade 
was  wrong. 

This  investiture  of  an  outer  law,  conceived  to  be  of  super- 
natural origin,  with  sovereign  authority  over  man's  every  act, 
and  the  subordination  to  it  of  the  inner  law  of  the  individual 
conscience,  had  consequences  of  vast  importance  for  the  eth- 
ical evolution  not  only  in  ancient  Israel  but  also  among  all 
the  peoples  whose  moral  ideal  was  essentially  an  inheritance 
from  her.  For  where  the  full  duty  of  man  is  made  to  consist 
in  obedience  to  the  minute  requirements  of  an  external  law 
there  is  inevitably  created  a  morality  made  up  largely  of 
artificial  ritual   duties,   and  as   intelligence  grows   and  the 


138 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


moral  consciousness  deepens  and  clarifies,  there  necessarily 
arises  a  conflict  between  this  conventional  morality  and  the 
natural  morality  of  the  human  reason  and  conscience.  In 
such  a  conflict,  in  this  way  created,  within  the  moral  life  of 
Israel  centers  the  dramatic  interest  of  her  moral  history. 


Special 
ground  of 
the  Israel- 
ites' feel- 
ing that 
obedience 
to  the  law 
was  their 
highest 

duty- 


There  was  a  special  reason  why  the  Israelites  felt  that 
their  first  duty  was  absolute  obedience  to  the  revealed  will 
of  Yahweh.  They  possessed  a  tradition  which  told  how 
their  fathers  were  serfs  in  the  land  of  Egypt ;  how  Yahweh, 
through  his  servant  Moses,  had  intervened  in  their  behalf, 
and  with  a  strong  arm  and  with  mighty  signs  had  brought 
them  up  out  of  the  land  of  bondage ;  and  how  at  Mt.  Sinai  he 
had  entered  into  a  covenant  with  them  in  which  he  pledged 
to  them  his  powerful  protection  on  condition  of  their  fidelity 
in  his  worship  and  obedience  to  all  his  commandments. 

This  belief  was  the  germ  out  of  which  grew  most  of  what 
was  unique  in  the  ethical  development  of  Israel.1  It  played 
exactly  the  same  part  in  creating  and  molding  the  religious 
conscience  of  Israel  that  the  Christian's  belief  in  the  descent 
of  the  Son  of  God  into  the  world  and  his  voluntary  death  to 
effect  man's  deliverance  has  had  in  molding  the  religious  con- 
science of  Christendom.  As  we  advance  in  our  study  we  shall 
see  how  largely  the  moral  consciousness  of  the  Israelites  was 
a  creation  of  this  belief  in  a  most  sacred  covenant  between 
Yahweh  and  their  fathers  at  the  "  Terrible  Mount "  in  the 
wilderness. 


The  rite  of 
sacrifice 


We  have  seen  that  religion  on  the  lower  levels  of  culture 
consists  largely  in  sacrifice  ;  that  is,  in  gifts  or  offerings  either 
to  the  spirits  of  the  dead  or  to  the  gods.  The  religion  of 
the  ancient  Hebrews  did  not  differ  in  this  respect  from  the 


1  Budde,  Religion  of  Israel  to  the  Exile  (1899),  pp.  35  ff. ;  Hoy,  Judaism 
and  Christianity  (1891),  p.  307  ;  W.  Robertson  Smith,  The  Religion  of  the 
Semites  (1894),  pp.  75  ff. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  IN  ISRAEL  139 

religion  of  other  peoples  in  the  same  stage  of  culture.1  But 
the  evolution  of  the  rite  of  sacrifice  among  the  Israelites  differs 
from  its  development  among  all  other  peoples  in  that,  under 
the  influence  of  the  Hebrew  spirit,  the  rite  was  gradually 
reduced  to  symbolism  and  spiritualized.  In  this  process  it 
underwent  the  most  remarkable  metamorphoses.  Beginning 
with  meat  and  drink  offerings  from  man  to  God,  it  ends  with 
God  giving  himself  a  sacrifice  for  man.  The  system  thus 
transformed  became  the  great  inspirer  of  ethical  sentiment 
and  a  unique  vehicle  of  moral  instruction. 

The  Israelite's  thought  of  death  and  of  the  after  life  also  The  vague- 
reacted  powerfully  upon  his  moral  feelings  and  colored  all  his  belief  in  an 
ethical  speculations  ;  for,  like  the  conceptions  held  of  God,  after  llfe 
the  notions  entertained  of  man's  lot  after  death,  as  we  have 
seen  in  the  case  of  the  ancient  Egyptians,  has  far-reaching 
consequences  for  the  moral  life. 

Now  the  Hebrew  conception  of  the  future  state  was  the 
same  as  the  Babylonian.  Sheol,  like  the  Babylonian  Arallu, 
was  a  vague  and  shadowy  region  beneath  the  earth,  a  sad  and 
dismal  place  which  received  without  distinction  the  good  and 
the  bad.  The  same  fate  was  allotted  all  who  went  down  to 
the  grave  :  "  The  small  and  the  great  are  there  ;  and  the 
servant  is  free  from  his  master."2  There  was  no  return  there 
for  good  or  for  evil :  "  But  the  dead  know  not  anything,  nei- 
ther have  they  any  more  a  reward."  3  Memory  and  hope 
were  there  dead  :  "  For  in  death  there  is  no  remembrance  of 
thee.  .  .  .  They  that  go  down  into  the  pit  cannot  hope  for 
thy  truth."  4 

1  W.  Robertson  Smith  urges  that  sacrifice  among  the  Hebrews  had  its 
origin  in  the  sacramental  communal  idea.  According  to  this  belief  the 
clansmen  and  their  god  are  of  the  same  stock,  and  the  bond  of  kinship  is 
renewed  and  strengthened  through  the  human  and  the  divine  members  of 
the  community  partaking  together  of  the  flesh  and  blood  of  an  animal  slain. 

2  Job  hi.  19. 

8  Eccl.  ix.  5  ;  and  so  ix.  10  :  n  For  there  is  no  work,  nor  desire,  nor  knowl- 
edge, nor  wisdom  in  Sheol,  whither  thou  goeth."  *  Is.  xxxviii.  18. 


140  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

We  shall  see  later  how  this  vague  and  feebly  held  idea  of 
the  future  life  reacted  upon  the  evolution  of  the  moral  con- 
sciousness in  Israel,  how  deeply  it  influenced  the  troubled 
ethical  speculations  of  the  more  thoughtful  minds  of  the 
nation,  and  how  it  inspired  theories  of  the  moral  order  of  the 
world  which  have  not  yet  lost  their  power  over  the  thoughts 
and  the  conduct  of  men.1  We  need  in  this  place  merely  to 
point  out  how  it  was  the  absence  of  a  clearly  defined  belief  in 
a  life  of  rewards  and  punishments  in  another  world  that  cre- 
ated, or  helped  to  create,  the  Messianic  ideal,  one  of  the  most 
fruitful  conceptions,  in  its  ethical  outcomes,  that  ever  entered 
into  the  mind  of  man. 


II.  The  Evolution  of  the  Moral  Ideal 

/.    The  Development  up  to  the  Exile 

The  primi-  The  history  of  Hebrew  morals  is  the  record  of  a  long  and 
codem°ra  slow  evolution.  The  primitive  code  with  which  the  develop- 
ment began  was  the  code  of  Semitic  nomadism.  It  was  essen- 
tially the  same  as  that  which  to-day  governs  the  conduct  of 
the  practically  unchanged  kinsmen  of  the  Hebrews,  the  Bed- 
ouin of  Arabia  and  neighboring  lands.  It  was  the  morality 
of  the  kinship  group.2  The  principle  of  communal  responsi- 
bility, which  affords  the  key  to  a  large  part  of  the  moral  his- 
tory of  Israel,  had  not  yet  been  challenged  as  unethical,  and 
blood  revenge  was  a  most  sacred  duty.  The  circle  covered  by 
the  moral  feelings  was  still  narrow ;  there  was  practically  no  sen- 
timent of  duty  or  obligation  toward  tribes  or  nations  outside  the 
group  of  tribes  constituting  the  people  of  Israel.  The  concep- 
tion of  Yahweh  as  a  jealous  national  god  prevented  the  growth 
of  feelings  which  might  have  formed  the  basis  of  a  true  inter- 
national morality.  The  wars  which  the  Israelites  waged  against 
their  enemies  were  wars  of  ruthless  slaughter  and  rapine. 

i  See  below,  pp.  165  f.  2  Cf.  Chapter  II. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  IN  ISRAEL  141 

This  rudimentary  morality  is  summarized  in  the  Decalogue,1 
for  the  Ten  Commandments  are  indisputably  of  a  high  an- 
tiquity. One  mark  of  the  primitive  character  of  this  legisla- 
tion is  the  negative  form  of  the  commandments.2  Where 
there  is  need  of  the  "thou  shalt  not,"  the  moral  life  is  still 
on  a  low  plane.  The  aim  and  purpose  of  the  law  thus 
worded  are  restraint  and  repression.  There  is  a  wide  interval 
in  moral  chronology  between  the  morality  of  the  Ten  Words 
and  that  of  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount.  In  this  earlier  code 
there  is  only  the  slightest  recognition  of  the  truth  that  the 
truly  moral  life  consists  not  in  refraining  from  evil  but  in 
doing  good.  The  nomads  of  the  desert  for  whom  these 
negative  commands  were  framed,  forbidding  mostly  crude, 
coarse  crimes,  were  evidently  a  long  way  yet  from  that  level 
of  moral  attainment  where  the  only  law  is  the  law  of  love 
and  liberty. 

That  period  of  transition  which  marks  the  passage  of  the  The  moral 
Israelite  tribes  from  the  nomadic  pastoral  life  of  the  desert  to  Seageof 
a  settled  agricultural  life  in  Palestine  may  be  instructively  theJud«es 
compared  with  that  transition  period  in  the  history  of  Europe 
which  followed  the  migration  of  the  German  tribes  and  their 
settlement  in  the  provinces  of  the  disrupted  Roman  Empire. 
It  was  an  epoch  characterized  by  the  rapid  decay  of  the  clan 
and  tribal  organization,  with  an  accompanying  loss  of  the 
rude  virtues  of  the  nomadic  and  pastoral  life,  and  the  acqui- 
sition of  the  vices  of  the  civilized  or  semicivilized  communi- 
ties among  which  they  had  thrust  themselves  and  whose  lands 
they  had  forcibly  seized. 

Especially  upon  the  religious  system,  which  in  Israel  was 
ever  closely  bound  up  with  morality,  was  felt  the  reaction  of 
the  new  environment.    Many  foreign  elements  adopted  from 

1  The  oldest  form  of  the  Decalogue  is  found  in  Ex.  xxxiv  ;  cf.  Ex.  xxxiii. 

2  If  we  compare  the  morality  of  this  Hebrew  Decalogue  with  that  of  the 
Egyptian  Negative  Confession,  we  shall  find  it  to  belong  to  about  the  same 
stage  of  ethical  development. 


142  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

the  Canaanite  peoples  were  incorporated  with  it,  while  the 
national  god  Yahweh,  as  conceived  by  the  popular  imagina- 
tion, tended  to  become  sanguinary,  capricious,  and  unjust. 
He  became  eminently  a  god  of  war,  and  is  for  his  people 
right  or  wrong.  Thus  a  chief  bulwark  of  morality  was  im- 
paired. The  result  was  a  moral  interregnum.  The  old  stand- 
ards and  rules  of  conduct  lost  their  sanction.  Every  man 
did  that  which  was  right  in  his  own  eyes.1 

prophetism:  The  necessities  of  the  situation  called  into  existence  the 
elements11  monarchy  (about  1050  B.C.).  Then  followed  the  disruption 
of  the  kingdom  (about  953  B.C.).  The  significant  matter  in 
the  moral  domain  during  the  period  of  the  united  and  the 
divided  kingdom2  was  the  appearance  of  teachers  called 
prophets  or  seers,  men  who  were  believed  to  speak  the  word 
given  them  by  Yahweh.  This  emergence  of  prophetism  in 
Israel  is  beyond  controversy  one  of  the  most  important  phe- 
nomena in  the  moral  history  of  the  world. 

There  were  in  this  prophetism  various  elements.3  First,  it 
contained  a  nomadic  element ;  that  is,  some  of  the  prophets 
were  men  who  looked  backward  to  the  simple  pastoral  life  of 
the  desert  as  the  ideal  moral  life.  They  regarded  civilization 
as  the  sum  of  all  evils.  Their  reading  of  history  was,  in  the 
words  of  Wellhausen,  that  "  as  the  human  race  goes  forward 
in  civilization,  it  goes  backward  in  the  fear  of  God."  Second, 
there  was  in  it  a  socialistic  element.  These  prophets  were  the 
first  socialists.  Theirs  was  the  first  passionate  plea  for  the  poor, 
the  wretched,  and  the  heavy-burdened.    Third,  it  contained 

1  In  the  Book  of  Judges  are  preserved  some  traditions  which  are  illus- 
trative of  the  moral  state  of  society  at  this  time ;  for  though  all  the  details 
of  these  stories  may  not  be  historical,  still  they  doubtless  reflect  the  general 
condition  of  things  during  this  period.  There  is  a  striking  similarity  between 
these  traditions  of  gross  and  incredible  crimes  and  the  traditions  of  the 
atrocious  immoralities  of  the  Merovingian  Age  in  European  history. 

2  The  kingdom  of  Israel  was  destroyed  by  the  Assyrian  power  722  B.C.; 
the  kingdom  of  Judah  fell  before  Nebuchadnezzar,  king  of  Babylon,  586  B.C. 

8  Cf.  Kuenen,  The  Prophets  and  Prophecy  in  Israel. 


C\       _ 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  IN  ISRAEL  143 

a  predictive  element.  The  prophets  were  regarded  as  seers, 
as  foretellers  of  future  events.  Fourth,  there  was  in  this 
prophetism  an  element  of  pure  intuitional  morality  which 
was  in  irreconcilable  antagonism  to  all  legal  ritual  morality. 
Fifth,  it  contained  a  monotheistic  element.  The  later  prophets 
were  distinctively  teachers  of  the  doctrine  that  there  is  only 
one  God,  beside  whom  there  is  no  other. 

Of  these  several  elements  the  predictive,  or  prophetic  in 
the  popular  sense,  has  been  given  such  undue  prominence 
that  Hebrew  prophetism  in  the  minds  of  many  stands  for  little 
else  than  a  supernatural  forecasting  of  future  events.  But, 
in  truth,  this  is  the  element  of  least  importance.  In  the  words 
of  Kuenen,  the  business  of  the  prophets  was  "  not  to  commu- 
nicate what  shall  happen,  but  to  insist  upon  what  ought  to 
happen."  1  They  were  preachers  of  individual  and  social 
righteousness.  It  is  this  ethical  element,  forming  the  very 
heart  and  core  of  their  message,  which  makes  the  appearance 
of  prophetism  in  Israel  a  matter  of  such  transcendent  impor- 
tance for  universal  history.  Our  main  task  in  the  following 
pages  of  this  chapter  will  be  to  point  out  this  moral  element 
in  the  message  of  the  prophets,  to  show  how  the  conception 
of  Yahweh  was  by  them  moralized,  and  how  the  morality  they 
inculcated  became  purer  and  more  elevated  as  the  centuries 
passed,  till  the  evolution  culminated  in  the  lofty  teachings  of 
the  Prophet  of  Nazareth. 

The  real  history  of  Hebrew  prophetism  opens  with  the  The  begin- 
appearance  in  the  northern  kingdom,  about  the  beginning  of  historical 
the  ninth  century  B.C.,  of  the  great  prophets  Elijah  and  Elisha.  fs™p:hEiijah 
It  was  the  moral  degeneracy  of  the  times  of  the  monarchy,  and  Elisha 
the  inrush  of  the  hateful  vices  of  civilization,  —  the  greed  of 
land  2  and  of  wealth,  the  cruel  inequalities  of  the  new  society, 
the  selfish  luxury  of  the  rich,  the  harsh  oppression  of  the  poor, 

1  The  Prophets  and  Prophecy  in  Israel  (1877),  p.  344. 

2  Cf.  1  Kings  xxi  —  the  story  of  Naboth's  vineyard. 


144  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

the  forgetting  of  men's  kinship,  the  substitution  of  the  wor- 
ship of  other  gods  for  the  sole  worship  of  Yahweh,  —  it  was 
all  this  which  called  out  the  vehement  protest  of  these  teach- 
ers of  social  justice  and  national  righteousness. 

It  was,  however,  a  very  different  prophetism  from  that  of 
the  later  seers  of  Israel  which  was  represented  by  these  early 
teachers.  There  was  in  it  a  large  nomadic  element.  Its  rep- 
resentatives looked  back  to  the  times  of  the  simple  pastoral 
life  of  the  fathers  as  the  Golden  Age  of  Israel.  They  hated 
civilization,  that  grossly  material  civilization  which  Israel, 
under  the  lead  of  an  idolatrous  and  luxurious  court,  was  now 
adopting  from  the  surrounding  nations,  and  looked  upon  it  as 
"  the  sum  of  all  evils."  They  were,  furthermore,  monolatrists 
rather  than  monotheists.  They  believed  in  sacrifice  ;  but  sacri- 
fices must  not  be  offered  to  strange  gods  —  only  to  Yahweh. 
They  were  fanatical  in  their  zeal  for  the  worship  of  Israel's 
patron  God ;  but  even  here  there  was  an  ethical  element,  for 
in  their  view  the  triumph  of  the  worship  of  Yahweh  over  that 
of  the  Baals  meant  a  triumph  of  the  simple,  severe,  desert 
morality  over  the  voluptuousness  and  the  nameless  vices  of 
the  Canaanite  civilization. 

This  early  prophetism,  in  a  word,  was  a  sort  of  Puritanism. 
Renan  calls  it  "this  terrible  prophetism."  It  was  fierce,  cruel, 
fanatical,  intolerant,  like  English  Puritanism.  Indeed,  it  can 
best  be  studied  in  this  modern  seventeenth-century  prophet- 
ism, which  was  essentially  a  revival  of  it.  But  notwithstand- 
ing the  imperfect  character  of  this  early  prophetism,  because 
of  the  true  ethical  element  it  contained,1  its  appearance  in 
Israel  and  its  successful  fight  against  a  sensuous  idolatry  was 

1  M  The  life-work  of  Elijah  was  a  turning-point  in  the  history  of  the 
religion  of  Israel,  similar  in  its  consequences  to  those  which  followed  the 
appearance  of  Zarathustra  in  Iran.  ...  It  was  the  ethical  idea  of  God 
matured  in  the  soul  of  the  prophet  by  the  need  of  his  time  which  broke 
through  with  irresistible  power  to  the  demand  for  a  final  choice  between 
Jehovah,  the  holy  God,  and  the  unholy  nature  gods  of  the  heathen."  — 
PFLEIDERER,  Religions  and  Historic  Faiths  (1907),  pp.  225  f. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  IN  ISRAEL  145 

a  matter  of  vast  moral  import,  for  here  in  this  narrow,  intol- 
erant monolatry  is  the  real  historical  beginning  of  that  long 
religious-ethical  development  which  lends  chief  significance  to 
the  story  of  Israel,  and  constitutes  a  main  interest  of  the  his- 
tory of  European  civilization.  In  the  words  of  Renan,  "  The 
prophetism  which  struggled  under  Ahab  and  triumphed  under 
Jehu  is  .  .  .  upon  the  whole  the  most  decisive  event  in  the  his- 
tory of  Israel.  It  forms  the  commencement  of  the  chain  which, 
after  nine  hundred  years,  found  the  last  link  in  Jesus."  1 

The  second  link  in  this  chain  was  formed  by  the  prophets  The  moral 
Amos  and  Hosea,  who  delivered  their  message  about  the  represented 
middle  of  the  eighth  century.    Amos  was  the  earlier.    There  SoSS) 
is  in  his  message  the  note  of  true  prophetism.    His  thought  *n* Hosea 
of  Yahweh  is  that  he  is  a  God  who  hates  iniquity  and  loves  BC) 
righteousness.    What  angers  him  is  not  idolatry  or  the  wor- 
ship of  other  gods,  but  social  wrongs  and  injustice  —  wicked- 
ness in  every  form.    He  is  angry  with  Israel 2  because  there 
has  been  stored  up  violence  and  robbery  in  the  palace ; 3  be- 
cause of  the  luxury  and  self-indulgence  of  the  rich ;  because 
of  the  treading  upon  the  poor  and  the  taking  from  him  bur- 
dens of  wheat ;  because  of  the  taking  of  bribes  and  the  turn- 
ing aside  of  the  poor  in  the  gate  from  their  right ; 4  because 
of  the  falsifying  of  the  balances  by  deceit  that  the  poor  may 
be  bought  for  silver  and  the  needy  for  a  pair  of  shoes.5  And 
what  pleases  Yahweh  is  not  fast  days  and  sacrifices,  but  jus- 
tice and  righteousness:  "I  hate,  ...  I  despise  your  fast  days,"6 
declares  Yahweh.    M  Though  ye  offer  me  burnt  offerings  and 
meat  offerings,  I  will  not  accept."  7    "  But  let  judgment  run 
down  as  water  and  righteousness  as  a  mighty  stream."  8 

1  History  of  the  People  of  Israel  (1892),  vol.  ii,  p.  275. 

2  Calamities  were  at  this  time  befalling  Israel.  "  The  national  distress 
served  to  awaken  Israel's  conscience.  The  obligation  covenanted  at  Sinai 
knocked  again  at  the  door  of  their  hearts"  (Budde,  Religion  of  Israel  to 
the  Exile  (1899),  p.  93). 

8  Amos  hi.  10.  5  Ibid.  viii.  5,  6.  7  Ibid.  v.  22. 

4  Ibid.  v.  11,  12.  6  Ibid.  v.  21.  8  Ibid.  v.  24. 


146  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

A  generation  later  the  prophet  Hosea  repeats  the  same 
message  ;  namely,  that  what  angers  Yahweh  is  moral  evil  — 
lying,  swearing,  stealing,  and  killing.  He  puts  in  the  mouth 
of  Yahweh  these  words  :  "  For  I  desire  mercy  and  not  sacri- 
fice, and  the  knowledge  of  God  more  than  burnt  offerings."1 

There  is  here  a  notable  ethical  advance  over  the  word  to 
Israel  of  the  prophets  of  the  preceding  century.  The  thought 
of  Amos  and  Hosea  that  it  is  social  wrongdoing  that  angers 
Yahweh  is  indeed  no  new  thought,  for  we  meet  with  this 
conception  of  the  moral  character  of  God  in  the  teachings  of 
the  earlier  prophets ;  what  is  new  is  the  emphasis  which  is 
laid  upon  it.  Here  we  reach  ethical  monolatry ; 2  ethical 
monotheism  lies  not  far  in  the  future. 

The  ideal  The  morality  of  Amos  and  Hosea  infolded  the  germ  of 

brotherhood  ethical  cosmopolitanism.  The  conviction  that  the  government 
and  univer-  °f  Yahweh  is  founded  on  absolute  justice  and  righteousness 
sal  peace  \e(\  t0  the  conviction  of  its  ultimate  universality,  '*  for  right  is 
everywhere  right,  and  wrong  is  everywhere  wrong."  The 
political  situation  in  the  Semitic  world  at  this  time  fostered 
the  thought  thus  awakened.  The  predominant  fact  in  inter- 
national relations  in  the  latter  half  of  the  eighth  century  was 
the  growth  of  the  Assyrian  Empire.  In  its  expansion  it  had 
already  engulfed  many  of  the  smaller  states  of  western  Asia, 
and  Assyria  had  become  a  world  power.  Political  unity  sug- 
gested now,  as  it  did  when  Rome  had  established  a  world 
empire,  religious  and  ethical  unity.  Yahweh,  Israel's  God  of 
justice  and  right,  is  the  suzerain  of  all  other  gods  and  peoples. 
He  will  establish  a  world-wide  kingdom,  and  all  nations  shall 
acknowledge  his  righteous  rule. 

As  representatives  of  this  broadening  vision  we  have  the 
great  prophets  Isaiah  and  Micah,  who,  proclaiming  the  universal 

1  Hosea  vi.  6. 

2  To  Amos  and  Hosea,  Yahweh  is  simply  the  supreme  god,  the  suzerain 
of  all  other  gods. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  IN  ISRAEL  147 

reach  of  the  law  of  right  and  justice,  held  aloft  a  noble  eth- 
ical ideal  of  the  brotherhood  of  nations  and  universal  peace. 
Seers  by  virtue  of  their  conviction  of  the  absoluteness,  the  one- 
ness and  sovereignty,  of  the  moral  law,  they  foretold  the 
coming  of  a  time  in  the  last  days  when  all  the  nations  of  the 
earth  should  form  a  federation  under  the  suzerainty  of  Israel 
with  Jerusalem  as  the  world  capital :  "  Out  of  Zion  shall  go 
forth  the  law,  and  the  word  of  the  Lord  from  Jerusalem,  and 
he  shall  judge  among  the  nations,  and  shall  rebuke  many 
people  ;  and  they  shall  beat  their  swords  into  ploughshares,  and 
their  spears  into  pruning-hooks  ;  nation  shall  not  lift  up  sword 
against  nation,  neither  shall  they  learn  war  any  more."  * 

This  is  the  first  distinct  expression  in  Hebrew  literature, 
or  in  that  of  any  race,  of  the  idea  of  the  brotherhood  of  man 
and  a  federated  world.  The  lofty  ideal  has  never  faded  from 
the  eyes  of  men.  It  has  inspired  all  the  noblest  visions  of 
world  unity  and  peace  through  the  war-troubled  ages,  and  is 
in  the  world  of  to-day  the  source  and  spring  of  much  of  that 
ethical  idealism  which  with  prophetic  faith  and  conviction 
proclaims  a  federated  world,  with  the  nations  dwelling  to- 
gether in  peace  and  amity,  as  the  one  divine  event  toward 
which  all  history  moves. 

With  this  lofty  ethical  universalism  in  the  teachings  of 
Isaiah  and  Micah  was  joined  a  simple  personal  and  social 
morality  of  the  human  heart  and  reason.  These  prophets 
were  at  one  with  Amos  and  Hosea  in  proclaiming  that  what 
Yahweh  delights  in  is  not  sacrifices  and  the  observance  of 
new  moons  and  Sabbaths,  but  cleanliness  of  life  and  services 
of  love.  Hear  Isaiah  as  he  repeats  the  words  of  the  Lord : 
"  I  delight  not  in  the  blood  of  bullocks,  or  of  lambs,  or  of 
he  goats.  .  .  .  Your  new  moons  and  your  appointed  feasts 
my  soul  hateth.  .  .  .    Cease  to  do  evil ;  learn  to  do  well ; 

1  Is.  ii.  3,  4  ;  cf.  Micah  iv.  1-3.  See  Driver,  Introduction  to  the  Literature 
of  the  Old  Testament  (1897),  p.  229,  for  the  opinion  of  different  commen- 
tators on  the  possible  exilic  or  postexilic  date  of  these  passages. 


148  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

seek  judgment,  relieve  the  oppressed,  judge  the  fatherless, 
plead  for  the  widow."  \  And  listen  to  Micah  :  "  Wherewith 
shall  I  come  before  the  Lord  and  bow  myself  before  the  high 
God  ?  Shall  I  come  before  him  with  burnt  offerings,  with 
calves  of  a  year  old  ?  Will  the  Lord  be  pleased  with  thou- 
sands of  rams  and  with  ten  thousands  of  rivers  of  oil  ?  .  .  . 
He  hath  shewed  thee,  O  man,  what  is  good ;  and  what  doth 
the  Lord  require  of  thee,  but  to  do  justly,  and  to  love  mercy, 
and  to  walk  humbly  with  thy  God  ?  "  2 

The  pro-  The  prophets  of  the  eighth  century  were  the  first  of  the 

creates8?"*  literai7  prophets  ;  that  is,  the  first  of  those  who  employed  lit- 
Uth"*uei         erature  as  the  vehicle  of  their  message  to  Israel.  Hence  here 
literature     our  attention  is  called  to  a  matter  of  supreme  significance  for 
universal  morality  —  the  ethicalizing  of  the  mythology  and 
traditional  history  of  the  Hebrew  people. 

It  was  during  the  age  of  the  kings  that  the  mass  of  cos- 
mological  myths  and  legends  borrowed  from  Babylonia,  — 
doubtless  largely  through  contact  with  Assyria,  —  the  tra- 
ditions of  the  patriarchs,  and  the  story  of  the  sojourn  in 
Egypt  and  the  Exodus,  all  of  which  had  been  transmitted 
from  the  foretime  orally  or  in  writing,  was  worked  over  and 
edited  afresh,  in  which  process  it  received  the  indelible  stamp 
of  the  deeper  and  truer  moral  consciousness  of  this  later  age. 
For  though  probably  little  of  this  work  was  done  by  the 
prophets  themselves,  it  was  done  by  men  who  wrote  under 
the  inspiration  of  the  new  thoughts  of  God  and  of  his  moral 
government  which  had  been  awakened  in  the  souls  of  the 
great  teachers  of  Israel.  The  polytheistic  elements  of  these 
myths  and  traditions  and  their  grosser  and  more  archaic  im- 
moralities were  pruned  away,  while  at  the  same  time  they 
were  given  a  monotheistic  cast  and  a  truer  morality  was 
breathed  into  them.  In  a  word,  all  this  literary  material  was 
censored  by  the  growing  moral  consciousness  of  Israel.    The 

1  Is.  i.  11-17.  2  Micah  vi.  6-8. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  IN  ISRAEL  149 

outcome  was  the  creation  of  a  literature  absolutely  unique  in 
its  moral  educative  worth. 

Thus  the  remolded  and  moralized  Chaldean  account  of  the 
creation  of  the  world  and  the  beginnings  of  human  history 
came  to  form  the  basis  of  the  opening  chapters  of  Genesis, 
whose  influence  upon  Hebrew  morality,  through  molding 
Israel's  idea  of  the  character  of  Yahweh  and  of  his  relations 
to  man,  it  would  hardly  be  possible  to  exaggerate.  Also  the 
tradition  of  the  Exodus,  given  now  its  final  form  and  received 
by  the  later  generations  of  Israel  as  an  historically  true  ac- 
count of  the  experiences  of  their  fathers,  left  an  ineffaceable 
impress  upon  the  mind  and  heart  of  the  Hebrew  nation, 
determining  largely  their  ideas  as  to  their  chief  moral  obli- 
gations as  the  chosen  and  covenanted  people,  of  Yahweh.  It 
was  this  tradition  of  their  heroic  past  which  was  the  inspi- 
ration of  the  moral  strivings  of  the  nation.  Furthermore, 
all  this  literary  material,  thus  reshaped  and  colored  by  the 
growing  monotheistic  ideas  of  the  teachers  of  Israel  and  bear- 
ing the  stamp  of  their  gradually  deepening  moral  conscious- 
ness, and  in  this  form  transmitted  to  the  Aryan  nations  of 
the  West,  was  destined  to  become  one  of  the  most  important 
factors  not  merely  in  the  religious  but  especially  in  the  moral 
life  of  the  European  peoples. 

Just  as  the  myths  and  traditions,  in  part  borrowed  from  The  ethical- 
neighboring  peoples  and  in  part  transmitted  from  Israel's  pagan° 
own  foretime,  were  transformed  and  moralized  by  the  ethical  JJfcSl 
genius  of  the  Hebrew  spirit,  so  were  the  institutions  and 
festivals  borrowed  by  the   Israelites  from  kindred  Semitic 
peoples,  and  particularly  from  the  Canaanites,  transmuted 
and  moralized.1    Permeated  by  the  ethical  spirit  of  Israel's 
great  teachers  and  transformed  into  moral  symbols,  these 
originally  nonethical   agricultural   cults   and   festivals   were 
given  a  distinct  educative  value. 

1  Wellhausen,  Prolegomena  to  the  History  of  Israel  (1885),  p.  414. 


150  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

Among  these  pagan  institutions  thus  moralized  was  the 
festival  or  rest  day  of  the  Sabbath.1  Filled  with  ethical 
meaning  and  consecrated  to  a  religious-moral  purpose,  this 
originally  pagan  lunar  festival  was  made  a  most  important 
means  of  moral  instruction  and  discipline.2  This  borrowing 
and  moralizing  by  Israel  of  this  festival  has  an  almost  exact 
parallel  in  the  later  borrowing  and  moralizing  by  the  Chris- 
tian Church  of  the  pagan  festival  of  the  winter  solstice,  which 
has  given  Christendom  one  of  its  most  beautiful  anniversa- 
ries, one  which  takes  precedence  of  all  others  in  its  power 
to  evoke  the  tenderest  altruistic  sentiments. 

As  with  the  Sabbath,  so  was  it  with  all  the  festivals  which 
the  Israelites,  after  their  settlement  in  Palestine  and  during 
the  period  when  they  were  passing  from  the  nomadic  to  the 
agricultural  life,  adopted  from  the  Canaanite  peoples  among 
whom  they  were  dwelling.  All  of  these  in  the  course  of  time 
were  turned  from  their  original  purpose,  were  cleansed  of 
immoral  and  sensuous  elements,  and  were  thus  made  the 
means  of  awakening  moral  feelings  and  developing  moral 
character. 

This  transforming  power  of  the  ethical  genius  of  Israel 
finds  a  true  historical  parallel  in  the  esthetic  genius  of 
ancient  Hellas,  which,  receiving  from  every  side  elements 
of  art  and  general  culture,  inspired  them  all  with  the  beauty 
and  energy  of  her  own  spirit.3  "  Israel,"  as  Cornill  finely 
says,  "  resembles  in  spiritual  things  the  fabulous  King  Midas, 
who  turned  everything  he  touched  into  gold." 

1  This  festival  was  probably  of  Babylonian  origin.  It  was  associated 
with  astronomical  phenomena  —  with  the  seven  planets  of  ancient  astron- 
omy and  with  the  phases  of  the  moon. 

2  The  feast  of  Purim  is  another  transformed  festival ;  H  Babylonian  in 
origin,  it  was  given  a  Jewish  dress  and  became  incorporated  into  the  system 
of  Jewish  observances"  (David  Philipson,  The  Reform  Movement  in  Judaism 
(1907),  p.  3). 

8  Thus  the  festival  of  Dionysus,  which  M  in  its  origin  was  a  mere  burst 
of  primitive  animal  spirits,  is  transmuted  into  a  complex  and  beautiful  work 
of  art"  (Dickinson,  The  Greek  Viezv  of  Life,  p.  14). 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  IN  ISRAEL  151 

The  effect  of  the  capture  of  Samaria  by  the  Assyrians  in  The  dual 
722  B.C.  and  the  carrying  away  into  captivity  of  the  flower  of  tteDeuter- 
the  Ten  Tribes  was  to  put  an  end  to  prophetism  in  the  North  onomic  code 
and  to  make  Judah  in  the  South  the  center  of  the  movement 
which  had  such  significance  for  the  moral  life  of  the  world. 

During  the  century  and  a  half  that  passed  between  the  fall 
of  the  northern  kingdom  and  the  destruction  of  Jerusalem 
by  the  Babylonian  King  Nebuchadnezzar,  only  one  great 
prophet  appeared  in  Judah.  This  was  Jeremiah,  who  prophe- 
sied in  the  reign  of  King  Josiah,  just  a  little  time  before 
the  Captivity. 

It  was  during  the  reign  of  this  king  that  there  appeared  a 
book  which,  excepting  the  Gospels  of  the  New  Testament, 
has  had  a  greater  influence  upon  the  general  evolution  of 
morality  than  any  other  book  ever  written.  This  was  a  work 
known  as  the  Book  of  Deuteronomy,  that  is,  the  repetition  of 
the  law.  Before  the  discovery  of  the  Laws  of  Hammurabi 
this  was  the  oldest  known  code  of  laws. 

The  book  contains  much  archaic  material  —  traditions,  cus- 
toms, judicial  decisions,  laws,  and  rituals  —  manifestly  handed 
down  from  the  earliest  times  in  Israel,  with  additions  made 
at  the  moment  of  its  appearance,  and  all  bearing  plainly  the 
stamp  of  the  spirit  and  temper  of  these  later  times.  Hence 
it  comes  that  there  are  two  moralities  embodied  in  the  work  — 
an  atavistic  ritual  morality  and  a  progressive  social  morality. 

In  that  part  of  the  code  which  has  to  do  with  the  ethics  The  ritual 
of  ritualism  the  dominant  motive  of  the  editors  or  compilers  tteoode 
springs  from  a  dread  and  abhorrence  of  idolatry,  like  the  dread 
and  abhorrence  of  heresy  in  medieval  Christendom.  Yahweh 
will  divide  his  worship  with  no  other  god.  Israel  had  gone 
after  other  gods  and  Yahweh  had  given  her  into  the  hands 
of  the  Assyrians.  A  like  fate  awaited  Judah  if  she  served 
any  other  than  him  :  "  Ye  shall  not  go  after  other  gods,  or  the 
gods  of  the  people  which  are  round  about  you,  lest  the  anger 


152  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

of  the  Lord  be  kindled  against  thee,  and  destroy  thee  from 
off  the  face  of  the  earth,"  x  is  the  first  commandment  with 
threatening. 

Fear  that  Yahweh  would  do  unto  Judah  as  he  had  done 
unto  Israel  awakened  the  conscience  of  the  nation.  Idolatry 
was  suppressed  ;  the  high  places  on  which  incense  was  burned 
unto  the  Baals  were  defiled,  and  the  altars  and  the  images  of 
the  strange  gods  were  broken  down  and  ground  into  dust. 

This  reform  movement  practically  ended  the  long  struggle 
which  had  gone  on  now  for  six  hundred  years  and  more 
between  polytheism  and  the  rising  monotheism  of  the  people 
of  Israel.  But  unfortunately  while  the  monotheistic  element 
of  the  religion  of  Yahweh  was  brought  out  by  the  reform  in 
sharper  outline,  the  ethical  element  was  obscured.  The  re- 
ligion that  was  now  made  the  exclusive  worship  was  really 
little  more  than  a  pagan  cult.  It  consisted  in  the  careful 
keeping  of  feast  days  and  the  observance  of  the  rites  and 
sacrifices  of  the  Temple  —  an  inheritance  largely  from  the 
heathen  nations  around  about  Israel.  Nothing  could  have 
been  more  opposed  to  true  prophetism.  It  was  the  triumph 
of  reactionary  ritualism. 

This  victory  of  ritualism  has  exerted  an  almost  incalculable 
influence  upon  the  development  of  morality  from  the  time  of 
King  Josiah  down  to  the  present  day.  The  immediate  effect 
upon  prophetism  in  Judah  was  most  lamentable.  "  Deuteron- 
omy simply  confirmed  the  belief  that  religion  was  concerned 
with  ritual  rather  than  with  morality."  2  And  so  the  outcome 
of  the  promulgation  of  a  written  revealed  law  was,  in  the 
words  of  Wellhausen,  "the  death  of  prophecy."3 

1  Deut.  vi.  14. 

2  Montefiori,  Lectures  on  the  Origin  and  Grozvth  of  Religion  (1892), 
p.  197. 

8  Prolegomena  to  the  History  of  Israel.  (1885),  p.  402.  Renan  speaks  of 
Deuteronomy  in  the  same  strain :  "  This  Thora  was  the  worst  enemy  of 
the  universal  religion  which  the  prophets  of  the  eighth  century  had  in  their 
dreams  "  {History  of  the  People  of  Israel  (1891),  vol.  hi,  p.  175). 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  IN  ISRAEL  153 

But  this  fatal  effect  was  not  felt  at  once.  In  the  dark 
days  of  the  Exile,  now  just  at  hand,  there  was  a  revival  of 
true  prophetism ;  but  after  the  return  from  the  Captivity,  as 
we  shall  see,  the  prophetic  spirit  was  almost  stifled  by  the 
rigid  legalism  of  the  Temple  cult.  And  it  was  this  same 
Deuteronomic  law  which,  in  the  hands  of  medieval  inquisi- 
tors, stifled  awakening  prophetism  in  Europe  and  delayed 
for  generations  true  moral  reform  after  the  stirring  of  the 
European  mind  by  the  Renaissance.1 

The  intolerant  spirit  of  this  narrow,  rigid  religion  of  ritu- 
alism found  specially  sinister  expression  in  Israel's  war  ethics. 
Instead  of  promoting  international  amity  and  good  will,  it 
deepened  intertribal  prejudices  and  hatreds  and  intensified 
the  barbarities  of  war.  M  Thou  shalt  save  alive  nothing  that 
breatheth ;  " 2  "thou  shalt  smite  them  and  utterly  destroy 
them,  thou  shalt  make  no  covenant  with  them,  nor  show 
mercy  unto  them,"  3  were  the  commands  to  Israel  regarding 
the  nations  round  about  her  who  were  the  worshipers  of  other 
gods  than  Yahweh. 

Thus  religion  was  made  an  active  principle  of  international 
savagery.  It  made  it,  in  the  words  of  Cheyne,  "  difficult,  if 
not  impossible,  ...  to  love  God  fervently  without  hating  a 
large  section  of  God's  creatures."  4  Under  the  influence  of 
the  fierce  ordinances  of  the  Deuteronomic  code  the  war 
practices  of  the  Israelites  became  more  ferocious  and  savage 
than  those  of  any  other  nation  of  antiquity,  unless  it  be 
those  of  the  Assyrian  kings.    Their  enemies,  who  were  also 

1  Cf.  Chapter  XVI.  The  persecutions  of  the  medieval  Church  were 
largely  the  outcome  of  this  legislation  which  made  the  extermination  of 
God's  enemies,  that  is,  idolators  and  misbelievers,  a  pious  duty.  "  The  ter- 
rible Directorium  Inquisitorum  of  Nicholas  Eymeric  follows  Deuteronomy 
word  for  word  "  (Renan,  History  of  the  people  of Israel  (1891),  vol.  iii,  p.  179). 

2  Deut.  xx.  16.  3  Ibid.  vii.  2. 

4  Jewish  Religious  Life  after  the  Exile  (1898),  p.  45.  The  teachings  of  this 
same  intolerant  monolatry  has,  down  to  the  present  day,  exerted  a  retarding 
influence  upon  the  development  of  international  morality,  especially  upon 
the  war  ethics  of  the  Christian  nations. 


154  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

the  enemies  of  Yahweh,  they  smote  with  the  utmost  fury, 
putting  to  the  edge  of  the  sword  men,  women,  and  the  little 
ones,  and  taking  as  booty  the  cattle  and  the  spoils. 

The  social  But,  as  we  have  said,  there  were  two  spirits  striving  together 
the^ode  in  this  strange  Deuteronomic  code.  In  opposition  to  this 
spirit  of  stern  fanatical  intolerance  there  was  a  spirit  of  tender 
sympathy  for  the  unfortunate,  the  poor,  and  the  oppressed.1 
Along  with  this  priestly  morality,  based  on  a  certain  con- 
ception of  Yahweh  and  of  his  relations  to  Israel,  there  was 
another  wholly  different  morality  —  a  social  morality  whose 
chief  sanctions  were  the  natural  impulses  and  sentiments  of 
the  human  heart  and  conscience. 

This  code  of  social  ethics  bears  witness  to  a  progressive 
development  of  the  moral  consciousness  in  Israel.  The 
ethical  advance  is  unmistakably  registered  in  various  amelio- 
rations effected  in  the  crude  customary  law  of  earlier  times. 
One  of  the  most  noteworthy  of  these  mitigations  con- 
cerned the  primitive  blood  revenge.  In  common  with  other 
peoples  in  the  kinship  stage  of  culture,  the  early  Hebrews 
in  their  pursuit  of  blood  vengeance  made  no  distinction 
between  intentional  and  unintentional  homicide.  The  regu- 
lations of  the  Deuteronomic  code  regarding  the  so-called 
cities  of  refuge2  bear  witness  to  a  growing  power  of  moral 
discrimination ;  for  these  cities  are  made  inviolable  sanc- 
tuaries whither  might  flee  the  manslayer  who  had  slain  his 
neighbor  unawares  and  hated  him  not  in  time  past.3 

Especially  is  the  humanitarian  advance  shown  in  the  pro- 
visions of  the  code  which  relate  to  the  poor,  the  debtor,  and 

1  We  meet  with  the  same  phenomenon  in  medieval  times.  The  Chris- 
tian Church,  which  was  so  harsh  in  its  dealings  with  misbelievers,  was  a 
tender  mother  toward  the  poor  and  the  afflicted  of  the  faith. 

2  The  origin  of  these  cities  may  date  from  a  much  earlier  time  than  the 
reform  under  King  Josiah.  The  code  may  simply  register  changes  already 
effected  in  the  customary  law.  See  Nathaniel  Schmidt,  The  Prophet  of 
Nazareth  (1905),  p.  61. 

3  Deut.  iv.  41,  42  ;  xix.  1— 13. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  IN  ISRAEL  155 

the  bondsman.  We  meet  here  some  of  the  most  humane 
regulations  to  be  found  in  any  of  the  codes  of  antiquity. 
Social  morality  is  almost  made  to  consist  in  consideration  for 
the  poor  :  "  If  there  be  among  you  a  poor  man  .  .  .  thou  shalt 
open  thine  hand  wide  unto  him" — so  the  law  enjoins  — 
"  and  shalt  surely  lend  him  sufficient  for  his  need."  *  Things 
that  were  necessities  to  the  poor  man  were  not  to  be  taken 
as  security  for  a  loan:  "No  man  shall  take  the  nether  or 
the  upper  millstone  to  pledge."2  If  a  garment  be  taken  as 
security,  this  must  be  returned  before  night,  in  order  that  the 
man  may  sleep  in  his  own  raiment.3  The  widow's  raiment 
must  not  be  taken  in  pledge  at  all.4  The  wages  of  the  poor 
and  needy  must  be  promptly  paid  :  "At  his  day  thou  shalt 
give  him  his  hire,  neither  shall  the  sun  go  down  upon  it ;  for 
he  is  poor,  and  setteth  his  heart  upon  it."  5 

The  law  goes  even  further  in  its  humane  endeavor  to 
prevent  the  oppression  of  the  needy.  The  loaning  of  money 
in  ancient  times  was  in  general  a  very  different  thing  from 
similar  money  transactions  in  this  commercial  and  industrial 
age  of  ours.  Those  seeking  loans  were  the  very  poor,  who 
were  forced  to  borrow  to  meet  domestic  necessities.  Under 
such  conditions  the  taking  of  interest  would  naturally  be  de- 
nounced, and  those  who  did  so  would  come  to  be  regarded 
as  extortioners,  and  robbers  of  the  poor.  Hence  the  prohi- 
bition, "Thou  shalt  not  lend  upon  usury  to  thy  brother; 
.  .  .  unto  a  stranger  thou  mayest  lend  upon  usury." 6 

This  legislation,  well  adapted  to  the  times  and  the  condi- 
tions of  the  society  for  which  it  was  enacted,  became  centuries 
later,  through  its  adoption  and  attempted  enforcement  by  the 
medieval  Church,  a  source  of  grave  mischief.    It  constituted 


1  Deut.  xv.  7,  8.  2  Ibid.  xxiv.  6.  3  Ibid.  xxiv.  12,  13. 

*  Ibid.  xxiv.  17.  6  Ibid.  xxiv.  14,  15. 

6  Ibid,  xxiii.  19,  20.  Cf.  Maspero,  The  Dawn  of  Civilization,  p.  760. 
The  poor  in  these  early  times  were,  in  all  the  lands  advancing  in  civiliza- 
tion, literally  devoured  by  the  money  lenders. 


156  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

a  heavy  drag  for  centuries  upon  the  industrial  development 
of  European  civilization. 

The  same  spirit  of  tenderness  toward  the  portionless  and 
needy  is  shown  in  the  provision  concerning  the  ingathering 
of  the  harvest :  "  When  thou  cuttest  down  thine  harvest  in 
thy  field,  and  hast  forgot  a  sheaf  in  the  field,  thou  shalt 
not  go  again  to  fetch  it ;  it  shall  be  for  the  stranger,  for  the 
fatherless,  and  for  the  widow."  x  This  tender  consideration 
for  the  poor  speaks  from  one  of  the  most  beautiful  of  Bible 
pictures  —  that  of  the  Moabitess  Ruth  gleaning  in  the  fields 
after  the  reapers,  who  "  let  fall  some  of  the  handfuls  of 
purpose  for  her."  2 

The  social  conscience  awakening  in  Israel,  to  which  the 
above  regulations  and  commandments  bear  witness,  finds 
further  expression  in  the  provisions  of  the  code  effecting 
ameliorations  in  the  lot  of  the  unfortunate  bondsman.  The 
master  is  enjoined  to  see  that  the  Sabbath  is  observed  by  his 
slave  as  well  as  by  himself  and  his  family,  and  the  reason 
assigned  is  the  humanitarian  one  —  "that  thy  manservant 
and  thy  maidservant  may  rest  as  well  as  thou."  3  And  a 
limitation  was  set  to  the  time  that  a  person  could  be  held 
in  bondage :  "  And  if  thy  brother,  an  Hebrew  man,  or  an 
Hebrew  woman,  be  sold  unto  thee,  and  serve  thee  six  years ; 
then  in  the  seventh  year  thou  shalt  let  him  go  free  from 
thee."  4  Furthermore,  the  law  is  solicitous  respecting  the 
welfare  of  the  bondsman  even  after  emancipation:  "And 
when  thou  sendest  him  out  free  from  thee,  thou  shalt  not  let 
him  go  away  empty.  Thou  shalt  furnish  him  liberally  out  of 
thy  flock,  and  out  of  thy  threshing  floor,  and  out  of  thy 
winepress :  of  that  wherewith  the  Lord  thy  God  hath  blessed 
thee  thou  shalt  give  unto  him."  5 

To  these  ameliorative  measures  effect  is  sought  to  be  given 
through  a  revival  of  memories  of  the  past.    The  masters  are 

1  Deut.  xxiv.  19.  3  Deut.  v.  14,  15.  6  Ibid.  xv.  13,  14. 

2  Ruth  ii.  4-17.  4  Ibid.  xv.  12. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  IN  ISRAEL  157 

enjoined  to  be  compassionate  to  their  bondsmen  because  they 
themselves  had  been  worn  and  bruised  in  bondage :  "  Re- 
member," says  the  lawgiver,  "that  ye  were  bondsmen  in  the 
land  of  Egypt."  1 


2.   The  Morality  of  the  Prophets  of  the  Exile 

We  have  reached  now  a  turning  point  in  the  moral  history  The  effects 
of  Israel.  Speaking  of  the  effects  of  the  Exile  upon  the  inner  tivity  upon 
life  of  Israel,  Renan  uses  these  words:  "Twice  it  was  the  evolution1 
fate  of  Israel  to  owe  its  salvation  to  that  which  is  the  ruin  of  in  Israel 
others,  and  to  be  recalled  by  the  crushing  of  its  earthly  hopes 
to  a  sense  of  its  great  duties  toward  humanity." 

The  mission  of  Israel,  her  duty  toward  humanity,  was,  as 
we  have  said,  to  interpret  life  in  ethical  terms.  As  the  story 
of  the  exilic  and  the  postexilic  period  unfolds,  .we  shall  see 
how  the  sad  experiences  of  the  Exile  purified  and  deepened 
the  moral  consciousness  of  Israel,  and  prepared  her  for  the 
great  part  she  was  destined  to  play  in  the  moral  education 
of  mankind. 

It  was  the  great  unknown  prophet  of  the  Exile,  the  so-called 
Second  Isaiah,  who  wrote  just  after  the  capture  of  Babylon 
by  the  Persian  king  Cyrus  (539  B.C.),  who  was  the  represen- 
tative of  the  essentially  new  conceptions  of  Yahweh  and  of 
the  requirements  of  the  moral  law  which  characterize  this 
ethical  development.2 

Shut  out  from  participation  in  political  affairs,  the  best  Ethical 

energies  of  the  exiled  community  seem  to  have  been  turned  Zm  at 

to  the  things  of  the  inner  life,  and  consequently  the  develop-  Son' aid1" 

ment  in  the  religious  and  moral  spheres  went  on  apace.  The  morality 

1  All  these  regulations  respecting  slaves,  however,  lack  universalism. 
It  is  compassion  for  the  slave  not  as  a  man,  but  as  a  Hebrew,  that  moves 
the  legislator.  The  laws  are  in  general  for  the  benefit  of  Hebrew  slaves 
alone.  Gentiles  or  foreigners  are  not  included  in  these  humane  provisions. 
See  Lev.  xxv  and  Ex.  xxi.  2.  2  See  Is.  xl-lxvi. 


158  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

conception  of  God  —  of  what  is  pleasing  to  him  and  what 
he  requires  of  man  —  was  elevated  and  purified. 

We  meet  now  for  the  first  time  monotheism  pure  and  ab- 
solute. Yahweh  is  conceived  as  the  only  God ;  the  gods  of 
the  other  nations  are  no  gods  at  all.  Some  of  the  earlier 
prophets  had,  it  is  true,  caught  sight  of  this  lofty  truth  ;  but 
the  multitude  of  the  people  certainly  had  no  such  idea  of 
their  patron  god.  The  prophets  of  the  Exile  are  the  first  to 
proclaim  this  doctrine  with  such  emphasis  as  to  cause  it  to 
become  a  part  of  the  indestructible  religious  consciousness 
of  Israel.1 

One  cannot  read  the  declarations  which  the  unknown 
prophet  puts  in  the  mouth  of  Yahweh  — "  Before  me  there 
was  no  God  formed,  neither  shall  there  be  after  me  ;  "  2  "I 
am  the  first  and  I  am  the  last ;  and  besides  me  there  is  no 
God  ; "  3  "  I  am  Yahweh  who  wrought  everything,  who  stretched 
forth  the  heavens  above,  who  spread  forth  the  earth  —  who 
was  with  me;"4  "I  am  Yahweh  and  there  is  none  beside 
me ; "  5  "I  am  God,  and  there  is  none  else,  I  am  God,  and 
there  is  none  like  me"6 — one  cannot  read  these  declarations 
without  being  convinced  that  they  were  not  phrased  by  one 
to  whom  the  idea  of  the  unity  of  God  had  become  a  common- 
place, but  rather  by  one  to  whom  the  thought  was  something 
in  the  nature  of  a  discovery.7 

But  it  was  not  merely  the  idea  of  the  oneness  of  deity,  of 
Yahweh  as  the  sole  God,  that  was  the  element  of  supreme 
significance  in  this  practically  new  thought  of  God.  There 
is  nothing  unethical  in  the  belief  in  many  gods ;  nor,  on  the 

1  "  Deutero-Isaiah  was  the  first  to  emphasize  and  make  use  of  this 
plenary  and  unconditional  monotheism."  —  Montefiori,  Lectures  on  the 
Origin  and  Growth  of  Religion  (1892),  p.  269.  2  Is.  xliii.  10. 

3  Ibid.  xliv.  6.  6  Ibid.  xlv.  5. 

4  Ibid.  xliv.  24.  6  Ibid.  xlvi.  9. 

7  There  is  a  repetition  of  this  in  the  Koran,  where  the  Prophet  of  Arabia 
speaks  as  one  to  whom  the  idea  of  the  unity  of  deity  had  come  as  a  new 
thought. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  IN  ISRAEL         1 59 

other  hand,  is  there  anything  ethical  in  the  belief  that  there 
is  only  one  God.  The  historically  important  thing  about  the 
monotheism  of  Israel  is  that  it  was  ethical  monotheism.  Up 
to  the  time  of  the  Exile  the  multitude  in  Israel,  notwithstand- 
ing the  teachings  of  the  prophets  Amos  and  Hosea,  Isaiah 
and  Micah,  had  never  thought  of  Yahweh  as  an  absolutely 
just  god,  but  rather  as  one  who  would  favor  his  people  under 
all  circumstances.  Put  in  the  language  of  to-day,  they  con- 
ceived Yahweh  as  a  partisan,  who  would  be  for  his  people 
right  or  wrong.  But  under  the  discipline  of  the  Exile  the 
more  spiritual-minded  of  the  nation  came  to  accept  the  teach- 
ing that  Yahweh 's  favor  "  is  conditioned  by  a  law  of  absolute 
righteousness."  ! 

This  conception  of  God  marks  a  turning  point  in  the  moral 
evolution  of  humanity.  It  lifted  a  new  ethical  standard.  It 
effected  a  union  of  religion  and  morality.  This,  it  is  true,  was 
not  a  wholly  new  thing  in  history.  In  the  worship  of  the  good 
Osiris  in  Egypt  these  elements  had  been  united ;  in  the 
Zoroastrian  worship  of  Ahura  Mazda  they  had  also  been 
brought  together ;  and  at  this  very  time  in  Greece  there  was 
an  effort  being  made  to  unite  them  in  the  worship  of  the 
Delphian  Apollo.  But  the  union  effected  by  the  prophets  of 
Israel  was  the  only  one  destined  to  have  large  and  permanent 
historical  consequences.  Because  of  the  ethical  content  given 
the  god  idea  by  them,  their  conception  of  deity  constituted 
the  most  precious  part  of  the  spiritual  heritage  bequeathed 
by  Judaism  to  Christianity. 

The  progressive  clarification  of  the  moral  consciousness  Repudia- 

in  Israel  disclosed  by  this  truer  conception   of   the  divine  doctrine  of 

character  is  further  shown  by  the  definite  and  emphatic  re-  ^ponsl® 

pudiation  by  the  prophets  of  the  Exile  of  the  doctrine  of  bility 
collective  responsibility.2 

1  W.  Robertson  Smith,  The  Religion  of  the  Semites  (1894),  p.  81. 

2  See  above,  pp.  18-20. 


160  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

There  was  an  ironical  proverb  current  in  Israel,  which, 
expressing  bitter  protest  against  the  unequal  ways  of  Yahweh 
in  visiting  the  sins  of  the  fathers  upon  the  children,1  ran 
thus  :  "  The  fathers  have  eaten  sour  grapes,  and  the  chil- 
dren's teeth  are  set  on  edge."  2  The  prophet  Ezekiel  says  to 
the  people  that  they  shall  not  have  occasion  any  more  to  use 
this  proverb.8  With  clear  moral  vision  he  sees  how  impossible 
it  is  that  the  moral  government  of  Yahweh  should  rest  upon 
the  principle  of  collective  responsibility,  and  that  the  innocent 
should  be  punished  for  the  guilty.  Declaring  that  the  ways 
of  God  are  just  and  equal,  he  annuls  all  earlier  provisions  of 
the  law  by  boldly  proclaiming  that  the  son  shall  not  bear 
the  iniquity  of  the  father,  neither  shall  the  father  bear  the 
iniquity  of  the  son.4 

It  marks  a  great  moral  advance  when  guilt  comes  thus  to 
be  viewed  as  a  personal  and  not  a  communal  thing.  But  un- 
fortunately the  ground  here  gained  for  morality  was  lost  when 
the  theologians  of  the  early  Christian  Church,  reviving  the 
outgrown  conception  of  collective  responsibility,  formulated 
the  dogma  that  all  the  generations  of  men  —  such  being  the 
solidarity  of  the  human  race  — are  partakers  in  the  sin  of 
the  first  parents  and  under  condemnation  therefor.6 

The  doc-  But  the  decisive  rejection  by  the  deepening  moral  con- 
sufferings  sciousness  in  Israel  of  the  doctrine  that  under  the  moral 
righteous  government  of  Yahweh  the  innocent  are  punished  for  the 
as  vicarious  guilty  left  still  unsolved  the  problem  of  the  sufferings  of  the 

and  expia-     &       J  r  ° 

tory  righteous  —  that  problem  which  had  at  all  times  so  troubled 

the  pious  Israelite,  and  for  the  solution  of  which  so  many 
different  theories  had  been  framed.    The  new  teaching,  or 

1  "  I  the  Lord  thy  God  am  a  jealous  God,  visiting  the  iniquity  of  the 
fathers  upon  the  children  unto  the  third  and  fourth  generation  of  them 
that  hate  me."  —  Deut.  v.  9.  2  Ezek.  xviii.  2.  8  Ibid,  xviii.  3. 

4  Ezek.  xviii.  20.  The  entire  chapter  is  devoted  to  this  single  subject. 
This  truer  view  had  dawned  upon  the  compilers  of  the  Deuteronomic 
code.    Cf.  Deut.  xxiv.  16  and  Jer.  xxxi.  29,  30.  5  See  below,  p.  364. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  IN  ISRAEL         161 

the  implication  of  the  new  teaching,  that  such  sufferings  are 
not  penal  in  character,  that  they  are  no  sign  of  God's  dis- 
pleasure with  the  sufferer,  while  a  teaching  of  consolation, 
contributed  nothing  to  the  actual  solution  of  the  problem. 
But  a  new  theory  now  offers  a  new  interpretation.  This 
theory  assumes  that  all  transgression  must  be  atoned  for  by 
suffering,  but  teaches  that  this  suffering  may  be  borne  vica- 
riously by  one  not  the  transgressor,  and  the  guilt  thereby 
expiated. 

This  idea  worked  itself  out  in  the  sorrow-burdened  souls 
of  the  pious  exiles  in  Babylon.  Never  did  acquaintance  with 
bitter  sorrow  yield  sweeter  fruit.  The  thought  finds  expres- 
sion in  Chapters  LI  I  and  LI  1 1  of  Isaiah.1  The  right- 
eous Servant  of  Yahweh,  who  is  despised  and  rejected  of 
men,  a  man  of  sorrow  and  acquainted  with  grief,  is.  the 
personified  community  of  the  pious  Israelites,  who  are 
wounded  for  the  transgressions  and  bruised  for  the  iniquities 
of  the  nation.2 

Of  all  the  ethical  products  of  the  troublous  life  of  Israel, 
this  idea  that  under  the  moral  government  of  the  world  one 
may  vicariously  bear  the  burden  of  another's  fault  and  thus 
atone  for  it  was  the  most  important  in  its  historical  conse- 
quences. Six  hundred  years  after  the  utterance  of  this  message 
of  consolation  to  the  pious  Israelite  exiles,  the  ideal  of  the 
suffering  Servant  of  Yahweh,  thus  held  aloft  by  the  Great 
Unknown,  was  incarnated,  so  it  was  believed,  in  Jesus  of 
Nazareth.  Clothed  in  actual  flesh  and  blood,  the  sweet  per- 
suasiveness of  the  ideal  —  the  nobility  and  divineness  of 
suffering  voluntarily  borne  in  the  stead  of  another  —  made 
unwonted  appeal  to  the  heart  of  humanity,  and  for  eighteen 
hundred  years  and  more,  accepted  as  a  true  symbol  and 
interpretation  of  the  moral  order,  it  has  been  a  chief  mold- 
ing force  in  the  moral  life  of  the  Western  world. 

1  See  Hi.  13-Hii.  12. 

2  Cf.  Bennett,  The  Religion  of  the  Post-Exilic  Prophets  (1907),  pp.  326  ff. 


morality 


162  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

J.   The  Moral  Life  in  the  Postexilic  Age 

a  ritual  The  chief  moral  fact  in  the  postexilic  period1  was  the 

putting  into  strict  practice  of  the  Levitical  and  Deuteronomic 
law,  and  the  consequent  triumph  of  ritual  morality.  From 
the  establishment  of  this  law  till  the  rise  of  Christianity, 
orthodox  morality  in  Judah  consisted  in  the  careful  observance 
of  the  thousand  and  one  minute  rules  and  requirements  of 
this  Temple  code.  The  good  man  was  he  who  kept  the  law 
of  the  Lord.2  All  duties  were  in  a  sense  religious  duties ; 
they  were  acts  performed  simply  because  of  the  supposed 
divine  command  that  they  should  be  performed.3 

Such  dependence  as  this  on  rules  and  forms  and  rites  is  of 
course  disastrous  to  all  true  morality.  It  fosters  the  idea  that 
morality  consists  in  the  performance  of  certain  outer  acts, 
instead  of  being  the  attitude  of  the  soul  toward  the  good  and 
the  right  inwardly  discerned.  It  substitutes  an  outer  standard 
for  the  individual  conscience.  Conscience  disused  loses  its 
power  of  discrimination  and  becomes  atrophied.  The  ethi- 
cally indifferent  is  made  the  all-important,  and  thus  all  moral 
values  are  confused. 

What  confusion  resulted  in  Israel  is  revealed  in  the  denun- 
ciations of  this  rigid,  mechanical  legalism  by  the  Prophet  of 

1  In  the  year  539  B.C.  Cyrus,  king  of  Persia,  having  captured  Babylon, 
issued  a  decree  giving  the  Jewish  exiles  in  Babylonia  permission  to  return 
to  their  own  land  and  to  rebuild  the  Temple  destroyed  fifty  years  before  by 
Nebuchadnezzar.  A  band  returned  and  set  themselves  to  the  task  of  re- 
storing their  houses  and  rebuilding  the  Temple.  After  many  interruptions 
and  long  delay  the  building  was  finished  and  dedicated  anew  to  the  worship 
of  Yahweh  (516  B.C.). 

2  "  The  growth  of  Judaism  and  the  Judaic  veneration  for  the  law,  after 
Ezra's  reformation,  shows  some  marked  resemblances  to  the  growth  in 
post- Reformation  Protestant  theology  of  the  legal  conception  of  salvation, 
and  particularly  the  tendency  to  formalize  and  almost  to  deify  the  literal 
inspiration  and  authority  of  the  Scriptures."  —  Newman  Smyth,  Christian 
Ethics  (1892),  p.  95. 

8  For  life  under  the  law  consult  Schiirer,  History  of  the  Jewish  People, 
division  ii,  vol.  ii,  pp.  90  ff. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  IN  ISRAEL  163 

Nazareth  :  "Woe  unto  you,  scribes  and  Pharisees,  hypocrites  ! 
for  ye  pay  tithe  of  mint  and  anise  and  cummin,  and  have 
omitted  the  weightier  matters  of  the  law,  judgment,  mercy, 
and  faith ;  these  ought  ye  to  have  done,  and  not  to  leave 
the  other  undone."1  "  Not  that  which  goeth  into  the  mouth 
defileth  a  man,  but  that  which  cometh  out  of  the  mouth.  .  .  . 
To  eat  with  unwashen  hands  defileth  not  a  man."  2 

The  Sermon  on  the  Mount  announces  the  awakening  of 
the  true  prophetic  spirit  in  Israel  after  a  sleep  of  five  hundred 
years. 

A  sinister  phase  of  the  orthodox  religious-ethical  system  of  An  intoier- 
the  postexilic  age  was  its  narrow,  intolerant  nationalism.  To  ausm*  10n" 
be  an  enemy  of  Israel  was  what  was  believed  to  constitute 
wickedness,  and  to  excite  the  wrath  of  Yahweh,  just  as  later 
in  the  ethics  of  certain  systems  of  Christian  theology  the  un- 
believer or  pagan,  merely  because  of  his  unbelief  or  paganism, 
was  regarded  as  wicked  and  as  deserving  of  eternal  punish- 
ment. In  psalms  which  date  from  this  period  these  enemies 
of  Yahweh  are  cursed  with  a  fierce  hatred  which  spares  not 
even  the  children,  but  pronounces  happy  him  who  shall  take 
up  and  dash  the  little  ones  against  the  stones.3  Nowhere 
in  history  do  we  meet  with  a  more  fanatically  intolerant 
nationalism. 

It  was  only  a  comparatively  small  part  of  the  Jewish  nation  The  reia- 
whose  home  was  the  city  of  Jerusalem  in  the  later  postexilic  synagogue 
period.  The  Israelite  community  was  now  widely  scattered  in  evolution"1 
the  cities  of  the  East  and  the  West.   One  important  outcome 
of  this,  in  its  bearings  upon  the  moral  life  of  Israel  and  of  the 
nations  that  were  to  receive  ethical  instruction  from  her,  was 

I1  Matt,  xxiii.  23. 

2  Ibid.  xv.  11,  20.  "The  identification  of  morality  with  ritual  in  his 
[Jesus']  day  had  confused  the  issue  before  human  life  much  as  that  issue 
is  now  confused  by  the  identification  of  morality  with  opinion "  (Hall, 
History  of  Ethics  within  Organized  Christianity  (1910),  p.  62).  . 

8  Ps.  cxxxvii.  9  ;  see  Ps.  cix. 


164  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

the  establishment  of  the  synagogue.1  For  the  Deuteronomic 
code  had  made  religion  to  be  something  connected  with  the 
Temple,  something  separate  and  apart  from  true  morality, 
whose  root  is  in  human  relationships.  Now  the  Dispersion, 
tearing  the  Israelites  away  from  the  Temple,  tended  to  bring 
into  prominence  those  religious  exercises  and  those  duties 
which  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  Temple  service.  This  was 
favorable  to  the  religion  and  morality  of  the  prophets,  as  op- 
posed to  the  religion  and  morality  of  the  priests.  The  serv- 
ices of  the  synagogue  took  the  place  of  the  ceremonies  and 
sacrifices  of  the  Temple.2  These  services  consisted  in  the 
reading  and  translation  of  a  portion  of  the  Scriptures  with 
comments  thereupon.3  This  meant  the  incoming  of  a  new 
and  powerful  agency  in  the  promotion  not  only  of  the  reli- 
gious but  also  of  the  moral  education  of  humanity,  for  this 
custom  "  was  the  origin  of  the  homily  and  sermon."  4  The 
synagogue  was  the  prototype  and  precursor  of  the  Christian 
basilica  and  the  Puritan  meetinghouse. 


The  new  The  reestablishment  of  the  Law  we  have  pronounced  the 

iinmortai-  chief  ethical  fact  in  the  history  of  Judaism  after  the  return 
icli  import  from  the  Babylonian  Captivity.  And  this  is  true  if  it  is  the 
history  of  the  Jews  alone  that  we  have  in  mind  ;  but  regard- 
ing the  moral  evolution  in  the  world  at  large  there  is  another 
fact  belonging  to  this  period  of  even  greater  importance.  This 
was  the  incoming  of  the  doctrine  of  immortality.6 

We  have  seen  that  from  the  first  the  Hebrews,  like  the 
Babylonians,  held  a  belief  in  a  sort  of  shadowy  existence 
after  death ; 6  but  of  a  belief  in  personal  immortality  in  our 


1  On  this  subject  see  Toy,  Judaism  and  Christianity  (1891),  pp.  246^^%/ 

2  "  The  people  had  learned  to  draw  nigh  to  God  without  the  aid*of 
sacrifice."  —  W.  Robertson  Smith,   The  Religion  of  the  Semites  (1894),  «v 
p.  215.  3  Cf.  Mark  i.  21  ;  vi.  2.  *L 

4  Renan,  History  of  the  People  of  Israel  (1895),  vol.  iv,  p.  195.  Sji 

5  Consult  on  this  subject  Charles,  A  Critical  History  of  the  Doctrine  df^ 
a  Future  Life  (1898-1899).  6  See  above,  pp.  139  f. 


N 


(A- 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  IN  ISRAEL  165 

sense  of  the  word,  of  a  life  of  rewards  and  punishments  be- 
yond the  grave,  there  is  no  certain  trace  in  Hebrew  literature 
until  about  the  third  or  second  century  B.C.1 

Different  influences  had  concurred  to  create  this  new  con- 
ception of  the  hereafter  and  to  secure  for  it  by  the  end  of  the 
Greek  period  a  wide  acceptance.  First,  there  was  what  has 
been  called  the  subjective  sense  of  fellowship  with  God.  Dur- 
ing this  period  of  Israelite  history  there  was  engendered  in 
select  souls  a  passionate  outreaching  after  divine  companion- 
ship. This  feeling  is  revealed  in  many  a  postexilic  psalm,  as 
where  the  psalmist  exclaims,  "  For  thou  wilt  not  leave  my  soul 
to  Sheol ;  neither  wilt  thou  suffer  thine  holy  one  [beloved]  to 
see  corruption."  2  This  was  the  divination  of  love  like  that  of 
the  old  mystic  who  exclaimed,  "O  God,  if  I  should  die,  Thou 
couldst  not  live*"  3  It  was  such  filial  love  and  trust  as  this, 
which  found  its  divinest  expression  in  the  life  of  M  the 
Sublime  Mystic  of  Galilee,"  that  created  in  many  a  devout 
soul  in  Israel  that  larger  hope  which  gave  birth  to  the  doctrine 
of  personal  immortality. 

But  while  it  was  probably  deep  religious  feeling,  the  soul's 
recognition  of  its  sonship  to  God,  that  called  into  existence 
the  idea  of  personal  immortality,  it  was  the  ethical  necessity 
created  by  a  profound  faith  in  God's  absolute  justice,  an  irref- 
ragable conviction  that  under  the  moral  government  of  the 
world  well-doing  will  be  rewarded  and  evildoing  punished, 
that  gained  for  the  doctrine  its  wide  acceptance.  That  good 
men  should  be  afflicted  and  wicked  men  should  enjoy  pros- 
perity, has  in  all  ages  of  reflection  caused  questionings  and 
murmurings.  But  this  ethical  problem  filled  with  peculiar 
unrest  the  souls  of  the  Israelites,  first,  because  more  than  any 

1  See  Cheyne,  Jewish  Religious  Life  after  the  Exile  (1898),  p.  229;  and 
Toy,  Judaism  and  Christianity  ( 1891 ),  pp.  378,  386.      2  Ps.  xvi.  10,  Rev.  Ver. 

3       "I  know  without  me  God  cannot  a  moment  live ; 

If  I  to  death  should  go,  He,  too,  would  death  receive." 

Quoted  by  Blow,  A  Study  of  Dante  (1887),  p.  102. 


1 66  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

other  people  they  felt  the  need  of  a  just  God ;  and  second, 
because  of  their  lack  of  belief  in  a  future  life  of  rewards  and 
punishments  in  which  the  wrongs  and  inequalities  of  this  life 
might  be  righted.  Hence  the  many  different  solutions  of  the 
problem  which  they  thought  out,  and  through  which  they 
sought  to  justify  the  ways  of  God  to  man.  So  long,  however, 
as  life  practically  ended  at  the  grave,  the  problem  remained 
insolvable.  But  the  doctrine  of  another  existence  in  which 
the  righteous  man  should  receive  compensation  for  his  suf- 
ferings here,  and  the  evil  man  just  retribution  for  his  deeds, 
offered  a  reasonable  solution  of  the  problem  that  had  so  trou- 
bled the  conscience  of  Israel.  It  was  this  undoubtedly  that 
caused  the  teaching  to  gain  popular  currency. 

The  doctrine,  however,  was  not  wholly  the  product  of  the 
religious  and  ethical  development  within  Israel.  Its  growth 
was  fostered  by  various  outside  influences.  Among  these 
was  the  Persian  doctrine  of  the  resurrection  and  a  future 
life  of  retributive  justice,  with  which  the  Jews  became  famil- 
iar at  the  time  of  the  Exile  in  Babylon  or  later  in  the  Persian 
period.  Then  again  the  development  of  the  idea  was  stim- 
ulated, after  the  third  century  B.C.,  by  Greek  philosophy, 
particularly  the  Platonic. 

But  far  more  influential  than  either  Zoroastrian  teachings 
or  Greek  philosophy  must  have  been  the  thought  and  con- 
viction of  ancient  Egypt.  After  the  founding  of  Alexandria, 
toward  the  end  of  the  fourth  century  B.C.,  a  vast  number  of 
Jews  were  settled  in  that  capital ;  and  though  the  positive 
evidence  here  is  very  meager,  still  we  have  a  right  to  some- 
thing more  than  a  conjecture  that  in  that  city  Judaism  was 
deeply  influenced  by  the  ancient  Egyptian  doctrine  of 
immortality.1 

Under  these  various  influences  this  doctrine  rooted  itself 
firmly  among  the  Jews,  and  by  the  time  of  the  appearance  of 

1  Cf.  above,  p.  44  ;  see  also  Toy,  Judaism  and  Christianity  (1891),  p.  387 ; 
Hall,  History  of  Ethics  within  Organized  Christianity  (1910),  p.  216. 


.  THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  IN  ISRAEL         167 

Christ  had  become  a  distinctive  tenet  of  a  large  and  influen- 
tial party  among  them.1 

After  the  conception  of  a  just  God  and  the  ideal  of  the  suf- 
ering  Servant  of  Yahweh,  this  doctrine  of  immortality,  with 
its  correlate  teaching  of  future  rewards  and  punishments, 
was  perhaps  the  most  important  product,  in  its  moral  conse- 
quences, of  the  life  and  ethical  experiences  of  ancient  Israel. 
It  exercised  little  or  no  influence,  at  least  no  decisive  influ- 
ence, upon  the  moral  evolution  in  Judaism,  but,  adopted  by 
Christianity,  it  was  given  new  force  and  currency,  and  for 
eighteen  hundred  years  and  more  has  been  one  of  the  great 
bulwarks  and  sanctions  of  morality  in  the  Western  world. 

We  have  spoken  of  the  rigid  legalism  and  the  narrow  The  expan- 
nationalistic  spirit  of  orthodox  postexilic  Judaism.     But  it  moral  sym- 
must  not  be  thought  that  in  these  last  days  the  spirit  of  S?b5imi- 
prophetism  was  dead.    Hidden  beneath  this  hard  rind  of  legal-  istic  Age 
ism  there  pulsed  a  true  moral  life.    This  life  found  expression 
in  a  movement  toward  ethical  universalism.    To  understand 
this  movement  we  must  recall  the  great  political  revolution 
of  this  epoch. 

Almost  exactly  two  centuries  after  the  return  of  the  Jews 
from  the  Babylonian  Captivity,  all  the  political  relations  of  the 
Semitic  East  were  abruptly  ended  and  new  relations  estab- 
lished by  the  conquests  of  Alexander  the  Great.  Hellenism, 
the  most  powerful  solvent  of  history,  now  came  in  contact 
with  Hebrew  life  and  thought  both  in  Palestine  and  in  Egypt. 
The  effect  upon  the  ethical  development  in  Judaism  was  pro- 
found. With  the  expansion  of  the  political  and  mental  hori- 
zons the  moral  sympathies  of  men  were  widened.  The  wall 
of  separation  between  Jew  and  Gentile  was  thrown  down.  In 
Alexandria  and  in  the  many  new  Hellenistic  cities  in  Asia, 
the  nobler  spirits  of  dispersed  Israel,  casting  aside  their  narrow 
racial  prejudices,  with  enlarged  mental  vision  and  widened 

1  The  Pharisees ;  cf.  Acts  xxiii.  6-8. 


1 68  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

moral  sympathies,  came  to  read  with  new  understanding 
their  great  prophets  who  had  preached  the  universality  of 
the  moral  law  and  the  brotherhood  of  nations.1  Hebrew 
literature  registers  the  change.  This  new  spirit  of  interna- 
tionalism, of  kindness  and  justice  even  to  enemies,  breathes 
from  many  of  the  later  psalms2  and  speaks  from  many 
a  passage  of  the  so-called  "wisdom  books"  of  the  period. 
The  allegory  of  Jonah  embodies  the  liberal  spirit  of  this  new 
Judaism.  The  great  lawyers  Hillel  and  Shammai,3  who  laid 
emphasis  upon  social  duties  and  human  service,  represented 
the  humanitarian  phase  of  the  age  movement.  Philo,  the 
Alexandrian  Jew,  represented  its  philosophical  side.  The 
way  was  being  prepared  for  the  incoming  of  the  ethical 
universalism  of  Christianity. 

1  We  see  a  repetition  of  all  this  in  what  is  going  on  to-day  among  the 
Jews  in  the  great  cities  of  the  New  World.  Liberal  Judaism  is  largely 
the  outcome  of  just  such  influences  as  brought  forth  Christianity  out  of 
the  narrow  ritual  Judaism  of  the  Alexandrian  Age.  See  David  Philipson, 
The  Reform  Movement  in  Judaism  (1907),  chap.  xii. 

2  M  Those  psalms  into  which  a  sense  of  something  like  the  brotherhood 
of  nations  begins  to  penetrate  are  for  various  reasons  later  than  382  B.C.  .  .  . 
Not  till  the  coming  of  the  Macedonian  reconciler  of  East  and  West  could 
there  be  a  presentiment  of  the  truth  of  the  divine  education,  not  only  of 
Israel,  but  of  the  human  race."  —  Cheyne,  Jewish  Religious  Life  after  the 
Exile  (1898),  pp.  134  f. 

3  To  Shammai  is  credited  the  maxim,  "  What  thou  wouldst  not  have 
another  do  to  thee,  do  not  thou  to  another." 


CHAPTER  X 

THE   MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS   OF  HELLAS:  AN   IDEAL 
OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

The  Greek  ethical  ideal,  a  creation  of  the  natural  feelings  mtroduc- 
and  impulses  of  the  human  mind  and  heart  uninfluenced  by 
theological  doctrines,  was  one  of  the  most  imperishable  prod- 
ucts of  Greek  life  and  thought.  This  conception  of  what 
constitutes  good  life  became  a  part  of  the  Greek  bequest  to 
civilization.  The  modern  world  is  thus  indebted  to  Greece 
not  only  for  priceless  elements  of  its  intellectual  and  art  life, 
but  for  precious  elements  of  its  moral  life  as  well.  Through- 
out the  medieval  age,  it  is  true,  it  was  the  ethical  heritage 
from  Judea  that  shaped  and  colored  the  moral  ideal  of  the 
European  peoples,  but  even  during  that  period  this  Semitic 
ideal  bore  the  deep  impress  of  Greek  ethics,  while  ever  since 
the  Renaissance  it  is  the  ethical  bequest  of  Hellas  which  has 
steadily  become  an  ever  more  and  more  dominant  factor  in 
the  moral  life  of  the  Western  nations.  The  conscience  of  the 
modern  world  of  science  is  Hellenic  rather  than  Hebraic. 

I.  Institutions  and  Ideas  determining  the  Moral 

Type 

The  Greek  city  state  was  the  creator  of  the  Greek  con-  The  city 

science  ;  that  is  to  say,  the  relationships  and  activities  of  the  moid  of e 

Greek  as  a  citizen,  and  not  his  relationships  and  activities  as  JJgJJ  ™°d" 

a  husband  or  father  or  business  man,  determined  his  chief  the  chief 

1  '  sphere  of 

duties.    Conscience  was  very  little  involved  in  that  part  of  Greek  moral 

3.ctivitv 

his  life  which  lay  outside  the  civic  sphere.    It  was  solely  as 
a  member  of  a  city  community,  which  was  to  the  Greek  what 

169 


170 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


The  Greek 
view  of 
man's 
nature  as 
good 


The  idea  of 
harmony  in 
the  god 
world 


the  Church  was  to  the  man  of  medieval  times,  that  he  could 
live  the  truly  moral  life  and  attain  the  highest  virtue. 

The  common  Greek  view  of  man's  nature  was  like  that  of 
the  Chinese  moralists ;  that  is,  it  conceived  human  nature  as 
being  essentially  good.1  And  this  conception  included  the 
whole  of  man's  nature,  his  body  as  well  as  his  spirit.  As  we 
shall  learn,  this  doctrine  influenced  profoundly  the  Greek 
conception  of  what  is  permissible  and  right  in  conduct.  It 
made  it  seem  right  to  give  full,  though  regulated  and  rea- 
sonable, indulgence  to  the  bodily  impulses  and  instincts.  It 
made  the  fundamental  maxim  of  Greek  morality  to  be,  Live 
according  to  nature.  It  left  no  place  in  Greek  thought 
for  the  Oriental  notion  of  an  antagonism  between  the  flesh 
and  the  spirit.  Hence  asceticism  with  its  repressions  of  the 
bodily  instincts  and  appetites,  which  is  so  common  an  expres- 
sion of  the  moral  sentiment  among  the  Oriental  races,  found 
no  place  in  Greek  morality  till  after  Greek  culture  had  come 
in  contact  with  the  religious  and  ethical  systems  of  Asia. 

Closely  connected  with  this  idea  of  the  essential  goodness 
and  oneness  of  man's  nature  was  the  conception  of  unity 
and  harmony  in  the  god  world.  In  passing  from  the  Orient 
to  Greece  we  leave  behind  not  only  Indian  pessimism,  but 
Egyptian  and  Persian  dualism.  We  leave  behind  that  con- 
ception of  disharmony  and  conflict  in  the  invisible  world 
which  is  such  a  characteristic  phase  of  much  of  Oriental 
thought.  We  hear,  indeed,  the  faint  echo  of  a  prehistoric 
struggle  between  the  earth  gods  and  the  sky  gods.  But  all 
now  is  peace.  The  Titans  are  chained,  and  the  gods  that 
are  the  friends  of  men  reign  supreme.2 

1  The  teaching  of  the  Orphic  sects  that  there  are  two  elements,  one 
good  and  another  bad,  in  man's  nature,  was  an  esoteric  doctrine  which  had 
no  influence  on  the  popular  mind  and  conscience.  Cf.  G.  Lowes  Dickinson, 
The  Greek  View  of  Life,  6th  ed.,  pp.  31  f. 

2  There  are,  it  is  true,  gods  of  the  lower  world  unfriendly  to  man,  but 
there  is  nothing  in  the  Greek  world-view  corresponding  to  the  Egyptian 
conception  of  the  struggle  between  the  good  Osiris  and  the  wicked  Set, 


THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  HELLAS      171 

Just  as  that  Oriental  dualistic  world  philosophy  exercised 
a  vast  influence  upon  the  moral  ideals  of  the  East  and  of  the 
later  Christian  world  that  inherited  that  system  of  thought, 
making  the  moral  life  serious  and  strenuous,  a  fight  against 
evil,  so  did  the  opposing  Greek  conception  of  unity  and  har- 
mony in  the  god  world  exert  a  profound  influence  upon  Greek 
morality,  emptying  the  moral  life  of  everything  like  stren- 
uousness  and  battle.  It  made  Greek  morality  to  be  like  the 
morality  of  sensuous,  joyous  youth. 

In  strong  contrast  to  Hebrew  morality,  which,  as  we  have  Thecharac- 
seen,  was  almost  exclusively. a  religious  one,  springing,  that  Greek  gods 
is  to  say,  from  certain  conceptions  of  God's  character  and  of 
his  relations  to  man,  Greek  morality  was  in  the  main  a  lay 
or  secular  one.  Aristotle,  who  gave  scientific  form  to  Greek 
ethics,  allowed  hardly  any  place  in  the  moral  code  to  religious 
duties.  Yet,  though  the  Greek  moral  ideal  was  not  based  upon 
religion,  it  was  influenced  by  it ;  for  there  cannot  be  an  entire 
separation  of  religion  and  morality.  Religious  beliefs,  like  be- 
liefs of  every  other  kind,  help  to  shape  men's  ideas  of  what 
is  right  and  what  is  wrong  in  conduct. 

The  influence  of  the  Greek  religion  upon  Greek  morality 
was  not  wholly  favorable.  The  attribution  by  the  Greeks  of 
human  frailties  and  vices  to  their  gods  tended  to  depress 
human  morality,  since  men  are  never  better  than  their  gods. 
It  is  true  that  the  moral  character  of  the  gods  of  any  people 
is  a  creation  of  the  moral  consciousness  of  that  people ;  still, 
after  once  called  into  existence  and  enthroned,  these  divinities 
react  upon  their  creators  and  shape  in  a  greater  or  less  degree 
the  moral  character  of  their  worshipers. 

But  though  there  were  elements  in  some  of  the  Greek 
cults,  particularly  in  those  of  Dionysus 1  and  Aphrodite  in  the 

or  of  the  Persian  idea  of  the  conflict  between  the  beneficent  Ahura  Mazda 
and  the  evil-working  Ahriman.  Nor  was  there  anything  in  this  view  like 
the  Babylonian  or  Persian  notion  of  malicious  spirits. 

1  The  Dionysian  cult  fostered  art,  but  not  directly  morality.  In  so  far 
as  the  Attic  drama  was  an  elevating  moral  influence,  the  cult  may  be  said 


172  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

later  period,1  that  were  harmful  to  morality,  still  in  general 
Greek  morality  found  in  religion  at  once  a  restraining  and  a 
stimulating  influence. 

Even  as  early  as  the  Homeric  Age  religion  had  become 
a  moral  force.  It  is  the  fear  of  the  gods  even  more  than 
the  fear  of  men  which  is  the  motive  force  for  rightdoing.2 
Odysseus'  request  of  Ilus  of  Ephyra  for  poison  with  which  to 
smear  the  points  of  his  arrows  is  refused  through  fear  of  the 
divine  anger,  and  Priam  in  praying  Achilles  for  the  body  of 
Hector  admonishes  him  to  have  reverence  for  the  gods. 

And  throughout  later  times  the  gods  are  the  guardians  of 
morality.  They  are  the  avengers  of  perjury.  They  are  the 
punishers  of  him  who  breaks  the  law  of  hospitality.  Espe- 
cially does  Zeus,  as  the  god  of  hospitality,  "  take  note  of  those- 
who  welcome  and  those  who  maltreat  the  stranger."  3  The 
shrines  of  all  the  gods  are  places  of  refuge  and  sanctuary. 
The  suppliant  at  the  altar  is  sacrosanct.  Here  the  hand  of 
the  avenger  of  injury  is  stayed.  "  Mercy,"  says  Sophocles, 
"  shares  the  judgment  seat  of  Zeus."  As  the  god  of  the  sup- 
pliant, Zeus  not  only  protects  but  purines  and  delivers.  Thus 
were  the  high  moral  qualities  of  mercy  and  forgiveness  thrown 
into  relief,  and  men,  while  taught  self-restraint,  were  imbued 
with  reverence  for  these  attributes  of  character. 

This  high  morality  of  the  Greek  religion  reached  its  cul- 
mination in  the  worship  of  the  Delphian  Apollo.    In  truth, 


to  have  indirectly  promoted  morals.    But  the  foreign  orgiastic  god  had  to 
be  thoroughly  converted  before  he  could  strengthen  others. 

1  The  pre-Hellenic  Oriental  cult  of  Aphrodite  had  undoubtedly  an  un- 
favorable influence  on  morality.  w  Some  part  of  this  evil  character  [was] 
transplanted  into  Greek  legend,  but  very  little  into  Greek  worship.  .  .  . 
What  we  know  is  that  until  the  declining  period  of  Greek  history  the  cult 
of  Aphrodite,  so  far  as  it  appears  in  written  or  monumental  record,  was  as 
pure  and  austere  as  that  of  Zeus  and  Athena  "  (Farnell,  The  Cults  of  the 
Greek  States  (1896),  vol.  ii,  pp.  657,  663). 

2  Cf.  Schmidt,  Die  Ethik  der  alten  Griechen  (1882),  Bd.  i,  S.  165. 

8  Farnell,  The  Cults  of  the  Greek  States  (1896),  vol.  i,  p.  74,  quoting 
Charondas,  the  Sicilian  legislator. 


THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  HELLAS      173 

the  history  of  Delphi  is  a  large  part  of  the  history  of  Greek 
morality.  It  reflected  from  age  to  age  the  deepening  moral 
perceptions  of  the  race.  The  oracle  thus  stood  in  close  rela- 
tion with  the  great  teachers  of  Greece.  The  ethical  impulse 
of  Pythagoreanism  seems  to  have  gone  forth  from  Delphi. 
Apollo  gave  a  religious  sanction  to  the  emancipation  of  the 
slave,  and  thus  promoted  social  morality.  The  slave  given  his 
freedom  by  his  master  at  Delphi  became,  as  a  freedman,  sacro- 
sanct.1 Apollo  stimulated  also  political  morality.  Through 
the  Delphic  Amphictyony  his  influence  was  exerted  in  miti- 
gating the  barbarities  of  war  between  Greek  and  Greek,  and 
in  creating  an  Hellenic  fraternity.  Thus  through  religion 
was  the  narrow  sphere  embraced  by  the  ordinary  moral  feel- 
ings of  the  Greeks  broadened  and  brought  to  cover  wide 
federations  of  cities  and  tribes. 

Greek  religion  also  exercised  a  stimulating  influence  upon 
morality  through  the  Mysteries,  especially  through  those  of 
Eleusis.  The  greater  number  of  these  religious  fraternities 
had  an  ethical  aim  —  "the  aim  of  worshiping  a  pure  god, 
the  aim  of  living  a  pure  life,  and  the  aim  of  cultivating  a 
spirit  of  brotherhood."  2 

But  the  most  noteworthy  fact  concerning  Greek  religion  significance 
in  its  relations  to  Greek  morality  is  this  —  that  it  was  a  reli-  morality  of 
gion  practically  without  a  priesthood.  For  there  never  arose  ^JJJSSJ 
in  Greece  a  priestly  class  like  that  in  Egypt,  in  Persia,  in  caste 
India,  and  in  Judea.    This  is  a  fact  of  supreme  importance 
in  the  history  of  Greek  morals.    It  prevented  the  growth  of 
a  theocratic  morality,  with  its  artificial  ritual  duties  and  its 
conservative  tendencies. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  it  was  the  early  rise  of  philoso- 
phy in  the  Greek  cities  of  Ionia  that  saved  Hellas  from  the 

1  Farnell,  The  Cults  of  the  Greek  States  (1896),  vol.  iv,  pp.  177  ff. 

2  Hatch,  The  Influence  of  Greek  Ideas  and  Usages  upon  the  Christian 
Church,  2d  ed.,  p.  292. 


174 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


The  doc- 
trine of 
race  elec- 
tion; Hel- 
lenes and 
Barbarians 


domination  of  a  sacerdotal  caste.  For  at  the  time  this  philoso- 
phy arose  the  Orphic  doctrines  were  overspreading  Greece. 
Now  this  was  a  priestly  religion,  that  is,  a  religion  interpreted 
and  administered  by  priests.  Its  triumph  in  Greece  would 
have 'meant  the  establishment  of  a  powerful  national  priest- 
hood. This  misfortune  was  prevented  by  the  intellectual  and 
philosophical  movement  in  Ionia.  It  is  this  fact  which  leads 
Professor  Bury  to  pronounce  the  rise  of  the  study  of  philoso- 
phy in  the  Ionian  cities  one  of  the  most  important  facts  in 
the  history  of  Hellas ;  for  "  it  meant  the  triumph  of  reason 
over  mystery ;  it  led  to  the  discrediting  of  the  Orphic  move- 
ment ;  it  insured  the  free  political  and  social  progress  of 
Hellas."  1  And  all  this  meant  the  keeping  of  the  ground  clear 
for  the  upgrowth  and  development  of  an  essentially  lay  or 
secular  morality,  a  morality  that  found  its  sanctions  alone  in 
the  human  reason  and  conscience. 

There  was  one  conception  common  to  both  Greek  and  Jew 
which  reacted  powerfully  upon  the  moral  system  of  each. 
This  was  what  has  been  called  the  doctrine  of  race  election. 
The  Jews  believed  themselves  to  be  the  "  chosen  people." 
The  Greeks  believed  the  same  concerning  themselves.  They 
were  the  intellectually  elect  people.  All  other  peoples  were 
"  barbarians."  Just  as  the  Jewish  doctrine  of  election  excluded 
the  Gentile  world  from  the  pale  of  Jewish  moral  sympathies, 
so  did  the  Greek  doctrine  of  separateness  cause  the  Greek 
to  shut  out  from  his  moral  sympathies  the  entire  non-Greek 
world.  We  shall  see  a  little  further  on  how  this  race  egotism 
dictated  large  sections  of  the  Greek  code  of  morals. 


II.  The  Ideal 

patriotism  As  we  have  already  noticed,  it  was  out  of  his  relations  as  a 
virtu?;  ™&  citizen  that  the  primary  duties  of  the  Greek  arose.  His 
mliitaiyd      supreme  duty  was  patriotism,  devotion  to  his  city.    "  Good 

duties 

1  History  of  Greece  (1900),  pp.  320  f. 


THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  HELLAS      175 

citizen  "  and  "  good  man  "  were  interchangeable  terms.  And 
since  a  state  of  war  rather  than  of  peace  was  the  normal  re- 
lation of  the  Greek  cities,  the  military  virtues  held  the  high- 
est place  in  the  ideal  of  excellence.  M  Their  bodies,"  — thus 
Thucydides  makes  one  of  his  characters  speak  of  the  cit- 
izen soldiers  of  a  typical  Greek  city — "their  bodies  they  de- 
vote to  their  country  as  though  they  belonged  to  other  men."  x 
Thus  the  preeminent  Greek  virtue,  courage,  was  almost  syn- 
onymous with  valor  in  war.  To  throw  away  one's  shield 
was  the  last  infamy  with  the  Greeks  as  with  the  Romans. 

This  type  of  character,  blending  the  civic  and  the  mili- 
tary virtues,  is  presented  to  us  with  incomparable  charm  in 
Plutarch's  Lives.  Here  we  see  the  ideal  in  actual  flesh  and 
blood.  It  is  the  altruistic  element  in  this  type  of  character 
which  renders  it  so  morally  attractive. 

For  we  should  not  fail  to  note  that  in  the  Greek  enumer-  The  Greek 
ation  of  the  virtues,  the  virtue  of  self-sacrifice,  which  we  give  courage* 
the  first  place  in  our  own  moral  ideal,  is  hidden  under  cour-  a  f0™  of 

r  '  our  virtue 

age  or  fortitude. 2   With  us  this  virtue  expresses  itself  in  a  of  se.lf- 

°  .  r  sacrifice 

great  variety  of  forms;  with  the  Greeks,  in  one  form  chiefly — 
self-devotion  on  the  battlefield.  This  altruism,  it  is  true,  was 
narrow ;  it  did  not  look  beyond  one's  own  city ;  but  notwith- 
standing this  limitation  it  was  genuine  altruism,  for  facing 
death  in  battle,  as  Aristotle  says,  is  M  the  greatest  and  noblest 
of  perils."  3  This  ready  self-devotion  of  the  individual  to  the 
common  interests  of  his  city  was  the  most  attractive  feature 
of  Greek  morality.  It  formed  the  basis  of  Greek  civilization. 
When  this  virtue  was  lost  the  Greek  city  perished,  and  with 
it  Greek  civilization  passed  away. 

Among  all  the  cities  of  Greece,  Sparta  realized  most  per- 
fectly the  military  virtues  of  the  Greek  ideal.    The  great  place 

1  Thucyd.  i.  70. 

2  For  an  illuminating  comparison  of  the  Greek  virtues  of  fortitude  and 
temperance  with  the  corresponding  Christian  virtues,  see  T.  H.  Green, 
Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  5th  ed.,  pp.  304  ff.  3  Ethics,  iii.  10. 


176  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

so  long  held  by  her  in  the  ancient  world  she  won  through 
the  loyalty  of  her  citizens  to  the  soldier's  ideal  of  obedience, 
courage,  and  self-devotion.  The  conduct  of  Leonidas  and 
his  companions  in  the  pass  of  Thermopylae  not  only  had 
a  bracing  effect  upon  Greek  character  for  generations,  but 
has  never  ceased,  through  the  inspiration  of  example,  to  add 
to  the  sum  total  in  the  world  of  loyalty  to  duty. 

The  virtues  To  the  virtue  of  self-sacrifice,  under  the  guise  of  fortitude, 
ance  and  or  the  facing  of  danger  or  the  endurance  of  pain  in  a  worthy 
justice         causGj  the  Greeks  added  temperance,  justice,  and  wisdom. 

The  Greek  virtue  of  temperance  or  moderation  was  essen- 
tially the  same  as  our  virtue  of  self-control  or  self-denial.  It 
meant  measure  in  all  things,  the  avoidance  of  the  too  much 
and  the  too  little.1  Everything  must  be  in  fair  proportion. 
In  building  a  house  one  should  not  go  "  beyond  bounds  in 
size,  magnificence,  and  expense."  In  conduct  likewise  the 
mean  must  always  be  the  aim.  Restraint  must  be  laid  upon 
one's  appetites  and  desires.  Excessive  ambition  was  a  grave 
fault,  as  was  an  undue  lack  of  ambition. 

The  Greek  conception  of  justice  was  this  :  Do  no  wrong, 
and  suffer  no  wrong  to  self  or  to  others  —  with  the  emphasis 
on  the  latter  part  of  the  injunction.2  Christianity  shifted  the 
emphasis  to  the  first  part  of  the  commandment. 


The  virtue        By  the  term  "  wisdom  "  the  Greeks  covered  very  nearly 
mental  self-  what  we  mean  by  mental  self-culture.    Now  there  has  been  a 
duty re  a      W1<^e  divergence  of  opinion  among  different  peoples  respect- 
ing this  matter.   Primitive  races  can  of  course  have  no  feeling 
of  obligation  as  to  intellectual  self-culture  ;  but  even  a  people 

1  "  But  let  [each  man]  know,"  says  Plato,  "  how  to  choose  the  mean 
and  avoid  the  extremes  on  either  side,  as  far  as  in  him  lies,  not  only  in 
this  life  but  in  all  that  which  is  to  come.  For  this  is  the  way  of  happiness" 
{Republic,  tr.  Jowett,  x.  619). 

2  Socrates,  it  is  true,  taught  that  it  is  better  to  suffer  wrong  than  to  do 
wrong,  but  he  was  here  far  in  advance  of  the  common  Greek  conscience. 

—  4 


THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  HELLAS      177 

as  advanced  in  civilization  as  the  Romans  may  have  little  or 
no  conscience  concerning  it.  Throughout  a  great  part  of  the 
medieval  age  in  Europe  mental  culture  was  looked  upon 
with  suspicion.  Very  few  regarded  it  as  a  duty.  But  since 
the  Renaissance,  that  is,  since  the  rebirth  in  the  European 
world  of  the  Greek  spirit,  intellectual  culture  has  been  coming 
to  be  regarded  more  and  more  as  an  urgent  and  imperious 
duty.  It  is  to  the  ancient  Greeks,  as  implied  in  what  we 
have  just  said,  that  we  are  largely  indebted  for  this  ethical 
feeling.  To  the  truly  representative  Greek  the  ethical  imper- 
ative to  seek  self-realization  called  especially  for  the  develop- 
ment of  the  mind,  "  his  true  self."  Mere  intellectual  curiosity, 
love  of  knowledge  for  its  own  sake,  was,  it  is  true,  one 
of  the  creative  forces  of  Greek  intellectualism ;  but  the 
ethical  motive  was  ever  near.  In  the  Socratic  philosophy 
indeed  it  is  made  the  dominant  motive  for  the  reason  that 
virtuous  conduct  is  by  Socrates  held  to  be  dependent  upon 
knowledge,  the  knowledge  of  things  as  they  really  are,  things 
human  and  divine.  With  the  philosopher  the  gaining  of  this 
knowledge  is  the  aim  and  end  of  life. 

Asceticism,  a  chief  characteristic  of  which  is  the  concep-  Thedevei- 
tion  that  there  is  something  meritorious  in  the  illtreatment  theTbodya 
or  neglect  of  the  body,  is  one  of  the  most  striking  phenom-  ethical  ae- 
ena  in  the  moral  history  of  mankind.  The  Oriental  peoples  Q^kin 
especially  have  ever  been  easily  persuaded,  under  the  influ-  athleticism 
ence  of  religious  ideas,  that  the  body  should  be  illtreated  in 
the  interest  of  the  spirit. 

In  passing  from  Asia  to  Greece  we  seem  to  enter  a  new 
ethical  atmosphere.  We  leave  behind  every  trace  of  asceticism. 
We  are  no  longer  surrounded  by  unkempt,  gaunt,  hollow- 
eyed  fakirs,  anchorites,  and  monks.  In  Greek  thought,  as 
we  have  seen,  there  was  no  trace  of  that  Oriental  idea  of 
a  warring  between  body  and  spirit.  This  happy  conscious- 
ness of  the  Greek  of  harmony  in  his  own  being  had  most 


178  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

important  consequences  for  Greek  morality.  It  made  the 
development  of  the  body,  equally  with  that  of  the  soul,  an 
ethical  requirement.  The  outcome  was  Greek  athleticism,  one 
of  the  most  attractive  phases  of  Hellenic  civilization. 

We  do  not  mean  to  say  that  moral  feeling  was  to  the  same 
degree  active  in  calling  into  existence  Greek  athleticism  that 
religious-ethical  feeling  was  active  in  the  creation  of  Oriental 
asceticism,  but  simply  that  the  ethical  motive  held  a  place 
among  the  various  motives  and  sentiments  at  work.  Without 
this  motive  the  Olympian  games  and  the  other  sacred  festi- 
vals into  which  athletic  exercises  and  competitions  entered, 
would  never  have  won  the  place  they  held  in  Greek  life  and 
culture.  When  in  later  times  these  festivals,  subjected  to 
commercial  and  mercenary  influences,  lost  wholly  or  in  part 
this  religious-ethical  element,  then  they  lost  also  their  dis- 
tinctive character,  and  that  morally  wholesome  and  uplifting 
influence  which  they  had  exercised  upon  the  Greek  world 
throughout  the  best  days  of  Hellas. 

wentiflca-  Just  as  the  cultured  Greek  brought  the  intellectual  domain 
mora?  good-  of  life  within  the  province  of  morals,  so  likewise  did  he  with 
beautylth  tne  aesthetic.  It  was  not  merely  his  aesthetic  sense  which  was 
offended  by  ugliness  in  form,  but  also  his  moral  sense.  To 
the  Greek  mind,  to  love  beauty,  sensuous  and  spiritual,  and  to 
be  beautiful  was  synonymous  with  being  good.  "  He  who  is 
beautiful  to  look  upon,"  says  Sappho,  "  is  good ;  and  who  is 
good  will  soon  be  beautiful."  1  "  The  beautiful,"  comments 
Wuttke  in  speaking  of  this  phase  of  Greek  ethics,  "  is  perse 
the  good ;  in  enjoying  and  creating  the  beautiful  man  is 
moral." 2  "The  ' good '  and  the  ' beautiful ' "  — thus  G.  Lowes 
Dickinson  sums  up  the  Greek  view — "were  one  and  the  same 
thing  ;  that  is  the  first  and  the  last  word  of  the  Greek  ideal."  3 

1  Quoted  by  Taylor,  Ancient  Ideals  (1896),  vol.  i,  p.  247. 

2  Christian  Ethics  (1873),  vo^  *»  P-  °3- 

8  The  Greek  View  of  Life  (1909),  p.  205. 


THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  HELLAS      179 

This  identification  by  the  Greeks  of  goodness  with  beauty 
is  one  of  the  most  important  matters  in  Greek  ethics.  For 
the  conception  was  not  with  them  an  inert  thing.  Greek 
civilization  in  all  its  phases  was  in  a  great  measure  the  ex- 
pression of  this  conviction.  The  Greeks  filled  the  world  with 
beautiful  things  because  to  create  beauty  was  with  them  an 
ethical  as  well  as  an  aesthetic  impulse  and  necessity.  They 
felt  the  holiness  of  beauty. 

All  the  particular  requirements  of  Greek  morality,  some  of  Live  ac- 
the  most  important  of  which  we  have  now  briefly  commented  Mtu*«ui 


sums 


upon,  are  summed  up  in  the  formula,  Live  conformably  to  rePquir™°ral 
nature.  The  idea  here  embodied  of  what  constitutes  man's  full  ments 
duty  springs  naturally  from  the  doctrine  that  man's  nature 
is  essentially  good.  If  that  nature  be  good,  then  virtuousness 
will  consist  in  the  well-rounded  symmetrical  development  of 
all  the  capacities  of  body  and  mind.  Pindar's  profound  in- 
junction, "  Be  what  you  are,"  embodies  the  essence  of  the 
teachings  of  the  Greek  moralists.  They  taught  that  man 
fulfills  his  destiny  by  becoming  what  he  is  in  his  innermost 
being  —  by  complete  self-realization.1 


III.  Limitations  and  Defects  of  the  Ideal 

A  chief  defect  of  Greek  ethics  was  its  aristocratic  spirit,  itsaristo- 
So  many  were  the  classes  excluded  in  whole  or  in  part  from  character 
the  moral  field  that  Greek  morality  was  almost  as  much  a 

1  If  we  contrast  the  Greek  conception  of  man's  nature  with  that  of 
certain  systems  of  Christian  theology,  we  shall  better  understand  the  ethical 
value  of  such  ideas  and  beliefs.  On  the  occasion  of  a  college  commence- 
ment one  of  the  speakers,  a  stout  upholder  of  the  doctrines  of  the  fall  of 
man,  original  sin,  and  the  utter  depravity  of  the  natural  man,  roundly  de- 
nounced this  injunction  of  Pindar's.  He  said  to  the  young  people  who  had 
chosen  as  their  class  motto,  M  Be  what  you  are,"  that  that  was  just  what  they 
ought  not  to  be.  He  then  went  on  to  show  them  that  their  nature  was 
wholly  corrupt,  that  all  their  natural  inclinations  were  toward  evil  contin- 
ually, and  that  if  they  ever  hoped  for  salvation  they  must  become  what  they 
were  not. 


i8o 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


class  morality  as  that  of  Brahmanic  India.  Entire  races  and 
classes  were  as  completely  outside  the  moral  pale  as  is  the 
Indian  pariah.  It  was  only  the  higher  cultured  classes  of 
citizens  who,  the  moral  philosophers  taught,  were  capable 
of  attaining  the  noblest  virtues  and  living  the  truly  moral 
life.  All  others  were  regarded  as  living  on  a  semimoral  or 
nonmoral  animal  plane  of  existence. 

Theexciu-        Thus  throughout  a  great  part  of  the  historic  period  the 

Greek  races  Greeks  virtually  excluded  all  non-Greek  peoples  from  the 

momithe       moral  domain.1  They  regarded  these  non-Hellenic  folk  about 

sphere         as  we  regard  animals,  or  as  many  a  few  generations  ago  looked 

upon  the  black  race.  They  thought  it  right  for  them  to  make 

unprovoked  war  upon  such  people  and  to  make  slaves  of  those 

they  might  capture.    Aristotle  taught  that  to  hunt  barbarians 

for  the  purpose  of  getting  slaves  was  just  as  right  and  proper  as 

to  hunt  animals  for  food  or  sacrifice.2    In  a  word,  non-Greeks 

were  regarded  as  being  practically  outside  the  pale  of  humanity. 

The  exciu-        The  moral  status  of   the   slave  in  ancient  Greece  was 
slaves  determined  by  the  fact  that  slaves  were  usually  barbarians.3 

Since  as  non-Greeks  they  were  already  outside  the  moral 
pale,  it  followed  naturally  that  as  slaves  they  had  no  standing 
in  the  court  of  morals.  Their  status  was  almost  the  same 
as  that  of  domestic  animals.  The  Greek  master  never  felt 
that  he  owed  any  moral  duties  to  his  slaves,  though  kind 
and  merciful  treatment  of  them  was  enjoined  by  the  philoso- 
phers and  moralists.  According  to  Aristotle,  the  relation  of 
slave  and  master  is  a  purely  natural  one,  like  that  of  body 
and  soul.    He  calls  slaves  "  living  instruments;" 

1  "  Aristotle  may  be  almost  said  to  have  made  the  difference  between 
Greek  and  barbarian  the  basis  of  his  moral  code."  —  Lecky,  History  of 
European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  i,  p.  200. 

2  Politics,  i.  7,  sec.  5 ;  8,  sec.  12  ;  vii.  14,  sec.  21. 

3  For  the  ethics  of  Greek  slavery  consult  Schmidt,  Die  Ethik  der  alien 
Griechen  (1882),  Bd.  ii,  S.  203-219. 


i 


THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  HELLAS      181 

Out  of  the  family  relationships  arise  a  large  part  of  the  The  exciu- 
duties  making  up  the  moral  code  of  the  modern  Western  domestic 
world,  while  in  the  atmosphere  of  the  domestic  circle  are  sphere 
nourished  many  of  what  we  regard  as  the  most  sacred  and 
attractive  of  the  virtues.    Now  these  family  virtues,  which  we 
esteem  so  highly,  found  only  a  very  subordinate  place  in  the 
Greek  ideal  of  character,  for  the  reason  that  the  family,  like 
the  clan  and  the  tribe,  was  almost  absorbed  by  the  city.    In 
Sparta  the  family  and  family  life   practically  disappeared. 
In  Plato's  ideal  republic  the  family  is  sacrificed  to  the  state. 

The  status  of  the  wife  in  most  of  the  Greek  cities  was  a 
low  one.  She  was  practically  one  of  the  slaves.  Ethical  sen- 
timent, as  was  true  of  the  sentiment  of  romantic  love,  seems 
to  have  been  almost  wholly  lacking  in  the  marriage  relation. 

Infancy,  in  its  earliest  stages,  was  in  general  never  brought 
beneath  the  protecting  aegis  of  the  moral  sentiment.1  In  the 
practice  of  the  exposure  of  ill-formed,  weak,  defective,  or 
unpromising  newborn  infants  the  Greeks,  like  the  Romans, 
never  advanced  much  beyond  the  standpoint  of  barbarians. 
This  abandonment  or  destruction  by  parents  of  their  offspring 
did  not  offend  the  common  conscience.  Even  the  philosophers 
and  moralists  saw  nothing  in  the  practice  to  censure.  Evidence 
of  how  general  the  custom  was,  is  afforded  by  various  tales 
and  dramas  which  turn  on  the  rescue  of  the  hero  in  his  in- 
fancy after  having  been  cast  out  to  die.2  The  story  of  King 
QEdipus  is  typical.3 

In  this  connection  a  word  must  be  said  regarding  chastity. 
We  find  here  one  of  the  most  serious  defects  of  Greek 

1  Thebes,  but  not  from  moral  scruples  seemingly,  prohibited  under  the 
penalty  of  death  the  destruction  of  healthy  infants. 

2  The  reader  of  Plato  will  recall  how  Socrates  uses  this  practice  of  the 
exposition  of  infants  to  illustrate  his  art  of  bringing  to  birth  true  and  false 
ideas  ("  lies  and  shadows")  in  the  minds  of  his  pupils,  and  exposing  to  die 
those  that  are  vain  shadows.   See  his  Dialogues,  tr.  Jowett,  vol.  iii,  pp.  350  f. 

3  The  practice  of  the  exposition  of  female  infants  in  the  Hellenistic  Age, 
when  luxury  increased  and  children  became  a  burden,  seems  to  have  been 
more  common  than  in  earlier  times. 


.«, 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


v/ 


» 


The  dises 
teem  of 
industrial 
virtues 


morality.  The  virtue  of  chastity  was  given  a  very  low  place, 
hardly  any  place  at  all,  in  the  Greek  ideal  of  character.  It 
was  the  undervaluing  of  this  virtue  that  without  doubt  was 
one  of  the  contributing  causes  of  the  decline  and  early  decay 
of  Greek  civilization. 

Another  equally  grave  defect  in  the  Greek  moral  character 
was  lack  of  respect  for  the  aged.  Save  at  Sparta  and  Athens, 
age  was  not  reverenced  in  ancient  Greece.1  In  this  respect 
the  Greeks  stood  almost  on  a  level  with  most  primitive  races. 

A  marked  characteristic  of  Greek  ethical  feeling  was  a 
deep  prejudice  against  manual  and  commercial  occupations 
as  unworthy  of  freemen.  Aristotle  taught  that  there  was 
"  no  room  for  moral  excellence  "  in  the  trades  and  employ- 
ments of  artisans,  traders,  and  laborers.2  Even  artists  like 
Phidias  and  Polyclitus  were  looked  upon  as  "  miserable 
handicraftsmen."3  Plato  in  his  Laws  says:  "  He  who  in 
any  way  shares  in  the  illiberality  of  retail  trade  may  be 
indicted  by  any  one  who  likes  for  dishonoring  his  race, 
before  those  who  are  judged  to  be  first  in  virtue ;  and  if 
he  appear  to  throw  dirt  upon  his  father's  house, —  by  an  un- 
worthy occupation,  —  let  him  be  imprisoned  for  a  year  and 
abstain  from  that  sort  of  thing."  4  In  some  cities  the  person 
who  engaged  in  trade  was  disqualified  for  citizenship,  and  in 
others  no  mechanic  or  field  laborer  could  enter  the  place 
where  the  freemen  met. 

This  feeling  that  labor  is  degrading  came  in  after  the 
Homeric  Age,   with   the    rule    of   the    oligarchs,   and   was 

1  Mahaffy,  Social  Life  in  Greece  (1888),  p.  120. 

2  Politics,  vi.  4,  sec.  1 2.  This  contempt  for  tradesmen  and  laborers,  gen- 
erally speaking,  continued  through  all  periods  of  Greek  history.  In  some 
states,  however,  particularly  in  Athens,  it  underwent  modification.  "  The 
later  Athenians  began  to  consider  trade  an  honorable  road  to  riches,  and 
aristocrats  like  Nicias  were  known  as  careful  trade  masters."  In  Rhodes, 
also,  trade  became  honorable. 

3  Paulsen,  System  of  Ethics,  tr.  Thilly,  p.  62  n. 

4  Laws,  tr.  Jowett,  xi.  919. 


THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  HELLAS      183 

the  natural  and  inevitable  outcome  of  slavery.  The  effect 
of  slavery  is  to  make  work  seem  ignoble  and  servile,  and  to 
cause  the  industrial  virtues  to  assume  a  low  place  in  the 
moral  ideal,  or  to  drop  out  of  it  entirely.  The  high  place 
assigned  the  industrial  virtues  in  the  moral  ideals  of  ancient 
Persia  and  Israel  was  due  probably  as  largely  to  the  sub- 
ordinate place  which  slavery  held  in  those  countries  as  to  the 
influence  of  religious  doctrines  and  physical  environment. 

Another  ground  for  the  feeling  was  that  hard,  coarse  work 
destroys  the  suppleness  and  mars  the  beauty  and  symmetry  of 
the  body ;  and  this  to  the  Greek  way  of  thinking  was  suffi- 
cient reason  why  the  freeman  —  to  use  Plato's  phrase  — 
"  should  abstain  from  that  sort  of  thing." 

Still  another  reason  for  the  feeling  that  the  retail  trades 
were  unworthy  of  citizens  was  the  conviction  that  this  kind 
of  business  had  "  a  strong  tendency  to  make  men  bad."  The 
small  merchants  and  traders  in  Greece  certainly  bore  a  very 
bad  reputation,1  and  it  is  probable  that  the  public  disesteem 
of  their  occupation  and  the  contempt  in  which  they  them- 
selves were  held  had  the  same  sinister  influence  upon  them 
that  the  similar  feeling  in  Old  Japan  had  upon  the  petty 
trader  there.2 

In  nothing  did  the  ordinary  Greek  moral  consciousness  Revenge 
differ  more  widely  from  the  Christian  than  in  the  matter  of  a  virtue 
forgiving  injuries.  This  was  one  of  the  virtues  brought  in  by 
Christianity  which  to  the  Greek  mind  was  foolishness.  To 
the  Greek  the  taking  of  revenge  upon  an  enemy  was  a  duty. 
A  man  should  render  himself  useful  to  his  friends  and  dan- 
gerous to  his  enemies.  The  Greek  orator,  in  order  to  justify 
his  resentment  toward  any  one,  always  took  pains  to  show 
that  he  had  been  injured  in  some  way  by  the  person,  and 

1  They  were  charged  with  adulteration  of  foods,  cheating  in  measure, 
etc.  Demosthenes  declares  that  a  man  honest  in  commercial  transactions 
was  a  prodigy.    Cf.  Mahaffy,  Social  Life  in  Greece  (1888),  p.  419. 

2  See  above,  p.  89. 


ness 


184  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

hence  had  good  ground  for  wishing  to  do  him  evil.  Indeed, 
one  who  neglected  to  take  revenge  upon  his  personal  enemy 
was  looked  upon  as  a  weak,  pusillanimous  creature.1 

But  out  of  this  virtue  of  revenge,  paradoxically  enough, 
arose  the  virtue  of  forgiveness ;  for  revenge  was  limited  by 
the  requirements  of  the  virtue  of  moderation  or  self-restraint. 
The  person  seeking  revenge  for  an  injury  must  set  reason- 
able bounds  to  his  thirst  for  vengeance.  Hence  when  the  age 
of  reflection  came  there  were  teachers  of  spiritual  insight  who, 
regarding  the  matter  from  this  point  of  view,  saw  forgiveness 
to  be  a  virtue  because  it  required  in  the  one  forgiving  great 
self -conquest  and  self-control.2 

low  esti-  Another  serious  defect  in  the  ordinary  Greek  moral  stand- 

truthfui-  ard  was  the  low  place  assigned  to  the  virtue  of  veracity.  The 
Greeks,  in  marked  contrast  to  the  ancient  Persians,  had  only 
a  very  feeble  sense  of  the  sanctity  of  the  plighted  word.  Un- 
truthfulness was  ingrained  in  the  nation.  The  Homeric  heroes 
were  full  of  guile  and  deceit,  and  the  historic  Greeks  were 
little  better.  They  had  throughout  the  ancient  world  a  well- 
earned  reputation  for  disregard  of  promises  and  oaths.  When 
it  seemed  to  them  necessary  to  lie  in  order  to  gain  a  desired 
end,  then  lying  appeared  to  them  justifiable.  Scythas,  tyrant 
of  Zancle,  if  we  may  judge  from  a  story  told  by  Herodotus, 
was  the  only  Greek  who  kept  his  word  to  Darius.  This  man 
was  in  exile  at  Susa.  He  obtained  from  the  king  permis- 
sion, presumably  on  parole,  to  visit  Sicily,  and  honorably 
returned  to  Persia.  The  conduct  of  Scythas  in  this  matter 
must  have  been  exceptional,  for,  in  the  words  of  Herodotus, 
"  him  Darius  regarded  the  most  upright  of  all  the  Greeks 
to  whom  he  afforded  a  refuge."  3 

1  This  ethical  feeling  is  to  be  reckoned  with  in  dealing  with  Asiatics  — 
until  there  is  a  change  in  their  ideal  of  manliness.  The  overlooking  of  an 
injury  is  apt  to  be  regarded  by  them  as  an  indication  of  weakness  and 
cowardice.      2  Schmidt,  Die  Ethik  der  alten  Griechen  (1882),  Bd.  ii,  S.  312. 

8  Herod,  vi.  24.  The  Delphian  oracle  tried  to  cure  this  defect  in  the 
national  character.    See  the  story  of  Glaucus,  Herod,  vi.  86. 


Age 


THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  HELLAS      185 

The  great  moral  teachers  of  Greece  recognized  this  defect 
in  the  moral  character  of  their  countrymen  and  sought  to  cor- 
rect it  by  extolling  the  virtue  of  truthfulness.  After  the  Persian 
war  a  class  of  men  arose,  historians  and  philosophers,  whom 
Schmidt,  because  of  their  reverence  for  truth,  calls  the  an- 
cestors of  the  modern  men  of  science.1  Thucydides  had  the 
same  sense  of  the  sanctity  of  exactness  in  statement  of  fact  as 
has  the  historian  of  to-day.  Socrates  died  rather  than  cloak 
the  truth  before  his  judges.  Aristotle  said,  "  Friends  and  truth 
are  both  dear  to  us,  but  it  is  a  sacred  duty  to  prefer  the  truth."  2 

IV.  The  Moral  Evolution 

The  historical  starting  point  of  the  moral  evolution  in  Greece  The  mo- 
is  the  morality  of  the  Homeric  Age.    This  morality  we  find  Homeric 
incarnated  in  the  heroes  of  the  time,  Achilles  and  Odysseus, 
for,  as  Wundt  observes,  "  the  inmost  moral  convictions  of  a 
people  are  shown  far  more  plainly  in  the  character  of  its  heroes 
than  in  its  gods."  3 

The  qualities  of  character  with  which,  as  worthy  of  admi- 
ration, the  poet  invests  his  heroes  show  that,  notwithstanding 
the  great  advance  already  achieved  in  many  of  the  arts  of  life, 
in  morality  the  Greeks  of  this  age  were  still  in  some  respects 
on  a  level  with  savages.  Thus  the  poet  extols  the  "  good 
Autolycus  "  for  his  skill  in  thievery  and  perjury.4  But  steal- 
ing and  lying,  as  with  uncivilized  people  generally,  to  be  proper 
and  right,  must  be  adroit  and  "  for  the  good  of  friends  and 
the  harm  of  enemies."  Piracy  was  an  honorable  occupation.5 
The  bodies  of  enemies  slain  in  battle  were  maltreated,  as  is 
the  wont  of  savages.6  Conceptions  of  deity  were  crude  and 
unethical,  the  gods  being  represented  as  capricious,  profligate, 
partial,  and  unjust. 

1  Die  Ethik  der  alten  Griechen  (1882),  Bd.  ii,  S.  413. 

2  Ethics,  Xx.  Welldon,  i.  4. 

3  Ethics ;  the  Eacts  of  the  Moral  Life  (1908),  p.  95. 

4  Oct.  xix.  396-398.  6  Thucyd.  i.  5.  6  //.  xxii.  485-499. 


1 86        HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

But  there  was  a  sound  core  in  this  morality.  Clan  virtues 
were  firmly  inwrought  in  character.  The  virtue  of  loyalty  to 
comrades  was  strong ;  the  ethical  qualities  of  courage  and 
self-devotion  for  the  common  good,  and  of  hospitality  to 
strangers  were  well  developed ;  and  the  domestic  virtues  of 
chastity  and  constancy  in  woman  are  portrayed  in  such  a  way 
as  to  show  that,  if  not  common,  they  were  at  least  held  in 
high  esteem  and  reverence. 

Reproba-  From  the  Homeric  Age  onward  there  was  a  progressive 

phnoso-  e  purification  of  the  moral  feelings.  One  evidence  of  this  eth- 
latwpoets  ^ca^  progress  is  found  in  the  repudiation  by  the  later  moral 
of  the  ho-     consciousness  of  the  primitive  myths  of  the  gods.    These 

menc  tales  r  ■>  ° 

of  the  gods  tales,  as  we  have  just  noted,  were  coarse,  sensual,  and  im- 
moral. The  philosophers  of  the  sixth  and  following  centu- 
ries, and  the  poets  of  this  later  time,  denounced  these  stories 
as  unworthy  and  unethical  conceptions  of  deity.  Pythagoras 
is  said,  upon  his  return  from  Hades,  to  have  reported  seeing 
there  the  souls  of  Homer  and  Hesiod  undergoing  punishment 
for  what  they  had  said  of  the  gods.  Pindar  purges  the  tales 
of  their  grosser  immoral  elements.  Others  sought  to  relieve 
the  poets  of  the  charge  of  impiety  by  reading  the  myths  as 
allegories.  The  Sophists  and  Stoics  moralized  them,  giving 
them  an  ethical  aim  and  purpose.1  Plato,  in  reprobating  what 
Hesiod  says  of  Uranus,  declared  it  "  the  greatest  of  all  lies 
in  high  places."  He  would  strike  out  from  the  poets  all  pas- 
sages in  which  they  told  these  lies  about  the  gods  and  heroes, 
before  allowing  the  boys  and  men  to  read  them.2  In  the 
hands  of  the  later  Attic  tragedians  the  whole  traditionary 
religious  mythology  was  spiritualized  and  given  a  deeper 
ethical  content  and  meaning. 

This  purifying  of  the  Greek  moral  consciousness  finds  an 
exact  parallel  in  what  is  taking  place  in  the  modern  Christian 

1  See  Xen.  Mem.  ii.  i,  21,  for  the  parable,  by  the  Sophist  Prodicus,  of 
the  choice  of  Heracles  at  the  parting  of  the  ways. 

2  The  Republic,  iii.  386-392. 


THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  HELLAS      187 

world  respecting  the  conceptions  of  deity  found  in  the  early 
chronicles  of  the  Hebrew  Bible  and  transmitted  as  a  reli- 
gious bequest  to  the  European  peoples.  These  ideas  of  God 
are  rejected  by  the  truer  moral  consciousness  of  to-day  as 
the  crude  notions  of  a  gross  and  morally  immature  age.  Just 
as  this  modern  rejection  of  these  unworthy  primitive  concep- 
tions of  the  divine  character  register  our  own  moral  advance, 
so  does  the  rejection,  by  the  later  Greek  thinkers  and  teachers, 
of  the  Homeric  and  Hesiodic  conceptions  of  the  gods  register 
the  advance  in  ethical  thought  in  Greece  during  the  interval 
that  separates  the  era  of  these  poets  from  the  Solonian  and 
Platonic  Ages. 

In  an  earlier  chapter  we  spoke  of  the  continuance  theory  Ethical  sig- 
of  life  after  death,  and  of  the  retribution  theory  as  marking  tL  tart- 
an advance  upon  this  in  ethical  feeling.1   At  the  opening  of  J^cwaSi- 
the  historical  period  in  Greece  we  find  the  primitive  unethical  JJJJJtrtU. 
continuance  theory  in  existence,  but  in  a  state  of  transition  tion  theory 
into  the  retribution  theory.    The  early  Greek  Hades,  like  the 
Babylonian  Arallu  and  the  Hebrew  Sheol,  was  a  place  where 
moral  distinctions  were  not  recognized.    The  same  phantom 
life  was  the  lot  of  all  alike  who  went  down  to  the  world  of 
shadows.  The  Elysian  Fields,  it  is  true,  had  already  been  cre- 
ated, but  these  were  simply  a  sort  of  aristocratic  heaven,  a 
"  Greek  Valhalla,"  the  abode  of  the  great  heroes  of  the  race  ;2 
and  Tartarus  also  had  been  called  into  existence,  but  this  was 
a  prison  house  only  for  those  who  had  incurred  the  special 
enmity  of  the  gods.    The  fables  of  Tantalus,  Ixion,  and  the 
Danai'des  show  that  the  belief  in  an  after  life  had  no  ethical 
significance  for  the  masses.3 

1  See  above,  p.  35. 

2  "  The  blessed  islands  of  the  West  were  indeed  even  then  [in  the 
Homeric  Age]  a  home  for  the  dead,  but  they  had  not  yet  been  opened  to 
moral  worth,  as  in  the  days  of  Pindar."  —  Mahaffy,  Social  Life  in  Greece 
(1888),  p.  26. 

8  See  Zeller,  History  of  Philosophy  (1881),  vol.  i,  p.  125,  and  Schmidt, 
Die  Ethik  der  alten  Griechen  (1882),  Bd.  i,  S.  99.   "  Strictly  speaking,"  says 


1 88  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


But  already  in  Pindar  these  ideas  of  the  after  life,  through 
virtue  of  an  ethical  necessity,  have  undergone  great  changes.1 
Just  as  the  poet  moralizes  the  Homeric  conception  of  the 
gods,  so  does  he  moralize  the  Homeric  conception  of  the  un- 
derworld. Alongside  the  continuance  theory  we  find  now  the 
retribution  theory.  The  life  beyond  the  grave  is  conceived  as 
a  life  of  rewards  and  punishments.  The  Elysian  Fields  have 
been  "  opened  to  moral  worth,"  and  a  tribunal,  called  into 
existence  by  a  growing  moral  consciousness  like  that  which 
created  the  Egyptian  Judgment  of  the  Dead,  has  been  set 
up,  and  Rhadamanthus  apportions  the  destiny  of  souls  ac- 
cording to  their  merit  and  demerit.2  From  the  Persian  war 
on,  the  life  after  death  had  ethical  significance  for  all  men, 
and  not  simply  for  exceptional  cases.  In  the  literature  there 
are  allusions  in  growing  numbers  to  the  retribution  awaiting 
the  wicked  and  the  blessedness  in  store  for  those  "  unstained 
with  vice." 

In  Plato  this  moral  evolution  attains  a  stage  almost  identi- 
cal with  that  reached  by  medieval  Christian  ethics.  We  find 
in  the  Republic  a  threefold  division  of  the  realm  of  the  dead 
corresponding  closely  to  the  Schoolmen's  purgatory,  heaven, 
and  hell. 3  Punishment  is  conceived  as  having  for  aim  and 
end,  in  all  save  cases  of  abominable  and  incurable  wickedness, 
the  purification  of  earth-stained  souls. 

All  these  modifications  in  the  topography,  the  classifica- 
tions, and  the  arrangements  of  the  underworld,  like  the  sim- 
ilar changes  effected  by  the  modern  spirit  in  the  medieval 

Professor  Seymour,  "  Homer  knows  of  no  instance  of  rewards,  and  of  only 
one  case  of  punishment  after  death"  {Life  in  the  Homeric  Age  (1908), 
P-  469). 

1  For  the  Greek  view  of  the  underworld,  and  the  incoming  of  the  idea 
of  rewards  and  punishments  in  the  after  life,  see  Schmidt,  Die  Ethik  der 
alien  Griechen  (1882),  Bd.  i,  S.  97  ff.,  and  Rhode,  Psyche:  Seelencult  und 
Unsterblichkeits  Glaube  der  Griechen,  4te  Auflage,  Bd.  i,  S.  301-319. 

2  This  moralization  of  Hades  is  carried  still  further  by  Vergil.  It  is 
instructive  to  compare  his  vision  of  Hades  with  Homer's. 

8  Republic,  x.  614-616;  see  also  Gorgias,  523-527. 


THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  HELLAS      189 

conception  of  hell,  were  the  work  of  a  gradually  clarifying 
moral  sense,  and  bear  witness  to  the  progressive  develop- 
ment of  Greek  ethical  thought  between  the  Homeric  and  the 
Alexandrian  Age. 

The  early  Greeks  held  a  doctrine  known  as  the  Envy  of  The  evoiu- 
the  Gods.  They  imagined  that  the  gods  were  envious  of  the  doctrine  of 
great  and  prosperous.  Hence  they  thought  it  was  the  envy  jJJJJStf 
of  the  gods  which  brought  about  the  undoing  of  the  great  Nemesis 
and  powerful.  Their  prayer  for  a  friend  enjoying  an  unusual 
run  of  good  fortune  was,  "  May  the  gods  not  become  envious." 
We  find  this  doctrine  embodied  in  the  Herodotean  story  of 
Crcesus,  king  of  Lydia,  whose  long  career  of  unbroken  and 
dazzling  prosperity  ends  at  last  in  dreadful  reverses  and 
sudden  downfall. *  The  same  belief  colors  the  advice  which 
Herodotus  represents  Artabanus,  the  uncle  of  Xerxes,  as 
giving  the  king,  who  was  meditating  an  attack  on  the  Greek, 
cities.  The  immoderate  ambition  of  the  king,  in  view  of  the 
envious  nature  of  the  gods,  had  awakened  the  apprehension 
of  the  old  and  experienced  counselor,  and  he  labored  to  dis- 
suade the  king  from  engaging  in  so  vast  a  project.  "  Dost  thou 
not  notice,"  said  he,  "  how  the  lightning  smites  always  the 
highest  buildings  and  the  tallest  trees.  Thus  often  the  mighty 
host  is  overthrown  by  lightning  sent  by  the  jealous  gods  ;  for 
the  gods  are  jealous  of  mortals,  and  will  allow  no  one  unduly 
to  exalt  himself."  2  There  is  here  no  suggestion  of  an  ethical 
element.  The  envious  gods  overthrow  things  simply  and  solely 
because  they  are  big  and  tall  and  cast  them  into  the  shade. 

At  a  still  later  period  the  Athenian  general  Nicias  gives 
memorable  expression  to  this  belief  in  his  speech  to  his 

1  Herod,  i.  30-32.  But  Nemesis  appears  later  in  the  story,  and  Croesus 
is  represented  as  being  punished  for  the  crime  of  an  ancestor. 

2  Ibid.  vii.  10.  The  views  which  the  historian  here  attributes  to  the 
Persian  Artabanus  were  of  course  a  reflection  of  Greek  belief.  P'or  further 
instances  in  Greek  literature  of  the  conception  of  the  envy  of  the  gods, 
consult  Schmidt,  Die  Ethik  der  alien  Griechen  (1882),  Bd.  i,  S.  78-84. 


190  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

disheartened  troops  before  Syracuse.  He  bade  them  take 
cheer  from  their  wretched  plight  because  the  envious  gods 
must  certainly  be  disarmed  by  the  sight  of  their  woeful  con- 
dition and  would  now  pity  and  help.1 

But  alongside  this  unethical  doctrine  of  the  Envy  of  the 
Gods  the  Greeks  held  another,  which  seems  to  have  been 
simply  a  modification  and  outgrowth  of  the  earlier  crude  con- 
ception of  deity.  This  was  the  doctrine  of  Nemesis.  There 
was  here  full  recognition  of  the  vicissitudes  of  human  life. 
The  great  and  the  overpowerful  are  indeed  destroyed  by  the 
gods, —  there  was  no  denying  the  fact, —  but  not  merely  be- 
cause they  are  great,  but  because  their  greatness  and  their 
prosperity  has  made  them  self-confident,  insolent,  overbearing. 
In  their  blind  arrogance  they  have  overstepped  the  limits  of 
moderation  ;  hence  their  downfall  wrought  by  the  gods. 

It  was  under  the  spell  of  this  belief  that  Herodotus  wrote 
his  history  of  the  Persian  wars,  although,  as  we  have  seen,  he 
loved  to  rehearse  stories  which  illustrated  the  doctrine  of  the 
envious  nature  of  the  gods.  His  narrative  is  in  truth  a  great 
historical  drama  illustrating  the  moral  order  of  the  world  and 
teaching  the  impressive  lesson  of  how  the  gods  punish  pre- 
sumptuous pride  and  overvaulting  ambition.  The  historian 
prepares  his  pious  readers  for  the  final  catastrophe  by  show- 
ing in  vivid  portrayal  the  transactions  at  the  Hellespont.  The 
swift  current  of  the  strait  has  broken  the  bridge  of  boats  laid 
upon  the  waters  by  Xerxes.  The  all-powerful  and  audacious 
king  orders  that  the  sacred  Hellespont  be  scourged  with  three 
hundred  lashes,  that  fetters  be  cast  into  the  rebellious  waters, 
and  that  they  be  branded  as  a  slave  is  marked  with  branding 
irons.  All  this  is  done,  and  the  treacherous  waters  are  cursed 
with  blasphemous  words. 

Now  follows  quickly  the  tragic  issue  at  Salamis  of  the  vast 
undertaking,  and  the  return  passage  of  the  Hellespont  a  few 
months  later  by  the  humbled  and  fugitive  king.    All  this  is 

1  Thucyd.  vii.  77. 


THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  HELLAS      191 

the  work  of  Nemesis,  the  punisher  of  those  who  have  lifted 
up  their  hearts  in  insufferable  pride  and  arrogance. 

It  is  not  alone  in  the  dramatized  history  of  Herodotus  that 
we  are  able  to  trace  the  moral  effects  of  the  Persian  wars  in 
bringing  into  the  foreground  of  the  Greek  consciousness  the 
conception  of  Nemesis  as  the  vindicator  of  the  moral  govern- 
ment of  the  world.  "  After  the  battle  of  Salamis,"  in  the 
words  of  the  historian  Abbott,  "the  instability  of  human 
greatness  and  the  punishment  of  '  insolence '  echoes  as  an 
undertone  through  all  Greek  thought."  * 

This  deepened  moral  feeling  of  the  nation  found  expres- 
sion both  in  art  and  in  the  drama.  The  order  given  by  the 
Athenians  to  Phidias  to  carve  a  statue  of  Nemesis  as  a 
memorial  of  the  war  was  a  sanction  of  that  interpretation  of 
the  Persian  overthrow  which  made  it  the  work  of  the  aveng- 
ing goddess.  But  the  fullest  expression  of  this  new  ethical 
sentiment  is  found  in  Athenian  tragedy.2  ^Eschylus  was  the 
representative  of  this  moral  awakening  and  advance.  The 
doctrine  of  Nemesis  colors  all  his  dramas.  He  was  the  first 
to  give  to  the  legend  of  Niobe,  originally  merely  a  tale  of  the 
envy  of  Apollo,  an  ethical  meaning  as  an  instance  of  "retri- 
bution for  presumptuous  sin."  3  His  imperishable  tragedy 
Prometheus  Bound  makes  the  sufferings  of  the  Titan  to  be 
but  the  just  penalty  of  his  presumption  and  self-will.  His 
Agamemnon  depicts  with  tragic  intensity  the  awful  vengeance 
with  which  the  implacable  goddess  punishes  unnatural  crime. 
His  Persians  teaches  how  Nemesis  humbles  insolent  pride 
and  "  Zeus  tames  excessive  lifting  up  of  heart." 


1  Pericles  (1890),  p.  312. 

2  "  The  very  event  [the  Persian  war]  which  determined  the  sudden  splen- 
dor of  the  drama  gave  a  sublime  and  terrific  sanction  to  the  already  exist- 
ing morality."  —  Symonds,  Studies  of  the  Greek  Poets  (1880),  vol.  ii,  p.  17. 

8  Farnell,  The  Cults  of  the  Greek  States  (1896),  vol.  i,  p.  129.  After  the 
tale  had  been  moralized  by  ^schylus,  Phidias  carved  the  story  on  the  great 
Zeus  throne  at  Olympia,  using  it  to  give  emphasis  to  the  conception  of  the 
god  as  the  guardian  of  the  moral  order  of  the  world. 


192 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


Further 
moraliza- 
tion  of  the 
doctrine  of 
Nemesis 


In  the  later  Thucydides  we  meet  with  the  same  teaching 
concerning  the  moral  government  of  the  world.  In  a  memo- 
rable passage  of  his  History  of  the  Peloponnesian  War  the 
historian  becomes  the  moralist  and  gives  his  reader  a  tragic 
illustration  of  the  workings  of  the  law  of  Nemesis.  Thucydides 
is  approaching  the  chapter  in  his  history  which  depicts  the 
terrible  catastrophe  which  befell  the  Athenians  in  Sicily.  He 
skillfully  foreshadows  the  coming  tragedy  by  preluding  his 
narrative  of  the  Sicilian  Expedition  with  an  account  of  the 
arrogant  and  wicked  conduct  of  the  Athenians  in  driving 
the  Melians  from  their  island  home  and  adding  the  stolen 
land  to  their  own  empire.1  This  high-handed  crime,  like  the 
impiety  of  the  presumptuous  Mede  at  the  Hellespont,  arouses 
the  avenging  Nemesis.  The  reader  forecasts  the  future,  and 
in  the  cruel  fate  of  the  Melians  reads  the  doom  of  the 
Athenian  army  before  Syracuse. 

This  moralizing  of  the  primitive  unethical  conception  of 
the  gods  as  envious  and  unjust,  and  the  evolving  therefrom 
of  the  morally  advanced  doctrine  of  Nemesis,  is  an  instructive 
illustration  of  how,  as  time  passed,  Greek  ethical  feeling  was 
deepened  and  Greek  ethical  thought  was  purified  and  elevated 
through  intellectual  progress  and  the  teachings  of  experience.2 

There  was  a  still  further  evolution  of  Greek  ethical  thought 
along  the  line  traced  above.  The  mutations  and.  tragedies  of 
life,  —  terrible  reverses  of  fortune,  sudden  loss  of  reputation 
and  friends,  irremediable  ruin  following  great  prosperity,  — 
these  things  are  by  a  truer  moral  insight  recognized  as  the 
sign  neither  of  the  envy  nor  of  the  righteous  anger  of  the 
gods,  but  of  the  divine  pity  and  love.3  "  The  wholesomeness 

1  Thucyd.  v.  84-116. 

2  The  attitude  of  the  later  philosophers  toward  the  notion  that  the  gods 
are  envious  is  fairly  represented  by  Plato's  protest:  "He  [the  Creator]  is 
good,  and  no  goodness  can  have  any  jealousy  of  anything"  {Timceus,  tr. 
Jowett,  29). 

3  "  The  dispensation  which  takes  the  aspect  of  divine  envy  to  mortals 
might,  it  seems,  from  a  higher  point  of  view,  be  discerned  as  the  very 


THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  HELLAS      193 

of  punishment  for  the  wrongdoer  himself  is  the  crown  of 
^Eschylean  ethics."  *  Phidias  taught  the  same  lofty  truth 
through  carving  the  myth  of  Prometheus  Unbound  on  the 
throne  of  his  Olympian  Zeus.  It  spoke,  as  no  other  scene 
wrought  there,  of  the  moral  significance  of  suffering,  of  di- 
vine mercy  and  deliverance.2  And  Plato's  philosophy  accords 
with  the  ^Eschylean  teaching  that  M  Zeus  has  put  in  suffering 
sovereign  instruction."  M  Then  this  must  be  our  notion  of  the 
just  man,"  he  says,  "  that  even  when  he  is  in  poverty  or  sick- 
ness or  any  other  seeming  misfortune,  all  things  will  in  the 
end  work  together  for  good  to  him  in  life  and  death."  3 

In  this  ethical  interpretation  of  the  vicissitudes  of  human 
life,  of  the  miscarriage  of  ambitious  plans,  the  wrecking  of 
high  hopes,  the  Greek  thinkers  reached  at  last  the  same  ele- 
vated point  of  view  that  was  attained  by  the  great  prophets 
of  the  Hebrew  race.4 

In  the  ethics  of  war  a  similar  though  less  marked  develop-  The  ame- 
ment  in  moral  feeling  is  traceable.    Aside  from  the  relapse  war  rules 
into  the  practices  of  savagery  under  the  malign  influence  of  tices**0" 
the  Peloponnesian  War,  there  was  throughout  Greek  history 
a  slow  but  steady  amelioration  of  the  primitive  barbarities  of 
warfare.    In  the  Homeric  Age  moral  feeling  had  hardly  be- 
gun to  exercise  its  influence  in  humanizing  war  and  in  setting 
limits  to  the  rights  of  the  conqueror.    The  Greeks  of  Homer 
were  in  some  respects  almost  on  the  level  of  savages  in  their 
war  practices.    The  life  of  the  captive  was  in  the  hands  of 
his  captor,  and  he  might  be  slain  without  offense  to  the  com- 
mon conscience.    Women  and  children  were,  as  a  matter  of 

opposite ;  human  vicissitude  is  the  result  of  a  divine  love  anxious  to  share 
the  true  blessedness  which  comes  in  the  form  of  sorrow."  —  Wedgwood, 
The  Moral  Ideal,  3d  ed.,  p.  112. 

1  Taylor,  Ancient  Ideals  (1896),  vol.  i,  p.  227. 

2  Farnell,  The  Cults  of  the  Greek  States  (1891),  vol.  i,  p.  129. 

3  Republic,  tr.  Jowett,  x.  613. 

4  See  James  Adam,  The  Vitality  of  Plaionism  (191 1),  chap,  v.  Ancient 
Greek  Views  of  Suffering  and  Evil." 


194  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

course,  appropriated  by  the  conqueror  or  sold  into  slavery. 
Homer  relates  as  something  to  be  gloried  in,  how  his  hero 
Achilles  dragged  the  body  of  Hector  around  the  walls  of 
Troy.  Such  an  act  of  savagery  evidently  stirred  in  the  poet's 
listeners  no  feelings  of  reprobation.1 

In  the  historical  period  the  mitigation  of  the  barbarities  of 
war  was,  after  the  protection  of  the  sanctuary  of  Apollo  at 
Delphi,  a  chief  object  of  the  celebrated  Amphictyonic  League. 
The  oath  taken  by  the  members  of  the  league  included  the  fol- 
lowing engagement:  "We  will  not  destroy  any  Amphictyonic 
town,  nor  cut  it  off  from  running  water,  in  war  or  in  peace." 
This  was  one  of  the  most  noteworthy  efforts  in  antiquity  to 
lay  restraint  upon  the  primitive  license  of  war.  Limits  are  set 
to  the  rights  of  the  conqueror.  War  begins  to  have  rules. 

From  the  words  which  Thucydides  puts  into  the  mouth  of 
the  Plataeans  at  the  beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  War, 
we  gather  that  at  that  time  the  common  sentiment  of  Hellas 
condemned  the  slaughter  of  prisoners  of  war.2  At  Athens  this 
sentiment  had  found  embodiment  in  the  laws,  which  forbade 
the  slaying  of  war  captives.  But  under  the  demoralizing 
influences  of  the  long  and  bitter  struggle  between  Sparta  and 
Athens,  the  little  gain  which  had  been  made  in  the  humaniz- 
ing of  war  during  the  preceding  centuries  was  lost.  Prisoners 
of  war  were  sold  into  slavery  or  killed  without  the  least 
offense  being  given  to  the  numbed  conscience  of  Hellas.3 
Even  the  terrible  massacre,  toward  the  end  of  the  war,  of  the 
four  thousand  Athenian  prisoners  at  ^Egospotami,  by  the 
Spartan  Lysander,  awakened  no  protest  in  Greece  at  large.4 

1  When  we  contrast  with  this  Sophocles'  treatment  of  the  same  theme 
in  Antigone  we  realize  how  great  an  advance  during  the  interval  the  Greeks 
had  made  in  humanitarian  feeling. 

2  See  Thucyd.  iii.  53-59. 

8  The  Spartan  admiral  Callicratides  (the  successor  of  Lysander,  406  B.C.) 
refused  to  sell  his  Greek  prisoners  of  war  as  slaves,  but  he  stood  almost  or 
quite  alone  in  this.    See  Xen.  Hellen.  i.  6,  14. 

4  Mahaffy,  Social  Life  in  Greece  (1888),  p.  235. 


THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  HELLAS      195 

Never  has  "  the  moral  damage  of  war  "  had  a  more  tragic 
illustration.1 

During  the  century  following  the  Peloponnesian  War,  how- 
ever, there  seems  to  have  been  a  positive  advance  in  this 
domain.  In  this  period  the  grosser  atrocities  of  war  were  in 
a  measure  mitigated  by  a  growing  humanitarian  sentiment. 
But  all  efforts  to  humanize  war  seem  to  have  been  limited  to 
wars  between  Greek  and  Greek.  From  first  to  last  in  Greek 
history  war  against  barbarians  was  waged  practically  without 
the  least  mitigation  of  its  primitive  barbarities.  It  was  the 
practice  of  Alexander  the  Great  in  his  campaigns  in  Asia  to 
massacre  the  men  of  non-Greek  cities  taken  by  assault,  and 
to  sell  the  women  and  children  as  slaves.  We  hear  no  protest, 
even  on  the  part  of  the  philosophers,  against  these  atrocities 
so  long  as  it  is  non-Greeks  who  are  the  victims  of  them. 

But  though  the  efforts  of  the  Greeks  to  regulate  and  limit 
the  rights  of  the  conqueror  were  confined  to  wars  of  Greek 
against  Greek,  still  these  efforts  are  significant  as  a  sign  of 
an  awakening  ethical  sentiment  in  this  domain.  This  is  a 
prophecy  of  a  future  day,  distant  though  it  be,  when  the 
growing  conscience  of  mankind  shall  have  rendered  wars 
between  civilized  nations  an  impossible  crime. 

The  common  Greek  conscience  never  condemned  war  in  Efforts  to 
itself.  There  never  sprang  up  in  Greece  an  agitation  like  the  £y  Irbitra-1 
Peace  Movement  of  to-day  in  Christendom.  How  deeply  in- 
grained in  the  Greek  mind  was  the  conviction  that  war  is  a 
part  of  the  established  order  of  things  is  shown  by  the  fact 
that  their  treaties  ending  open  hostilities  were  ordinarily  drawn 
for  a  limited  term  of  years.  They  were  merely  truces,  as 
though  peace  were  only  an  incident  in  international  relations. 

1  The  war  brought  into  fearful  exaggeration  the  salient  weakness  of  Greek 
morality.  The  most  reprehensible  moral  faults  of  the  Greeks  were  the  out- 
growth of  political  factions  and  cabals,  of  party  jealousies  and  rivalries  in  the 
close  quarters  of  city  walls.  These  faults  were  lifted  into  the  most  savage 
passions  by  the  war.  Thucydides  in  a  memorable  passage  (iii.  82)  draws  a 
striking  picture  of  the  disastrous  moral  effects  of  the  prolonged  quarrel. 


tion 


196  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

Even  the  philosophers  regarded  a  state  of  war  as  the  nor- 
mal and  natural  relation  of  Hellenes  and  barbarians.  Aristotle, 
as  we  have  seen,  taught  that  barbarians  might,  without  moral 
scruple,  be  hunted  like  wild  animals.1  Plato  had  no  word  of 
condemnation  of  war  by  Greek  against  non-Greek.  But  the 
Greeks  had  an  uneasy  feeling  respecting  the  rightfulness  of 
war  between  Greek  and  Greek  ;  and  there  came  a  time  when 
the  best-instructed  conscience  of  Greece  positively  denounced 
wars  of  this  kind.  Plato  condemned  wars  between  Hellenes 
and  Hellenes  as  unnatural.2  This  feeling  had  a  kind  of 
restraining  influence  upon  the  Greek  cities,  and  there  are 
many  instances  of  arbitration  in  Greek  history.  Sometimes 
a  single  person  of  eminence  acted  as  mediator ;  but  oftener 
some  city  or  league  like  the  Delphian  Amphictyony  was 
chosen  as  the  arbitrator.  In  the  Hellenistic  Age  the  Roman 
Senate  frequently  undertook  the  commission  of  arbitrating 
quarrels.  The  cities  concerned  were  sometimes  bound  by 
oath  or  by  a  deposit  of  money  to  abide  by  the  decision. 
Oftener,  however,  the  decisions  rendered,  like  those  by  the 
Hague  Tribunal  of  to-day,  depended  for  their  execution  upon 
the  good  will  and  honor  of  the  states  concerned.  There  are 
instances  recorded  where  one  or  both  of  the  parties  refused 
to  abide  by  the  judgment  of  the  arbitrator.3 

Various  motives,  it  is  true,  were  at  work  in  these  arbitra- 
tion treaties,  but  the  ethical  motive  was  certainly  operative  to 
a  greater  or  less  degree.  There  was  not  lacking  the  feeling, 
vague  though  it  may  have  been,  which  was  later  given  ex- 
plicit expression  by  Plato,  that  war  between  Greek  and  Greek 
was  wrong  and  a  crime  against  Hellenic  civilization. 

But  the  most  interesting  and  instructive  of  all  the  measures 
taken  by  the  Greeks  to  limit  wars  among  themselves  or  to 
fence  them  away  from  a  given  district  was  the  consecration, 

1  See  above,  p.  180.  2  Republic,  v.  469-471. 

8  Hobhouse,  Morals  in  Evolution  (1906),  vol.  i,  p.  267 ;  see  also 
A.  Raeder,  V Arbitrage  international  chez  les  Hellenes  (1912). 


THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  HELLAS      197 

by  common  consent  and  agreement,  of  the  land  of  Elis  — 
wherein  was  situated  the  sacred  Olympia — to  perpetual  peace 
and  the  establishment  of  a  truce  of  forty  days,  embracing  the 
festival  period  of  the  Olympian  games,  during  which  it  was 
sacrilegious  for  one  Greek  city  to  make  war  upon  another. 
With  true  vision  the  philosopher-historian  Laurent  sees  in 
the  little  land  of  Elis,  inviolable  as  a  temple,  a  prophecy  of 
the  time  when  the  whole  earth  shall  be  consecrated  to  per- 
petual peace  —  an  ideal  toward  which  humanity  unceasingly 
advances.1 

From  no  other  personage  in  history,  aside  from  the  found-  Socrates 
ers  of  unfversal  religions,  has  there  flowed  such  a  stream  of  relation  to 
moral  influence  as  issued  from  the  life  and  teachings  of  moment 
Socrates,  the  son  of  Sophroniscus.  All  the  chief  ethical 
systems  of  the  Greco- Roman  world  were  the  development  of 
germs  found  in  his  doctrines.  The  Cyrenaic  and  Eleatic,  the 
Cynic,  Stoic,  and  Epicurean,  the  Platonic,  Neoplatonic,  and 
Aristotelian  systems  had  their  sources  here.  The  Stoic  and 
Neoplatonic  systems  contributed  important  elements  to  early 
Christian  ethics,  while  the  Aristotelian  system  exercised  a 
profound  influence  upon  the  scholastic  ethics  of  medieval 
times.  In  the  contribution  which  these  various  systems, 
especially  the  Stoic,  have  made  to  the  world's  common  fund 
of  ethical  thought  and  feeling  is  found  in  large  part  the 
measure  of  the  ethical  debt  which  modern  civilization  owes 
to  Hellenism. 

1  Etudes  sur  Phistoire  de  humanite  (1880),  t.  ii,  p.  105.  Because  of  its 
long  exemption  from  the  ravages  of  war,  Elis  was  more  populous  and 
wealthy  than  any  other  district  of  the  Peloponnesus  {Polyb.  iv.  73,  74). 
The  contrast  presented  by  Greece  in  general  constituted  an  impressive 
commentary  on  the  fatal  consequences  for  Greek  civilization  of  the  war 
system.  Speaking  of  the  depopulation  which  incessant  wars  had  caused 
over  almost  all  the  world  he  knew,  Plutarch  says  of  Greece,  a  land  once 
"  strong  in  cities,"  that  the  whole  country  could  raise  barely  three  thousand 
men,  the  same  number  that  the  single  city  of  Megara  sent  to  Plataea  at 
the  time  of  the  Persian  war  {Philosophical  Essays,  *"  On  the  Cessation  of 
Oracles,"  sec.  viii). 


i 


198  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

Socrates'  aim  was  to  replace  the  artificial  conventional 
conscience  of  his  contemporaries  by  a  natural  rational  con- 
science ;  in  other  words,  to  replace  customary  communal 
morality  by  reflective  individual  morality.1  His  fundamental 
doctrine  was  that  virtue  is  dependent  upon  knowledge ;  indeed 
he  almost  or  quite  made  knowledge  and  virtue  one  and  the 
same  thing.  He  maintained  that  one  can  no  more  see  the 
right  without  doing  it  than  one  can  see  a  proposition  to  be 
true  without  believing  it.  Therefore  without  knowledge  — 
insight  —  there  can  be  no  true  virtue.2 

But  clearness  of  vision  requires  the  purification  of  the 
intellect,  the  getting  rid  of  all  false  intellectual  and  moral 
notions ;  hence  the  aim  and  purpose  of  Socrates'  unique 
method  of  cross-examination  was  to  show  his  interlocutor  the 
baseless  and  mutually  contradictory  character  of  his  inherited 
chance-acquired  ideas  and  beliefs,  and  to  bring  him  to  that 
self-knowledge  which  is  the  beginning  of  real  knowledge.3 

This  practical  identification  by  Socrates  of  knowledge  and 
virtue,  this  doctrine  of  his  that  it  is  impossible  that  one 
should  not  will  to  do  that  which  he  sees  to  be  good  and 

1  See  above,  p.  18. 

2  "  Really  to  see  the  good  and  to  know  it  as  such,  yet  not  to  love  and 
pursue  it,  is  impossible ;  the  vision  carries  with  it  its  own  persuasion  and 
authority."  —  Martineau,  Types  of  Ethical  Theory,  3d  ed.,  vol.  i,  p.  74. 
M  Mere  school  and  word  knowledge,  of  course,  is  powerless,  but  real  knowl- 
edge, knowledge  that  represents  real  personal  conviction,  cannot  fail  to 
influence  life."  —  Paulsen,  System  of  Ethics,  tr.  Thilly  (1906),  p.  62. 

8  M  There  are  few  men  whose  minds  are  not  more  or  less  in  that  state 
of  sham  knowledge  against  which  Sokrates  made  war ;  there  is  no  man 
whose  notions  have  not  been  first  got  together  by  spontaneous,  unexamined, 
unconscious,  uncertified  association  —  resting  upon  forgotten  particulars, 
blending  together  disparities  or  inconsistencies,  and  leaving  in  his  mind 
old  and  familiar  phrases  and  oracular  propositions,  of  which  he  has  never 
rendered  to  himself  account ;  there  is  no  man,  who,  if  he  be  destined  for 
vigorous  and  profitable  scientific  effort,  has  not  found  it  a  necessary  branch 
of  self-education  to  break  up,  disentangle,  analyse,  and  reconstruct  this 
ancient  mental  compound,  and  who  has  not  been  driven  to  it  by  his  own 
lame  and  solitary  efforts,  since  the  giant  of  the  colloquial  Elenchus  no 
longer  stands  in  the  market  place  to  lend  him  help  and  stimulus."  —  Grote, 
History  of  Greece  (1888),  vol.  vii,  pp.  168  f. 


THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  HELLAS      199 

right,  overlooks  the  saddest  and  yet  most  certain  fact  of  human 
experience,  namely,  that  perversity  of  the  human  will  which 
causes  man  though  seeing  the  good  to  choose  the  evil.  But 
it  is  a  theory  of  human  nature  which,  in  the  case  of  such 
happily  constituted  souls  as  Socrates,  in  whom  the  authority 
of  conscience  is  sacrosanct  and  inviolable,  is  nearly  or  quite 
accordant  with  fact.  With  such  persons  to  see  an  act  to  be 
right  is  to  do  it.  With  them  dissonance  between  knowledge 
and  volition  is  a  moral  impossibility. 

Right  here,  however,  a  just  criticism  may  be  made  of  the 
Socratic  philosophy.  It  is  true  that  without  self-knowledge, 
without  the  fulfilling  of  the  Delphian  requirement,  M  Know 
thyself,"  one  cannot  be  truly  moral.  But  neither  Socrates 
nor  the  Greek  philosophers  in  general  recognized  that  this 
self-knowledge  comes  through  right  living  rather  than  through 
right  thinking.  As  Goethe  discerningly  observes,  man  comes 
to  know  himself  not  through  reflection  but  through  conduct : 
"  Do  your  duty  and  thou  wilt  know  what  thou  art."  * 

And  for  the  common  moral  life  of  the  world  there  is  a 
profound  teaching  in  this  Socratic  doctrine  which  makes 
knowledge  the  spring  of  virtue.2  There  is  in  knowledge, 
in  insight,  in  the  clear  recognition  of  the  relation  of  man's 
highest  good  to  virtue,  an  impelling  force  and  authority.  As 
the  world  advances  in  true  knowledge,  it  will  advance  in  true 
morality.  The  Renaissance  is  ever  the  precursor  of  the 
Reformation.  It  is  this  fact  which  should  make  optimists  of 
us  all,  for  the  unceasing  advance  of  the  world  in  knowledge 
is  well  assured. 

In  the  ethical  system  of  Socrates  we  have  a  good  illustra- 
tion of  the  truth  that  great  men  are  the  product  of  their 
age.    With  all  his  originality  and  profound  spiritual  insight, 

1  Quoted  by  Schmidt,  Die  Ethik  der  alten  Griechen  (1882),  Bd.  ii,  S.  396. 

2  "  His  [Socrates']  significancy  for  moral  philosophy  lies  in  his  calling 
attention  to  rational  knowledge  as  the  source  of  the  moral."  —  Wuttke, 
Christian  Ethics  (1873),  v°l-  **  P-  &9- 


200  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

Socrates  could  not  and  did  not  rise  much  above  the  plane 
of  the  common  moral  consciousness  of  his  contemporaries. 
He  stood  on  essentially  Greek  ground.  His  morality  was 
the  morality  of  his  time  and  place.  In  his  practical  code  of 
morals  he  made  the  Greek  virtue  of  self-control  or  modera- 
tion a  cardinal  virtue ;  he  laid  the  Greek  emphasis  upon  the 
civic  virtues,  dying  rather  than  disobey  or  evade  the  decree  of 
his  city ;  he  entertained  the  common  Greek  ideas  respecting 
the  family  and  the  domestic  virtues ;  he  saw  nothing  to  disap- 
prove in  the  life  of  the  hetaera ;  he  viewed  the  beautiful  from 
a  standpoint  wholly  Greek,  almost  identifying  beauty  with 
goodness  ;  he  was  thoroughly  Greek  in  the  aristocratic  tend- 
ency of  his  ethical  teachings,  making  the  practice  of  true 
virtue  the  prerogative  of  the  cultured  class  alone ;  he  had 
the  ordinary  Greek  conscience  in  regard  to  slavery;  and  he 
never  detached  himself  from  that  narrow  Greek  prejudice 
which  saw  in  the  Hellenes  the  elect  race.  He  never  pro- 
claimed, as  did  many  a  later  Greek  and  Roman  moralist, 
the  essential  unity  of  the  human  race. 

piato  and  Socrates  made  virtue  and  man's  moral  nature  the  subject 

system1Ca     of  philosophic  reflection.    His  pupil,  Plato,  systematized  his 

master's  teachings,  and,  reducing  these  and  the   common 

ethical  notions  of  his  time  to  scientific  form   laid  the  basis 

of  the  science  of  ethics. 

Plato  agreed  with  Socrates  in  teaching  that  to  know  the 
good  is  necessarily  to  seek  it.  He  accordingly  makes  wisdom 
the  first  of  the  virtues,  by  wisdom  meaning  insight,  the  clear 
recognition  of  what  constitutes  the  highest  good.  Issuing 
from  this  primary  virtue  of  wisdom,  like  a  stream  from  a 
fountain,  are  the  virtues  of  courage,  temperance,  and  justice. 
From  wisdom  comes  courage,  for  perfect  knowledge  of 
good  and  evil  casts  out  fear ;  and  moderation,  for  knowledge 
of  higher  and  lower,  of  the  penalty  that  awaits  all  excess, 
leads  to  prudence  and  self-control ;  and  justice,  for  knowledge 


THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  HELLAS     201 

of  one's  relations  to  one's  fellows  creates  consideration  for  the 
rights  of  others.  Plato  here  simply  systematizes  and  reduces 
to  scientific  form  those  various  virtues  which  the  common 
Greek  conscience  recognized  as  constituting  moral  excellence. 

Particularly  noteworthy  is  Plato's  doctrine  that  virtue  in 
the  state  is  the  same  as  virtue  in  the  individual.  There  is 
need  of  emphasis  being  laid  anew  upon  this  teaching  at  the 
present  time,  when  the  disciples  of  Machiavelli  would  give 
fresh  vogue  to  the  doctrine  of  a  double  standard  of  morality, 
one  for  the  individual  and  another  for  the  state.  The  modern 
world  might  well  sit  at  Plato's  feet  and  learn  that  virtue  is 
ever  one  and  the  same,  and  that  the  moral  law  can  no  more 
be  traversed  with  impunity  by  a  nation  than  by  a  single 
individual. 

In  many  of  his  ethical  teachings  Plato  anticipated  and 
deeply  influenced  Christian  doctrines.  He  has  been  called 
the  precursor  of  the  Fathers  of  the  Church.  "His  ideas  on 
virtue,"  as  Denis  observes,  "take  us  far  from  Greece  and 
antiquity ;  they  seem  addressed  rather  to  the  saints  and  an- 
chorites than  to  the  citizens  of  Sparta  and  Athens."  *  His 
doctrines  that  the  way  of  approach  to  God  is  through  con- 
templation ;  that  withdrawal  from  the  turmoil  of  public  life 
is  a  furtherance  of  the  true  life ;  that  the  body  is  a  "  prison 
house  "  of  the  soul ;  that  the  soul  is  immortal  and  that  there 
awaits  it  in  the  after  life  recompense  for  deeds  done  in  the 
flesh ;  that  expiation  for  sin  is  an  ethical  necessity  ;  that 
punishment  is  not  a  deterrent  and  restraint  but  a  remedy 
that  restores  to  health  the  sin-diseased  soul2  —  all  these 
ideas  and  principles  were  in  exact  accord  with  the  Christian 
moral  consciousness,  and  through  St.  Augustine  and  other 
Fathers  of  the  Church  came  to  enrich  and  reenforce  the 
ethical  system  of  the  monastic  and  the  papal  Church  of  the 
medieval  age. 

1  Histoire  des  theories  et  des  idtes  morales  dans  Vantiquiti  (1879),  *•  h 
pp.  125  f.  2  Cf.  Gorgias,  478,  479. 


202  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

Perhaps  what  is  the  most  admirable  of  Plato's  teachings  is 
embodied  in  this  petition  :  M  And  may  I,  being  of  sound 
mind,  do  to  others  as  I  would  that  they  should  do  to  me."  1 
The  significance  of  this  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  is  a  prayer,  and 
that  the  petitioner  asks  that  he  may  be  of  sound  mind  when 
he  reflects  on  what  he  would  like  to  have  others  do  to  him. 

Yet  notwithstanding  the  loftiness  and  nobility  of  much  of 
Plato's  ethical  thought,  still,  like  Socrates,  he  stood  almost 
wholly  on  Greek  ground.  His  ethics  is  scarcely  more  than  a 
justification  of  the  common  Greek  morality  of  his  time.  He 
destroys  the  family  in  the  interest  of  the  state ;  he  approves 
of  the  exposition  of  ill-formed,  unpromising  infants ;  he 
makes  morality  to  be  a  class  thing  —  only  select  and  cultured 
souls  are  with  him  capable  of  genuine  virtue.  He  accepts 
slavery  as  a  necessary  institution  of  the  state ;  he  practically 
shuts  out  the  non-Greek  world  from  the  sphere  of  morality  ; 2 
and  with  the  common  Greek  he  believes  that  to  do  evil  to 
one's  enemies  is  an  imperative  duty.3  Nor  does  Plato,  like 
Hebrew  seer,  rise  high  enough  above  the  general  Greek 
viewpoint  to  discern  the  great  law  of  moral  progress,  and 
to  prevision  the  historical  goal  —  ethical  world  unity. 

Aristotle  Aristotle  makes   Plato's  classification  of  the  virtues  the 

ethics  basis  of  his  well-rounded  system  of  ethics.    In  one   impor- 

tant respect,  however,  he  differs  from  Plato ;  he  did  not  be- 
lieve that  knowledge  of  the  right  necessarily  leads  to  its 
practice.  He  recognized  the  fact  that  man  though  knowing 
the  good  often  perversely  follows  evil. 

The  great  defect  of  Aristotelian  ethics  is  its  failure  to  rise 
to  the  ethical  conception   of  collective  humanity.     In  the 

1  Laws,  tr.  Jowett,  xi.  913.  Plato  saw  what  the  socialist-philosopher 
Lloyd  saw  when  he  wrote,  M  More  searching  .  .  .  than  the  Golden  Rule 
is  that  which  commands  us  to  inquire  if  what  we  desire  for  ourselves  and 
others  is  a  right  desire  "  (Man  the  Social  Creator  (1906),  p.  147). 

2  In  the  Republic  Plato  reaches  the  conception  of  a  Greek  brotherhood, 
but  beyond  this  he  never  advanced.  8  Xen.  Mem.  ii.  6,  35. 


THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  HELLAS     203 

moral  inequality  of  men,  which  he  assumes  as  the  presuppo- 
sition of  his  ethics,  he  even  exaggerated  the  common  Greek 
view.  He  divided  men  so  rigorously  into  classes  with  varying 
grades  of  moral  capacity  that  his  moral  system  was  ethically 
like  the  caste  system  of  the  Indian  Brahmans.  To  affirm 
the  moral  equality  of  men  seemed  to  him  to  be  a  species 
of  treason  against  the  true  humanity,  a  crime  against  Greek 
civilization. 

According  to  Aristotle  the  slave  was  a  being  so  morally  dif- 
ferent from  the  freeman  as  to  constitute  practically  another 
species.  He  .was  not  wholly  incapable  of  virtue,  but  could 
practice  only  such  servile  virtues  as  obedience  and  humility. 
The  last,  though  a  virtue  in  a  slave,  was  in  a  freeman  an 
unworthy  weakness. 

Barbarians  were  slaves  by  nature.  Hence  it  was  right  for 
the  Greeks  to  make  war  on  them  and  reduce  them  to  slavery, 
because  "  for  that  end  they  were  born."  1  Plato  had  in  his 
Laws  accepted  slavery  as  a  political  necessity  ;  Aristotle  pro- 
claimed it  as  a  part  of  the  natural  order  of  things.  This  doc- 
trine had  far-reaching  historical  consequences.  Aristotle's 
declaration  that  slaves  are  merely  animated  instruments,  are 
men  incapable  of  virtue,  worked  as  powerfully  in  destroy- 
ing ancient  slavery  as  the  obiter  dictum  of  Chief  Justice 
Taney  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  in  the 
Dred  Scott  case,  that  negro  slaves  have  no  rights  which  the 
white  man  is  bound  to  respect,  worked  for  the  destruction 
of  negro  slavery  in  the  Southern  states.  For,  as  Professor 
Denis  says,  by  pushing  too  far  the  argument,  by  founding 
slavery  on  natural  right,  Aristotle  provoked  thought  and 
protest,  and  led  the  Stoics  to  reject  with  indignation  his 
theories  and  to  proclaim  the  moral  equality  of  master  and 
slave,  of  Greek  and  barbarian.2 

1  Politics,  i.  7,  sec.  5 ;  8,  sec.  12  ;  vii.  2,  sec.  15 ;   14,  sec.  21. 

2  Histoire  des  theories  et  des  idies  morales  dans  Pantiipiite  (1879),  t.  i, 
p.  228. 


204  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

Aristotle's  ethics  exercised  very  little  influence  either  upon 
the  actual  moral  life  or  the  ethical  speculations  of  antiquity ; 
but  in  the  medieval  time  it  came  to  exert  a  profound  influ- 
ence upon  Christian  ethics.1  The  schoolmen  made  it  the 
trunk  into  which  they  grafted  Christian  morals  —  with  incon- 
gruous results,  as  we  shall  see  later. 

Decay  of  The  political  revolution  in  Hellas  in  the  fourth  century 

city  state     B.C.  had  deep  import  for  Greek  morality.    That  century  saw 
accompany-  tne  triumph  of  Macedonia  over  the  Greek  cities.  This  meant 
the  GrCak°f  ^e  triumph  of  despotic  monarchy  over  city  democracy.   This 
ideal  of        revolution  in  the  political  realm  meant  a  great  revolution  in 
the  realm  of  morals,  for  the  reason  that,  as  we  have  seen, 
the  old  Greek  ideal  of  excellence  was  largely  based  upon  the 
relation  of  the  individual  to  the  state.    With  the  loss  of  Greek 
liberty  the  very  basis  of  the  Greek  ideal  of  character  was 
removed,  and  the  virtues  of  the  type  tended  to  disappear.2 
In  the  despotic  monarchies  of  the  successors  of  Alexander 
there  was  little  room  for  the  growth  and  exercise  of  those 
virtues  of  citizenship  which  had  been  nourished  in  the  free 
air  of  the  ancient  city.    The  virtues  now  in  vogue  and  fos- 
tered by  the  new  monarchical  regime  were  no  longer  those 
of  the  patriot  citizen  and  the  patriot  warrior,  but  those  of  the 
pliant  subject,  the  servile  courtier,  and  the  mercenary  soldier. 
In  Plutarch's  Lives,  out  of  the  twenty  heroes  and  worthies 
whom  the  biographer  selected  as  the  noblest  representatives 
of  the  virtues  most  highly  esteemed  by  the  Greeks,  we  find 
only  two  who  lived  after  the  general  loss  of  Greek  freedom, 

1  "  A  moral  ideal  which  was  not  coextensive  with  the  whole  spiritual 
nature  of  man  was  taken  by  the  schoolmen  from  the  Aristotelian  ethics, 
and  then  the  so-called  religious  virtues  were  more  or  less  cumbrously  and 
precariously  built  upon  it.  Supernaturalism  in  morals  was  added  to  the 
classic  naturalism  as  a  divine  appendix  to  ethics."  —  Newman  Smyth, 
Christian  Ethics  (1892),  p.  133. 

2  The  downfall  of  the  institutions  of  the  free  city  state  was  to  Greek 
morality  what  the  downfall  of  the  papal  Church  would  have  been  to  the 
morality  of  the  medieval  ages. 


THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  HELLAS     205 

and  these  x  were  men  whose  characters  were  formed  in  the 
cities  of  the  Achaean  League,  in  which  the  ancient  liberties 
of  Hellas  were  maintained  till  the  rise  of  the  Roman  power. 
It  could  not  be  otherwise,  so  completely  were  the  fortunes 
of  the  Greek  moral  ideal  bound  up  with  the  fortunes  of  the 
Greek  city  state. 

But  besides  the  decay  of  the  free  city  there  were  other 
causes  contributing  to  the  moral  decadence  which  marked 
Hellenism  in  the  Alexandrian  Age.  The  close  contact  of 
Greek  culture  with  the  corrupt  society  of  the  Orient  had 
disastrous  consequences  for  Greek  morality.  The  principal 
courts  of  the  Hellenistic  East  were  plague  spots  of  moral 
contagion.  The  virus  of  gross  sensual  immorality  was  com- 
municated to  Greece,  and  Greek  society  was  fatally  infected. 
The  Orontes  emptied  into  the  Ilissus  and  the  Eurotas,  as 
later  it  emptied  into  the  Tiber. 

And  still  another  contributing  cause  of  the  moral  decline 
in  Hellas  was  the  sudden  acquisition  of  vast  individual 
and  social  wealth  through  the  conquest  and  exploitation  of 
the  East.  The  morals  of  no  age  or  people  have  been  proof 
against  suddenly  acquired  riches.  One  explanation  of  this  is 
that  new  and  untried  sources  of  pleasure,  most  often  illicit 
sensuous  pleasure,  are  opened  up,  and  the  temptation  to  self- 
ish indulgence  is  irresistible,  coming  as  it  does  before  self- 
restraint,  in  the  face  of  these  unaccustomed  solicitations,  has 
become  a  habit. 

Still  another  cause  of  the  moral  degeneracy  of  the  age,  one 
which  we  shall  have  occasion  to  speak  of  more  at  length  a 
little  further  on,  is  to  be  sought  in  the  fact  that  the  period 
was  one  of  transition  in  religion  as  well  as  in  politics  and 
social  relations.  Greek  morality  was,  it  is  true,  based  in  the 
main  upon  the  old  system  of  independent  city  life.  Yet  Greek 
morality  was  in  a  way  braced  by  religion  and  even  in  part 
based  upon  it.    Now  in  the  Alexandrian  Age  the  religious 

1  Philopoeman  and  Aratus* 


206 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


Ethical 
products  of 
the  Hellen- 
istic Age : 
Stoicism 
and  Epicu- 
reanism 


system  of  Hellas  was  undergoing  a  process  of  disintegration. 
Men  were  losing  faith  in  their  ancestral  gods.  Philosophic 
skepticism  was  widespread.  Inevitably  this  movement  in  the 
religious  realm  caused  all  that  part  of  the  moral  system  de- 
pendent in  any  degree  upon  the  old  religious  doctrines  and 
teachings  to  weaken  and  crumble  away. 

There  were,  however,  two  ethical  products  of  the  Hellenistic 
Age  which  render  that  period  one  of  the  most  important  of 
all  epochs  in  the  moral  evolution  of  humanity.  These  were 
Stoicism  and  Epicureanism.  At  first  blush  it  may  seem 
strange  that  out  of  the  same  environment  there  should  arise 
two  systems  of  life  and  thought  so  strongly  contrasted.  But 
both  of  these  systems  are  perfectly  natural,  indeed  inevitable, 
products  of  an  epoch,  such  as  the  Alexandrian  Age  was,  of 
transition  and  moral  decadence.  In  such  times  strong,  self- 
reliant,  deeply  moral  natures  ever  seek  refuge  in  the  philos- 
ophy and  creed  of  Zeno,  while  those  of  less  sturdy  faith  in 
the  moral  order  of  the  world,  of  a  less  strong  sense  of  duty, 
turn  to  the  philosophy  and  creed  of  Epicurus. 

Springing  up  in  Greece  as  an  offshoot  of  the  Socratic  phi- 
losophy just  after  the  death  of  Alexander,  Stoicism  became  the 
creed  of  the  select  spirits  of  the  age.  The  crowning  virtues 
of  the  moral  ideal  it  held  aloft  were  self-control,  imperturba- 
bility, the  patient  endurance  of  the  ills  of  life.  Amidst  the 
wreck  of  worlds  one  must  stand  unmoved  and  erect. 

In  the  very  rigid  restraint  it  placed  upon  the  appetites, 
passions,  and  emotions  the  Stoic  ideal  of  character  differed 
widely  from  the  ordinary  Greek  ideal.  It  approached  here 
the  ascetic  type.1  However,  in  general  the  Stoic  type  of  char- 
acter was  closely  related  to  the  historic  ideal  of  the  Greek 
race.  The  Stoics  adopted  the  fundamental  maxim  of  classi- 
cal Greek  morality,  namely,  that  man  should  live  conformably 


1  This  ascetic  tendency  in  Stoicism  is  doubtless  to  be  attributed  to  the 
influence  of  the  Orient  upon  Greek  life  and  thought. 


THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  HELLAS     207 

to  nature.  They  possessed  the  common  Greek  consciousness 
in  the  light  esteem  in  which  they  held  the  family  relations 
and  duties.  They  were  aristocratic  in  their  moral  sympathies 
and  looked  upon  the  multitude  with  disdain.  They  regarded 
the  gentler  virtues,  compassion  and  forgiveness,  as  weak- 
nesses, and  ranked  humility  as  a  virtue  only  in  the  slave. 

Because  of  the  weak  sense  of  duty  possessed  in  general 
by  the  Greeks,  the  Stoic  ideal  of  character  did  not  become 
a  really  important  factor  in  the  ethical  life  of  the  ancient 
world  till  after  its  adoption  by  the  finer  spirits,  like  Mar- 
cus Aurelius,  among  the  Romans,  to  whose  sense  of  M  the 
majesty  of  duty"  the  ideal  made  strong  and  effective  appeal. 
It  never  influenced  the  masses,  but  for  several  centuries 
it  gave  moral  support  and  guidance  to  the  best  men  of  the 
Roman  race. 

Alongside  Stoicism  grew  up  Epicureanism,  which  made 
pleasure,  not  gross  sensuous  pleasure,  but  rational  refined 
enjoyment,  the  chief  good,  and  hence  the  pursuit  of  pleasure 
"  the  highest  wisdom  and  morality."  But  this  philosophy 
made  pleasurable  feeling  dependent  upon  tranquillity  of  mind. 
To  secure  this  mental  repose,  one  must  get  rid  of  fear  of 
the  gods  and  of  death.  These  ignoble  and  disquieting  fears 
Epicurus  and  his  disciples  sought  to  banish  by  teaching  that 
the  gods  do  not  concern  themselves  with  human  affairs,  and 
that  death  ends  all  for  man. 

Epicureanism  in  its  moral  code  was  at  one  with  the  com- 
mon Greek  consciousness  in  making  moderation  or  prudence 
a  cardinal  virtue ; !  but  it  differed  radically  from  the  ordinary 
Greek  mode  of  thought  in  its  depreciation  and  neglect  of  the 
civic  virtues.  Hence  the  system  was  at  once  a  symptom  and 
a  cause  of  the  decay  of  the  Greek  city  state  and  of  the  old 
moral  ideal  which  was  based  so  largely  upon  it. 

1  Consistently  so,  since  only  through  self-control  and  the  avoidance  of 
all  excesses  of  passion,  appetite,  and  desires  can  one  maintain  that  tran- 
quillity of  mind  which  is  the  condition  precedent  of  happiness. 


208  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

The  philosophy  of  Epicurus,  as  we  have  already  said,  is 
the  natural  product  of  an  age  of  transition  and  social  disloca- 
tion. It  offers  an  ideal  of  life  which  is  eagerly  adopted  by 
those  unable  to  combat  trouble,  by  those  to  whom  duty  does 
not  appeal  as  something  dignified  and  majestic.  Hence  in 
the  decadent  and  unsettled  age  of  the  Roman  Empire  it 
became  the  rule  of  life  of  large  numbers  of  the  cultured 
classes  of  society,  and  must  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  dis- 
integrating agencies  of  Greco- Roman  civilization. 

Advance  in  A  general  view  of  the  society  of  the  Hellenistic  world 

ria^eei-"  toward  the  opening  of  the  Christian  era  discloses  the  fact 

growthdin  tnat  tne  moral  evolution  so  long  in  progress  has  effected 

ethical  cos-  suc\l  changes  in  the  Greek  moral  consciousness  as  to  render 

mopolitan-  ° 

ism  this  ethical  movement  an  important  preparation  for  the  in- 

coming of  the  moral  ideal  of  Christianity.  These  changes 
are  especially  to  be  observed  in  the  growth  of  humanitarian 
sentiment  and  in  a  broadening  of  the  moral  sympathies. 

The  Greeks,  compared  with  the  Romans,  were  naturally  a 
humane  folk.  When  it  was  proposed  to  introduce  at  Athens 
the  gladiatorial  games,  the  orator  Demonax  told  the  people 
that  they  should  first  tear  down  the  ancestral  altar  to  Pity,  a 
shrine  which,  in  the  words  of  Lecky,  "  was  venerated  through- 
out the  ancient  world  as  the  first  great  assertion  among  man- 
kind of  the  supreme  sanctity  of  mercy." *  One  of  the  motives 
of  Pythagoras  in  forbidding  the  use  of  meat  as  food  was,  seem- 
ingly, to  inspire  a  horror  of  shedding  blood,  even  that  of  an 
animal.  The  laws  of  Athens  permitted  no  punishment  more 
severe  than  a  painless  death.2 

This  natural  humaneness  of  the  Greek  spirit  deepened  as 
the  centuries  passed.    Contrasted  with  the  Periclean  Age  the 

1  Lecky,  History  of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  i,  p.  228. 

2  Mahaffy,  Social  Life  in  Greece,  p.  264.  The  author  contrasts  this  hu- 
maneness of  the  laws  of  the  Athenian  democracy  four  centuries  before 
Christ  with  the  atrocious  cruelty  of  the  criminal  laws  of  Christian  Europe 
down  almost  to  the  nineteenth  century. 


THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  HELLAS     209 

Platonic  Age  shows,  Professor  Mahaffy  affirms,  "  a  greater 
gentleness  and  softness,  ...  a  nearer  approach  to  the  greater 
humanity  of  Christian  teaching."  1  We  have  already  noted 
this  movement  in  the  domain  of  war  practices  and  customs, 
where  it  found  expression  in  the  amelioration  of  the  gross, 
archaic  barbarities  of  primitive  warfare.  In  the  social  sphere 
the  progressive  evolution  is  evidenced  by  the  growing  mild- 
ness of  slavery  and  the  frequency  of  the  manumission  of 
slaves.2 

The  broadening  movement  ran  parallel  with  the  humani- 
tarian. Classical  Greek  morality,  as  we  have  seen,  was  narrow 
and  racial.  Now  one  of  the  most  important  facts  in  the  moral 
evolution  of  Hellas  was  the  broadening  of  the  moral  sympa- 
thies, especially  during  the  three  centuries  immediately  pre- 
ceding our  era.  This  development  is  connected  closely  with 
the  great  expansion  movement  which  followed  the  conquests 
of  Alexander  and  which  resulted  in  the  Hellenization  of  the 
East.  Everywhere  the  Greeks  came  in  close  contact  with 
various  peoples  upon  whom  they  had  been  accustomed  to 
look  with  aversion  or  disdain.  Ancient  prejudices  were  dis- 
pelled, race  barriers  were  leveled,  and  the  moral  sympathies 
overspread  wide  areas  from  which  they  had  hitherto  been 
excluded  by  ignorance  and  race  egotism. 

It  would  doubtless  be  unhistorical  to  represent  this  move- 
ment as  anything  more  than  a  tendency  —  a  dawning  recog- 
nition by  select  spirits  of  the  ethical  kinship  of  all  men,  and 
the  coextension  of  the  moral  law  with  the  human  race.  It 
may,  however,  rightly  be  compared  with  that  broadening  of 
the  moral  feelings  which  we  have  traced  among  the  people 
of  Israel,  and  which  resulted  in  a  morality  at  first  as  narrow 
and  exclusive  as  that  of  the  Greeks,  widening  at  last  into  the 
ethical  universalism  of  the  great  teachers  of  the  nation. 

The  widening  movement  was  represented,  and  was  given 
its  chief  impetus,  by  the  Stoics.    The  Stoic  ideal  of  character 

1  Social  Life  in  Greece  (1888),  p.  269.  2  Ibid.  p.  554. 


210  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

differed  from  the  ordinary  Greek  ideal  especially  in  its 
cosmopolitanism.  Influenced  by  the  spirit  of  the  age  in 
which  it  had  birth,  it  ignored  the  old  distinction  between 
Greek  and  non-Greek  and  proclaimed  the  essential  brother- 
hood of  man.1  The  Stoic  regarded  the  world  and  not  his 
native  city  as  his  fatherland.  The  Cynics,  whom  we  may 
regard  as  extreme  Stoics,  looked  upon  city  patriotism  as  a 
narrow  prejudice  and  refused  to  give  love  of  one's  city  a 
place  among  the  virtues.  Just  as  the  Greek  age  was  merging 
into  the  Greco- Roman  the  broadening  movement  found  its 
noblest  representative  in  Plutarch,  "  the  last  of  the  Greeks."2 
His  chief  characteristics  were  his  broad  interests  and  his  uni- 
versal moral  sympathies.  He  had  moved  far  away  from  the 
common  Greek  standpoint.  He  had  emancipated  himself 
from  the  tyranny  of  the  common  Greek  prejudices.  Under 
the  influences  of  his  time  he  had  become  a  cosmopolitan.  To 
him  the  Greek  was  no  longer  an  elect  race.  His  moral  sym- 
pathies embraced  all  mankind.  His  was  almost  a  Christian 
conscience,  save  as  to  the  purely  theological  virtues. 

This  enlargement  of  the  intellectual  and  moral  outlook  of 
the  Greek  world  presaged  the  dawn  of  a  new  epoch  in  the 
moral  evolution  of  humanity.  It  made  easier  for  many  the  ac- 
ceptance of  the  Gospel  teachings  of  human  brotherhood  and 
universal  love.  Christian  ethics  was  largely  debtor  to  the 
cosmopolitan  spirit  of  Greek  culture,  especially  as  embodied 
in  the  Stoic  ideal  of  moral  excellence.3 

1  The  Apostle  Paul  at  Athens,  seeking  common  ground  with  his  hearers 
for  the  doctrine  he  preached  that  God  hath  made  of  one  blood  all  nations 
of  men,  finds  it  in  the  familiar  line  of  the  Stoic  Cleanthes  —  w  We  are  the 
offspring  of  God." 

2  Plutarch  died  about  40  a.d. 

3  M  From  contact  with  the  Greeks,  therefore,  Christianity  obtained  this 
support,  that  an  ideal  long  known  to  the  Western  world,  the  Stoic  ideal, 
was  found  to  correspond  with  it,  so  that  the  preaching  of  the  Apostles  was 
in  this  respect  not  out  of  harmony  with  the  wants  and  aspirations  of  the 
higher  and  better  minds  of  the  age."  —  Mahaffy,  Progress  of  Hellenism 
in  Alexander*  s  Empire  (1905),  p.  146. 


THE  MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  HELLAS     21 1 

To  trace  further  this  moral  development  in  the  ancient 
world  we  must  now  turn  from  following  its  course  among 
the  Greeks  to  follow  it  among  that  kindred  people,  the 
Romans,  who,  through  the  political  unification  of  the  world, 
reenforced  this  growing  universalism  in  the  moral  domain, 
and  thereby  reached  that  ethical  conception  of  collective  hu- 
manity which  Israel  had  reached  through  spiritual  intuition, 
and  Hellas  through  philosophical  reflection  and  widening 
culture.1 

1  "  The  essential  oneness  of  human  moral  experience  has  shown  itself 
in  the  ethical  results  achieved  by  these  various  peoples."  —  T 'oy,  Judaism 
and  Christianity  (1891),  p.  337. 


CHAPTER  XI 

ROMAN   MORALS:    AN   IDEAL  OF  CIVIC   DUTY 

I.   Institutions  and  Conditions  of  Life  Determining 
the  Early  Moral  Type 


The  Roman 
family:  an- 
cestor wor- 
ship and 
the  patria 
potestas 


The  family  in  early  Rome  may  more  unreservedly  be  pro- 
nounced a  seed  plot  of  morals  than  in  the  case  of  any  other 
ancient  people  save  the  Chinese.  It  was  ancestor  worship 
which  made  it  such  a  nursery  of  morality,  for  the  cult  of  an- 
cestors made  the  family  a  group  of  co-worshipers  about  the 
domestic  hearth.  This  worship  purified  and  braced  morality, 
since  the  tutelary  spirits  were  believed  to  watch  over  the 
morals  of  the  family  and  to  punish  wrongdoing.  No_ini=_ 
pure  act  could  be  committed  in  the  presence  of  the  chaste 
hearth  fire,  and  no  one  guilty  of  unexpiated  crime  dared 
to  come  into  its  presence.1 

But  it  was  in  constituting  the  father  the  high  priest  of  the 
family  group  that  this  domestic  worship  exercised  its  greatest 
influence  upon  early  Roman  morality.  It  gave  a  religious 
sanction  to  the  father's  authority  and  made  the  patria  potestas 
for  many  centuries  a  molding  force  in  the  moral  life  of  the 
Roman  people.2  A  little  further  on  we  shall  see  how,  in 
the  atmosphere  of  the  home  thus  constituted,  was  fostered 
in  the  youth  the  virtues  of  submission  to  rightful  authority, 

1  Coulanges,  The  Ancient  City,  ii,  9. 

2  The  authority  of  the  father  over  each  and  every  member  of  the  family 
was  legally  absolute,  extending  to  life  and  death.  Not  until  late  in  the 
Empire  did  the  law  forbid  fathers  to  kill  their  grown-up  children  or  to  sell 
them  as  slaves.  Cf.  McKenzie,  Studies  in  Roman  Law,  6th  ed.,  p.  141  ;  and 
Sohm,  Institutes  (1 901),  p.  53. 

212 


ROMAN  MORALS  213 

respect  for  law,  and  obedience  to  magistrates  —  virtues  which 
were  one  secret  of  the  strength  and  triumphs  of  early  Rome. 

Next  after  the  family  the  state  was  the  most  important  The  city 
agency  in  the  creation  of  the  Roman  type  of  virtue.  We 
have  to  do  here,  as  in  Greece,  with  the  city  state.  This  was 
the  chief  sphere  of  duty  of  the  Roman  during  his  mature  and 
active  life.  Consequently,  just  as  it  was  the  nature  of  the 
city  state  which  in  Greece  determined  in  large  measure  what 
should  constitute  the  supreme  virtues  and  duties  of  the  Greek 
ideal  of  character,  so  was  it  the  constitution  of  Rome  as  a  city 
state  that,  as  we  shall  see  a  little  later,  determined  what 
should  be  the  leading  virtues  and  duties  entering  into  the 
Roman  ideal  of  goodness.  This  made  that  ideal  to  be  pre- 
eminently an  ideal  of  civic  duty.  "  Never  since  the  fall  of 
paganism  have  the  civic  virtues  shone  out  so  brilliantly."  ! 

Alongside  domestic  and  political  institutions  stands,  as  we  Tneoccupa- 
have  seen,  occupation  as  a  creator  and  molder  of  the  moral  farming 
type  of  a  people.    The  two  occupations  of  the  early  Latins  andwar 
were  farming  and  war,  and  thus  it  came  about  that  in  the 
primitive  ethical  type  were  united  the  sturdy  moral  qualities 
of  the  peasant  farmer  and  the  heroic  virtues  of  the  warrior. 
This  blend  produced  one  of  the  most  admirable  moral  types 
of  the  ancient  world. 

Aside  from  the  cult  of  ancestors,  religion  among  the  Tnereii- 
Romans  exercised  but  little  direct  influence  upon  morality, 
for  the  reason  that  it  was  mainly  a  method  of  obtaining 
prosperity,  of  averting  calamity,  and  of  reading  the  future. 
There  was  in  truth  an  almost  complete  separation  of  religion 
and  morality.  It  was  only  in  later  times  that  the  Roman 
philosophers  sought  in  the  moral  character  of  the  gods 
models  for  human  imitation.  But  though  religion  had  so 
little  to  do  in  creating  the  salient  virtues  of  the  moral  type, 

1  Inge,  Society  in  Rome  tinder  the  C&sars  (1888),  p.  8. 


214 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


it  did  reenforce  the  sentiment  of  patriotism,  since  the  tem- 
ple was  a  state  institution,  and  in  various  other  ways  —  as, 
for  instance,  in  lending  sanctity  to  oaths  —  quickened  and 
strengthened  the  sense  of  obligation  and  duty. 


The  ethics 
of  the  fam- 
ily; the 
virtue  of 
obedience 


II.  The  Primitive  Moral  Type 

In  the  bosom  of  the  family  was  nourished  what  we  may 
regard  as  the  primal  virtue  of  the  Latin  race — submission 
to  authority.1  The  son's  subjection  to  the  father's  authority 
was  complete  throughout  his  whole  existence.  He_could  not 
disobey  his^atta^-xcunmanxl  More  than  seven  centuries 
alter  the  founding  of  Rome  the  Emperor  Tiberius  absolved 
a  certain  person  from  guilt  in  participating  in  a  revolt, 
because  it  was  shown  that  he  had  acted  under  the  orders 
of  his  father.2 

This  virtue  of  submission  to  rightful  authority,  of  obedience 
to  superiors,  contributed  much  to  the  military  efficiency  of 
the  Roman  people.  Indeed,  it  lay  at  the  basis  of  their  great- 
ness in  war.  The  consul's  authority  in  the  field  was  like  that 
of  the  father  in  the  family,  and  obedience  in  the  soldier  was 
a  habit,  almost  a  religious  instinct.  Thus  did  this  virtue, 
which  had  its  starting  point  in  the  family,  help  largely  to 
give  the  Romans  the  rule  of  the  world.3 

1  This  Roman  virtue  of  obedience  to  the  state  has  been  just  such  an 
enduring  force  in  the  moral  life  of  the  Christian  world  as  has  the  Jewish  vir- 
tue of  obedience  to  a  revealed  law  (see  Chapter  IX).  Historically  regarded, 
the  Protestant  Church,  which  makes  obedience  to  a  written  revealed  law 
a  necessary  virtue,  is  the  inheritor  of  the  ethical  feeling  and  conviction  of 
ancient  Israel;  while  the  Roman  Catholic  Church,  which  makes  submission 
to  ecclesiastical  authority  an  indispensable  virtue,  is  the  inheritor  of  the 
ethical  tradition  and  spirit  of  ancient  Rome.  See  H.  M.  Gwatkin  (co-author), 
Early  Ideals  of  Righteousness  (1910),  pp.  71  ff. 

2  Tacitus,  Annals,  iii.  16,  17. 

3  This  legal  subjection  of  the  son  to  the  father,  while  it  developed  and 
strengthened  the  virtue  of  obedience,  seemed  to  deaden  filial  affection. 
M  Of  all  the  forms  of  virtue,"  says  Lecky,  w  filial  affection  is  perhaps  that 
which  appears  most  rarely  in  Roman  history"  {History  of  European  Morals, 
3d  ed.,  vol.  i,  p.  299). 


ROMAN  MORALS  215 

Patriotism,  meaning  submission,  obedience,  devotion  to  ciyicand 
the  state,  was  the  saving  virtue  in  the  Roman  ideal  of  virtues 
excellence.  "  Patriot"  and  "good  man"  were  identical  terms. 
"  Dear  to  us  are  our  parents,"  says  Cicero,  "  dear  our  chil- 
dren, our  kindred  and  our  friends ;  but  one's  country  alone 
includes  all  our  loves,  for  what  good  man  would  hesitate 
to  die  if  he  could  promote  her  welfare."  x 

Since  war  was  the  normal  status  of  society  in  ancient 
times,  the  moral  qualities  of  the  Roman  as  of  the  Greek 
patriot  were  the  virtues  of  the  soldier  —  obedience,  courage, 
and  self-devotion  in  battle.  And  by  no  people,  save  per- 
haps the  Japanese  as  shown  in  their  recent  history,  has  the 
soldierly  virtue  of  self-renunciation  for  the  fatherland  been 
more  exalted  or  more  finely  exemplified  than  by  the  Romans 
in  early  times. 

In  this  ready  self-devotion  of  the  Roman  hero  to  public 
interests  we  have  an  exhibition  of  the  altruistic  sentiment 
in  its  loftiest  form,  for  of  all  forms  of  disinterested  action,  x 
as  Lecky  maintains,  the  self-abnegation  of  the  ancient  war- 
rior for  his  city  was  the  most  unselfish,  for  the  reason 
that  he  made  the  sacrifice  without  any  hope  of  reward  in 
another  life.2 

In  early  Rome  there  was  no  such  prejudice  against  labor  The  indus- 
as  unworthy  and  morally  degrading  as  we  meet  with  at  a  later  tues  Vir" 
period.  The  fact  that  a  large  body  of  the  citizens  in  primitive 
Rome  were  peasant  farmers  determined  that  the  traditional 
virtues  of  this  class  should  find  a  high  place  in  the  early 
national  ideal  of  character.  The  moral  or  semi-moral  qualities 
of  the  peasant,  namely,  simplicity,  frugality,  industry,  and 
conservatism  or  respect  for  the  past,  formed  the  substratum 
of  early  Roman  morality.  It  was  from  the  primitive  citizen 
peasantry  that  came  the  strong,  tough,  moral  fiber  of  the  old 
Roman  character. 

1  De  Of  i.  17.       2  History  of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  i,  pp.  177  f. 


2l6 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


Religious 
duties 


Defects  of 
the  type: 
(a)  its  aris- 
tocratic 
character 


In  dealing  with  the  subject  of  the  relation  of  the  Roman 
religion  to  morality  we  may  speak  of  religious  duties  but 
hardly  of  religious  virtues,  and  for  the  reason  that  the  aim 
of  religion  was  the  safety  and  welfare  of  the  state.  Neg- 
lect of  the  temple  rites  and  sacrifices  was  believed  to  anger 
the  gods,  who  would  in  their  resentment  bring  terrible  trouble 
and  misfortune  upon  the  nation  —  for  the  Romans  never 
outgrew  the  conception  of  collective  responsibility.  Hence 
the  careful  performance  of  religious  duties  was  a  phase  of 
patriotism.  Neglect  of  these  duties  was  anti-social  conduct.1 

In  the  performance  of  his  religious  duties  the  Roman  con- 
ceived that  all  that  was  necessary  was  to  do  the  right  thing, 
to  perform  the  right  act,  or  repeat  correctly  the  right  formula ; 
the  disposition  of  mind  and  state  of  heart  made  no  differ- 
ence with  the  result.  Marias  relations  to  deity  were  assimilated 
to  his  relations  to  nature,  To  secure  a  given  result  in  the 
physical  world,  man  needs  only  to  do  the  right  thing,  as,  for 
instance,  to  drop  the  seed  into  the  ground  at  the  right  season 
and  the  harvest  follows  without  any  regard  to  the  state  of 
mind  or  heart  of  the  person  performing  the  act.  This  was 
the  Roman's  conception  of  his  relation  to  the  gods.  Hence 
religion  and  morality  were  practically  separated.  Religion 
failed  to  supply  motives  for  moral  action,  except  in  so  far  as 
it  reenforced  the  sentiment  of  patriotism. 

From  the  foregoing  brief  notice  of  some  of  the  chief  ex- 
pressions of  the  moral  consciousness  of  the  early  Romans  we 
cannot  fail  to  recognize  that  their  ideal  of  character  was  in 
many  respects  a  very  admirable  one.  Its  realization  in  actual 
flesh  and  blood  gives  us  those  heroic  characters  which  will 
live  forever  in  Roman  legend,  and  alongside  the  Greek  heroes 
in  the  pages  of  Plutarch.  It  molded  men  grave,  earnest,  and 
austere,  reverent  toward  superiors,  patriotic  and  self-devoted 
to  the  common  good. 


1  See  p.  245,  on  the  ethics  of  persecution. 


ROMAN  MORALS  217 

But  the  ideal  had  great  defects.  One  of  the  most  conspic- 
uous of  these  was  its  aristocratic  character.  Rome,  writes 
Wedgwood,  "  accepts  consistently  and  logically  the  aristo- 
cratic theory  on  which  ancient  society  is  based,  and  carries  out 
the  ideal  of  the  Old  World  in  all  its  naked  impressiveness."  * 
Though  advancing  far  during  a  thousand  years  of  eventful 
history  toward  ethical  universalism,  pagan  Rome  never  actu- 
ally reached  this  moral  goal.  She  never  recognized  in  prac- 
tice the  moral  equality  of  all  men.  There  were  to  the  very 
last  in  the  pagan  Empire,  classes,  such  as  slaves  and  glad- 
I  iators,  who  were  practically  outside  the  moral  sphere.  Even 
Roman  Stoicism,  which  was  the  latest  and  noblest  expression 
of  the  moral  life  of  Rome,  notwithstanding  its  cosmopolitan 
tendencies,  was  essentially  aristocratic. 

Another  defect  of  the  old  Roman  type  of  excellence  was  (&)  its 
its  exclusion  of  the  gentler  virtues  —  humility,  tenderness,  the  gentler 
and  sympathy  with  suffering.    The  type  of  character  fostered  ?eiiectuain" 
by  the  ideal  was  hard  and  severe,  even  callous  and  cruel,  virtues 
proud  and  selfrassertive.    It  was  a  type  somewhat  like  the 
Spartan,  one  which,  when  the  age  of  reflection  came,  naturally 
developed  into  the  Stoic.   The  old  Romans  lacked  the  quality 
of  mercy  and  compassion  for  weakness.   They  seemed  almost 
destitute  of  the  sentiment  of  pity  for  misfortune.    Their 
treatment  of  prisoners  of  war  and  of  their  slaves  in  the 
later  period  was  marked  by  a  repellent  brutality.    The  place 
in  their  amusements  which  the  gladiatorial  combats  assumed 
evidences  their  callous  insensibility  to  suffering. 

Still  another  defect  of  this  ideal  was  that  it  gave  little  or  no 
place  to  the  intellectual  virtues.  These  ethical  qualities  which 
were  assigned  so  prominent  a  place  in  the  Greek  type  of  ex- 
cellence, and  which  since  the  Renaissance  the  Western  world 
has  come  to  esteem  so  highly,  were  never  greatly  valued  by 
the  Romans  until  they  came  under  the  influence  of  Greek 

1  The  Moral  Ideal,  3d  ed.,  p.  148. 


218  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

culture,  and  then  only  by  the  few ;  hence  their  intellectual 
life  was,  in  general,  lacking  in  moral  impulse.  Mental  self- 
culture  was  not  with  them,  as  it  was  with  the  Greeks  and  is 
coming  to  be  with  ourselves,  a  moral  requirement. 

III.  The  Moral  Evolution  under  the  Republic 


The  main-  The  four  essential  facts  in  the  moral  life  of  Rome  as  a 
theTtand-  republic  are  :  firstjthe  high  standard  maintained  in  the  early 
times early  Peri°d  ;  second,  the  gradual  widening  of  the  moral  sympathies 
through  the  influence  of  conquest  and  advance  in  civilization  ; 
third,  the  general  decline  in  morals  during  the  two  centuries 
preceding  the  establishment  of  the  Empire ;  and  fourth,  the 
modification  of  the  moral  type  through  contact  with  Greece 
and  the  Orient. 

Through  the  legendary  haze  which  envelops  all  the  earlier 
centuries  of  Rome,  the  one  fact  which  stands  out  with  com- 
parative clearness  is  the  Spartan-like  loyalty  of  the  old  Roman 
to  the  ideal  of  character  which  he  had  conceived  as  the  noblest 
and  best.  The  legends  of  this  period,  invented  or  repeated 
by  the  men  of  a  later  age,  celebrate  qualities  of  character 
which  we  may  believe  really  marked  early  Roman  life  and 
thought.  Among  these  virtues  were  patriotic  altruism,  abso- 
lute self-abnegation  for  the  common  good,  as  illustrated  by 
such  tales  as  those  of  the  self-devotion  for  the  Roman  people 
of  Curtius  and  of  the  Elder  and  Younger  Publius  Decius 
Mus ;  reverence  for  law,  as  shown  by  the  consul  Lucius 
Junius  Brutus  in  the  condemnation  of  his  sons  to  death  for 
taking  part  in  a  conspiracy ;  and  incorruptible  integrity,  as 
illustrated  by  the  tales  of  Fabricius. 

Even  though  all  these  stories  of  the  heroic  age  of  Rome 
be  the  invention  of  a  later  time,  they  at  least  show  what  at 
this  later  (though  still  comparatively  early)  period  were  highly 
esteemed  qualities  of  character,  just  as  the  stories  celebrating 
the  filial  piety  of  Chinese  heroes  of  the  olden  time  show  how 


ROMAN  MORALS  219 

high  a  place  this  moral  trait  held  in  the  ideal  of  the  age  that 
invented  or  repeated  these  tales  with  a  didactic  purpose. 

The  gradual  broadening  of  the  moral  sympathies  was  a  The  widen- 
very  important  phase  of  the  moral  evolution  in  Roman  moral  sym- 
society  up  to  the  end  of  the  Republic.  These  sympathies  pathies 
embraced  at  first  hardly  more  than  the  patrician  class,  which 
formed  the  nucleus  of  the  early  Roman  community.  The 
enlarging  of  the  area  covered  by  the  ethical  feelings  was 
simply  one  phase,  and,  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  student  of 
morals,  the  most  important  phase  of  that  political  evolution 
which  in  the  course  of  centuries  brought  within  the  sacred 
pale  of  Roman  citizenship  first  the  Plebeians,  then  the  Latins, 
next  the  Italians,  and  finally  all  the  freemen  of  the  extended 
Roman  dominions.  That  is  to  say,  this  central  fact  in  Roman 
history,  the  expansion  of  the  city  into  the  world  state,  was  in 
its  deepest  significance,  in  its  remote  consequences,  as  much 
a  moral  as  a  political  movement.  Conquest,  it  is  true,  pre- 
pared the  way  for  the  revolution,  and  the  concessions  made 
by  the  ruling  class  to  the  demands  of  the  disfranchised  classes 
and  peoples  were  motived  in  the  main  by  political  prudence 
and  expediency.  But  it  is  equally  true  that  ethical  sentiment 
worked  with  these  other  causes  in  determining  the  course 
and  progress  of  the  revolution,  and  that  one  of  its  most 
important  results  was  the  imparting  of  a  great  impulse  to 
the  widening  moral  movement  going  on  in  the  ancient 
world,  and  the  bringing  to  recognition  of  the  principles  of 
the  moral  equality  and  brotherhood  of  men. 

This  great  all-embracing  movement  in  the  Roman  world 
can,  we  believe,  best  be  understood  in  its  significance  for  the 
moral  evolution  of  mankind  only  when  translated  into  terms 
of  the  similar  movement  in  modern  times.  We  recognize  the 
moral  character,  in  a  final  analysis,  of  the  revolution  which, 
during  the  past  century,  has  by  successive  enfranchisements 
admitted  to  a  share  in  government  and  to  the  enjoyment  of 


220  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

political  rights  the  masses  in  modern  civilized  states.  The 
movement  has  been  largely  ethical  in  its  causes  and  still  more 
largely  ethical  in  its  effects.  The  struggle  of  the  people  has 
had  for  aim  to  do  away  with  unjust  privilege  and  to  establish 
equality  and  justice.  The  most  important  permanent  effects 
of  the  revolution  are  indisputably  to  be  looked  for  in  the  moral 
sphere.  The  incoming  of  democracy,  meaning  as  it  does  the 
investing  of  the  individual  with  dignity  and  worth,  means 
the  ennobling  of  the  moral  life  of  the  world.  It  is  this  that 
constitutes  the  real  significance  of  the  democratic  revolution 
and  which  gives  it  its  important  place  in  the  moral  history 
of  humanity.1 

The  same  is  true  of  that  phase  of  the  modern  movement 
which  looks  toward  the  formation  of  the  world  state.  The 
forces  at  work  here  are  admittedly  varied  and  complex,  but 
prominent  among  these  agencies  are  the  ethical.  It  is  the 
broadening  of  the/ moral  sympathies,  the  development  of 
a  true  cosmopolitanism,  a  deepening  consciousness  of  the 
brotherhood  of  men,  the  growth  of  a  new  social  and  interna- 
tional conscience — it  is  this  slow  evolution  in  the  moral  realm 
that  has  laid  or  is  laying  the  true  basis  of  the  future  world 
union.  The  universal  state,  once  created,  —  this  need  not 
be  argued,— r  would  inevitably  react  powerfully  and  favorably 
upon  the  moral  feelings  and  sympathies  of  men. 

It  was  the  same  in  the  ancient  world.  The  admission  to 
full  Roman  citizenship,  through  successive  enfranchisements, 
of  all  the  freemen  of  the  Roman  dominions  was  at  once  the 
sign  and  the  cause  of  a  vast  moral  development.  As  fellow 
citizens  with  equal  rights  and  privileges,  men  came  to  know 
and  feel  their  ethical  kinship.  Likewise  the  establishment  of 
the  world  state  registered  a  great  moral  advance  and  supplied 
the  conditions  of  a  still  greater  progress.  Had  not  the  moral 
forces  worked  with  the  Roman  legions,  the  world  union  could 
never  have  been  formed,  or,  at  least,  if  once  formed,  could 

i  Cf.  Chapter  XVIII. 


ROMAN  MORALS  221 

never  have  been  maintained  for  the  long  period  that  it  was.  • 
It  is  probably  true  that  the  bringing  by  Rome  of  such  a  wide 
reach  of  lands  under  her  rule  did  as  much  to  awaken  the  sense 
of  the  brotherhood  of  man  as  did  the  teachings  of  Hebrew 
prophet  or  the  culture  and  philosophy  of  Greece.  It  was  *"* 
certainly  the  political  union  of  the  civilized  world  that  helped 
to  awaken  in  Cicero  and  in  the  later  philosophers  of  the 
Empire  the  conviction  that  the  reach  of  the  moral  sympa- 
thies should  be  as  extended  as  the  human  race.  Thus  the 
wide  empire  created  by  Rome  was  a  potent  influence  making 
for  ethical  universalism.  Never  since  the  unification  of  the 
ancient  world  by  Rome  have  the  moral  feelings  of  men  been 
quite  so  narrow  as  before;  never  since  has  the  conception 
of  human  brotherhood,  the  ideal  of  a  united  world,  seemed 
so  entirely  a  dream. 

Notwithstanding  this  broadening  movement  in  the  moral  causes  of 
domain,  the  last  century  of  the  Republic  was  marked  by  a  in  morals16 
great  lowering  of  the  earlier  high  moral  standard  and  by  a  SJJbJJ!*. 
loss  of  some  of  the  chief  virtues  of  the  primitive  Roman  lic : .(«)  t^e 

r  passing  of 

type.  There  were  many  causes  contributing  to  this  moral  the  city 
degeneracy.  Among  these  was  the  decay  of  institutions 
that  had  created  or  fostered  the  primitive  moral  type,  and 
the  growth  of  others,  such  as  slavery  and  the  gladiatorial 
games,  which  exercised  a  pernicious  influence  upon  morality. 
Besides  causes  of  this  nature  there  were  others  which  were 
the  natural  outcome  of  the  career  of  conquest  the  Romans 
had  led.  The  conquest  of  the  world  had  imported  into  the 
Roman  political  and  social  system  many  alien  elements  unfavor- 
able to  morality,  and  had  brought  Roman  civilization,  on  one 
side,  into  hurtful  contact  with  the  older  and  morally  corrupt 
cultures  of  the  Orient.  In  what  follows  we  shall  speak  in 
some  detail  of  the  more  important  of  these  agencies,  which 
in  the  later  preimperial  period  undermined  the  originally 
sound  morality  of  the  Roman  people. 


222  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

A  first  cause  of  the  moral  deterioration  was  the  decay  of 
the  city  constitution.  We  have  seen  that  the  free  city  state 
was  the  chief  nursery  of  those  patriotic  virtues  which  con- 
stituted the  cardinal  moral  qualities  of  the  Roman  ideal  of 
character.  But  by  the  beginning  of  the  last  century  preceding 
the  Christian  era  various  causes,  chiefly,  however,  the  mere 
widening  of  the  Roman  territory  through  conquest,  had  under- 
mined the  political  institutions  of  Rome  and  had  converted 
into  mobs  of  the  proletariat  the  public  assemblies  of  citizens. 
The  original  constitution  of  the  city  had  become  an  empty 
form,  and  the  way  had  been  paved  for  the  setting  up  of 
monarchical  government. 

With  the  passing  of  the  city  state  those  civic  patriotic 
virtues  which  the  discipline  of  the  democratic  city  constitu- 
tion had  trained  and  developed,  disappeared.1  As  the  Chris- 
tian Church,  which  wris  destined  in  the  fullness  of  time  to 
take  the  place  of  the  hipf  in  the  minds  and  hearts  of  men 
and  become  the  object  and  inspirer  of  moral  enthusiasm,  had 
not  yet  come  in  with  its  new  ideal  of  virtue,  there  ensued  a 
sort  of  moral  interregnum,  such  as  usually  marks  transition 
periods  in  the  history  of  states  and  races. 

(6)Theeco-  A  second  cause  of  the  moral  decline  is  to  be  found  in 
cay  of  the  the  decay  of  the  Italian  peasantry.  This  economic  revolution 
had  its  real  starting  point  in  the  Hannibalic  War.  That  pro- 
tracted struggle,  carried  on  largely  in  Italy  itself,  practically 
ruined  the  peasant  class  in  many  districts,  and  their  little 
farms  were  absorbed  by  the  growing  estates  of  the  great 
landholders  —  those  latifundia  which  Pliny  later  declared  to 
have  been  the  ruin  of  Italy. 

The  practical  disappearance  of  the  Italian  peasant  farmer 
meant  the  disappearance  of  those  simple  robust  virtues,  bred 

1  The  citizen  army,  which  had  been  the  seed  plot  of  those  heroic  virtues 
that  cast  such  a  halo  around  the  earlier  history  of  Rome,  had  been  replaced 
by  a  mercenary  force  in  which  only  the  coarser  military  virtues  could  find 
sphere  for  exercise. 


rural  class 


ROMAN  MORALS  223 

in  thousands  of  homes  of  the  countryside,  like  the  little 
Sabine  farm  of  the  Elder  Cato,  which  had  contributed  so 
largely  to  determine  the  type  of  Roman  character. 

The  decay  of  the  Italian  peasantry  was  accompanied  by  (c)  Growth 
the  development  of  the  slave  system,  so  that  at  the  same  system  ave 
time  that  the  peasant  home,  a  nursery  of  sterling  if  crude 
virtues,  was  being  destroyed,  the  slave  estate  with  its  chain 
gangs  and  its  ergastula,  a  very  hotbed  of  degrading  vices, 
was  being  created.  Of  all  the  institutions  that  contributed  to 
the  moral  degradation  of  the  later  Republic,  slavery  as  it 
developed  here  must  be  assigned  the  first  place  of  evil  pre- 
eminence. Its  effects  were  equally  debasing  upon  the  master, 
the  slave,  and  the  poor  farmer.  It  tended  to  render  more 
callous  and  cruel  the  spirit  of  the  master,1  to  destroy  the 
moral  character  of  the  slave,  to  undermine  family  morals,2 
and,  by  placing  a  stigma  upon  labor,  to  degrade  the  free 
laborer.  Thus  did  the  institution  tend  to  develop  in  different 
classes  of  the  population  feelings,  sentiments,  and  a  dispo- 
sition of  mind  wholly  unfavorable  to  the  existence  or  the 
development  of  a  sound  moral  life  in  society  at  large. 

In  placing  a  stigma  upon  labor,  slavery  did  not  create  a  (d)Thedis- 
new  prejudice,  but  merely  intensified  and  made  more  inclu-  the  indus- 
sive  a  prejudice  already  existing.  As  we  have  seen,  there 
existed  in  classical  antiquity  a  deep-rooted  feeling  against 
manual  labor  as  morally  unworthy  of  a  freeman.  Agriculture 
was  the  only  occupation  which  escaped  this  general  condem- 
nation, and  which  was  regarded  as  becoming  a  gentleman.3 

1  "  The  unchecked  power  of  the  master  .  .  .  produced  those  cold  hearts 
which  gloated  over  the  agony  of  gallant  men  in  the  arena."  —  Dill,  Roman 
Society  from  Nero  to  Marcus  Aurelius  (1904),  p.  12. 

2  Friedlander,  Darstellungen  aus  der  Sittengeschichte  Roms  (1888),  Bd.  i, 
S.  479-481 ;  English  ed.,  Roman  Life  and  Manners  under  the  Early  Empire, 
vol.  i,  pp.  243  f. 

8  "  The  senator  was  forbidden  down  to  the  last  age  of  the  empire,  both 
by  law  and  sentiment,  to  increase  his  fortune  by  commerce."  —  Dill,  Roman 
Society  from  Nero  to  Marcus  Aurelius,  p.  102. 


trial  vir- 
tues 


224  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

Cicero  declares  all  mechanical  laborers  to  be  by  virtue  of 
their  profession  mean,  the  gains  of  hired  workmen  to  be  un- 
genteel,  and  says  that  all  retailers  of  merchandise  should  be 
despised.1  Even  buying  and  selling  on  a  large  scale  did 
not  entirely  escape  the  taint  of  retail  merchandizing ;  it  was 
merely  a  little  less  despicable. 

This  general  contempt  for  the  occupations  of  the  artisan 
and  merchant  rendered  impossible  the  development  of  indus- 
trial virtues  in  the  Roman  masses.  Torn  from  the  soil  and 
swept  into  the  cities  by  the  movement  cityward  in  this  period, 
the  free  poor,  too  proud  .to  engage  in  occupations  which  were 
looked  upon  as  degrading,  were  stranded  in  idleness  and  ex- 
posed to  all  the  demoralizing  influences  of  city  life.  Crowds 
of  them  became  the  dependents  of  the  rich  and  formed  that 
despicable  client  class  of  the  later  Republic  and  the  early  Em- 
pire whose  abominable  vices  roused  the  anger  and  provoked 
the  scorn  of  the  satirists  and  moralists  of  the  time. 

(e)  Free  dis-       A  direct  outgrowth  of  the  presence  in  Rome  of  this  great 
com  multitude  of  the  idle  free  poor  was  the  evil  of  the  corn  laws. 

The  indiscriminate  public  free  distribution  of  corn  to  the 
poorer  citizens  —  prompted,  for  the  most  part,  not  by  genu- 
ine humanitarian  feelings  but  by  unworthy  political  and  per- 
sonal motives  —  had  a  most  debauching  effect  upon  morals. 
It  intensified  the  very  evil  it  was  supposed  to  ameliorate. 
It  attracted  still  greater  crowds  of  the  idle  to  the  capital, 
depressed  to  a  still  greater  degree  agriculture  in  Italy, —  grain 
for  distribution  being  imported  in  the  main  from  Egypt  and 
North  Africa, —  and  checked  every  tendency  toward  the  for- 
mation of  habits  of  industry,  self-reliance,  and  thrift  in  the 
lower  classes.  The  evil  attained  its  climax  when  the  largesses 
became  an  undisguised  bid  by  the  corrupt  demagogue  for 
popular  favor  —  the  naked  price  paid  by  rich  plotters  against 
the  commonwealth  for  the  support  of  the  morally  debauched 
and  fickle  proletariat. 

1  De  Off.  i.  42. 


ROMAN  MORALS  225 

The  idle  population  of  Rome  had  not  only  to  be  fed  but  (/)  Giadia- 
to  be  amused.  The  same  motives  that  had  led  to  the  enor- 
mous increase  in  the  largesses  of  grain  to  the  free  poor 
contributed  also  to  the  multiplication  of  the  spectacles  of  the 
circus  and  the  amphitheater,  particularly  of  the  gladiatorial 
games,  which,  introduced  at  Rome  in  the  third  century  B.C., 
had  now  become  the  favorite  amusement  of  the  Roman 
populace.  "  That  not  only  men,  but  women  in  an  advanced 
period  of  civilization,  —  men  and  women  who  not  only  pro- 
fessed but  very  frequently  acted  upon  a  high  code  of  morals, 
—  should  have  made  the  carnage  of  men  their  habitual 
amusement,  that  all  this  should  have  continued  for  centuries, 
with  scarcely  a  protest,  is  one  of  the  most  startling  facts  in 
moral  history."  1 

But  this  fact  is  by  no  means  an  isolated  or  unique  one  in 
the  ethical  history  of  mankind.  The  student  of  the  history  of 
morals  is  often  brought  face  to  face  with  similar  facts  in  the 
annals  of  every  race  and  of  every  age.  The  fact  with  which 
the  moralist  is  here  confronted  is  hardly  more  startling  than 
the  hideously  barbarous  treatment  of  their  enemies  by  the 
deeply  pious  Jews ;  the  heartless  massacre  at  times  of  their 
prisoners  by  the  naturally  humane  Greeks ;  the  savage  sever- 
ity of  the  medieval  inquisitors  toward  heretics,  while  in  general 
showing  the  greatest  compassion  and  sympathy  for  those  in 
pain  and  distress ;  the  atrocious  cruelty  of  the  punishments 
meted  out  to  offenders  against  society  by  the  Christian  gov- 
ernments of  Europe  down  almost  to  the  last  century ;  the 
callous  insensibility,  until  just  now,  of  modern  society  to  "the 
bitter  cry  of  the  children  "  of  its  city  slums ;  and,  above  all, 
the  glorification  of  war  by  the  professed  followers  of  Him 
whose  most  distinctive  title  is  the  Prince  of  Peace. 

But  just  as  all  these  startling  inconsistencies  and  aberra- 
tions in  moral  conduct  may  be  explained,  in  part  at  least,  by 
reference  to  the  effect  upon  the  moral  sympathies  of  tribal 

1  Lecky,  History  of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  i,  p.  271. 


226  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

religion,  of  political  rancor  and  fanaticism,  of  false  theo- 
logical dogmas,  and  of  bad  bequests  of  practices  and  con- 
ventions unreflectingly  adopted  by  an  advanced  civilization 
from  ages  of  barbarism  and  savagery,  so  is  it  possible  in  the 
same  way  to  explain  and  render  in  a  measure  comprehensible 
to  ourselves  the  existence  without  protest  among  the  com- 
paratively cultured  Romans  of  such  an  institution  as  that  of 
the  gladiatorial  combats.  The  system  was  fostered  by  slavery 
and  the  Romans'  occupation  of  war.  The  Roman  people 
were  originally  stern  and  just ;  slavery  and  war  tended  to 
make  them  hard  and  callous.  Slavery  created  a  sort  of  caste 
morality,  which  excluded  from  the  moral  sphere  large  classes 
as  completely  as  though  they  belonged  to  the  dumb-animal 
creation.  It  was  these  pariah  classes  that  contributed  a  large 
portion  of  the  victims  of  the  cruel  sport.  The  enormous 
quantities  of  human  flesh  and  blood  required  to  nourish  the 
system  could  have  been  found  in  no  society  except  in  one 
where  a  considerable  part  of  the  population  had  been  de- 
graded to  a  mere  animal  plane  of  existence  and  thus  put 
practically  beyond  the  range  and  reach  of  the  moral  feelings. 

Like  slavery,  the  constant  wars  in  which  the  Romans 
were  engaged  tended  to  indurate  their  feelings  and  to  de- 
stroy all  sense  of  the  sanctity  of  human  life.  In  what  way 
the  military  life  of  the  Romans  reacted  upon  their  feelings  and 
sentiments  and  molded  even  their  ethical  theories  is  shown 
by  the  fact  that  the  Roman  moral  philosophers  in  general 
defended  and  approved  the  combats  of  the  amphitheater  on 
the  ground  that  they  inured  the  soldier  to  the  sight  of  blood 
and  taught  him  contempt  of  death.1 

The  effect  of  these  inhuman  spectacles  upon  morality  was 
most  lamentable.  They  hindered  the  growth  of  humane  feel- 
ings in  the  men,  deadened  every  tender  sensibility  of  the 

1  Friedlander,  Darstellungen  aus  der  Sittengeschichte  Roms  (1889),  Bd.  ii, 
S.  414 ;  English  ed.,  Roman  Life  and  Manners  under  the  Early  Empire, 
vol.  ii,  p.  77. 


ROMAN  MORALS  227 

women,  habituated  the  young  to  scenes  of  cruelty,1  and 
developed  finally  the  normal  impassiveness  of  the  Roman 
temperament  into  a  fierce  delight  in  human  suffering.2 

The  influence  of  religion  upon  Roman  morality  was  never  (*)  Decay 
great;  still,  as  we  have  seen,  the  Roman's  sense  of  duty  was  faith lgl°US 
in  some  degree  strengthened  by  his  belief  in  the  gods  and 
in  their  general  watch  over  the  conduct  of  men.  Hence  that 
growth  of  philosophic  doubt  among  the  learned  class  which 
characterized  the  later  period  of  the  Republic,  and  the  trans- 
formation of  religion  into  gross  superstition  among  the  debased 
population  of  the  cities,  contributed  to  hasten  and  render  more 
decisive  the  moral  decline  we  are  tracing. 

The  apparent  teaching  of  history  is  that  there  is  an  antithe-  (h)  Ex- 
sis  between  wealth  and  morality.   It  is  a  commonplace  of  the  wealth  and 
records  of  civilization  that  as  a  community  has  advanced  in  poverty 
material  prosperity  and  waxed  rich  it  has  gone  backward  in 
morals.    The  growth  in  great  riches  of  a  people  has  usu- 
ally been  the  prelude  to  their  moral  degeneracy  and  loss  of 
place  in  the  competition  of  races  and  cultures. 

There  ought  certainly  to  be  no  antithesis  between  riches 
and  morality,  any  more  than  between  intellectual  culture  and 
morality.  To  suppose  that  there  is  any  natural  and  neces- 
sary incompatibility  between  these  two  elements  of  civilization 
is  to  suppose  that  there  exists  a  fatal  antinomy  at  the  very 
heart  of  the  cosmic  evolution. 

1  "  The  unusual  enthusiasm  for  the  shows  is  expressed  in  many  a  rude 
sketch  which  has  been  traced  by  boyish  hands  upon  the  walls."  —  Dill, 
Roman  Society  from  Nero  to  Marcus  Aurelius,  p.  238. 

2  In  an  eloquent  passage  Lecky  thus  sums  up  the  demoralizing  effects  of 
the  spectacles  :  w  Those  hateful  games,  which  made  the  spectacle  of  human 
suffering  and  death  the  delight  of  all  classes,  had  spread  their  brutalising 
influence  wherever  the  Roman  name  was  known,  had  rendered  millions 
absolutely  indifferent  to  the  sight  of  human  suffering,  had  produced  in 
many,  in  the  very  centre  of  an  advanced  civilization,  a  relish  and  a  passion 
for  torture,  a  rapture  and  an  exultation  in  watching  the  spasms  of  extreme 
agony,  such  as  an  African  or  an  American  savage  alone  can  equal "  {History 
of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  i,  p.  467). 


228  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

That  moral  degeneracy  should  be  the  common  accompani- 
ment of  a  community's  growth  in  wealth,  springs  not  from 
the  mere  possession  of  wealth,  but  in  the  main  from  its 
inequitable  distribution.  Thus  far  in  history,  as  a  society  has 
grown  in  riches  it  has  become  divided  into  two  sharply  con- 
trasted classes,  the  very  rich  and  the  very  poor.  Now  each  of 
these  extremes  is  unfavorable  to  morality.  Excessive  fortune 
gives  birth  to  luxury,  to  gross,  extravagant,  and  unethical 
uses  of  wealth.  Particularly  is  this  likely  to  be  true  if  the 
elevation  to  affluence  has  been  sudden  and  from  comparative 
poverty.  The  reason  of  this  is,  as  was  long  ago  pointed  out, 
that  men  before  they  have  learned  self-control  have  placed 
in  their  hands  means  for  the  unlimited  satisfaction  of  every 
appetite  and  desire,  and  generally  the  desire  of  such  men 
is  for  indulgence  in  gross  sensuous  and  sensual  forms  of 
pleasure.  On  the  other  hand,  extreme  poverty  is  equally 
disastrous  to  morals ;  for  poverty  means  almost  inevitably 
undue  nutrition  of  body  and  soul,  and  generally  squalid  and 
insanitary  conditions  of  life  that  destroy  at  once  physical 
and  moral  health,  and  breed  in  the  young  and  old  alike  the 
most  repellent  and  contagious  forms  of  vice. 

Now  while  at  every  period  of  Roman  history  we  find 
two  classes,  the  rich  and  the  poor,  the  extremes  of  wealth 
and  poverty  do  not  appear  until  about  a  century  before 
the  establishment  of  the  Empire.1  And  unfortunately  all  the 
conditions  which  tend  to  render  such  inequality  of  fortune 
especially  pernicious  to  morals  were  existent  at  this  time 
in  Roman  society.  The  men  into  whose  control  came  the 
great  fortunes  of  the  period  were  generally  men  of  servile 
origin,  because  law  and  public  sentiment  prevented  the  sen- 
atorial order  from  engaging  in  trade  or  commerce.  These 
men,  who  had  not  yet  outgrown  the  grossness  and  vices  of 
the  slave  class  from  which  they  had  sprung,  with  unlimited 

1  The  period  which  witnessed  the  greatest  inequality  of  fortunes  was 
the  last  century  of  the  Republic  and  the  first  of  the  Empire. 


ROMAN  MORALS  229 

wealth  at  their  command,  and  "  without  the  restraint  of  tradi- 
tions or  ideals,"  were  naturally  prone  to  indulge  in  vulgar  lux- 
ury, in  ostentatious  extravagance,  and  in  orgies  of  sensuality. 

At  the  same  time  at  the  other  end  of  the  social  scale 
were  the  very  poor,  subjected  to  the  debasing  influences  of 
idleness,  of  a  grossly  immoral  stage,  and  of  the  brutalizing 
spectacles  of  the  amphitheater.  The  relations  of  the  large 
number  of  propertyless  clients  to  their  wealthy  patrons  bred 
in  this  class  the  hateful  vices  of  servility  and  hypocrisy.1 

Thus  the  division  of  Roman  society  into  two  classes,  the 
overrich  and  the  very  poor,  —  a  division  which  is  always  the 
sign  and  register  of  social  maladjustment  and  injustice,  — 
became  one  of  the  most  potent  causes  of  that  moral  degen- 
eracy which  relaxed  the  fiber  of  the  Roman  race  and  preluded 
the  downfall  of  the  Republic. 

After  the  conquest  of  the  East  the  national  character  of  m  Demor- 
the  Romans  was  subjected  to  a  great  variety  of  influences  fluenceof" 
from  Greece  and  the  half-Hellenized  countries  of  the  Orient.  ^uryand 
Many  of  these  influences,  as  we  shall  notice  a  little  later,  vice 
had  a  strengthening  and  uplifting  effect  upon  Roman  life, 
especially  in  the  upper  circles  of  society,  but  in  general  the 
new  elements  now  imported  into  Roman  civilization  from 
the  Hellenistic  East  were  hurtful  to  morals.    Rome  "  sucked 
poison  from  the  Attic  bloom  decayed." 

It  is  a  commonplace  of  history  that  at  the  time  of  the 
Roman  conquest  of  the  East  the  great  semi-Hellenized  cities 
of  the  Orient  were  sinks  of  moral  corruption.  Brought  into 
close  contact  with  these  morally  debased  communities,  Roman 
civilization  was  at  once  infected  with  the  fatal  virus.  Streams 
of  impurity  overflowed  every  country  of  the  once  moral  West. 

1  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  clients  of  this  period  were  wholly 
different  from  the  clients  of  the  earlier  times.  The  relations  of  the  early 
clients  to  their  patrons  were  those  of  clansmen  to  their  chief ;  the  relations 
of  these  later  clients  to  their  patrons  were  the  degrading  relations  of  idle, 
needy  dependents  to  newly  rich  men  without  family  traditions  and  socially 
and  morally  wholly  unfit  for  their  elevation. 


230 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


Modifica- 
tions in 
the  moral 
type  itself 


The  Orontes  emptied  into  the  Tiber.  Oriental  vices  and 
luxury  came  in  as  a  flood.  The  primitive  Roman  virtues 
of  frugality  and  simplicity  disappeared.  Greek  cooks,  we  are 
told,  brought  a  higher  price  than  Greek  philosophers. 

Almost  every  element  of  the  Greco-Oriental  culture  seemed 
to  bear  within  it  the  seeds  of  moral  deterioration  and  decay. 
Greek  philosophy,  pervaded  in  general  by  a  spirit  of  skep- 
ticism, tended  to  unsettle  still  more  positively  the  already 
shaken  faith  of  the  Romans  in  their  ancestral  gods.  Roman 
morality,  in  so  far  as  it  was  supported  by  religious  belief, 
was  thus  fatally  impaired.  The  Epicurean  philosophy,  if  not 
—  as  taught  by  most  of  the  Sophists  —  a  direct  incentive  to 
vice,  afforded  at  least  a  ready  apology  for  indulgence  in 
coarse  and  gluttonous  pleasures. 

The  plays  presented  on  the  Roman  comic  stage  were  mostly 
pieces  of  the  Greek  drama,  which,  in  the  process  of  adaptation 
to  a  Roman  audience,  had  been  made  coarse  and  dissolute. 
Thus  the  theater  became  one  of  the  most  effective  agencies 
of  social  corruption.  In  the  words  of  Mommsen,  it  was  "  the 
great  school  at  once  of  Hellenism  and  of  vice."  x 

A  much  more  important  fact  in  the  moral  history  of  the 
later  Republic  than  this  lowering  of  the  standard  of  conduct 
is  the  change  which  was  being  effected  in  the  moral  ideal 
itself.  While  certain  causes  were  at  work  depressing  the 
moral  standard  to  the  lowest  point,  perhaps,  that  it  ever 
touched  in  the  long  history  of  Rome,  there  were  other  causes 
in  operation  which  were  slowly  modifying  the  old  Roman  type 
of  character  and  creating  a  new  type  made  up  largely  of  new 
virtues.  We  speak  of  this  change  in  the  ideal  as  a  fact  of 
greater  significance  than  that  of  moral  degeneracy,  for  the 
reason  that  a  decline  in  actual  morality,  the  failure  of  a  peo- 
ple to  live  up  to  the  best  they  know,  is  always  a  superficial  and 
transient  phenomenon  compared  with  the  changes  effected 


1  The  History  of  Rome  (1888),  vol.  ii,  p.  524. 


ROMAN  MORALS  231 

by  different  influences  in  the  moral  type  itself,  since  these 
changes  constitute  the  very  essence  of  the  ethical  evolution. 

The  causes  at  work  modifying  the  old  Roman  ideal  of 
character  were  various ;  but  more  vital  than  all  other  influ- 
ences were  those  that  came  through  the  contact  of  Rome  with 
Greek  culture  and  the  civilizations  of  the  Orient.  At  the  heart 
of  these  ancient  cultures  were  ethical  elements  of  inestimable  - 
value.  Among  these  were  the  Greek  humanitarian  spirit  and 
the  various  intellectual  virtues  which  characterized  the  Greek 
type  of  excellence  ;  and,  in  the  Oriental  theosophic  cultures, 
a  deeply  religious  spirit  and  the  religious  virtues  which  marked 
the  moral  ideals  of  the  Eastern  nations,  particularly  the  Egyp- 
tian, the  Persian,  and  the  Hebrew.  We  recognize  the  supreme 
importance  for  the  later  moral  history  of  Rome,  as  well  as  for 
that  of  the  whole  Western  world,  of  the  ethical  products  of 
the  religious  culture  of  Judea,  but  we  do  not  recognize  as  fully 
the  importance  of  the  ethical  elements  of  the  secular  culture 
of  Greece  and  of  the  theosophic  civilizations  of  Egypt  and 
Persia.  But  Rome's  ethical  debt  to  these  older  cultures  was 
also  indisputably  great. 

But  since  these  Greco-Oriental  influences  which  were 
at  work  modifying  the  old  Roman  type  of  character  had 
not  wrought  their  full  effects  before  the  close  of  the  third 
century  of  the  imperial  period,  we  shall  reserve  further  com- 
ment on  them,  and  on  the  new  composite  type  they  were 
contributing  to  create,  for  the  next  division  of  this  chapter, 
in  which  we  shall  follow  the  trend  of  the  moral  evolution 
under  the  pagan  Empire. 

IV.  The  Moral  Evolution  under  the  Pagan  Empire 

Roman  society  throughout  the  first  century  of  the  pagan  The  bad 
Empire,  as  mirrored  in  the  literature  of  the  period,  presents    eques 
a  picture  of  frightful  moral  degeneracy.    This  state  of  things 
was  largely  an  inheritance  from  the  Republic.     It  was  the 


232  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

continuation  of  that  moral  decline  which  began  in  the  second 
century  B.C.,  and  some  of  the  contributing  causes  of  which, 
such  as  slavery,  the  spectacles  of  the  amphitheater,  the  free 
distribution  of  corn,  together  with  contact  with  the  dissolute 
civilizations  of  the  Orient,  were  considered  briefly  in  the  pre- 
ceding pages.  Since  all  these  causes  of  moral  degradation 
were  still  at  work  in  the  society  of  the  early  Empire,  and  as 
fresh  agencies  of  malign  influence  were  added  to  them,  it  was 
inevitable  that  the  moral  anarchy  should  not  only  continue 
but  should  grow  worse. 

The  definitive  establishment  of  the  Empire  and  the  passing 
of  the  liberal  institutions  of  the  Republic  changed  wholly  the 
atmosphere  in  which  had  been  nourished  the  virtues  of  Re- 
publican Rome.  Political  liberty  was  dead,  and  all  true  civic 
activity,  which  had  been  the  very  breath  of  life  to  the  citizen 
of  the  ancient  city,  had  come  to  an  end.  In  the  new  world 
that  was  forming  there  was  no  room  for  the  exercise  of  those 
patriotic  virtues  which  had  made  the  early  history  of  Rome 
so  great,  and  had  given  her  the  rule  of  the  world.1 

One  wholly  fresh  cause  of  moral  debasement  was  the  per- 
sonal character  of  several  of  the  occupants  of  the  imperial 
throne  during  the  first  century  of  the  Empire.  The  Oriental 
extravagancies  and  coarse  debaucheries  which  disgraced  the 
court  of  a  Claudius,  a  Caligula,  or  a  Nero,  communicated  their 
virus  to  every  part  of  the  social  body.  Never  did  the  proverb, 
"As  court,  so  people,"  have  such  justification.  At  the  same 
time  the  tyranny  which  marked  the  rule  of  more  than  one  of 
the  emperors  instituted  a  demoralizing  terror  like  that  of  the 
proscriptions  of  the  Civil  Wars.  Under  the  influence  of  the 
frightful  persecutions  of  their  order,  the  senatorial  aristoc- 
racy, with  moral  fiber  now  relaxed  and  corroded  by  effeminate 
luxury,  lost  seemingly  all  those  virtues  which  earlier  had 

1  "  The  deepest  feeling  of  Tacitus  about  the  early  Empire  seems  to 
have  been  that  it  was  fatal  to  character  both  in  prince  and  subject."  — 
Dill,  Roman  Society  from  Nero  to  Marcus  Aurelius,  p.  29. 


ROMAN  MORALS  233 

characterized  their  class,  and  was  transformed  into  a  body  at 
times  sycophantic,  cringing,  and  base  almost  beyond  belief. 
But  it  is  doubtful  if  any  other  aristocracy  which  history  has 
known  would  have  stood  the  test  any  better.  The  French 
nobility  of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries,  excluded 
from  participation  in  political  affairs  by  the  divine-right  mon- 
archy, and  made  servile  dependents  of  the  court,  exhibited 
almost  as  depressing  a  spectacle  of  moral  degeneracy  as  did 
the  higher  Roman  classes  under  the  more  frightful  tyranny 
of  the  early  Caesars. 

But  we  may  here  profitably  call  to  mind  the  words  of  Wedg-  The  old  and 
wood  to  the  effect  that  the  phenomenon  of  moral  decay,  al- 
though the  most  striking,  is  not  the  most  significant  fact  in 
the  moral  history  of  a  race  or  of  an  age.  M  The  fact  that  an 
old  ideal  is  perishing,"  remarks  this  writer,  "  must  always  be 
a  stronger  or  at  least  a  more  obvious  moral  influence  than 
the  fact  that  a  new  one  is  coming  into  life.  ...  A  death  is 
more  impressive  than  a  birth."  x 

What  in  this  reflection  claims  our  attention  here  is  the  im- 
plied truth  that  the  passing  of  the  old  means  the  coming  of 
the  new.  At  the  base  of  the  falling  leaf  there  is  always  a  new- 
forming  bud.  It  is  not  otherwise  in  the  moral  world.  Unless 
the  forces  of  the  moral  life  have  become  fatally  impaired, 
the  decay  of  an  old  ideal  of  excellence  is  ever  accompanied 
by  the  growth  of  a  new  and  better  one.  And  it  was  so  in  the 
Rome  of  the  early  Caesars.  The  Roman  ancestral  ideal  of 
character,  with  its  attractive  civic  and  heroic  virtues,  was 
indeed  falling  into  decay  and  passing  away,  but  a  new  and 
better  ideal  of  goodness  was  slowly  forming  and  winning 
the  allegiance  of  the  select  spirits  of  the  age. 

Lecky  distinguishes  in  the  moral  history  of  pagan  Rome  The  three 
three  periods  characterized  "  by  the  successive  ascendancy  of  f/the 
the  Roman,  the  Greek,  and  the  Egyptian  spirit."    Up  to  near  J^alofhis" 

Rome 

1  The  Moral  Ideal,  3d  ed.,  p.  204. 


234  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

the  end  of  the  Republic  the  moral  ideal  was  essentially  Roman ; 
during  the  first  and  second  centuries  of  the  Empire  it  was 
characterized  by  the  dominance  of  the  humanitarian_and  cos- 
mopolitan spirit  of  Greece  ;  while  in  the  third  and  last  century 
of  the  pagan  Empire  it  was  marked  by  the  ascendency  of  the 
Egyptian  spirit  of  religious  reverence.1  In  the  immediately 
following  pages  we  shall  consider  the  second  of  these  periods. 

Modifying  Already  at  the  time  of  the  establishment  of  the  Empire  the 
the  Roman  two  great  civilizations  of  classical  antiquity  had  been  in  close 
GreVkspirlt  contact  for  a  hundred  years  and  more.  The  elements  of  Greek 
culture  which  reacted  most  powerfully  upon  Roman  society 
were  the  purely  intellectual  and  the  ethical.  History  has  fully 
recognized  the  debt  of  Rome  to  Greek  intellectualism,  but  it 
has  not  so  fully  recognized  her  ethical  debt  to  Hellenism. 
Yet  it  was  the  contribution  made  by  Greece  to  the  new- 
forming  moral  ideal  of  the  Roman  world  which  was, prob- 
ably the  most  historically  important  element  of  the  Hellenic 
bequest.  This  ethical  inheritance  of  Rome  from  Greece  was 
second  only  to  her  ethical  heritage  from  Judea. 

It  was  largely  through  the  medium  of  Greek  literature  and 
Greek  philosophy,  particularly  the  Platonic  and  the  Stoic, 
that  the  ethical  Greek  spirit,  characterized  by  its  humanita- 
rian and  cosmopolitan  sympathies,  exerted  its  modifying  in- 
fluence upon  the  Roman  moral  consciousness  and  gradually 
changed  it  into  something  very  different  from  what  it  was  at 
first.  This  influence  can  best  be  traced  in  Roman  literature 
and  the  imperial  legislation. 

Evidences  The  two  great  changes  in  the  moral  type  consisted,  as  Lecky 
ture  of  tie  observes,  in  the  greater  prominence  accorded  the  benevolent  or 
th^momi01  amiable  virtues,  and  in  the  broadening  of  the  moral  sympathies.2 
feelings  The  effect  of  the  action  of  the  humanitarian  Greek  spirit  upon 
the  old  Roman  ideal  of  character  was  to  soften  its  harsher 

1  History  of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  i,  pp.  332  ff. 

2  Ibid.  3d  ed.,  vol.  i,  p.  227. 


ROMAN  MORALS  235 

features  and  to  cause  the  heroic  virtues  to  yield  place,  in  a 
measure,  to  the  benevolent  qualities,  that  is  to  say,  to  those 
virtues  which  in  the  course  of  three  centuries  or  more,  largely 
under  Hebrew-Christian  influences,  were  destined  to  assume 
a  dominant  place  in  the  accepted  ideal  of  moral  excellence.1 

Cicero,  Vergil,  Juvenal,  and  Seneca  may  be  considered  the 
truest  representatives  of  this  new-forming  social  conscience. 
Cicero,  writing  just  at  the  end  of  the  Republic  and  after 
Rome  for  more  than  three  generations  had  been  under  the 
influence  of  Greek  culture  and  philosophy,  exhibits  unmistak- 
ably the  effect  upon  the  Roman  character  of  the  comparatively 
humane  and  gentle  spirit  of  Hellas.  In  his  treatise  De  Offiais, 
"  concerning  duties,"  in  which  he  interprets  and  enlarges  for 
the  benefit  of  his  son  Marcus  the  ethical  work  of  the  Greek 
philosopher  Panaetius,  he  gives  his  sanction  to  moral  doctrines 
which  could  hardly  have  been  approved  by  a  Roman  moralist 
before  Rome  had  felt  the  influence  of  the  ethical  spirit  of 
Greece.  The  work  is  a  glorification  of  the  virtues  of  pity, 
gentleness,  and  benevolence. 

The  softening  movement  finds  another  representative  in 
Vergil.  His  great  poem  is  in  its  ethical  spirit  more  Greek 
than  Roman.  In  the  "  transformation  of  the  goddess  of  law- 
less self-pleasing  love  into  a  goddess  of  a  maternal  compas- 
sionate love,"  Wedgwood  would  have  us  see  summed  up  the 
change  in  moral  feeling  of  the  classical  world  during  the 
centuries  that  separated  the  age  of  the  Iliad  from  that  of 
the  yEneid? 

Juvenal,3  too,  applauds  the  moral  qualities  of  pity  and  ten- 
derness. M  His  moral  tone  appears  to  unite  the  spirit  of  two 
different  ages."4  Seneca  denounced  the  gladiatorial  games  as 
inhuman  and  degrading.    He  constantly  lays  emphasis  upon 

(j  n  Men  ceased  to  be  adventurous,  patriotic,  just,  magnanimous ;  but  in 
exchange  they  became  chaste,  tender-hearted,  loyal,  religious,  and  capable 
of  infinite  endurance  in  a  good  cause."  —  Seeley,  Roman  Imperialism 
(1889),  p.  33.         2  The  Moral  Ideal,  3d  ed.,  p.  187.         3  About  40-120  a.d. 

4  Dill,  Roman  Society  from  Nero  to  Marcus  Aurelius,  p.  64. 


236  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

those  amiable  virtues  which  belong  rather  to  the  Greek  than 
to  the  Roman  ideal  of  moral  excellence. 

Ethical  Nor  was  this  moral  evolution  confined  to  ethical  theory ; 

emboli- °  S  these  precepts  of  the  moralists  found  generous  embodiment 
Notice  m  practice.  Especially  was  the  age  of  the  Antonines  a  benev- 
olent age,  one  in  which  all  kinds  of  charities  abounded.  Re- 
specting private  benefactions  in  this  period  Professor  Samuel 
Dill  asserts  that  we  may  well  doubt  whether  they  were  less 
numerous  and  generous  than  at  the  present  day,  and  that 
"  there  has  probably  seldom  been  a  time  when  wealth  was 
more  generally  regarded  as  a  trust,  a  possession  in  which  the 
community  at  large  has  a  right  to  share."1  These  numer- 
ous gifts  and  legacies  assumed  the  form  of  baths,  theaters, 
libraries,  markets,  colonnades,  aqueducts,  fountains,  temples, 
basilicas,  and  other  monuments  of  utility  or  adornment. 

The  motives  which  led  to  all  this  public  giving  were  of 
course  mixed,  just  as  are  the  motives  of  givers  of  to-day,  but 
we  may  without  much  hesitation  assume  with  the  historian 
Dill  that  they  sprang  largely  from  genuine  altruistic  feeling, 
from  a  recognition  of  the  true  uses  of  wealth,  and  from  a 
sense  of  the  duty  of  the  rich  to  the  poor  and  dependent  — 
from  the  same  motives,  in  a  word,  that  a  century  or  two  later 
were  to  cover  these  same  lands  with  churches  and  monasteries 
and  oratories.2 


The  broad-  The  second  important  ethical  movement  in  the  pre-Christian 
moment  :i  Roman  world  consisted,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the  widening  of 
versaiism1"  tne  moral  sympathies.  The  two  most  efficient  causes  of  this 
as  the  out-    movement  were  the  establishment  of  the  world  empire  and 

come  of  the  ,    * 

world  em-  the  ascendancy  at  Rome  of  Greek  philosophy,  particularly  the 
stoicism      philosophy  of  the  Stoics. 

Never  before  in  the  history  of  the  world  down  to  our  own 
day  were  there  so  many  forces  and  circumstances  making  for 

1  Dill,  Roman  Society  from  Nero  to  Marcus  Aurelius,  pp.  231  f. 

2  Cf.  Ibid.  p.  232. 


ROMAN  MORALS  237 

cosmopolitanism  in  life  and  thought  as  in  the  age  of  the  early 
Caesars.  The  growth  of  the  little  city  state  of  Rome  into  a 
world  state  had  made  all  freemen  actually  or  potentially  citi- 
zens of  the  world.  The  political  unity  of  the  world  had 
awakened  the  consciousness  of  a  moral  unity.  In  thought  and 
feeling  many  select  souls  recognized  themselves  as  brothers 
of  all  other  men.  It  was  not  merely  the  world-wide  reach  of 
the  Roman  rule  that  promoted  the  growth  of  this  cosmopoli- 
tanism, but  contributing  largely  to  it  were  the  policies  of  the 
imperial  government,  many  of  whose  agencies  and  institutions 
made  directly  and  powerfully  for  the  development  of  a  senti- 
ment of  universal  human  kinship.  The  unification  of  the 
world  on  its  physical  side,  by  the  creation  of  the  splendid 
Roman  roads  and  the  facilities  thus  provided  for  world-wide 
trade  and  travel,  had  the  same  broadening  effect  upon  the 
moral  feelings  that  modern  railways,  steamboats,  and  tele- 
graphs have  upon  the  ethical  sympathies  of  our  own  day. 
Furthermore,  the  practically  autocratic  authority  of  the  Em- 
peroj//ended  to  destroy  class  distinctions  by  reducing  all  to  the 
same  level  of  servitude,  to  obliterate  national  boundaries,  and 
to  weaken  race  prejudices.  Then  also,  as  the  capital  of  the 
world,  Rome  had  become,  as  a  center  and  creator  of  cosmo- 
politan life,  a  second  Alexandria.  The  character,  too,  of  the 
slaves,  drawn  now  largely  from  the  East,  and  often  superior 
in  culture  to  their  masters,  tended  to  blur  the  distinctions 
between  classes  based  on  outer  conditions,  and  to  suggest  the 
doctrine  of  equality  in  the  sphere  of  the  spirit.  The  army, 
also,  recruited  from  every  race  and  land  in  the  Empire,  and 
from  the  outside  barbarian  world  as  well,  with  the  legions 
raised  in  one  country  serving  in  another,  was  a  liberalizing 
agency,  and  a  most  effective  one  in  breaking  down  race  bar- 
riers and  in  widening  the  mental  outlook  and  the  moral 
sympathies  of  the  traveled  legionaries. 

The  second  great  cause  of  the  enlarging  of  the  moral 
feelings  was  the  influence  of  the  Greek  spirit.    Indeed,  this 


238  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

broadening  movement  was  in  large  measure  the  effect  of  the 
action  of  the  cosmopolitan  spirit  of  the  Stoic  philosophy  upon 
the  originally  narrow  spirit  of  Rome.1  Evidences  in  literature 
of  this  widening  of  the  moral  horizon  multiply  from  Terence 
in  the  second  century  b.c.  to  the  age  of  the  Antonines.  The 
familiar  sentiment  of  the  poet,  "I  am  a  man  and  nothing 
human  is  alien  to  me,"  2  although  we  know  nothing  as  to  the 
response  this  evoked  in  the  readers  of  Terence,  may  fairly  be 
accepted  as  evidence  that  the  new  spirit  of  cosmopolitanism 
was  already  at  work  in  Roman  society.  But  the  first  clear 
sustained  note  of  universalistic  morality  comes  from  Cicero 
in  his  treatise  De  Officiis*  to  which  we  have  already  referred. 
The  author  says  much  about  the  Law  of  Nature  and  of  the 
society  and  community  of  the  human  race.  One  should,  in 
imitation  of  Hercules,  even  at  the  cost  of  great  labor  and 
pain,  give  succor  and  aid  to  every  one,  whoever  he  may  be, 
for  this  is  consonant  with  nature.4  In  destroying  Corinth 
Rome  was  guilty  of  a  great  crime.5  The  human  race  forms 
a  universal  society,  by  virtue  of  the  bond  of  reason  and 
speech;  therefore  we  are  to  do  good  to  all  men — but  liberal- 
ity should  begin  at  home.6  "The  love  of  humanity,"  he  says, 
"which  has  its  beginnings  in  the  love  of  parents  for  their 
offspring,  binds  together  first  the  members  of  the  family ; 
then,  gradually  reaching  out  beyond  the  domestic  circle,  em- 
braces successively  relatives,  friends,  neighbors,  fellow  citizens; 

1  Stoicism  is  second  only  to  Christianity  as  a  moral  force  in  European 
civilization.  w  One  of  the  most  important  expressions  of  the  moral  sense 
for  all  time,"  affirms  Professor  Clifford,  *  is  that  of  the  Stoic  philosophy, 
especially  after  its  reception  among  the  Romans  "  {Lectures  and  Essays 
(1901),  vol.  ii,  p.  108).  Mahaffy  declares  that  the  Stoic  philosophy,  "  above 
all  the  human  influences  we  know,  purified  and  ennobled  the  world  "  ( The 
Silver  Age  (1906),  p.  103).  Denis  thinks  that  it  was  through  Stoicism  that 
Rome  did  most  for  civilization  {His  to  ire  des  theories  et  des  idees  morales  dans 
rantiquitt  (1879),  t  ii,  p.  5).  a  Taken  from  Menander. 

8  "  One  of  the  most  emphatic  as  well  as  one  of  the  earliest  extant  asser- 
tions of  the  duty  of  charity  to  the  human  race  occurs  in  the  treatise  of 
Cicero  upon  duties."  —  Lecky,  History  of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  i, 
p.  240.  4  De  Off.  iii.  5.  6  Ibid.  iii.  xi.  6  Ibid.  i.  16. 


ROMAN  MORALS  239 

next  broadens  to  include  allied  nations ;  and  finally  comes  to 
embrace  the  whole  human  race."  1 

Two  generations  later,  in  the  reign  of  Nero,  Seneca  en- 
joined the  same  cosmopolitan  morality.  He  declared  all  men 
to  be  citizens  of  a  universal  commonwealth,  and  inculcated 
the  lofty  sentiment,  "  Man  should  be  sacred  to  his  fellow 
man."  Epictetus  in  the  same  age  preached  a  like  doctrine  of 
human  fraternity,  and  taught  that  a  man  should  regard  him- 
self not  as  a  citizen  of  this  or  of  that  city,  but  as  a  citizen 
of  the  world. 

But  it  is  in  the  Meditations  of  the  Emperor  Marcus  Aure- 
lius  that  we  find  the  most  emphatic  declaration  of  this  Stoic 
doctrine  of  the  unity  of  mankind  and  the  universal  reach  of 
the  moral  law.  As  envisioned  by  the  emperor-philosopher 
the  whole  world  is  a  single  state  and  all  men  are  fellow 
citizens.  "  My  city  and  country,"  he  says,  "  so  far  as  I  am 
Antoninus,  is  Rome,  but  so  far  as  I  am  a  man,  it  is  the 
world."2  Again  he  muses:  "The  poet  says,  Dear  city  of 
Cecrops ;  and  wilt  not  thou  say,  Dear  city  of  Zeus  ? " 3 
Every  man,  he  declares,  should  remember  that  every  rational 
being  is  his  kinsman,  and  that  "  to  care  for  all  men  is  accord- 
ing to  man's  nature  ;  " 4  for  "  men  exist  for  the  sake  of  one 
another."  5 

In  what  measure  these  moralists  and  philosophers  whom 
we  have  quoted  really  represented  their  times  it  is  of  course 
impossible  to  say ;  but  probably  we  would  not  be  wrong  in 
assuming  that  they  appealed  to  a  certain  public  sentiment,  and 
that  the  doctrines  they  taught  evoked  consenting  response 

1  De  Finibus,  v.  23. 

2  Meditations,  vi.  44.  This  and  the  following  citations  are  from  Long's 
translation,  2d  ed. 

3  Ibid.  iv.  23.  The  moral  element  in  the  conception  of  the  universal 
city  must  not  be  overlooked.  There  was  implied  in  it  the  idea  of  universal 
brotherhood,  of  the  ethical  oneness  of  mankind.  The  creation  and  pro- 
mulgation of  this  conception  was  one  of  the  great  services  which  Stoicism 
rendered  to  civilization.  4  Ibid.  iii.  4.  5  Ibid.  viii.  59. 


240 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


from  the  moral  consciousness  of  more  than  a  few  in  every 
rank  of  Roman  society. 

The  doctrine  of  the  Law  of  Nature,  upon  which  such  em- 
phasis was  laid  by  the  Stoic  philosophers,  had  such  conse- 
quences for  the  evolution  of  Roman  morals  and  so  great  an 
influence  upon  the  moral  philosophers  of  later  times,  par- 
ticularly upon  the  speculations  of  the  philosophers  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  that  we  must  in  the  present  connection 
endeavor  to  gain  some  idea  of  what  the  Stoics  meant  by  this 
phrase,  and  the  ethical  value  of  the  conception.1 

The  Law  of  Nature  is  merely  the  Stoic  designation  of  a 
law  which,  under  other  names,  all  the  ages  have  revered  as 
the  supreme  law  of  the  universe.  It  i-s  practically  the  law  of 
conscience,  the  inner  law  written  on  the  hearts  of  men.2  It 
is  that  law  which  is  in  the  background  of  our  consciousness 
when  we  say,  "  We  must  obey  God  rather  than  man."  It  is 
that  holy  law  which  came  to  Hebrew  prophet  as  the  word  of 
Jehovah.  It  is  that  inviolable  law  which  Antigone  feared  to 
break,  "  a  law  not  proclaimed  by  men,  and  which  lives  not  for 
to-day  nor  yesterday,  but  evermore."  3  It  is  what  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  in  a  recent  decision  calls  "  the  rule 
of  reason,"  that  inborn  sense  of  what  is  reasonable  and  just. 

This  Law  of  Nature  being  thus  the  expression  of  what  is 
most  constituent  and  essential  in  man  as  man,  it  necessarily 
results  that  there  is  a  large  common  element  in  the  customs 
and  the  rules  of  conduct  of  all  peoples  who  are  in  the  same  or 
nearly  the  same  stage  of  culture ;  hence  the  substantial  con- 
formity between  the  Law  of  Nature  and  the  Laws  of  Nations. 
The  conformity,  however,  is  not  perfect.  The  moral  task  of 
humanity  is  to  make  it  perfect. 

1  This  subject  is  dealt  with  by  Lecky,  History  of  European  Morals, 
3d  ed.,  vol.  i,  pp.  295  ff. ;  Bryce,  Studies  in  History  and  Jurisprudence, 
vol.  ii,  essay  xi,  M  The  Law  of  Nature." 

2  Bryce,  Studies  in  History  and  Jurisprudence  (1901),  vol.  ii,  p.  143. 
8  Sophocles,  Antigone. 


ROMAN  MORALS  241 

It  is  of  course  the  ethical  imperative  of  the  Law  of  Nature 
which  has  rendered  it  such  a  revolutionary  and  reconstructive 
force  in  history.  During  the  medieval  period  it  was  seldom 
invoked  because  the  Church  and  not  the  normal  human  rea- 
son was  regarded  as  the  supreme  authority  in  the  domain  of 
morals.  But  after  the  Renaissance  and  the  Reformation  had 
proclaimed  the  autonomy  of  the  individual  spirit  and  the  ulti- 
mate authority  of  the  individual  conscience  in  the  realm  of 
moral  right  and  wrong,  then  came  naturally  an  appeal  from 
the  rules  and  conventions  of  society  to  the  unwritten  Law  of 
Nature ;  hence  the  prominence  it  assumed  in  the  writings 
of  the  philosophers  of  the  eighteenth  century,  who  prepared 
the  way  for  the  French  Revolution. 

But  what  it  concerns  us  now  to  notice  is  merely  the  influ- 
ence of  this  conception  of  a  Law  of  Nature  on  the  moral 
development  in  the  later  period  of  the  Roman  Empire.  A 
fundamental  principle  of  the  law,  as  apprehended  by  the 
Stoics,  is  that  men  are  born  free  and  equal.  If  this  teaching 
be  received  as  axiomatic,  it  is  easy  to  understand  its  impor- 
tance for  morality.  Tried  by  this  touchstone,  many  social  insti- 
tutes, such  for  instance  as  slavery,  are  shown  at  once  to  be 
contrary  to  nature,  and  hence  opposed  to  natural  justice.  The 
acceptance  of  this  Stoic  doctrine  by  the  Roman  jurists  caused 
the  Roman  law,  as  we  shall  see  immediately,  to  be  molded 
in  opposition  to  servitude  and  in  the  interest  of  freedom.1 

In  its  moral  influence  Stoicism  worked  in  the  Roman  world  influence  of 

more  like  a  religion  than. a  philosophy.    In  truth  it  was  a  aattkiaa 

missionary  philosophy.    It  created  in  a  remarkable  measure  R0mean gov- 
ernment 

1  Commenting  on  the  consequences  of  the  inspiration  of  Roman  law  by  and  law 
this  doctrine  of  Stoicism,  Lecky  says  :  w  To  the  Stoics  and  the  Roman 
lawyers  is  mainly  due  the  clear  recognition  of  the  existence  of  a  law  of 
nature  above  and  beyond  all  human  enaclmerrt^wliich  has  been  the  basis 
of  the  best  moral  and  of  the  most  influential,  though  most  chimerical,  politi- 
cal speculations  of  later  ages,  and  the  renewed  study  of  Roman  law  was  an 
important  element  in  the  revival  that  preceded  the  Reformation  "  {History 
of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  i,  p.  297). 


242  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

moral  enthusiasm.  "  In  the  Roman  Empire,"  declares  Lecky, 
M  almost  every  great  character,  almost  every  effort  in  the 
cause  of  liberty,  emanated  from  the  ranks  of  Stoicism."  * 

In  the  first  place  it  presented  an  ideal  of  monarchy  which 
powerfully  influenced  Roman  imperialism.2  It  made  the 
prince  "  the  shepherd'  of  his  people."  It  taught  that  the 
sole  aim  of  the  ruler  should  be  "  the  good  of  his  subjects." 
The  effects  of  these  teachings  were  evident  in  the  rule  of 
more  than  one  of  the  pagan  emperors.  The  blessings  which 
the  reigns  of  Pius  and  Marcus  Aurelius  Antoninus  and 
others  of  the  "  good  emperors  "  brought  to  the  Roman  world 
are  to  be  attributed  in  large  measure  to  the  influence  upon 
these  rulers  of  the  doctrines  and  ideals  of  Stoicism.  In  the 
beneficent  rule  of  these  Stoic  emperors  the  ideal  of  Plato 
and  Dion  was  realized;  the  philosopher  was  upon  the  throne. 
Only  in  the  effects  of  the  teachings  of  the  philosophers  of 
the  eighteenth  century  upon  the  Enlightened  Despots  of 
that  period  do  we  find  a  like  illustration  of  the  influence 
of  philosophy  upon  the  possessors  of  absolute  power. 

The  enlightened  and  humane  spirit  of  Stoicism  was  felt 
especially  in  the  law.3  It  was  the  Stoic  doctrine  of  the  nat- 
ural equality  of  all  men  that  worked  most  effectively  in  this 
domain.  Many  of  the  disabilities  placed  upon  woman  by 
the  earlier  law  were  removed ;  children  were  emancipated 
in  a  measure  from  the  now  unreasonable  authority  of  the 
father;4  and  the  slave  was  placed  under  the  protection  of 

1  History  of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  i,  p.  129.  Lecky  instances 
(vol.  i,  p.  292)  three  ways  in  which  Stoicism  worked  for  good  in  the  Em- 
pire:  (1)  it  raised  up  good  emperors;  (2)  it  led  men  to  engage  in  the 
public  service ;  and  (3)  it  rendered  the  law  more  catholic  and  humane. 

2  Dill,  Roman  Society  from  Nero  to  Marcus  Aurelius  (1904),  p.  376. 

8  "  In  the  Stoic  emperors  ...  we  find  probably  the  earliest  example  of 
great  moral  principles  applied  to  legislation  on  a  large  scale." — Clifford, 
Lectures  and  Essays,  vol.  ii,  p.  108. 

4  Public  feeling  in  regard  to  the  exercise  of  the  patria  potestas  had 
been  slowly  changing  during  the  centuries.  Seneca  relates  {De  Clem.  i.  14) 
how  within  his  memory  the  people  furiously  assaulted  in  the  Forum  a 
certain  knight  because  he  had  whipped  his  son  to  death. 


ROMAN  MORALS  243 

the  law  and  safeguarded  against  the  worst  brutalities  of  a 
cruel  master. 

The  mitigation  of  the  lot  of  the  slave  constitutes  so  impor-  Ameiiora- 
tant  a  phase  of  the  moral  evolution  of  the  pre-Christian  period  slavery 
that  we  must  consider  it  here  apart  and  in  some  detail.   The  JJJJa^. 
causes  of  this  moral  reform  were  various.   Among  the  most  Perors 
efficient  agencies  were  Stoicism  and  the  other  Greek  philoso- 
phies.1 Then  the  character  of  many  of  the  slaves  themselves, 
the  equal  or  superior  often  of  their  master  in  intelligence  and 
culture,  won  for  the  class  respect  and  consideration.   Further- 
more, the  great  number  of  freedmen,  who  constituted  a  very 
large  element  of  the  free  population  of  the  Empire,2  tended 
to  create  a  public  sentiment  favorable  to  the  slave.    Having 
had,  like  Epictetus  the  Stoic,  acquaintance  with  the  bitterness 
of  bondage,  they  knew  how  to  pity  the  bondsman. 

Already  in  the  first  century  of  the  Empire  all  the  chief 
leaders  of  moral  reform  taught  that  the  slave  is  the  equal 
of  his  master  in  capacity  for  virtue.3  Dion  Chrysostom  con- 
demned hereditary  slavery  as  contrary  to  the  Law  of  Nature 
and  hence  wrong.  He  is  thought  to  have  been  the  earliest 
writer  in  the  Roman  Empire  to  take  this  advanced  moral 
ground.4  Seneca  proclaimed  the  obligations  of  the  higher 
law:  "Although  our  laws,"  he  says,  "permit  a  master  to 
treat  his  slave  with  every  degree  of  cruelty,  still  there  are 
some  things  that  the  common  law  of  life  forbids  being  done 
to  a  human  being."  5  Cruel  masters,  he  adds,  are  hated  and 
detested. 

1  M  The  alleviations  of  slavery  by  the  imperial  law  are  essentially  trace- 
able to  the  influence  of  the  Greek  view."  —  Mommsen,  Roman  Provinces 
(1887),  vol.  i,  p.  296. 

2  "  The  majority  of  the  free  population  had  probably  either  themselves 
been  slaves,  or  were  descended  from  slaves."  —  Lecky,  History  of  European 
Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  i,  p.  237. 

8  Dill,  Roman  Society  from  Nero  to  Marcus  Aurelius  (1904),  p.  3. 

4  Lecky,  History  of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  i,  p.  312. 

5  De  Clem.  i.  18. 


244  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

The  growing  sentiment  of  tenderness  for  the  slave  found 
significant  popular  expression  in  the  reign  of  Nero.  A  certain 
prefect  of  the  city  having  been  murdered  by  a  slave,  the 
Senate,  in  accordance  with  ancient  usage,  adjudged  to  death 
the  entire  household  of  slaves,  four  hundred  in  number.  Sen- 
timent in  the  Senate  itself  was  divided,  some  of  the  senators 
voting  against  the  proposal,  while  the  people  gathering  in 
seditious  crowds  threatened  to  prevent  by  force  the  carrying 
out  of  the  edict.  A  body  of  soldiers  was  necessary  to  over- 
awe the  populace  and  secure  the  execution  of  the  slaves.1 

A  little  later  we  see  these  growing  humanitarian  feelings 
reflected  in  the  imperial  legislation.  Hadrian  took  away  from 
masters  the  ancient  right  willfully  to  kill  their  slaves ;  and 
Antoninus  Pius  made  the  killing  of  a  slave,  sine  causa,  murder. 
The  edicts  of  other  emperors  effected  further  mitigations  of 
the  law,  so  that  the  slave  code  of  the  later  pagan  Empire  is 
characterized  by  a  humaneness  of  spirit  that  places  it  in  strong 
contrast  with  the  callousness  of  the  code  of  earlier  times. 

Additional  evidence  of  the  increased  humanity  of  the  age 
is  afforded  by  the  numerous  manumissions  of  slaves.2  The 
motives  that  prompted  such  action  were  undoubtedly  mixed, 
one  self-regarding  motive  being  the  ambition  to  have  a  great 
retinue  of  clients ; 3  but  the  dominant  motive  is  unquestionably 
to  be  sought  in  the  growing  humanity  of  the  age. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  the  greatest  alleviations  of  slavery 
were  effected  before  the  influence  of  Christianity  was  felt. 
The  Christian  emperors  added  almost  nothing  to  the  laws  of 
the  pagan  Empire  ameliorating  the  lot  of  the  slave,  and  the 
Christian  bishops  in  general  fell  behind  Seneca  in  advocacy 
of  the  cause  of  the  bondsman.    The  emphasis  laid  by  the 

1  Tacitus,  Annals,  xiv.  42-45. 

2  Manumissions  were  frequent  even  in  Seneca's  time.  Pliny  the  Elder 
was  a  kind  master,  regarded  his  slaves  as  "humble  friends,"  and  manu- 
mitted many  of  them. 

3  The  client  class  of  the  imperial  period  was  made  up  almost  wholly  of 
freedmen. 


ROMAN  MORALS  245 

Church  upon  a  future  life  where  the  poor  and  the  oppressed 
of  this  world  should  receive  compensation  for  their  wrongs 
and  sufferings  here,  caused  the  Christian  teachers  to  regard 
earthly  rank  and  outer  conditions  of  life  as  of  little  moment.1 

While  considering   the  steady  expansion   of   the    moral  Ethics  of 
sympathies  and  the  growth  of  humanitarian  sentiment  in  the  cution  of 
pagan  Empire,  we  are  confronted  by  the  startling  fact  that  Jfans  byS" 
the  best  of  the  emperors,  those  most  closely  identified  with  g^JJJJ11 
the  legislation  embodying  the  new  spirit  of  humanity  and  jus- 
tice, were  among  the  most  severe  and  persistent  persecutors 
of  the  Christians. 

This  apparent  moral  paradox  is  the  same  as  will  again 
confront  us  in  the  medieval  age  in  connection  with  the 
Inquisition  and  the  cruel  persecution  of  heretics  and  dis- 
senters by  a  Church  which  was  based  on  the  principle  of 
universal  love,  and  which  exalted  to  the  highest  place  in  its 
ideal  of  goodness  the  qualities  of  gentleness  and  pity. 

The  paradox  in  each  case  is,  however,  such  only  in  seem- 
ing. The  persecution  of  Christians  by  pagans,  and  of  heretics 
by  Christians,  was  practically  the  inevitable  issue  of  certain 
ideas  and  beliefs  which  became. the  premises  of  moral  conclu- 
sions. In  neither  case  does  the  act  of  the  persecutor  necessa- 
rily imply  moral  turpitude.2  The  persecution  of  the  Christians 
by  the  pagan  emperors  sprang  in  the  main  from  the  belief  — 
in  connection  with  the  idea  of  corporate  responsibility  —  that 

1  It  is  surprising  that  while  in  the  Stoic  and  other  schools  there  was, 
during  these  centuries,  great  advance  in  theoretical  ethics  in  various  do- 
mains, in  that  of  war  there  was  no  essential  modification  of  the  views  and 
feelings  of  the  teachers  and  leaders  of  moral  reforms.  In  the  whole  range 
of  Roman  literature  and  philosophy  there  are  to  be  found  scarcely  any 
expressions  of  disapproval  of  war.  The  attitude  of  the  Roman  moralists 
in  this  matter  appears  to  have  been  altogether  like  that  of  the  Greek 
philosophers.  The  right  to  wage  war  for  empire  and  for  glory  was  taught 
even  by  Cicero,  only  such  wars,  he  insisted,  should  be  waged  more  gently 
than  wars  to  recover  property,  to  punish  insult,  or  to  avenge  a  wrong 
{De  Off.  i.  12). 

2  For  the  ethics  of  Christian  persecution,  see  below,  p.  324. 


and  senti- 
ment 


246  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

the  welfare  of  the  state  was  bound  up  with  the  careful  ob- 
servance of  the  rites  of  the  temple.1  It  was  thought  that  the 
neglect  of  the  temple  service  by  any  single  member  of  the 
community  awakened  the  resentment  of  the  gods  toward  all 
the  members  alike.  If  the  Tiber  overflowed  its  banks,  the 
people  were  ready  to  believe  that  the  calamity  had  been 
brought  upon  the  city  by  the  neglect  of  the  new  sect  to  offer 
the  customary  sacrifices  to  the  gods,  and  the  cry  arose,  "The 
Christians  to  the  lions! "  In  a  word,  the  refusal  of  the  Chris- 
tians to  participate  in  the  common  worship  was  looked  upon 
as  a  crime,  as  a  species  of  treason  against  the  state,  and  was 
punished  as  such.2 

stoic  teach-  As  we  are  now  approaching  the  time  when  a  new  moral 
San  in  tone  ideal,  that  of  Christianity,  is  to  displace  the  old  classical  ideal 
of  character,  it  will  be  both  instructive  and  interesting  to 
note  to  what  degree  this  ideal  which  was  passing  away  had, 
in  theory  if  not  in  practice,  under  the  varied  influences  to 
which  it  had  been  subjected  through  the  centuries,  become 
assimilated  to  this  new  ideal  of  excellence.3 

The  nobility  of  forgiveness  was  taught  by  many  of  the 
pagan  philosophers  with  Christian  insistence.   Cicero  regarded 

1  See  on  this  subject  Fiske,  Excursions  of  an  Evolutionist  (1883), 
pp.  238  ff. ;  Hardy,  Christianity  and  the  Roman  Government  (1894),  p.  17  ; 
Pollock,  Essays  in  Jurisprudence  and  Ethics  (1882),  p.  147. 

2  Besides  this  main  motive  of  the  persecutions  there  were  these  minor 
ones:  (1)  The  teachings  and  practices  of  the  new  sect  offended  the  pre- 
vailing spirit  of  luxury  and  sensuality;  (2)  families  were  divided;  (3)  the 
business  of  many,  as  that  of  the  silversmiths  of  Ephesus,  was  threatened 
(Acts  xix.  24-41) ;  and  (4)  fear  on  the  part  of  the  government  of  the  danger 
from  the  growth  of  such  a  strong  semi-secret  organization  as  the  Church 
was  becoming  within  the  Empire  (Hardy,  Christianity  and  the  Roman 
Government  (1894),  p.  165). 

8  M  Upon  the  approach  of  Christianity  humanity  took  a  consciousness 
more  alert  and  sensitive,  and  during  the  first  three  centuries  of  our  era  all 
the  ideas,  all  the  sentiments  which  constitute  morality  developed  on  parallel 
lines  and  with  remarkable  force  in  the  growing  Church  and  in  expiring 
paganism."  —  Denis,  Histoire  des  theories  et  des  idees  morales  dans  Fantiquiti 
(1879).  t.ii,  p.  145- 


ROMAN  MORALS  247 

repentance  as  perhaps  sufficient  to  stay  the  hand  of  chastise- 
ment, and  declares  that  nothing  is  more  laudable  than  clem- 
ency and  willingness  to  forgive.1  Marcus  Aurelius  would 
repress  even  the  first  risings  of  resentment  for  injury  :  "When 
one  is  trying  to  do  thee  harm,  continue  to  be  of  a  kind  dis- 
position toward  him,  gently  admonish  him,  and  calmly  cor- 
rect his  error,  saying,  '  Not  so,  my  child ;  we  are  constituted 
by  nature  for  something  else  ;  I  shall  certainly  not  be  injured, 
but  thou  art  injuring  thyself,  my  child,'  —  and  show  him  by 
gentle  tact  and  by  general  principles  that  this  is  so."2 
And  again:  "It  is  royal  to  do  good  and  to  be  abused"3; 
"be  gentle  toward  those  who  try  to  hinder  or  otherwise 
trouble  thee."  4  "  The  best  way  of  avenging  thyself  is  not 
to  become  like  [the  wrongdoer]."5  Epictetus  quotes  with 
approval  Pittacus,  one  of  the  Seven  Wise  Men,  in  these 
words  :  "  Forgiveness  is  better  than  revenge,  for  forgiveness 
is  the  sign  of  a  gentle  nature,  but  revenge  the  sign  of  a 
savage  nature."  6 

Purity  and  sincerity  of  thought  is  inculcated  by  Marcus 
Aurelius.  '-A  man  should,"  he  says,  "accustom  himself  to 
think  of  those  things  only  about  which  if  one  should  suddenly 
ask,  What  hast  thou  now  in  thy  thought  ?  with  perfect  open- 
ness thou  mightest  immediately  answer,  This  or  that ;  so  that 
from  thy  word  it  should  be  plain  that  everything  in  thee  is 
simple  and  benevolent."  7 

Seneca  taught  that  adversity  has  moral  uses  :  "  God  does  not 
pamper  the  good  man  ;  he  puts  him  to  the  test  to  prove  him, 
he  hardens  him,  and  thus  prepares  him  for  himself."  8  Trust 
in  Providence  and  resignation  is  inculcated  by  Marcus  Aurelius 
in  many  passages  in  which  he  teaches  that  one  should  accept 
with  all  his  soul  everything  which  happens  to  him  as  his 

1  De  Off.  i.  2 5.  5  Ibid.  vi.  6. 

2  Meditations,  xi.  18.  6  Fragments,  tr.  Long,  lxviii ;  cf.  lxvii. 
8  Ibid.  vii.  36.                                 7  Meditations,  iii.  4. 

4  Ibid.  ix.  9 ;  cf.  vi.  47.  8  De  Prov.  i.  1. 


248 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


portion  assigned  by  God.  He  trusts  in  Him  who  governs ; 
he  says  to  the  universe,  M  I  love  as  thou  lovest."  x  He  accepts 
death  with  perfect  resignation  whether  it  be  extinction,  or 
birth  into  another  life  :  "To  go  away  from  among  men  is 
not  a  thing  to  be  afraid  of,  for  the  gods,  if  there  be  gods, 
will  not  involve  thee  in  evil."  2  But  death  may  be  extinction. 
If  so,  well ;  for  "  if  it  ought  to  have  been  otherwise,  the  gods 
would  have  ordered  it  so."  3 

Strangely  Christian  in  tone  are  the  reflections  of  Marcus 
Aurelius  on  the  transitoriness  of  earthly  life  :  "  What  be- 
longs to  the  soul  is  a  dream  and  vapor,  and  life  is  a  warfare 
and  a  stranger's  sojourn."  4 

The  duty  of  godlikeness  is  enjoined  by  Epictetus  :  "He 
who  seeks  to  please  the  gods  must  labor  as  far  as  in  him  lies 
to  resemble  them.  He  must  be  faithful  as  God  is  faithful, 
free  as  He  is  free,  beneficent  as  He  is  beneficent,  magnani- 
mous as  He  is  magnanimous."  5  Marcus  Aurelius  sums  up 
the  duty  of  man  in  love  to  his  fellows  and  in  following  God  ; 6 
and  Plutarch  declares  that  "  man  can  enjoy  no  greater  bless- 
ing from  God  than  to  attain  to  virtue  by  the  earnest  imitation 
of  the  noblest  qualities  of  the  divine  nature."  7 


Some  di- 
vergences 
between 
Roman  and 
Christian 
ethics 


But  while  in  many  of  the  teachings  of  the  leaders  of  mora? 
thought  in  the  later  Roman  Empire,  as  shown  by  the  above 
quotations,  we  find  a  near  approach  to  Christian  ethics,  or  a 
perfect  accordance  therewith,  still  it  is  a  fact  that  must  not 
be  overlooked  or  minimized  that  in  other  of  their  teachings 
in  which  they  represented  more  truly  the  popular  conceptions 
of  right  and  wrong,  they  as  conspicuously  diverged  from  the 
Christian  ideal. 


1  Meditations,  x.  2 

2  Ibid.  ii.  ii. 

6  Arrian,  Epict.  ii. 
3d  ed.,  vol.  i,  p.  246. 


8  Ibid.  xii.  5. 
4  Ibid.  ii.  17. 
quoted  by  Lecky,  History  of  European  Morals, 
6  Meditations,  vii.  31. 


7  Ethical  Essays,  v,  "  On  those  who  are  punished  by  the  Deity  late.' 


ROMAN  MORALS  249 

We  have  heard  some  of  the  moralists,  particularly  the  Stoic 
Marcus  Aurelius,  condemning  the  spirit  of  revenge  and  ex- 
tolling forgiveness  as  a  virtue ;  but  in  general  the  Stoics  as 
well  as  the  followers  of  other  schools  had  not  advanced  be- 
yond the  common  conscience  of  the  time  in  regard  to  the 
permissibility  and  even  duty  of  returning  injury  for  injury. 
Cicero  unequivocally  approved  the  taking  of  revenge  for  in- 
juries received;1  only  the  person  injured  should  avenge  him- 
self equitably  and  humanely.2  Again  he  says  that  justice 
requires  that  no  one  should  do  harm  to  another,  "  unless 
in  requital  of  some  injury  received."  3  Even  the  gentle  Plu- 
tarch, who  may  be  regarded  as  representing  the  composite 
ideal  of  character  which,  was  forming  in  the  first  century  of 
the  Empire  through  the  union  of  Greek  and  Roman  ethical 
ideas  and  feelings,  declares  it  to  be  a  virtue  to  make  one's 
self  disagreeable  to  one's  enemies. 

Tyrannicide,  which  in  general  is  condemned  by  the  modern 
conscience,  was  given  by  the  Roman  moralist,  as  by  the  Greek 
teachers,  a  place  among  the  greatest  of  the  virtues.  Cicero 
deems  it  a  meritorious  act  to  slay  a  tyrant  on  the  ground  that 
he  is  but  a  "  ferocious  beast  in  the  guise  of  a  man,"  4  and 
declares  that  of  all  illustrious  deeds  the  Roman  people  regard 
tyrannicide  the  most  laudable.5  Consistently  he  extols  the 
killing  of  the  Gracchi.6 

Pity  or  compassion  for  suffering,  which  is  assigned  such  a 
high  place  in  the  Christian  type  of  character,  was  regarded 
by  the  Roman  moralists  as  a  weakness,  even  a  vice ;  not 
but  that  they  extolled  clemency  in  the  ruler,  but  they  dis- 
tinguished between  this  sentiment  and  that  of  pity.  Seneca 
declared  pity  to  be  a  vice  incident  to  weak  minds.  "  The 
wise  man,"  he  said,  "will  dry  the  tears  of  others  but  will 

1  De  Off.  ii.  14.  3  iiM.  i.  7. 

2  Ibid.  ii.  5.  *  Ibid.  iii.  6. 

5  Ibid.  iii.  4.  Compare  this  expression  of  the  ancient  Greek  and  Roman 
moral  consciousness  with  that  of  the  modern  Japanese  (see  p.  86). 

6  Ibid.  ii.  12. 


250  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

not  add  his  to  theirs.  He  will  not  pity  those  in  distress, 
but  will  relieve  and  aid  them."  * 

Suicide,  which  to  the  modern  conscience  appears  a  cen- 
surable act,  was  by  most  of  the  Roman  moralists  regarded 
with  unqualified  approval,2  provided  the  person  committing 
the  act  had  a  strong  motive  for  doing  so.  Epictetus  said, 
"  The  door  is  open  "  ;  but  added  this  admonition,  "  Do  not 
depart  without  a  reason."3  But  almost  any  circumstance 
which  made  life  hard  or  a  burden  would  justify  the  act ;  "  The 
house  is  smoky,  and  I  quit  it,"  calmly  remarks  the  Stoic 
Emperor  Aurelius.4  Seneca  says,  "  The  eternal  law  has 
decreed  nothing  better  than  this,  that  life  should  have  but 
one  entrance  and  many  exits."  5  He  thinks  the  gods  must 
have  looked  on  with  great  joy  when  Cato,  with  the  world 
fallen  into  Caesar's  power,  drove  the  sword  into  his  own 
breast.  That  in  his  view  was  "a  glorious  and  memorable 
departure."  By  such  an  act  a  man  raises  himself  to  the 
level  of  the  gods.6 

Suicide  was  at  its  height  in  the  early  Empire.  This  is  to 
be  explained  by  the  teachings  of  the  Stoics  —  among  whom 
suicides  were  numerous7  —  and  the  unbearable  tyranny  of 
the  imperial  regime.  Not  till  Christianity  came  with  its  teach- 
ings regarding  the  sacredness  of  human  life  and  the  duty  of 
resignation  was  there  any  essential  change  in  the  general  atti- 
tude of  the  ancient  world  toward  the  act  of  self-destruction.8 


1  De  Clem.  ii.  6.  The  trouble  with  this  philosophy,  as  has  been  said,  is 
that  if  one  does  not  feel  pity  for  the  sufferings  of  others  he  will  not  be 
likely  to  help  them. 

2  Cicero,  however,  denied  the  right  of  self-destruction,  and  Vergil  mildly 
censured  the  act.    See  sEneid,  vi.  434. 

8  Discourses,  i.  9.  4  Meditations,  v.  29. 

6  Ep.  lxx;  quoted  by  Lecky,  History  of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  i, 
p.  218.  6  De  Prov.  i.  2. 

7  Zeno,  the  founder  of  the  school,  and  Cato,  its  exemplifier  in  active  life, 
both  committed  suicide. 

8  Compare  the  views  on  this  subject  of  the  ancient  classical  peoples 
with  those  of  the  modern  Japanese  (see  p.  85  and  p.  86  n.  1.). 


ROMAN  MORALS  251 

The  composite   Greco- Roman    ideal,   in  which    Stoicism  Tneinsuf- 
had  united  the  best  elements  of  the  Greek  and  the  Roman  stoicSmas 
type  of  character,  while  it  did  serve  as  a  guide  to  the  moral  J5Ste 
strivings  of  select  souls,  was  wholly  unfitted  to  give  support  the  masses 
to  the  moral  life  of  the  masses  or  to  awaken  in  them  moral 
enthusiasm.    There  were  in   Stoicism  two  serious   defects 
which  made  it  impossible  for  it  to  become  the  guide  and  rule 
of  life  for   the  multitude.    First,   it  was   too  intellectually 
exalted  and  cold  to  make  appeal  to  the  common  people.    The 
Stoics,  in  the  suppression  of  the  feelings  and  emotions,  — 
"they  made  solitude  in  the  heart  and  called  it  peace,"1  — 
cut  themselves  off  from  all  sympathy  with  the  masses,  with 
whom  feeling  is  ever  the  larger  part  of  life.   Second,  Stoicism 
failed  to  give  due  place  to  the  religious  sentiment.    Belief  in 
the  ancestral  Roman  gods  had,  it  is  true,  been  undermined, 
but  the  religious  feeling  of  awe  and  mystery  in  the  presence  of 
the  Unseen  was  deeper  and  more  universal  than  ever  before. 
Man,  in  the  fine  phrase  of  Sabatier,  is  incurably  religious. 

The  ideal  of  character  which  shall  appeal  to  the  masses 
must  be  an  ideal  whose  requirements  make  full  recognition 
of  the  rightful  claims  of  human  affections  and  of  the  re- 
ligious instinct  of  mankind.  The  mystical  and  religious 
East  contributes  to  the  ideal  created  by  the  interaction  of  the 
Greek  and  the  Roman  spirit  those  elements  which  neither  of 
the  classical  cultures  could  supply. 

From  the  first  century  of  our  era,  Rome  was  in  close  con-  The  orient 
tact  with  the  Orient,  as  long  before  she  had  been  in  contact  new"^-  S 
with  Greece.    And  just  as  the  Greek  spirit  had  profoundly  ^"morai 
influenced  the  moral  ideal  of  Rome,  so  now  was  the  spirit  ™*sltthe 
of  the  Orient  to  effect  even  greater  changes  in  her  ancestral 
standard  of  character. 

As  philosophy  mediated  between  Rome  and  Greece,  so 
did  religion  mediate  between  Rome  and  the  Orient.    It  was 

1  Glover,  The  Conflict  of  Religions  in  the  Early  Roman  Empire,  3d  ed. 
(1909),  p.  67. 


252  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

through  the  religions  or  cults  of  Egypt,  Persia,  and  Judea 
that  the  ethical  forces  of  the  ancient  cultures  of  the  East 
were  brought  to  bear  on  Roman  life  and  thought  and  con- 
duct. In  the  present  connection  we  shall  speak  only  of  the 
influences  which  went  forth  from  Egypt  and  Persia,  and  point 
out  in  what  way  they  gave  an  added  impulse  to  that  ethical 
movement  going  on  in  the  Roman  world  which  finally  culmi- 
nated in  the  triumph  of  the  creed  and  moral  ideal  of  Judea. 

The  con-  And  first  we  note  the  relation  to  this  ethical  evolution 

Egypt-  the  of  the  worship  of  I  sis  and  Serapis,  the  chief  imported  and 
worship  of  modified  cults  of  the  ancient  civilization  of  the  Valley  of  the 
Nile.  In  this  worship  religion  and  morality  were  joined  in 
a  way  practically  unknown  to  the  priestly  colleges  of  Rome. 
"The  Egyptian,"  says  Lecky,  ".  .  .  bowed  low  before  the 
divine  presence.  He  veiled  his  eyes,  he  humbled  his  reason,  he 
represented  the  introduction  of  a  new  element  into  the  moral 
life  of  Europe,  the  spirit  of  religious  reverence  and  awe."  1 

Forming  an  important  part  of  the  body  of  ideas  which  con- 
stituted the  basis  of  this  religious  feeling,  was  the  doctrine 
of  a  life  after  death.  This  was  a  doctrine  which  was  com 
mon  to  all  the  Oriental  religions  with  which  we  have  here 
to  do,  —  the  Isiac,  the  Mithraic,  and  the  Christian,  —  but  a 
doctrine  which,  aside  from  the  initiates  of  the  Orphic,  the 
Eleusinian,  and  like  Mysteries,  was  practically  new  to  the 
classical  world.  It  was  this  doctrine  which  helped  greatly  to 
secure  for  these  religions  or  cults  such  wide  acceptance  in 
the  Roman  world,  —  for  the  Roman  world,  old,  worn,  and 
weary,  was  yearning  for  assurance  of  another  and  better  life, 
—  and  which  largely  explains  the  moral  influence  they 
exerted  upon  the  nations  of  the  West.2 

For  more  than  five  hundred  years  the  worship  of  I  sis 
particularly  found  ardent  devotees  in  the  West.   The  general 

1  History  of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  i,  p.  324. 

2  Paulsen,  A  System  of  Ethics,  tr.  Thilly  (1906),  pp.  in  f. 


Mithraism 


ROMAN  MORALS  253 

effect  of  the  cult  upon  its  followers  was  to  cause  the  active, 
heroic  qualities  in  the  old  Roman  ideal  of  character  to  be 
overshadowed  by  the  passive  contemplative  virtues,  and  to 
impart  a  religious,  ritual  character  to  the  moral  code.  Expia- 
tory and  purification  rites  formed  a  large  part  of  the  duties 
of  the  worshiper  of  the  Egyptian  goddess. * 

The  influence  of  Egypt  upon  the  religious-ethical  life  of  The  contn- 
the  West  was  reenforced  by  a  like  influence  from  Persia,  Persia: 
which  came  through  the  cult  of  Mithra.2  This  worship  came 
into  Europe  by  the  way  of  Asia  Minor.  Its  missionaries  were 
seemingly  Oriental  recruits  in  the  Roman  legions.  It  came 
bearing  many  accretions  gathered  in  its  passage  through  the 
west  Asian  lands,  and  yet  with  all  the  characteristics  which 
marked  the  old  Persian  religion  as  a  religion  of  combat  and 
strenuousness,  of  moral  striving  and  moral  achievement.3 
During  the  last  three  centuries  of  the  Empire  the  cult 
spread  widely  in  the  Western  lands,  taking  deep  root  espe- 
cially in  the  frontier  regions  of  the  Danube  and  the  Rhine, 
and  in  the  remote  province  of  Britain. 

This  incoming  of  Mithraism  had  special  significance  for 
the  reason  that  Mithra,  as  the  god  of  light,  was  invested  with 
certain  moral  qualities  symbolized  by  his  physical  attributes. 

1  The  cult  of  Isis  when  introduced  into  the  Western  lands  favored  illicit 
love,  but  by  the  second  century  of  our  era  it  had,  in  its  new  environment, 
become  so  far  transformed  as  to  be  a  true  moral  force  in  society.  "  Sacra- 
ment and  mystery  lent  their  aid  to  fortify  the  worshiper  [of  Isis]  in  the 
face  of  death,  but,  to  derive  their  full  virtue,  he  must  exercise  himself  in 
temperance,  abjure  the  pleasures  of  the  senses,  and  purify  himself  for  the 
vision  of  God"  (Dill,  Roman  Society  from  Nero  to  Marcus  Aurelius  (1904), 

P-  583). 

2  On  this  subject  see  Franz  Cumont,  Les  Mysteres  de  Mithra  (1892); 
English  ed.,  The  Mysteries  of  Mithra,  tr.  McCormack. 

8  "  It  [Mithraism]  is  perhaps  the  highest  and  most  striking  example  of 
the  last  efforts  of  paganism  to  reconcile  itself  to  the  great  moral  and  spirit- 
ual movement  which  was  settling  steadily,  and  with  growing  momentum, 
toward  purer  conceptions  of  God,  of  man's  relations  to  Him,  and  of  the 
life  to  come."  —  Dill,  Roman  Society  from  Nero  to  Marcus  Aurelius,  p.  585. 


254 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


He  was  the  god  of  truth  and  purity.  It  was  this  moral 
element  in  the  cult,  in  connection  with  its  doctrine  of  a 
future  life, —  the  promise  and  hope  of  which  was  depend- 
ent upon  purification,  inward  as  well  as  ceremonial,  from  all 
earthly  stains  and  impurities,  —  which  in  a  measure  met  and 
satisfied  the  yearnings  of  the  age,  and  which,  in  the  great  re- 
ligious and  ethical  propaganda  that  marked  the  later  centuries 
of  the  Roman  Empire,  rendered  the  religion  of  Mithra  the 
most  formidable  rival  of  Christianity  in  its  great  competition 
with  the  various  Oriental  religions  and  cults  for  supremacy  in 
the  hearts  and  consciences  of  men.1 


But  the  pagan  priest  no  more  than  the  pagan  philosopher 
could  effect  the  moral  renovation  of  ancient  society.    Like 


Relation  of 
the  Egyp- 
tian and 

propaganda  tne  moral  propaganda  carried  on  by  Cynic,  Stoic,  and  Neo 

to  that 
of  Chris- 
tianity 


platonist  missionaries  and  preachers,  these  efforts  of  paganism 
to  effect  its  own  moral  regeneration  failed,  perhaps  because 
these  pagan  cults  lacked  what  Christianity  possessed  —  "  the 
dynamic  of  a  great  personality."  Yet  these  efforts  were  not 
without  influence  upon  the  ethical  development  of  the  West- 
ern nations.  In  two  ways  the  Egyptian  and  Persian  propa- 
ganda was  a  preparation  for  the  moral  revolution  effected 
by  Christianity :  first,  it  helped  to  give  morality  a  religious 
basis,  which  it  did  not  have  in  classical  antiquity  ;  and  second, 
it  taught  men  to  seek  in  deity  and  not  in  themselves  the 
pattern  of  moral  excellence.2  Thus  did  Egypt  and  Persia, 
through  the  mediation  of  religion,  contribute  important  eth- 
ical elements  to  Greco- Roman  civilization,  and  thereby  help 
to  give  a  fresh  impulse  and  a  new  trend  to  the  moral  evolu- 
tion of  the  Western  world. 

1  "  On  peut  dire  que,  si  le  christianisme  eut  ete  arrete  dans  sa  croissance 
par  quelque  maladie  mortelle,  le  monde  eut  ete  Mithriaste."  —  Renan, 
Marc-Aurtle>  5me  ed.,  p.  579. 

2  M  Isis  and  Serapis  and  Mithra  were  preparing  the  Western  world  for 
the  religion  which  was  to  approve  the  long  travail  of  humanity  by  a  more 
perfect  vision  of  the  divine."  —  Dill,  Roman  Society  from  Nero  to  Marcus 
Aurelius  (1904),  p.  574. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  ETHICS  OF  DOCTRINAL  CHRISTIANITY:    AN 
IDEAL  OF  RIGHT  BELIEF 

The   establishment   of    Christianity,   in   its    Greco-Judaic  Ethical  im- 
form,  as  the  favored  religion  of  the  Roman  Empire  by  the  christian- 
edict  of  the  Emperor  Constantine  is  rightly  regarded  as  one  ^eon  of 
of  the  most  important  events  not  only  in  the  history  of  the 
Empire  but  also  in  that  of  the  Western  world.    What  made 
this  act,  or  rather  the  religious  revolution  it  registered,  of 
such  transcendent  importance  was  the  fact  that  the  ascend- 
ancy of  the  new  religion  meant  the  ascendancy  of  a  new 
moral  ideal ;  for  Christianity,  unlike  Stoicism,  did  not  merely 
act  upon  the  old  classical  ideal  of  excellence  to  modify  and 
remold  it,  but  superseded  it  by  another  made  up  largely  of 
a  wholly  different  set  of  virtues. 

It  was  this  new  ethical  element  thus  introduced  into 
Greco-Roman  civilization  which  was  the  most  dynamic  of 
the  forces  active  in  the  transformation  of  the  ancient  into 
the  medieval  world.  The  new  ideal  re-created  ethically  the 
Roman  world  and  made  Europe  for  a  thousand  years  and 
more  —  until  the  Renaissance  of  the  fifteenth  century  called 
forth  again  the  ethical  thought  and  feeling  of  classical  antiquity 
—  in  moral  conviction  and  striving  an  extension  of  Asia. 

A  prerequisite  to  an  intelligent  study  of  the  history  of  this 
new  moral  ideal  is  a  knowledge  of  the  beliefs  and  theological 
doctrines  out  of  which  it  arose  ;  for  this  ideal  has  through  the 
centuries  followed  the  fortune  of  these  beliefs  and  teachings. 
In  the  immediately  following  pages  we  shall  indicate  what 
were  some  of  the  most  influential  of  these  ideas  and  doctrines. 

255 


256 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


The  doc- 
trine of  a 
moral  law 
supernatu- 
rally  re- 
vealed 


The  teach- 
ing of  the 
unity  of 
God  and  of 
his  univer- 
sal father- 
hood 


I.  Religious  Ideas  and  Theological  Dogmas  molding 
the  Ideal 

Among  the  doctrines  of  Christian  theology  freighted 
heavily  with  ethical  consequences  was  that  of  a  moral  law 
supernaturally  promulgated.  This  was  essentially  an  Oriental 
conception,  a  heritage  of  Christianity  from  the  Hebrew  past, 
and  a  conception  quite  alien  in  general  to  the  manner  of 
thinking  of  the  Greeks  and  Romans,  with  whom  morality,  as 
we  have  seen,  was  a  civic  and  secular  and  human  thing,  an 
expression  of  man's  essential  nature,  that  is,  an  outcome  of 
the  human  reason  and  conscience. 

This  doctrine  exercised  an  immense  influence  upon  the 
moral  evolution  in  the  Western  world.  First,  it  displaced 
naturalism  with  supernaturalism  in  ethics.  The  whole  history 
of  morals  records  no  revolution  more  momentous  than  this. 
Second,  it  made  rigid  large  sections  of  the  moral  code  and 
thus  tended  to  impart  for  an  historical  epoch  a  certain  immo- 
bility to  the  religious-ethical  side  of  European  civilization. 

Another  idea  found  in  this  body  of  religious  doctrines,  an 
idea  rich  in  ethical  consequences,  was  the  conception  of  God 
as  one  and  as  the  Universal  Father.  We  have  seen  that  the 
great  defect  in  primitive  morality  was  the  limited  range  of  the 
moral  feelings.  The  circle  of  moral  obligation  was  bounded 
by  the  clan,  the  tribe,  the  city.  This  resulted  in  large  part 
from  the  notion  that  each  kin  group  had  an  origin  and 
ancestry  different  from  that  of  every  other.  One  group 
thought  themselves  to  be  the  offspring  of  Zeus  ;  another  pro- 
claimed themselves  to  be  the  descendants  of  Heracles ;  and 
still  another  believed  themselves  to  be  the  children  of  Mars. 
So  long  as  this  view  of  men's  origin  and  descent  prevailed 
there  could  arise  no  conception  of  their  spiritual  relationship 
and  ethical  oneness.  Tacitus  merely  expressed  the  common 
opinion  of  the  ancient  world  when  he  declared  absurd  the 
doctrine  that  all  men  are  brothers. 


trine  of  a 
future  life 
of  rewards 
and  pun- 


ETHICS  OF  DOCTRINAL  CHRISTIANITY      257 

But  from  the  doctrine  of  the  common  fatherhood  of  God 
there  arises  naturally  the  conception  of  the  essential  brother- 
hood of  men.  The  apostle's  declaration,  "We  are  the  off- 
spring of  God,"  l —  phrasing  the  teachings  of  the  Master  in 
terms  understood  by  the  men  to  whom  he  spoke, — announced 
the  opening  of  a  new  era  in  the  moral  development  of  the  race. 
The  proclamation  of  this  practically  new  thought 2  meant,  at 
once  in  ethical  theory  and  sooner  or  later  in  actual  practice, 
the  widening  of  the  narrow  class  and  race  circle  of  moral 
obligation  to  include  all  tribes  and  peoples. 

Greco-Roman  morality  was  influenced  but  slightly  by  a  be-  The  doc- 
lief  in  a  life  after  death.   The  vision  of  the  other  world  was  in 
general  too  indistinct  for  it  to  exert  any  decided  influence 
upon  the  conduct  of  men.3  The  conception  of  Hades,  though  laments 
it  did  undergo  with  the  lapse  of  time  a  process  of  moralization, 
was  never  so  far  ethicalized  as  to  have  a  positive  moral  value. 

But  by  Christianity  the  other  world  was  lifted  into  such 
prominence  as  it  had  had  in  the  life  and  thought  of  no 
people  of  antiquity  except  the  Egyptians,  and  immortality 
was  declared  to  be  the  destiny  of  every  human  soul.  With  the 
classical  peoples  it  was  the  city  which  had  been  conceived 
as  eternal.  This  transference  of  immortality  from  the  city 
to  the  individual  had  vast  import  for  morality.4  What  con- 
tributed to  render  it  of  such  ethical  importance  was  the  fact 

1  Acts  xvii.  29. 

2  New  to  the  multitude.  Some  of  the  Stoic  philosophers,  as  we  have 
seen,  held  and  taught  this  doctrine. 

3  The  Eleusinian  Mysteries  in  Greece,  and  some  Oriental  cults,  particu- 
larly that  of  Mithra,  imported  into  the  Roman  Empire,  made  the  participa- 
tion in  a  blessed  life  beyond  the  grave  dependent  upon  moral  purity  of  life 
on  earth  and  through  this  doctrine  exercised  a  favorable  influence  upon 
morality  (see  p.  254). 

4  This  thought  and  conviction  of  the  immortality  of  the  individual  was, 
it  is  possible,  in  part  the  outcome  of  the  decay  of  the  ancient  city,  whose 
fancied  eternity  had  satisfied  for  a  time  the  instinct  of  immortality.  But 
when  some  centuries  had  passed,  the  "  Romans  sailed  round  the  Mediter- 
ranean and  recognized  that  the  cities  of  the  past  were  not  eternal,  and  with 


258 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


The  teach- 
ing of  the 
sanctity  of 
human  life 


that  the  after  life  was  conceived  as  a  life  of  rewards  and 
punishments.  A  heaven  of  ineffable  and  everlasting  bliss 
and  a  hell  of  unutterable  and  everlasting  torment  were  laid 
open  to  the  eyes  of  men,  and  became  the  tremendous  sanc^ 
tions  of  the  new  moral  code  promulgated  by  Christianity.  It 
would  be  difficult  to  exaggerate  the  influence  of  this  teach- 
ing upon  the  moral  life  of  the  European  peoples,  especially 
during  the  medieval  centuries  of  faith.  To  make  this  life 
transitory,  vain,  and  worthless,  and  life  in  another  world  the 
only  real  life,  is  to  cause  the  transvaluation  of  all  moral 
values,  and  to  change  fundamentally  conceptions  of  what  is 
rational  and  right  in  conduct. 

Springing  naturally  from  the  foregoing  conceptions  of 
man's  origin  and  eternal  destiny  is  the  Christian  doctrine  of 
the  sanctity  of  human  life.  In  no  respect  do  Christian  teach- 
ings contrast  more  sharply  with  pagan  conceptions  than  in 
this  regard.  In  the  Greco-Roman  view  value  did  not  attach 
to  man  as  man.  To  the  Greek  way  of  thinking  it  was  the 
Greek  freeman  alone  who  possessed  the  full  capacity  for 
virtue  and  the  rights  of  manhood.  In  the  common  Roman 
view  only  the  Roman  citizen  was  regarded  as  dowered  with 
the  full  faculties  and  rights  of  a  human  being.  The  slave 
was  looked  upon  and  treated  as  belonging  to  an  inferior 
order  of  existence. 

The  Christian  doctrine  of  man's  divine  sonship  and  of 
his  eternal  destiny  gave  infinite  worth  to  every  human  life, 
and,  investing  man  as  man  with  an  inviolable  sanctity,  worked 
effectively  in  widening  the  range  of  the  moral  sympathies 
and  in  bringing  within  the  scope  of  the  moral  law  all  classes 
and  conditions  of  men.    It  checked  infanticide,  which  in  the 


the  same  waft  of  conviction  came  a  compensating  belief  that  eternity  was 
the  heritage  of  every  son  of  man.  Immortality  arose  on  the  horizon  of  the 
man,  as  its  last  glow  faded  from  the  city  "  (Wedgwood,  The  Moral  Ideal, 
3d  ed.,  p.  341).  It  was  the  same  in  Judea;  as  immortality  faded  from  the 
political  horizon  of  Israel,  it  arose  on  that  of  the  individual  soul. 


ETHICS  OF  DOCTRINAL  CHRISTIANITY       259 

pre-Christian  world  had  been  very  generally  practiced  without 
the  least  moral  scruple ;  it  suppressed  the  gladiatorial  games 
in  which  the  lives  of  men  were  placed  on  a  level  with  those 
of  the  wild  beasts  with  which  they  fought ;  it  helped  to  make 
suicide,  which  the  Romans  looked  upon  as  a  noble  mode  of 
departure  from  life,  a  crime ;  and  contributed  to  mitigate  the 
lot  of  the  slave  and  finally  to  help  lift  him  into  freedom. 

The  view  of  man's  moral  nature  taught  by  the  Founder  of  The  dogma 
Christianity  was  simple  and  natural.    It  is  embodied  in  the  0f  man  and 
parable  of  the  prodigal  son.    Man  may  go  wrong,  but  he  has  guntltary 
ever  the  capacity,  and,  when  he  comes  to  himself,  the  desire, 
to  return  to  the  right  way. 

In  direct  opposition  to  this  view  of  man's  nature  and  deep- 
est preferences  as  being  essentially  good,  we  find  elaborated 
in  early  Christian  theology  the  dogma  that  the  first  man, 
though  created  upright,  fell  through  disobedience  and  trans- 
mitted to  all  his  descendants  a  nature  wholly  evil  and  a  total 
incapacity  for  doing  good  or  even  desiring  the  good.  And 
not  only  was  man  thus  attainted  by  the  primal  disobedience, 
but  all  nature  became  accursed. 

This  dogma  of  the  fall  of  man  is  one  of  the  most  influ- 
ential conceptions  in  the  moral  domain  ever  entertained  by 
the  human  mind.  It  was  the  germ  from  which  was  developed 
the  larger  part  of  Christian  theological  ethics.1  For  out  of  the 
dogma  of  ancestral  sin  and  total  depravity  sprang  naturally 
and  logically  the  doctrines  of  the  atonement,  imputed  right- 
eousness, and  salvation  through  faith.  The  moral  history  of 
the  Christian  centuries  we  shall  find  to  be  largely  the  history 
of  the  influence  of  this  doctrine  upon  men's  conceptions  of 
their  religious  obligations  and  duties.  As  with  the  passage  of 
time  and  the  incoming  of  evolutionary  science  the  belief  in 

1  Though  the  account  of  the  fall  of  man  forms  the  prelude  of  the 
Hebrew  Scriptures,  the  conception  never  influenced  to  an  appreciable 
degree  pre-Christian  ethics. 


of  the 
Sabbath 


260  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

this  teaching  decays,  we  shall  find  men's  idea  of  what  consti- 
tutes duty  in  the  religious  sphere  undergoing  a  great  change, 
and  shall  see  acts,  observances,  and  states  of  mind  once  re- 
garded as  supremely  virtuous  and  indispensable  to  salvation 
now  looked  upon  as  morally  indifferent  or  even  positively  wrong. 

The  doc-  Christianity  inherited  from  Judaism  the  belief  in  the  sacred 

sawedness6  character  of  the  Sabbath  day.  This  belief  created  one  of  the 
most  important  of  the  religious  duties  of  the  Christian.  It 
determined  how  one  seventh  of  all  his  time  should  be  spent. 
The  history  of  the  observance  of  this  Sabbath  as  holy  time, 
and  the  changed  moral  value  attached  to  such  observance 
as  times  and  beliefs  have  changed,  forms  a  chapter  of  the 
greatest  suggestiveness  to  the  student  of  the  evolution  of 
morals,  since  this  chapter  epitomizes  and  repeats  the  entire 
history  of  ceremonial  or  ritual  morality. 

The  person-  But  far  more  influential  than  all  these  inherited  Jewish 
Prophet  of6  beliefs  and  doctrines  of  speculative  theology  in  molding  the 
moral  ideal  of  Christianity,  in  all  that  renders  it  superior  to 
the  moral  ideals  of  the  other  great  religions  of  the  world,  as 
well  as  in  all  that  it  possesses  of  permanent  ethical  value  for 
humanity,  has  been  the  simple  appealing  story  of  the  words 
and  deeds  of  the  Prophet  of  Nazareth.2  Those  elements  of 
the  ideal  which  are  based  on  speculative  theological  doctrines 
have  changed  as  these  doctrines  have  changed  with  the  world's 
advance  in  general  intelligence  and  with  the  deepening  and 
clarifying  of  the  moral  consciousness  of  men ;  while  those 
elements  derived  from  that  wonderful  personality,  from  that 
life  of  unbounded  tenderness  and  love  and  self-forgetting 
service,  have  been  given  an  ever  higher  and  more  dominant 
place  in  the  world's  ideal  of  goodness.    In  the  eloquent  words 

*  See  Schmidt,  The  Prophet  of  Nazareth  (1905),  p.  322. 

2  "  L'humanite  cherche  l'ideal ;  mais  elle  veut  que  l'ideal  soit  une  per- 
sonne ;  elle  n'aime  pas  une  abstraction."  —  Renan,  Marc-Aurtle,  5me  ed., 
p.  582. 


Nazareth  1 


ETHICS  OF  DOCTRINAL  CHRISTIANITY       261 

of  the  historian  Lecky :  "It  was  reserved  for  Christianity  to 
present  to  the  world  an  ideal  character,  which  through  all  the 
changes  of  eighteen  centuries  has  inspired  the  hearts  of  men 
with  an  impassioned  love  ;  has  shown  itself  capable  of  acting 
on  all  ages,  nations,  temperaments,  and  conditions  ;  has  been 
not  only  the  highest  pattern  of  virtue  but  the  strongest  incen- 
tive to  its  practice ;  and  has  exercised  so  deep  an  influence 
that  it  may  be  truly  said  that  the  simple  record  of  three  short 
years  of  active  life  has  done  more  to  regenerate  and  to  soften 
mankind  than  all  the  disquisitions  of  philosophers  and  the 
exhortations  of  moralists.  This  has  indeed  been  the  well- 
spring  of  whatever  is  best  and  purest  in  Christian  life."  * 

II.  The  Moral  Ideal 

Before  the  end  of  the  third  century,  under  the  influence  orthodoxy, 
largely  of  the  speculative  Greek  spirit,  what  was  to  be  essen-  religious 
tially  the  historical  creed  of  the  Church  had  been  practically  °Ss£ensa- 
formulated  and  the  corresponding  moral  code  brought  into  J1irt^v2ing 
existence.3    In  the  creation  of  this  standard  of  goodness  which 
was  to  give  guidance  for  an  epoch  to  the  moral  life  of  the 
European  peoples,  it  was  the  theological  doctrine  of  the  moral 
value  of  faith,  which  came  practically  to  be  defined  as  "  the 
acceptance  of  the  dogma  of  the  Trinity  and  the  main  articles 
of  the  creed,"  that  determined  the  precedence  and  subordi- 
nation of  virtues  and  duties.4    Correct  belief  wa§  made  an 

1  History  of  Eicropean  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  ii,  p.  8. 

2  On  this  subject  consult  Hatch,  The  Influence  of  Greek  Ideas  and  Usages 
upon  the  Christian  Chttrch  (1888),  lect.  xii,  "The  Transformation  of  the 
Basis  of  Christian  Union :  Doctrine  in  the  Place  of  Conduct." 

3  w  After  the  middle  of  the  third  century,  .  .  .  Christianity  may  be  just 
as  truly  called  a  Hellenic  religion  as  an  Oriental."  —  Harnack,  The  Ex- 
pansion of  Christianity  (1904),  vol.  i,  pp.  393  f. 

4  The  change  of  emphasis  from  moral  life  to  correct  doctrine  took  place 
during  the  last  half  of  the  second  and  the  first  half  of  the  third  century. 
M  Under  the  influence  of  contemporary  Greek  thought,  the  word  faith  came 
to  be  transferred  from  simple  trust  in  God  to  mean  the  acceptance  of  a 
series  of  propositions,  and  these   propositions,  propositions   in  abstract 


262  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

indispensable  virtue.  Without  this  there  could  be  no  salva- 
tion.1 On  the  other  hand,  unbelief,  doubt,  error,  even  honest 
error,  in  religious  matters  was  declared  to  be  in  the  highest 
degree  sinful.  This  conception  that  belief  is  a  virtue  and  doubt 
a  sin  was  destined,  since  it  imperils  freedom  of  thought,  to 
have  momentous  and  sinister  consequences  for  the  intellectual 
and  moral  history  of  Europe. 

The  virtue  Just  as  the  theological  dogma  of  the  ethical  value  of  reli- 
or  love"*7  gious  opinions  has  made  correct  belief  theoretically  the  saving 
virtue  in  Church  ethics,  so  has  the  personality  of  Jesus,  his 
teachings  and  his  self-sacrificing  life  as  mirrored  in  the  gos- 
pel records,  made  love  and  service  of  others,  in  multitudes  of 
souls,  practically  the  supreme  and  controlling  motive  of  life. 
It  was  the  emphasis  placed  by  primitive  Christianity  on  this 
virtue,  and  the  persuasion  to  its  practice  afforded  by  the  ex- 
ample of  the  Master,  that  for  the  first  two  centuries  of  the 
new  era  —  until  the  emphasis  became  changed  from  right 
living  to  right  opinion  —  lent  to  the  moral  life  in  the  Chris- 
tian communities  of  the  Empire  such  sincerity,  purity,  and 
elevation  as  have  marked  no  other  period  in  the  history  of 
the  Church. 

But  orthodox  theology  has  never  allowed  that  charity,  though 
combined  with  perfect  uprightness  of  life  and  expressed  in 
noblest  acts  of  self -abnegating  service  of  humanity,  is  a  saving 
virtue  unless  associated  with  correctness  of  religious  belief  and 
the  outgrowth  of  it.  This  opposition  in  the  bosom  of  the 
Church  itself  between  theological  and  natural  morality  has 

metaphysics  "  (Hatch,  The  Influence  of  Greek  Ideas  and  Usages  upon  the 
Christian  Church  (1888),  p.  310). 

1  The  Athanasian  Creed,  which  by  the  end  of  the  ninth  century  was  in 
use  in  the  churches  of  the  West  as  an  authoritative  symbol  and  exposition 
of  the  Roman  Catholic  faith,  says,  "  Whosoever  will  be  saved,  before  all 
things,  it  is  necessary  that  he  hold  the  Catholic  faith,  which  faith,  except 
every  one  who  do  keep  entire  and  unviolated,  without  doubt  he  shall  perish 
everlastingly "  (Philip  Schaff,  Bibliotheca  Symbolica  Ecclesiae  Universalis, 
vol.  ii,  p.  66). 


ETHICS  OF  DOCTRINAL  CHRISTIANITY       263 

created  a  great  dualism  in  the  moral  history  of  all  the  Chris- 
tian centuries,  like  the  dualism  in  ancient  Hebrew  history 
caused  by  the  opposition  between  the  morality  of  ritualism 
and  the  morality  of  prophetism. 

Alongside  the  primary  Christian  virtue,  whether  this  be  re-  The  body  of 
garded  as  correct  belief  or  as  charity,  were  grouped  a  cluster  virtue^ 
of  secondary  virtues,  such  as  humility,  meekness,  gentleness, 
compassion  for  weakness,  resignation,  and  renunciation  of  the 
world.  What  is  especially  noteworthy  respecting  this  body  of 
moral  qualities  making  up  the  Christian  ideal  of  excellence  is 
that  all  these  were  virtues  which  in  general  were  undervalued 
or  held  in  positive  disesteem  by  the  Greeks  and  Romans. 1 
Indeed  it  was  made  a  matter  of  reproach  to  the  early  Chris- 
tians by  the  pagan  opponents  of  Christianity,  that  its  virtues 
were  all  servile  virtues  —  the  virtues  of  the  slave. 

It  was  undoubtedly  this  character  of  the  new  ideal  which 
caused  it,  in  the  primal  age  of  Christianity,  to  make  such 
strong  appeal  to  the  common  people,  to  the  despised  and 
lowly,  to  the  broken  and  humble  in  spirit,  in  the  aristocrati- 
cally graded  society  of  the  ancient  world. 

The  Christian  ideal  of  excellence  has  fulfilled  itself  in  creation  of 
many  ways ;  that  is,  different  types  have  arisen  through  the  JJJes  ° 
shifting  in  rank  of  the  virtues  constituting  the  ideal,  through  JJoSSi- 
the  incorporation  of  pagan  elements,  through  racial  influence,  t*0™ •* the 
and  through  the  reaction  upon  the  ideal  of  the  changing  intel-  ideal 
lectual,  political,  and  economic  environment. 

Generally  these  specific  forms  of  the  ideal  have  been  cre- 
ated by  an  exaggerated  enthusiasm  for  one  or  another  par- 
ticular virtue  of  the  standard,  which  has  caused  this  special 
virtue  so  to  overshadow  all  the  others,  save  the  indispens- 
able one  of  correct  belief,  as  to  bring  into  existence  a  distinc- 
tive Christian  type.  Thus  through  the  exaltation  of  the  virtue 
of  chastity  there  arose  in  the  early  Church  the  ascetic  type 

1  Lecky,  History  of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  ii,  p.  68, 


264  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

of  excellence,  which  for  several  centuries  inspired  unbounded 
moral  enthusiasm  and  drew  away  into  the  desert  and  into 
the  seclusion  of  the  cloister  great  multitudes  of  both  men 
and  women ;  later,  through  the  reaction  upon  the  Church 
of  the  pagan  and  barbarian  world  it  had  nominally  converted, 
and  through  the  incorporation  into  the  ideal  of  a  number  of 
heathen  virtues,  there  came  into  existence  a  composite  type 
of  character  —  a  combination  of  the  virtues  of  the  saint  and 
the  virtues  of  the  hero  —  known  as  the  chivalric  ideal,  which 
colored  the  events  of  European  history  from  the  ninth  to  the 
fourteenth  century ;  and  still  later,  through  the  suppression 
of  some  of  the  distinctive  virtues  of  the  Roman  Catholic  type 
of  excellence  and  a  fresh  emphasis  laid  upon  others,  there 
was  created  the  Protestant  type  of  moral  character,  which 
has  given  a  special  cast  to  the  theological  morality  of  a  large 
section  of  modern  Christendom. 

Limita-  That  we  may  better  be  prepared  to  follow  intelligently  the 

defects  of  various  phases  of  the  moral  history  of  the  Christian  centuries, 
to  the  tracing  of  which  the  remaining  chapters  of  this  volume 
will  be  devoted,  there  is  need  that  to  the  brief  description  we 
have  now  given  of  the  chief  virtues  making  up  the  ideal 
which  was  to  give  guidance  to  the  moral  life  of  the  European 
peoples,  we  add  a  word  concerning  its  limitations  and  defects, 
since  these  negative  qualities  of  the  ideal  have  exercised  an 
influence  scarcely  less  decisive  than  its  positive  qualities  in 
making  the  history  of  the  Christian  world  what  it  has  been 
—  a  history,  on  the  whole,  of  inspiring  moral  progress,  yet  a 
history  of  moral  losses  as  well  as  of  moral  gains. 

The  first  limitation  of  the  ideal  which  we  notice  is  its 
practical  exclusion  of  those  civic,  patriotic  duties  and  virtues 
which  had  been  so  highly  esteemed  by  both  the  Greeks  and 
the  Romans.  Man  was  henceforth  to  be  the  citizen  of  no 
earthly  city,  but  of  a  heavenly  city  whose  builder  and  maker 
is  God.    We  can  easily  understand  how  this  new  conception 


the  ideal 


ETHICS  OF  DOCTRINAL  CHRISTIANITY       265 

of  life,  which  transferred  all  its  chief  interests  to  another 
world,  which  substituted  the  Church  —  symbolized  in  accord- 
ance with  the  modes  of  thought  of  the  time  as  "  the  city  of 
God  "  —  for  the  ancient  city  state  as  the  object  of  moral  en- 
thusiasm and  self-devotion,  should  leave  no  place  for  those 
civic,  military,  and  heroic  virtues  that  had  constituted  the 
very  soul  of  the  morality  of  classical  antiquity. 

A  second  limitation  of  the  ideal  is  its  neglect  of  the  intel- 
lectual virtues,  which  by  the  Greeks  had  been  assigned  such 
a  high  place  in  their  ethical  standard.1  The  slighting  of  this 
important  domain  of  ethics  by  Christian  theology  arose  natu- 
rally from  its  exaltation  of  faith  above  reason,  and  from 
its  assumption  that  in  the  revealed  word  the  Church  was 
already  in  possession  of  all  knowledge  really  essential  to 
man's  welfare  and  salvation.2 

But  the  chief  defect  of  the  ideal,  the  lamentable  historical 
consequences  of  which  we  shall  witness  later,  is,  as  we  have 
already  pointed  out,  in  its  making  the  acceptance  of  all  the 
articles  of  a  given  creed  an  indispensable  virtue.  In  assigning 
orthodox  belief  this  place  in  the  ideal  of  moral  goodness,  theo- 
logical ethics  has  marred  Christian  morality  by  fostering  the 
faults  of  intolerance  and  intellectual  insincerity.  This  dogma 
inspired  in  the  Church,  as  soon  as  it  became  powerful,  a  per- 
secuting spirit,  and  made  Christianity  for  centuries  something 
altogether  alien  to  its  real  genius  and  spirit  —  one  of  the 
most  intolerant  of  the  world's  religions.  At  the  same  time 
this  dogma,  by  making  religious  unbelief  and  nonconformity 
a  sin  so  heinous  as  to  be  worthy  of  death  by  the  most  exqui- 
site torture,  and  of  everlasting  punishment  in  the  hereafter, 
discouraged  intellectual  veracity  and  open-mindedness,  and 

1  w  The  virtues  of  the  intellect,  freedom  and  boldness  of  thought  and 
the  power  to  doubt,  the  vital  principle  of  scientific  research,  are,  in  the 
eyes  of  primitive  Christianity,  worthless  and  dangerous." — Paulsen, 
A  System  of  Ethics,  tr.  Thilly  (1906),  p.  68. 

2  Cf.  Harnack,  The  Expansion  of  Christianity  (1904),  vol.  i,  chap,  v, 
n  The  Religion  of  Authority  and  Reason." 


266  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

fostered  the  vice  of  insincere  conformity,  which,  more  than 
any  other  fault,  has  marred  Church  morality  from  the  end  of 
the  early  age  of  the  martyrs  to  the  present  day. 

conclusion  In  the  following  pages  we  shall  follow  the  fortunes  of  this 
ethical  ideal  through  medieval  and  modern  times.  We  shall 
trace  the  modifying  influence  upon  it  of  the  different  and 
changing  elements  of  the  civilization  of  which  it  has  formed 
a  part,  and  shall  note  the  reaction  of  the  ideal,  in  its  suc- 
cessive types,  upon  the  history  of  the  passing  centuries. 

• 


asceticism 


CHAPTER  XIII 

MORAL  HISTORY  OF  THE  AGE  OF  CHRISTIAN 
ASCETICISM 

I.  Conceptions  of  Life  and  Historical  Circumstances 

THAT  PRODUCED  THE  ASCETIC  IDEAL 

Before  the  close  of  the  third  century  the  development  in  General  fos- 
the  Christian  communities  of  the  East  of  asceticism,  the  cause*  of 
germs  of  which  were  immanent  from  the  first  in  Christian- 
ity, had  given  a  remarkable  trend  to  the  moral  movement 
inaugurated  by  the  new  religion.  We  shall  gain  a  sympa- 
thetic understanding  of  this  phase  of  Christian  ethics  only 
as  we  bear  in  mind  the  conceptions  of  life  and  of  the  world, 
and  the  historical  conditions  which  in  general  tend  to  foster 
the  development  of  the  ascetic  ideal  of  goodness. 

Asceticism,  a  definitive  characteristic  of  which  is  renun- 
ciation of  the  world  and  all  earthly  pleasures,  springs  from 
various  roots.  Sometimes  it  grows  out  of  a  dualistic  world 
philosophy,  which,  holding  matter  to  be  an  evil  creation  and 
"the  corruptible  body  a  load  upon  the  soul,"  teaches  the 
meritoriousness  of  the  suppression,  in  the  interest  of  the 
spirit,  of  all  bodily  impulses  and  appetites. 

Sometimes  it  arises  from  inequitable  and  oppressive  con- 
ditions of  society,  which  have  made  life  for  the  enslaved  and 
impoverished  masses  so  joyless  and  wretched  as  to  create  an 
inappeasable  yearning  for  deliverance  from  its  intolerable 
burdens. 

Again,  it  springs  from  a  world  philosophy,  which,  because 
of  its  vivid  vision  of  another  world  of  eternal  realities,  under- 
values and  reduces  to  nothingness  this  earthly  life  and  all  its 

relationships. 

267 


268 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


Still  again,  it  may  spring  from  the  soil  of  a  morally  decadent 
civilization,  for,  unless  the  sources  of  spiritual  life  have  been 
wholly  destroyed,  from  a  debasing  sensuality  and  dissoluteness 
that  rob  life  of  worth  and  dignity  there  is  ever  sure  to  come  a 
reaction  —  a  reaction  expressing  itself  in  an  extreme  emphasis 
laid  upon  the  worth  and  meritoriousness  of  world  renunciation. 


Fostering 

causes  of 

Christian 

asceticism: 

(a)  certain 

Christian 

teachings 


Now  in  the  case  of  Christianity  there  was,  in  the  early 
Christian  centuries,  an  unusual  concurrence  of  causes  and 
conditions  conducive  to  the  growth  of  asceticism.  First,  there 
were  virile  germs  of  asceticism  in  the  teachings  of  the  new 
religion.  It  taught  that  the  things  of  the  spirit  are  the  only 
abiding  realities.  It  caused  this  earthly  life  to  shrink  into 
insignificance  and  to  disappear  as  it  opened  to  the  eyes  of 
faith  the  infinite  perspectives  of  another  world.  The  Master 
said  :  "  He  that  hateth  his  life  in  this  world  shall  keep  it  unto 
life  eternal.  .  .  .  Whosoever  he  be  of  you  that  forsaketh  not 
all  that  he  hath,  he  cannot  be  my  disciple."  And  to  the 
young  man  who  asked  him  what  he  should  do  to  inherit 
eternal  life,  he  replied,  "  Sell  all  that  thou  hast,  and  distrib- 
ute unto  the  poor,  and  thou  shalt  have  treasure  in  heaven  : 
and  come,  follow  me."  He  seemed  to  set  the  relationships  of 
the  spiritual  life  above  the  most  intimate  of  earthly  relation- 
ships when  he  declared,  ''If  any  man  come  to  me,  and  hate 
not  his  father,  and  mother,  and  wife,  and  children,  and 
brethren,  and  sisters,  yea,  and  his  own  life  also,  he  cannot 
be  my  disciple."  He  taught  the  worthlessness  of  earthly 
riches  compared  with  the  treasures  of  the  spirit,  and  de- 
clared that  the  rich  should  hardly  enter  into  the  kingdom 
of  heaven. 

The  disciples  and  near  followers  of  the  Master  spoke  in 
like  manner.  These  teachings  tended  directly  and  power- 
fully to  cause  men  to  regard  this  earthly  life  as  fleeting  and 
valueless,  and  to  esteem  those  as  choosing  the  better  and 
worthier  part  who,  breaking  all  earthly  ties  and  suppressing 


Roman 
world 


HISTORY  OF  CHRISTIAN  ASCETICISM         269 

all  natural  affections  and  desires,  sought  in  the  solitude  of  the 
desert  or  the  quiet  of  the  cloister  to  win  the  life  eternal. 

These  seeds  of  Asian  asceticism  fell  into  a  soil  well  fitted  (&)  The 
to  nourish  them  into  a  vigorous  growth.    The  doctrine  of  moral  state 
world  renunciation  was  one  easy  of  acceptance  by  the  age  qtIco. 
in  which  Christianity  arose,1  for  the  world  into  which  prim- 
itive Christianity  entered  was  a  senile,  disillusioned,  morally 
corrupt,  and  life-weary  world. 

It  was  an  aged  and  disillusioned  world.  The  great  races 
of  the  East  and  the  West,  which  had  been  the  pioneers  in 
human  culture,  were  now  old.  They  had  lost  the  youthful 
zest  of  life.  It  was  the  disillusionment  of  age  that  predis- 
posed the  minds  of  men  to  an  acceptance  of  the  doctrine  of 
deliverance  through  self-denial  and  renunciation  of  the  world. 

And  this  old  world  was  morally  corrupt.  The  vice  of 
ancient  civilization  in  its  senility  was  sensuality.  Christian 
asceticism  was  in  part  a  recoil  from  this  dissoluteness  which 
denied  the  worth  and  majesty  of  life.2 

And  because  it  was  a  sensual  world  it  was  a  life-weary 
world.  The  prevailing  mood  of  society  of  the  Greco-Roman 
Empire  at  the  time  of  the  great  propaganda  of  Christianity 
was  one  of  satiety  and  weariness.  It  was  a  favorable  moment 
to  preach  contempt  of  the  world  and  all  earthly  things. 

Thus  did  the  state  of  decrepitude  and  moral  decadence 
into  which  the  cultured  communities  of  the  ancient  world 
had  fallen,  help  to  develop  into  a  spirit  of  absolute  world 
renunciation  the  spirit  of  unworldliness  which  characterized 
primitive  Christianity. 

1  See  Paulsen,  System  of  Ethics,  tr.  Thilly  (1906),  bk.  i,  chap.  iii. 

2  The  ascetic  movement  was  a  reaction  not  only  against  the  moral  dis- 
soluteness of  pagan  society,  but  also  against  the  moral  degeneracy  which, 
before  the  end  of  the  third  century,  had  set  in  within  the  Christian  com- 
munity itself.  The  Church  had  become  to  a  lamentable  degree  conformed 
unto  the  world,  and  had  lost  much  of  that  moral  fervor  which  characterized 
it  during  the  first  two  centuries. 


270 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


(c)  The 

Platonic 

philosophy 


Still  another  influence  which  contributed  to  give  direction 
and  force  to  the  ethical  movement  of  the  age  was  the  Platonic 
philosophy.  There  is  in  this  philosophy  an  ascetic  element. 
Plato  taught  that  a  life  of  contemplation  aloof  from  society  is 
the  highest  and  the  truly  blessed  life.  This  teaching  was  one 
of  the  formative  forces  in  the  creation  of  the  monastic  ideal. 


II.  The  Ideal  and  its  Chief  Types 


The  two 
types  of 


ideal 
(a)  the 
anchoretic; 
(6)  the 
monastic 


The  moral  ideal  of  Christian  asceticism  is,  in  its  essential 
the  ascetic  elements,  the  same  as  the  ascetic  ideal  of  other  religions.  Its 
leading  requirement,  after  that  of  right  belief,  is,  in  comprehen- 
sive terms,  world  renunciation.  In  the  early  Christian  period 
with  which  we  have  here  to  do,  the  ideal  presented  two  types, 
the  anchoretic  and  the  monastic.  The  anchoretic  or  eremite 
conception  of  the  perfect  life  was  complete  renunciation  of 
the  world  with  all  its  domestic,  social,  business,  and  political 
ties,  and  a  life  in  the  desert,  apart  from  all  human  companion- 
ship, spent  in  ceaseless  vigils,  prayer,  and  meditation.  He 
who  followed  this  mode  of  life  with  the  utmost  rigor,  who 
suppressed  every  natural  desire,  —  desire  of  family  and  wealth 
and  reputation  and  pleasure,  —  and  tamed  his  body  by  fasting, 
scourging,  and  other  austerities  was  looked  upon  as  a  saint 
and  was  regarded  with  peculiar  homage  and  veneration. 

Throughout  the  third  and  much  of  the  fourth  century  in 
all  the  countries  of  the  Orient  where  Christianity  had  spread, 
the  anchoretic  ideal  was  regarded  as  the  highest  and  most 
meritorious  type  of  the  Christian  life.  But  as  the  ascetic  en- 
thusiasm overspread  the  lands  of  the  West,  various  influences, 
such  as  climate  and  race  temperament,  caused  the  ascetics  in 
general  to  avoid  the  solitary  life,  and,  gathering  in  commu- 
nities, to  subject  themselves  to  rules  and  the  oversight  of 
superiors.  After  the  legislation  of  St.  Benedict  (480-543  a.d.) 
this  quickly  became  the  prevailing  mode  of  life  for  ascet- 
ics.  Thus  came  into  existence  the  monastic  system  with  its 


HISTORY  OF  CHRISTIAN  ASCETICISM        271 

distinctive  ideal  of  character,  which  added  to  the  virtues  of 
the  eremite  ideal  the  virtue  of  obedience  or  humility  and 
abated  somewhat  its  bodily  austerities.  This  ideal  was  des- 
tined to  exercise  for  centuries  a  profound  influence  upon  the 
religious  ethical  evolution  of  the  European  peoples. 

Both  types  are  mirrored  in  The  Lives  of  the  Saints}  the 
characteristic  literary  product  of  the  earlier  medieval  time. 
This  species  of  literature,  a  creation  of  the  pious  inventive- 
ness of  the  monks,  was  steeped  in  the  spirit  that  pervaded 
hermitage  and  cloister.  The  tales  illustrate  many  sides  of 
the  life  of  the  recluses,  but  are  chiefly  valuable  in  showing 
what  acts  and  practices  were  regarded  as  constituting  the 
most  meritorious  and  morally  excellent  life. 

The  ascetic  life  was  not  binding  upon  all.    It  could  not,  of  The  moral 
course,  become  the  universal  mode  of  life.    It  was  a  sort  of  for  the 
extra  service,  which  secured  extra  merit  for  him  who  ren-  2£mary 
dered  it.2    It  is  true  that  the  ascetic  ideal  absorbed  a  vast 
amount  of  the  moral  enthusiasm  of  the  age,  nevertheless  it 
was  a  standard  of  moral  attainment  for  the  lesser  number ; 
for  the  larger  body  of  Christians  there  was  the  less  exacting 
ideal  of  excellence  which  could  be  realized  in  the  ordinary 
life  in  the  world.    He  who  practiced  the  common  domestic, 
social,  and  business  virtues,  who  accepted  the  creed  of  the 
Church,  paid  tithes  to  the  priest,  and  was  faithful  in  the 
performance  of  all  required  religious  duties,  was  accounted 
a  good  man,  and  had  the  approval  of  his  fellow  men  and 
the  approbation  of  his  own  conscience. 

1  Alban  Butler,  The  Lives  of  the  Saints  (the  Fathers,  Martyrs,  and  other 
Principal  Saints,  compiled  from  monuments  and  other  authentic  sources), 
12  vols.  (1854).    Orig.  ed.  pub.  1754-1760. 

2  H  If  you  do  any  good  beyond  what  is  commanded  by  God,  you  will  gain 
for  yourself  more  abundant  glory,  and  will  be  more  honored  by  God  than 
you  would  otherwise  be,"  was  the  teaching  of  the  Church  respecting  the 
meritoriousness  of  ascetic  practices.  Cf.  Newman  Smyth,  Christian  Ethics 
(1892),  p.  313. 


272  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


III.    The  Chief  Moral  Facts  of  the  Period 

mtroduc-  In  the  present  division  of  this  chapter  it  will  be  our  aim 

merely  to  indicate  the  essential  facts  in  the  moral  history  of 
the  earlier  medieval  centuries.  Some  of  these  facts  will  serve 
to  show  in  how  remarkable  a  manner  the  age  was  dominated 
by  the  monastic  conception  of  good  life,  while  others  will 
simply  reveal  the  historical  outworkings,  in  its  more  general 
manifestations,  of  the  new  conscience  brought  into  the  world 
by  Christianity. 

The  ideal         As  a  prelude  to  the  brief  review  proposed  we  shall  do  well 
and  that  of  to  consider  for  a  moment  the  contrariety  between  the  new 
^Dialogue    ^eal  °^  ^e  Christian  monk  and  the  old  ideal  of  the  pagan 
between       hero  as  this  oppositeness  emerges  in  the  so-called  "Dialogue 
Patrick"     between  Oisin  and  St.  Patrick."  x   This  poem  discloses  most 
impressively  the  vast  revolution  which  the  incoming  of  Chris- 
tianity effected  in  the  moral  feelings  and  judgments  of  men. 
Oisin,  "  the  blind  Homer  of  Erin,"  is  represented  as  in 
his  old  age  entering  into  a  controversy  with  the  saint  respect- 
ing the  relative  merits  of  the  monk's  and  the  hero's  concep- 
tion of  worthiness.    The  dialogue  runs  as  follows  : 

St.  Patrick.  Oisin,  long  is  thy  slumber,  arise  and  listen  to  the  psalm  ; 
forsaken  is  thy  activity,  forsaken  thy  strength,  yet  wouldst  thou  de- 
light in  battle  and  wild  uproar. 

Oisin.  My  swiftness  and  my  strength  have  deserted  me  since  the  Fenii, 
with  Fionn  their  chief,  are  no  longer  alive;  for  clerks  I  have  no 
attachment,  and  their  melodies  are  not  sweet  to  me. 

O  Patrick,  hard  is  thy  service,  and  shameful  is  it  for  you  to  re- 
proach me  for  my  appearance ;  if  Fionn  lived,  and  the  Fenii,  I 
would  forsake  the  clergy  of  the  cross. 

Patrick,  pray  thou  to  the  God  of  heaven  for  Fionn  of  the  Fenii 
and  for  his  children,  making  entreaty  of  the  prince,  whose  equal  I 
have  never  heard  of. 

1  The  w  Dialogue  "  is  of  course  a  purely  literary  creation  of  some  monk. 
Oisin  was  not  a  contemporary  of  St.  Patrick. 


HISTORY  OF  CHRISTIAN  ASCETICISM        273 

St.  Patrick.    O  learned  man,  I  desire  not  strife  with  thee,  but  I  will 

not  make  request  to  heaven  for  Fionn,  for  all  the  actions  of  his  life 

were  to  be  in  love  and  to  urge  the  sounding  chase. 
Oisin.    If  you  were  to  be  in  company  with  the  Fenii,  O  clerk  of  clergy 

and  of  bells,  not  for  long  wouldst  thou  be  able  to  give  heed  to  the 

God  of  truth,  and  serve  the  clergy. 
St.  Patrick.  .  .  .  Oisin,  the  remainder  of  your  life  is  short,  and  badly 

will  you  fare  if  you  despise  the  clergy. 
Oisin.    Small  is  my  esteem  for  thyself  and  clergy,  O  holy  Patrick  of  the 

crozier :   I  have  greater  regard  for  Fionn,  the  white-handed  king  of 

the  Fenii,  but  he  is  not  near  me  now.  0   , 

Mournful  I  am  without  his  hounds  bounding,  and  his  dogs  all 

around  me;  if  they  and  their  agile  hero  were  alive,  Patrick,  you 

would  have  to  fear  rebuke  from  me. 
St.  Patrick.     In  that  way  did  you  and  the  Fenii  of  Erin  forsake 

heaven:  you  never  submitted  to  religion,  but  ever  put  confidence 

in  strength  of  limbs,  and  in  battles. 
Oisin.    Were  Fionn  alive,  and  the  Fenii  comely  and  warlike,  with  their 

hounds  running  propitiously,  they  would  seem  to  me  more  majestic 

than  those  who  dwell  in  heaven. 
St.  Patrick.    Desolate  are  the  Fenii,  without  slumber  or  liberty  in  the 

house  of  torment,  for  never  in  any  way  did  they  render  service  to 

the  Holy  Father. 

Oisin.  Fionn  delighted  in  strokes  upon  shields,  in  conquering  heroes, 
and  hunting  on  hills ;  the  sound  of  his  dogs  in  toil  was  more  melo- 
dious to  me  than  the  preaching  of  clerks  in  church  of  bells. 

St.  Patrick.  It  is  because  his  time  and  delight  were  taken  up  by 
pleasures  of  the  chase,  and  the  array  of  warlike  hosts ;  and  because 
he  never  thought  about  God,  that  Fionn  of  the  Fenii  is  in  thralldom. 
He  is  now  shut  up  in  torment ;  all  his  generosity  and  wealth  do 
not  avail  him  now,  for  lack  of  piety  toward  God,  for  this  he  is  in 
sorrow,  in  the  mansion  of  pain. 

Oisin.  Little  do  I  believe  in  thy  speech,  thou  man  from  Rome  with  white 
books,  that  Fionn  the  generous  hero  is  now  with  demons  and  devils. 

O  Patrick,  doleful  is  the  story :  Fionn  the  hospitable  to  be  under 
locks !  heart  without  malice  and  without  aversion,  heart  stern  in  de- 
fense of  battle. 
St.  Patrick.  However  great  the  number  of  troops  fighting  for  Fionn, 
he  did  not  act  the  will  of  God  above :  his  crimes  are  above  him  in 
pains  of  fire,  forever  in  anguish. 


274  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

Oisin.  It  is  plain  that  your  God  does  not  delight  in  giving  gold  and 
food  to  others :  Fionn  never  refused  strong  or  weak,  and  shall  he 
receive  hell  for  his  abode !  !  ! 

St.  Patrick.  However  much  he  may  have  divided  gold  and  venison, 
hard  are  his  bonds  in  the  den  of  pains :  no  glimpse  of  light  for  him, 
no  sight  of  brightness  such  as  he  first  received  from  God. 

Oisin.  Patrick,  inquire  of  God  if  He  remembers  the  Fenii  when  alive : 
ask  if,  east  or  west,  He  ever  saw  men  better  in  conflict. 

Or  did  He  observe  in  His  own  country,  although  it  is  high  above 
us,  for  sense,  for  ^conflict,  or  for  strength,  any  man  good  in  com- 
parison with  Fionn  ? 

Patrick,  I  am  wretched,  a  poor  bard,  ever  changing  residence,  with- 
out power,  without  activity,  without  force,  journeying  to  mass  and  altars. 

Without  good  food,  without  getting  wealth  and  booty,  without 
play  in  athletic  games ;  without  going  a-wooing  and  hunting,  two 
objects  for  which  I  always  longed. 

Without  reciting  deeds  of  champions,  without  bearing  spear ;  alas ! 
I  have  lost  Osgur  and  Fionn,  and  I  am  left  standing  like  a  withered 
tree,  out  under  injury. 
St.  Patrick.  Cease,  O  Bard !  Leave  off  thy  folly ;  you  have  as  yet 
said  but  little  in  favour  of  yourself :  think  of  the  torments  that  await 
you ;  the  Fenii  are  departed,  and  ere  long  you  will  go  likewise. 

Oisin.  I  will  not  obey  you,  O  Patrick,  though  great  your  creed  and 
faith.  I  own  without  lie  that  firm  is  my  belief  that  the  devil  will  be 
your  portion. 

I  would  rather  return  to  the  Fenii  once  more,  O  Patrick,  if  they 

were  alive,  than  go  to  the  heaven  of  Jesus  Christ,  to  be  forever  under 

tribute  to  Him. 
St.  Patrick.    O  withered  Bard,  thou  art  foolish;  thou  wouldst  not 

pay  tribute  to  any  one  if  thou  wast  in  the  heaven  of  Jesus  Christ, 

nor  wouldst  thou  witness  battle  and  uproar. 
Oisin.    I  would  rather  be  in  Fionn's  court  harkening  to  the  voices  of 

hounds  every  morning,  and  meditating  on  hard-fought  battles,  than 

in  the  court  of  Jesus  Christ ;  that  is  certain. 

It  was  easier  for  me  to  obtain  without  fail  both  meat  and  drink  in 
Fionn's  court  than  in  thy  mansion,  and  in  the  dwelling  of  the  Son 
of  God,  O  Patrick,  not  generous  in  dividing. 


HISTORY  OF  CHRISTIAN  ASCETICISM        27$ 

St.  Patrick.    It  is  better  for  thee  to  be  with  me  and  the  clergy,  as 

thou  art,  than  to  be  with  Fionn  and  the  Fenii,  for  they  are  in  hell 

without  order  of  release. 
Oisin.    By  thy  book  and  its  meaning,  by  thy  crozier  and  by  thy  image, 

better  were  it  for  me  to  share  their  torments,  rather  than  be  among 

the  clergy  continually  talking. 

Ah !  Patrick,  your  religion  may  be  great ;  but  I  have  not,  up  to 
this  day,  witnessed  among  ye  dinner  nor  banquet  like  banquet  of 
the  Fenii. 

St.  Patrick.  Although  Fionn  spent  generously  all  he  obtained  by 
strength,  fleetness,  and  plunder,  he  is  now  sorrowful  in  the  mansion 
of  a  lord  who  furnishes  no  dinner,  and  demons  torment  him  forever. 

Oisin.  It  would  be  pitiful  and  mournful,  if  thy  story  were  true,  ah 
Patrick !  for  all  the  saints  who  are  in  heaven,  if  they  were  to  strive 
with  Fionn  in  contest  of  liberality,  could  not  obtain  the  victory 
over  him. 


Tell  to  me  without  controversy  what  is  the  reason  of  the  custom 
you  have  to  be  ever  beating  your  breasts,  and  each  evening  kneeling 
under  gloom  ? 
St.  Patrick.  I  tell  thee  that  it  is  not  because  we  have  scarcity  of  food 
and  of  drink  that  we  are  under  armour  (watching),  but  because  we 
desire  to  be  perpetually  on  our  guard  against  gluttony. 
Oisin.  It  is  not  fear  of  gluttony,  nor  in  dread  of  king  of  saints  that  I 
receive  for  myself  scarcity  of  bread,  but  because  I  am  not  able  to 
obtain  it  from  the  clergy. 

Astonishment  is  upon  me  to  witness  the  greatness  of  your  love 
for  the  man  you  call  Christ,  if  hereafter  he  will  perpetually  upbraid 
you  for  the  abundance  of  your  portions  and  of  your  drink ! 

Farewell  to  Fionn  of  the  noble  Fenii ;  with  him  was  ample  ban- 
quet and  division ;  he  was  not  like  the  man  who  is  called  God ;  and 
moreover  he  gave  without  waiting  for  remuneration.  .  .  .  Never 
at  any  time  did  I  witness  him  asking  for  kneeling  and  bitter  weeping.1 

But  vain  was  the  lament  of  the  blind  bard.  The  ideal  of 
the  pagan  hero,  whose  fame  he  vaunted,  had  lost  its  primal 
appeal.    It  was  the  ideal  of  the  cloister,  incarnate  in  the 

1  J.  H.  Simpson,  Poems  of  Oisin  (1857),  pp.  42  ff.  We  have  reproduced 
only  a  small  part  of  the  poem. 


of  the  mod- 
ern social 
conscience 


276  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

"saint  of  many  prayers  and  many  vigils,"  that  was  now  en- 
thralling the  affections  and  shaping  the  consciences  of  men. 

Themonas-  In  the  course  of  a  few  generations  the  vast  enthusiasm 
the  cradle  awakened  for  the  ascetic  life  covered  all  Christian  lands  with 
convents  and  monasteries,  which  in  their  ethical  influence  con- 
stituted one  of  the  most  important  of  the  institutions  of  the 
Church.  In  truth,  the  monasteries  stand  in  closer  and  more 
vital  relation  than  does  any  other  ecclesiastical  institution 
to  the  ethical  evolution  of  the  Western  world.  The  service 
they  rendered  to  civilization  in  preserving  and  transmitting 
to  the  modern  world  various  elements  of  the  intellectual 
and  material  cultures  of  antiquity  has  been  fully  recog- 
nized and  gratefully  acknowledged ;  but  not  so  full  justice 
has  been  rendered  them  for  their  contribution  to  the  moral 
life  of  modern  times.  Yet  it  is  probably  true  that  the  most 
precious  thing  conserved  by  the  monasteries  from  the  wreck 
of  ancient  civilization  was  that  social  conscience  which  was 
generated  in  the  heart  of  old  Judaism  and  bequeathed  to 
Christianity.  Professor  Nash,  in  his  work  entitled  The  Gene- 
sis of  the  New  Social  Conscience,  maintains,  and  we  think 
with  right,  that  the  distinctive  qualities  of  the  modern  con- 
science—  tenderness  for  the  unfortunate,  a  lofty  altruism, 
a  noble  capacity  for  self-sacrifice  —  were  qualities  conserved 
and  cradled  in  the  medieval  monasteries. 

This  view  of  the  relation  of  the  monasteries  to  the  moral 
evolution  in  Western  civilization  may  be  accepted  by  the 
student  of  morals  as  a  correct  interpretation  of  medieval 
monastic  history,  while  at  the  same  time  he  admits  the 
truth  of  Lecky's  contention  that  there  was  a  self-regarding 
motive  in  Christian  asceticism  —  it  was  personal  salvation, 
7  he  says,  that  the  monk  was  primarily  seeking  —  which  made 
the  morality  of  the  Christian  saints  inferior  to  the  morality 
of  the  heroes  of  Greece  and  Rome.  It  is  undoubtedly  true 
that  many  entered  upon  the  monastic  life  from  self -regarding 


HISTORY  OF  CHRISTIAN  ASCETICISM        277 

motives ;  but  it  is  also  true  that  constant  meditation  upon 
religious  themes,  and  especially  the  holding  ever  before 
the  imagination  the  ideal  of  the  Master,  who  for  love  of 
man  made  the  supreme  self-sacrifice  of  the  Cross,  had  as  a 
natural  result  the  deepening  of  the  altruistic  feelings,  the 
sensitizing  of  the  conscience,  and  the  moving  of  the  will 
to  self-denying  service  for  others.  As  a  consequence  the 
spirit  of  true  self-renunciation  was  often  exalted  among  the 
recluses  of  the  cloister  to  an  unwonted  degree,  and  thus  it 
came  about  in  the  course  of  time  that  many  who  out  of 
solicitude  for  their  own  salvation  had  sought  the  solitude 
of  the  cloister  are  later  found  in  the  outside  world,  going 
about,  in  imitation  of  their  Master,  doing  good,  ministering 
in  the  spirit  of  absolute  self-forgetfulness  to  the  needs,  tem- 
poral as  well  as  spiritual,  of  the  poor,  the  afflicted,  the  heavy- 
laden,  and  the  life-weary.  A  large  part  of  the  philanthropic 
work  of  the  Church  during  the  Middle  Ages  was  carried  on 
by  the  monks. 

This  humanitarian  spirit,  this  cloister  conscience  of  mo- 
nasticism,  was  bequeathed  to  society  at  large.  Thus  may  the 
direct  line  of  descent  of  the  modern  social  conscience  be 
traced  through  the  medieval  monasteries. 

One  of  the  earliest  and  the  most  important  of  the  moral  The  new 
reforms  effected  by  the  new  conscience  in  the  institutions  condemns6 
of  pagan  Rome  was  the  suppression  of  the  gladiatorial  games.  JJjLJJJJJJ 
For  almost  seven  hundred  years  preceding  the  triumph  of  the  giadia- 
Christianity  in  the  Roman  world,  these  spectacles  had  formed  games 
the  favorite  amusement  of  the  Roman  people  without  having 
awakened  any  special  moral  protest.     Some  of  the  pagan 
philosophers  and  moralists,  particularly  Seneca  and  Plutarch, 
had  denounced  them  as  opposed  to  the  sentiment  of  human- 
ity, but  their  protest  had  found  no  echo  in  the  common 
conscience  of  the  age.    As  a  rule  the  pagan  moralists  saw 
nothing  in  them  to  condemn. 


278 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


The  new 
conscience 
condemns 
infanticide 
and  self- 
destruction 


It  was  reserved  for  the  Christian  moralists  to  awaken  the 
conscience  to  a  recognition  of  the  criminality  of  these  cruel 
spectacles.  It  was  particularly  the  Christian  teaching  of  the 
sacredness  of  human  life  that  contributed  powerfully  to  create 
the  new  ethical  feeling  as  to  the  immoral  character  of  these 
amusements,  and  prepared  the  way  for  their  final  abolition 
(404  a.d.)  through  the  protest  made  by  the  monk  Telemachus 
and  sealed  by  his  martyr  death. 

Speaking  of  the  significance  of  the  abolition  of  the  gladia- 
torial games,  Lecky  declares  that  "  there  is  scarcely  any  other 
reform  so  important  in  the  moral  history  of  mankind."  x  One 
thing  which  enhanced  greatly  the  importance  of  the  reform 
was  its  timeliness.  Just  at  the  moment  of  the  suppression  of 
these  spectacles  the  Germanic  tribes  were  passing  the  fron- 
tiers of  the  Empire  and  adopting  the  customs  and  institutions 
of  the  Romans.  Had  not  these  amusements  been  abolished 
or  put  under  the  ban  of  the  moral  feelings  before  the  final 
catastrophe  to  the  Empire,  the  barbarian  tastes  and  fighting 
instincts  of  this  new  race  would  have  led  to  the  eager  intro- 
duction of  these  sports  into  all  the  northern  countries,  just 
as  certainly  as  the  humane  spirit  of  the  Greeks  prevented 
their  general  introduction  into  Grecian  lands.  When  we  re- 
call the  indurating  and  dehumanizing  effects  of  these  amuse- 
ments upon  the  Roman  populace,  we  realize  the  importance 
and  timeliness  of  the  reform  which  kept  the  barbarian  nations 
free  from  their  brutalizing  and  deadening  influence. 

Equally  emphatic  was  the  condemnation  which  the  new 
conscience  pronounced  on  infanticide  and  self-destruction. 
We  have  seen  in  our  review  of  the  morality  of  the  classical 
peoples  how  almost  universal  was  the  practice  of  the  expo- 
sition of  infants,  and  how  slight  was  the  moral  condemna- 
tion which  the  custom  evoked  even  from  philosophers  and 
moralists.    When  the  practice  was  prohibited,  usually  the 


1  History  of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  ii,  p.  34. 


HISTORY  OF  CHRISTIAN  ASCETICISM        279 

prohibition  sprang  from  considerations  of  a  prudential  or 
economic  character  rather  than  from  scruples  of  conscience. 

But  the  Christian  teachers,  proclaiming  the  sacredness  of 
human  life  and  the  immortal  destiny  of  every  human  soul, 
declared  the  destruction  of  the  infant  as  sinful  as  the  taking 
of  the  life  of  the  adult.  It  is  to  this  teaching  doubtless  that 
is,  in  large  measure,  due  the  existence  in  Christian  lands  of  a 
conscience  which  condemns  the  destruction  of  the  newborn 
babe  as  an  act  of  deep  moral  turpitude. 

It  was  the  same  Christian  doctrine  of  the  sacredness  of 
human  life,  along  with  the  teaching  of  the  duty  of  resignation, 
that  created  also  a  new  moral  feeling  in  regard  to  suicide. 
We  have  seen  how  the  conscience  of  the  classical  peoples 
in  general  passed  no  condemnation  upon  the  act  of  self- 
destruction  if  life  had  in  any  way  become  a  burden ;  but  the 
Church  taught  that  suicide  is  the  same  as  murder,  indeed  a 
greater  sin  because  it  destroys  not  only  the  body  but  also  the 
soul.  Some  Christian  moralists  maintained  that  "Judas  com- 
mitted a  greater  sin  in  killing  himself  than  in  betraying  his 
master  Christ."  * 

Throughout  the  Middle  Ages,  under  the  influence  of  the 
Church,  the  act  of  self-destruction  was  regarded  with  the 
greatest  abhorrence,2  and  without  that  commingling  of  ten- 
derness and  pity  which  with  us  has  come  to  temper  the 
feeling  of  condemnation. 

But  the  new  conscience  found  most  characteristic  expres-  The  great 
sion  not  in  its  restraints  and  prohibitions  but  in  its  impulsions  ^paganTa 
to  altruistic  activity  and  endeavor.     In  our  account  of  the  "ession  of 
primitive  ethical  ideals  of  Greece  and  Rome  we  noticed  how  JJ^JJ1 
the  virtue  of  altruism  or  self-abnegation  for  the  common  good 
was  hidden  under  the  guise  of  courage.3    It  was  therefore  no 
new  virtue  which  Christianity  brought  into  the  world  when  it 

1  Westermarck,  The  Origin  and  Development  of  the  Moral  Ideas  (1908), 
vol.  ii,  p.  252. 

2  Cf.  Dante,  Inf.  xiii.  8  See  above,  pp.  175,  215. 


280  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

proclaimed  the  supreme  moral  excellence  of  self-renunciation 
for  others.  What  it  did  was  to  widen  the  circle  of  those  for 
whom  the  supreme  sacrifice  should  be  made,  and  to  give 
the  virtue  fuller  and  richer  content.  It  thus  imparted  fresh 
impulse  to  that  altruistic  movement  which  we  have  seen  to 
characterize  the  last  centuries  of  the  civilization  of  Greco- 
Roman  antiquity.  The  deepened  ethical  sentiment  found 
various  forms  of  expression,  but  the  most  important  of  these 
was  the  great  missionary  propaganda  which,  during  the  cen- 
turies from  the  sixth  to  the  ninth,  carried  the  new  gospel  to 
the  pagan  German  tribes  of  Europe.  Lecky  regards  this  as 
the  chief  altruistic  movement  of  the  medieval  period. 

This  conquest  of  the  continent  for  Christianity  was  effected 
in  large  part  by  men  whose  fervid  zeal  for  social  service  had 
been  kindled  in  the  quiet  and  holy  atmosphere  of  the  cloister.1 
The  movement  was  inspired  and  maintained  by  that  same 
spirit  of  self-devotion  which  animated  the  missionaries  of  the 
apostolic  age  of  Christianity.  The  declaration  of  the  first 
great  apostle  to  the  gentiles,  St.  Paul,  that  he  would  himself 
willingly  be  a  castaway  if  thereby  he  might  secure  the  salvation 
of  others,  could  have  been  made  by  many  a  self-devoted  monk- 
apostle  who  won  a  like  crown  of  martyrdom.  In  the  romance 
of  Christian  missions  the  monastic  chronicles  of  Iona  and 
Lindisfarne  and  St.  Gall,  and  the  tales  of  the  labors  and 
martyrdom  of  Saints  Columba,  Wilfrid,  Boniface,  and  a  great 
company  of  others  will  never  cease  to  enthrall  the  imagina- 
tion so  long  as  the  virtue  of  self-renunciation  is  esteemed 
and  reverenced  among  men. 

This  great  missionary  movement  which  brought  within  the 
pale  of  the  Church  the  northern  peoples  is  of  transcendent 
interest  to  the  student  of  the  history  of  morals,  not  merely 
because  it  is  such  a  splendid  exhibition  of  the  altruistic  spirit 

1  Ireland  was  foremost  in  this  missionary  movement  because  she  was 
so  given  over  to  the  monastic  spirit.  See  Montalembert,  The  Monks  of  the 
West  (1861),  vol.  ii,  p.  397. 


HISTORY  OF  CHRISTIAN  ASCETICISM        281 

of  Christianity,  but  also  because  the  success  of  these  medieval 
missions  meant,  besides  the  winning  of  the  barbarians  to  a  new 
religion,  the  winning  of  them  to  a  new  moral  life  ;  for  to  give 
a  people  a  new  religion  is  to  give  them  also  a  new  conscience. 

The  altruistic  spirit  of  the  new  religion  found  a  second  Almsgiving 
expression  in  charity,  in  the  sense  of  almsgiving  to  the  poor  founding  of 
and  the  wretched.  This  was  not  a  new  virtue  any  more  than  SSSSSai 
that  of  general  benevolence.  It  was  never,  it  is  true,  a  promi- 
nent virtue  with  the  Greeks  and  Romans,  but  it  had  always 
been  given  a  place  among  the  cardinal  virtues  by  all  the  great 
ethical  religions  of  the  East.  Judaism  laid  special  stress  upon 
the  duty  of  open-handedness  to  the  poor,  while  Buddhism 
made  it  a  rudimentary  virtue.1  Christianity  inherited  from 
Judaism  this  attractive  virtue  and  laid  a  fresh  emphasis  upon 
it.  Since  the  incoming  of  Christianity  the  poor  and  the  af- 
flicted have  been  cared  ior  in  a  spirit  of  compassion  and  tender- 
ness never  before  known  in  the  history  of  the  Western  races. 
Asylums  and  hospitals  and  charitable  institutions  of  every  kind 
have  multiplied  in  number  and  have  been  increased  in  effec- 
tiveness in  relieving  want  and  distress  as  the  centuries  have 
passed,  until  these  endowments  and  provisions  have  become 
a  distinctive  feature  of  Christian  civilization.  In  the  period 
we  are  here  reviewing,  and  throughout  the  later  medieval 
ages,  gifts  to  the  monasteries  were  especially  numerous  and 
large,  one  reason  for  this  being  that  the  monks  were  looked 
upon  as  the  almoners  of  society  and  "  trustees  for  the  poor." 
The  founding  of  hospitals  and  the  endowing  of  infirmaries 
afforded  another  outlet  for  the  unbounded  charity  of  the 
age.  The  first  Christian  hospital  was  founded  at  Rome  in  the 
fourth  century  by  a  Roman  lady  named  Fabiola,  a  widow  of 

1  According  to  Westermarck  ( The  Origin  and  Development  of  the  Moral 
Ideas  (1906),  vol.  i,  pp.  565-569)  charity  took  the  place  of  sacrifice  in  the 
primitive  cults,  and  for  this  reason  became  such  a  prominent  religious  duty 
in  all  the  higher  faiths. 


282  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

the  ancient  house  of  the  Fabii,  who  also  established  a  hospice 
for  pilgrims  at  the  mouth  of  the  Tiber.1 

The  spirit  of  charity  found  further  expression  in  the  emanci- 
pation of  slaves,  and  in  the  ransoming  of  prisoners  of  war, 
especially,  after  the  rise  of  Islam,  of  Christian  captives.  Un- 
fortunately the  teaching  of  the  Church  respecting  the  possi- 
bility of  possession  by  demons  caused  insanity  to  be  regarded 
as  obsession  by  an  evil  spirit,  and  for  more  than  a  thousand 
years  this  belief  not  only  put  the  unhappy  class  of  the  insane 
outside  the  pale  of  Christian  charity,  but  subjected  them  to  the 
most  cruel  treatment  that  fear  and  superstition  could  devise.2 

Mitigations       A  religion  or  a  philosophy  which  has  for  aim  the  reform 

of  slavery  ,    .        °  *  ,  .  i.         ,        •  i 

and  improvement  of  human  society  may  act  directly  either 
upon  the  individual  or  upon  institutions.  Thus  modern  social- 
ism ignores  the  individual,  maintaining  that  the  individual 
is  the  product  of  environment,  and  makes  its  direct  proxi- 
mate end  and  aim  the  reform  of  social  and  economic  institu- 
tions. Through  the  improvement  and  perfection  of  these  it 
would  bring  about  the  improvement  and  perfection  of  the 
individual,  and  thus  usher  in  the  era  of  equality,  justice,  and 
brotherhood  among  men. 

Now  the  method  of  Christianity  is  exactly  the  reverse  of 
this.  Its  appeal  is  made  to  the  individual ;  it  does  not  con- 
cern itself  directly  with  social  and  industrial  systems,  or  with 
governmental  institutions  and  arrangements.  It  would  reform 
society  by  reforming  the  individual.  When  Christianity  en- 
tered the  world  Caesarism  had  just  established  itself  upon 
the  ruins  of  republican  and  national  freedom,  but  the  Chris- 
tian preachers  said  nothing  about  political  liberty";  the  Master 
had  said,  "  Render  unto  Caesar  the  things  that  are  Caesar's." 
The  war  system  was  in  full  vigor ;  after  a  period  of  Quaker- 
ism the  Church  first  condoned,  then  accepted,  and  finally 

1  Montalembert,  The  Monks  of  the  West  (1861),  vol.  i,  pp.  397  f. 

2  Lecky,  History  of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  86  ff. 


HISTORY  OF  CHRISTIAN  ASCETICISM        283 

consecrated  this  heritage  of  barbarism  as  one  of  the  necessary 
institutions  of  human  society.  The  gladiatorial  games  were 
the  sole  important  institution  of  antiquity  which  the  Christian 
teachers  absolutely  condemned  as  an  institution,  and  the  abo- 
lition of  which  they  persistently  demanded  and  finally  effected. 
It  was  the  same  with  slavery  as  with  other  social  institu- 
tions. It  existed  everywhere  when  Christianity  appeared, 
but  the  Christian  teachers  never  preached  abolition.  The 
Christian  emperors  adopted,  and  for  two  centuries  main- 
tained practically  unchanged,  the  pagan  slave  code.  There 
were  under  these  rulers,  it  is  true,  some  ameliorations  in  the 
laws,  due  to  Christian  influence  ;  thus  cruel  forms  of  punish- 
ment, as  branding  on  the  forehead  or  throwing  from  a  preci- 
pice, were  prohibited.  With  the  exception  of  these  minor 
isolated  mitigations  of  the  lot  of  the  slave,  slavery  passed 
over  into  Christian  civilization  as  an  unchanged  heritage 
from  the  ancient  world,  and  continued  to  exist  as  a  Christian 
institution  until,  through  the  action  of  various  agencies,  politi- 
cal and  economic  as  well  as  moral,  it  was  gradually  transformed 
into  serfdom.  During  the  later  centuries  of  its  prevalence, 
however,  Christian  teachings  softened  many  of  the  cruelties 
of  the  system,  and  caused,  speaking  generally,  the  individual 
slave  to  be  treated  with  greater  consideration  and  humanity. 

Unfortunately  there  were  large  offsets  to  the  moral  gains  The  broad- 
of  which  we  have  been  speaking.    Christianity  had  entered  a  moveiS* 
world  in  which  the  most  important  ethical  movement  in  prog-  }J  l™®*™ 
ress  was  the  broadening  of  the  moral  sympathies.   The  genius  JJJjJj1^ 
of  the  new  religion,  a  genius  inherited  from  the  great  prophets  checked 
of  Judaism,  was  well  calculated  to  impart,  as  for  a  period  it 
did,  a  fresh  impulse  to  this  cosmopolitan  movement,  and  to 
foster  and  strengthen  this  growing  sentiment  of  philanthropy 
and  universal  brotherhood.    Its  mission  seemed  to  be  to  con- 
summate the  work  of  Greek  philosophy  and  of  Roman  world 
conquest,  to  complete  the  obliteration  of  national  boundaries, 


284  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

to  throw  down  the  partition  wall  between  Greek  and  barbarian, 
Jew  and  gentile,  patrician  and  plebeian,  bond  and  free,  and 
to  make  each  man's  neighbor  to  be  every  fellow  being  of 
whatsoever  race  or  class  or  creed. 

But  this  spirit  of  genuine  Christianity  was  soon  obscured 
and  the  world  movement  toward  ethical  universalism  ob- 
structed and  checked  by  the  theological  teaching  which  made 
moral  merit  and  salvation  dependent  upon  the  acceptance  of 
a  prescribed  creed.  In  place  of  the  tribal  and  racial  walls 
of  division  which  had  originally  separated  the  communities  of 
men  and  which  the  progress  of  events  had  thrown  down,  it 
raised  a  new  partition  wall  which  divided  mankind  into  two 
great  ethically  artificial  classes,  believers  and  unbelievers, 
Christians  and  pagans.  In  place  of  the  doctrine  of  race 
election  it  substituted  the  doctrine  of  individual  election. 
Throughout  a  large  part  of  the  Christian  period  "  infidels  " 
and  "  heathen  "  have  too  often  been  to  Christians  what  "  gen- 
tiles "  were  to  the  "  chosen  people,"  and  "  barbarians  "  to  the 
intellectually  elect  Greeks. 

Thus  was  the  broadening  and  leveling  movement  which 
marked  the  later  centuries  of  antiquity  checked,  while  a  new 
division  as  inimical  to  universal  charity  as  the  old  divisions 
of  race  and  cult  was  created. 


st.  Augus-        The  representative  and  promoter  of  this  retrograde  move- 
tine  as  the  .  .    _  .     l  .  ,  .  ,.'«„. 

representa-  ment  in  the  moral  domain  was  the  African  bishop  St.  Augus- 
narrowing  tine.  His  "  City  of  God,"  viewed  from  one  side,  is  altogether 
movement  j^e  unto  the  old  city  of  man.  It  is  simply  the  ancient  classical 
city  in  its  early  period  of  aristocratic  pride  and  exclusiveness 
before  it  had  felt  the  broadening  influence  of  a  thousand  years 
of  varied  experience  and  growing  culture.  Only  a  few  can 
acquire  citizenship  in  the  new  city.  Its  privileges  are  only  for 
V  the  elect."  A  great  multitude,  the  nonelect,  are  left  outside 
the  city  gates.  Thus,  in  the  words  of  Wedgwood,  "  all  the 
arrogance,  all  the  exclusiveness,  all  the  love  of  privilege,  for 


HISTORY  OF  CHRISTIAN  ASCETICISM        285 

which  the  city  of  man  no  longer  afforded  any  escape,  found 
a  refuge  in  the  city  of  God."  * 

The  narrowing  and  hampering  influence  upon  the  moral 
development  of  the  European  peoples  of  this  unethical  system 
of  Augustinian  theology  and  metaphysics  it  would  be  difficult 
to  exaggerate. 

The  new  division  was  even  more  of  a  hindrance  in  some  loss  of  the 
respects  than  the  old  to  the  moral  progress  of  the  world  ;  for  toleration 
there  was  not  merely  created  a  tendency  to  the  limitation  of 
Christian  charity  to  the  community  of  believers,  but  there 
was  fostered  an  intolerant  and  persecuting  spirit.  The  world 
into  which  Christianity  entered  was,  speaking  generally,  a 
tolerant  world.  There  were,  it  is  true,  persecutions  for  opin- 
ion's sake  in  the  pre-Christian  age,  but  these  were  compara- 
tively infrequent.  In  general,  persecution  in  classical  antiquity 
sprang  from  some  other  motive  than  dislike  or  fear  of  reli- 
gious dissent,  as  we  have  seen  to  have  been  the  case  in  the 
persecution  of  the  Christians  by  the  pagan  emperors  of  Rome.2 

But  after  the  promulgation  of  the  moral  code  of  the  Church, 
which  made  wrong  belief  or  denial  of  the  orthodox  creed  a 
fault  of  unmeasured  criminality,  toleration  ceased  to  be  a  virtue 
and  became  a  vice.  Thus  the  virtue  of  toleration,  which 
Lecky  pronounces  "  the  supreme  attainment  of  Roman  civili- 
zation," was  lost.  Intolerance  became  a  duty,  and  remained 
such  for  more  than  a  thousand  years,  making  a  tragedy  of 
centuries  of  European  history.  Wars  of  annihilation  or  sub- 
jection against  pagans  and  infidels  were  waged,  and  the  perse- 
cution of  heretics  was  carried  on  with  a  hatred  and  ferocity 
in  strange  contrast  to  the  unbounded  charity  and  infinite  ten- 
derness of  the  Founder  of  the  religion  in  the  name  of  which 
these  things  were  done. 

This  spirit  of  intolerance  thus  called  into  existence  led, 
during  the  period  under  review,  to  the  suppression,  first,  in 

1  The  Moral  Ideal,  3d  ed.,  p.  369.  2  See  above,  p.  245. 


286 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


"Between 
moralities" 
the  new- 
forming 
ideal 


the  fourth  century  by  the  Christian  emperors,  of  freedom  of 
religious  worship ;  and  then  quickly  to  the  suppression  of 
liberty  of  thought  throughout  Christendom.1  By  the  opening 
of  the  sixth  century  no  one  in  any  Christian  land  could  freely 
think  or  freely  express  his  thought,  even  on  philosophical 
themes.  This  retrograde  movement  in  its  ultimate  conse- 
quences was  one  of  the  most  far-reaching  revolutions  in  the 
moral  history  of  the  Western  world. 

Aside  from  the  broad  ethical  movements  traced  above, 
induced  by  the  Christian  conception  of  life  and  its  new  valu- 
ation of  particular  virtues  and  duties,  there  was  in  this  epoch 
a  moral  phenomenon  of  another  sort  which  we  must  now  no- 
tice, namely,  the  moral  anarchy,  which  characterized  the  later 
centuries  of  the  period  under  review. 

In  an  earlier  chapter  we  spoke  of  the  fusion  of  moral  ideals 
which  ultimately  takes  place  when  two  races  meet  and  unite 
to  form  a  new  race  and  a  new  culture.2  But  as  Bagehot  has 
pointed  out,  such  a  commingling  of  races  is  always  attended 
by  a  special  danger.  It  is  likely  for  a  time  to  produce  "  some- 
thing not  only  between  races,  but  between  moralities."  3 

In  the  fact  here  stated  we  must  doubtless  look  for  the  ex- 
planation in  part  of  the  turbulent,  anarchical  character,  ethi- 
cally viewed,  of  the  period  which  immediately  followed  the 
downfall  of  ancient  civilization,  and  which  saw  the  creation, 
out  of  Roman  and  barbarian  elements,  of  the  new  Romano- 
German  world.  In  the  migrations  and  settlements  of  the 
German  conquerors  in  the  Roman  provinces,  and  in  the 
mixture  of  races  which  there  took  place,  there  resulted  neces- 
sarily, on  the  one  side,  a  break-up  of  all  the  old  tribal  relations 

1  "  The  suppression  of  all  religions  but  one  by  Theodosius,  the  murder 
of  Hypatia  by  the  monks  of  Cyril,  and  the  closing  by  Justinian  of  the 
schools  of  Athens,  are  the  three  events  which  mark  the  decisive  over- 
throw of  intellectual  freedom."  —  Lecky,  History  of  European  Morals., 
3d  ed.,  vol.  i,  p.  428.  2  See  above,  p.  6. 

8  Physics  and  Politics  (1873),  PP-  7°  £ 


HISTORY  OF  CHRISTIAN  ASCETICISM        287 

which  formed  the  basis  of  the  morality  of  the  barbarians,  and, 
on  the  other  side,  the  destruction  of  all  the  restraints  and  con- 
ventions which  had  formed  the  bulwark  and  stay  of  the  more 
refined,  if  less  simple  and  pure,  morality  of  the  Romans. 
With  the  old  moral  codes  discredited,  with  ancestral  ethical 
ideals  disintegrated,1  men  stood,  to  use  Bagehot's  phrase,  not 
between  races  only  but  also  between  moralities,  and  the  his- 
torical ethical  evolution  was  broken  by  what  has  been  aptly 
called  a  moral  interregnum.  The  epoch  covering  the  interval 
between  the  destruction  of  the  Roman  governmental  system 
in  the  West  in  the  fifth  century  and  the  establishment  of  a 
semblance  of  social  order  by  Charlemagne  toward  the  end 
of  the  eighth  century,  presents,  according  to  the  concurrent 
view  of  all  chroniclers  and  historians  of  the  period,  one  of 
the  most  appalling  spectacles  of  moral  anarchy  afforded  by 
the  records  of  human  history. 

In  the  midst  of  this  moral  chaos,  however,  a  new  moral 
world  was  forming.  Gradually,  under  various  influences, 
racial,  cultural,  and  religious,  there  was  taking  shape  and 
form,  through  a  fusion  of  different  ethical  elements,  a  new 
moral  ideal,  the  ideal  of  knighthood,  which  for  an  epoch  — 
throughout  the  crusading  centuries  —  was  to  absorb  a  large 
part  of  the  moral  enthusiasm  of  Christendom,  and  to  determine 
in  great  measure  the  character  of  the  enterprises  of  the  age. 

Since  one  of  the  influences  which  produced  this  great  trans- 
formation in  the  Christian  ideal  was  the  creed  and  moral  code 
of  Islam,  we  shall  in  our  next  chapter  turn  aside  from  follow- 
ing the  ethical  evolution  among  the  European  peoples  to  watch 
for  a  space  the  rise  and  progress  of  this  new  faith  whose  mar- 
tial ethics  was  destined  to  leave  so  deep  an  impress  upon  the 
moral  ideal  of  Christianity. 

1  "  One  may  find  .  .  .  the  chief  characteristic  of  the  period  of  the  migra- 
tions in  a  complete  uprooting  of  public  morality,  a  universal  overturning 
of  inherited  conceptions  of  right  and  wrong."  —  Francke,  Social  Forces  in 
German  Literature,  2d  ed.,  p.  12. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE   ETHICS   OF  ISLAM:    A  MARTIAL   IDEAL 

I.  Religious  Basis  of  the  Moral  System 


Introduc- 
tion: Islam 
creates 
a  new  con- 
science in 
the  Arab 
race 


The  doc- 
trine of 
the  unity 
of  God 


The  great  revolution  which  in  the  seventh  century  of  the 
Christian  era  agitated  all  Arabia  and  gave  a  new  trend  to 
vast  currents  of  world  history  was  essentially  a  moral  revolu- 
tion. It  was  the  moral  degradation  of  the  Arab  tribes,  still 
clinging  to  an  outgrown,  idolatrous  worship  incapable  longer 
of  giving  moral  guidance  to  its  followers,  that  stirred  the 
soul  and  inspired  the  message  of  Mohammed.  The  Prophet's 
real  appeal  was  to  the  conscience  of  the  Arab  race.  The 
chief  aim  and  purpose  of  his  preaching  was  to  effect  a  moral 
reform.  He  gave  the  Arabs,  it  is  true,  a  new  religion,  but 
the  religion  was  to  give  impulse  and  sanction  to  the  new 
morality.  The  transformation  which  the  new  faith  wrought  in 
the  moral  consciousness  of  the  Arabian  nation  was  probably 
not  less  profound  than  that  effected  by  Christianity  in  the 
moral  consciousness  of  the  European  peoples.  It  is  this 
which  makes  the  rise  of  Islam  a  matter  as  important  in  the 
moral  as  in  the  religious  history  of  mankind. 

Islam  may,  with  strict  historical  accuracy,  be  said  to  be 
essentially  a  republication  of  Judaism.  Its  morality,  like  the 
old  Hebrew  morality,  is  largely  derived  from  its  conception 
of  deity.  It  teaches  that  God  is  one,  and  that  he  is  all- 
powerful,  compassionate,  forgiving,  and  righteous.  Allah  is 
great  and  merciful  and  just,  is  the  burden  of  the  Prophet's 
message  respecting  deity.  This  ethical  monotheism  has  been 
a  governing  force  in  the  moral  life  of  the  Mohammedan 

288 


THE  ETHICS  OF  ISLAM  289 

world,  just  as  a  like  ethical  monotheism  has  been  a  molding 
influence  in  the  moral  life  of  the  Jews  and  of  all  those 
nations  that  have  received  their  religion  from  them. 

Another  religious  doctrine  which  has  contributed  largely  The  dogma 
to  shape  the  morality  of  Islam  is  that  of  salvation  by  belief,  by  belief1011 
Only  the  true  believer  can  be  saved.  The  tendency,  indeed 
the  logical  and  inevitable  consequence  of  this  doctrine,  has 
been  to  make  Islam  one  of  the  most  intolerant  of  the  great 
religions.  It  has  tended  to  restrict  the  moral  sympathies  of 
Moslems  to  coreligionists  and  to  make  propagandism  by 
violence  seem  a  virtue. 

Islam  claims  to  be  a  divine  revelation  to  man.  This  doc-  An  un- 
trine  of  the  supernatural  origin  of  the  religion  makes  the  moranaw6 
moral  code,  which  is  bound  up  with  it,  a  rigid,  unchangeable 
law,  for  it  is  only  a  human  code  that  can  be  changed  without 
irreverence  and  sacrilege.  The  blighting  effects  upon  Moham- 
medan morality  of  this  dogma  of  a  moral  law  supernaturally 
given  for  all  time  will  be  noted  a  little  later,  when  we  come 
to  speak  of  the  actual  moral  life  in  Mohammedan  lands. 


II.  The  Moral  Code 

Like  all  the  other  ethical  systems  of  Asia,  save  those  of  General 
genuine  Christianity  and  Buddhism,  the  Islamic  system  lays  the  code 
special  emphasis  upon  the  performance  of  particular  prescribed 
acts.  It  is  by  no  means  silent  respecting  the  necessity  of  right 
states  and  dispositions  of  mind.  But  instead  of  relying  upon 
general  principles  for  the  guidance  of  the  moral  life,  it  lays 
its  emphasis  upon  specific  outer  observances,  such  as  alms- 
giving, fasting,  pilgrimages,  and  stated  prayers.1  The  tend- 
ency of  such  a  code  of  precise  rules  and  commands,  as  was 
pointed  out  in  connection  with  Chinese  morality  and  again 

1  Parliament  of  Religions  (1893),  vol.  i,  pp.  574  f. ;  consult  also  Bryce, 
Studies  in  History  and  Jurisprudence  (1901),  vol.  ii,  p.  237. 


290 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


The  duty 
and  virtue 
of  right 
belief 


in  connection  with  the  post-exilic  morality  of  the  Jews,  is  to 
externalize  morality  and  render  the  moral  life  conventional 
and  mechanical. 

In  correspondence  with  the  dogma  of  salvation  through 
belief,  the  paramount  duty  and  virtue  in  the  ethical-religious 
code  of  Islam  is  unquestioning  belief  in  Allah  as  the  only 
true  God  and  in  Mohammed  as  his  prophet.  Without  this 
virtue  of  correct  belief  there  can  be,  according  to  the  teach- 
ings of  Islam,  no  salvation. 

One  effect  of  thus  making  right  belief  an  indispensable 
virtue  was  to  make  intolerance  practically  a  virtuous  disposi- 
tion of  mind,  and  the  conquest  of  infidels  a  paramount  duty. 
It  is  here  that  we  find  one  of  the  fundamental  differences 
between  the  ethical  teachings  of  Christ  and  those  of  Moham- 
med. The  Founder  of  Christianity,  through  his  teaching  of 
nonresistance,  condemned  war.  He  commanded  his  followers 
to  put  up  the  sword.  The  founder  of  Islam,  on  the  other 
hand,  frankly  and  without  scruple  adopted  the  war  system  of 
his  time  and  consecrated  it  to  a  religious  end  and  purpose. 
His  followers  were  commanded  to  fight  for  the  extension  of 
the  religion  of  Allah.1  Those  who  fell  in  battle  for  the  faith 
were  promised  immediate  entrance  into  the  joys  of  Paradise.2 

Never  was  there  a  more  fateful  provision  given  a  place  in 
a  code  of  morals.  It  determined  in  large  measure  the  charac- 
ter of  Islam  and  foreshadowed  its  history.  It  made  it  a  martial 
religion.  This  martial  religion,  through  reaction  upon  Chris- 
tianity, helped  to  make  it  like  unto  itself.  Thus  was  prepared 
the  way  for  the  Holy  Wars. 

Just  as  Mohammed  adopted  the  war  system  he  found  in 
existence,  so  did  he  adopt  that  of  slavery.  But  while  accept- 
ing the  system,  he  did  much  to  improve  the  status  of  the 

1  Qur'dn,  tr.  Palmer  (Sacred  Books  of  the  East,  vols,  vi*  ix),  suras  ii. 
184-189,  212-215;  iv.  90;  viii.  40;  ix.  5-14,  29;  xlvii.  4,  and  many  others. 

2  Ibid,  suras  ii.  149;  iii.  151 ;  ix.  113. 


THE  ETHICS  OF  ISLAM  291 

bondsman.  The  legislation  of  the  Koran  in  this  department 
of  ethics  follows  the  humane  regulations  of  the  old  Hebrew 
code.  In  its  specific  provisions  favorable  to  the  slave  it  goes 
beyond  the  requirements  of  the  New  Testament.  It  not  only 
enjoins  the  kind  treatment  of  slaves  but  provides  that  con- 
verts to  Islam  shall  be  set  free,  and  in  general  encourages 
manumission.1 

In  no  department  of  ethics  is  the  contrast  between  Chris-  Family 
tian  and  Mohammedan  morals  sharper  than  in  the  sphere  of  polygamy 
domestic  morality.   Sex  relations  which  the  Christian  Church  Jjfjfjjja 
condemns  as  sin,  and  which  the  Christian  civil  law  makes  a 
crime,  are  by  the   Mohammedan  moral  consciousness  pro- 
nounced natural  and  right,  or  at  least  ethically  indifferent. 
The  New  Testament  absolutely  prohibited  polygamy,  although 
from  primitive  times  the  moralists  of  the  East  had  had  in 
general  no  condemnation  for  the  custom  ;  but  the  Koran  ac- 
cepted the  system  without  scruple.    In  doing  so,  however,  it 
placed  salutary  restraints  upon  the  unregulated  license  which 
had  hitherto  characterized  the  institution.     It  limited  the 
number  of  wives  of  the  faithful  to  four,2  and  surrounded 
divorce  with  wholesome  restrictions. 

Family  ethics  were  further  lifted  to  a  higher  level  by  the 
positive  prohibition  of  infanticide,3  a  practice  which  consti- 
tuted one  of  the  worst  evils  of  Arab  society  in  pre-Islamic 
times.  The  positive  enactments  of  the  Koranic  code  in  this 
department  of  morals  accomplished  what  was  effected  indi- 
rectly in  the  same  domain  by  Christianity  through  its  teach- 
ings of  the  sanctity  of  human  life. 

Among  the  other  prohibitions  of  the  moral  code  of  Islam  The  proni- 
are  two  worthy  of  special  notice  for  the  reason  that,  being  gambling 
made  largely  effective  by  the  sanctions  of  religion,  they  have 

1  Sura  xxiv.  33.  The  New  Testament  nowhere  inculcates  the  manumis- 
sion of  slaves,  but  the  spirit  of  its  teachings  is  opposed  to  slavery,  and  the 
early  Fathers  of  the  Church  encouraged  the  emancipation  of  slaves. 

2  Suras  iv.  3.  8  Suras  vi.  138,  141,  152;  xvii.  33. 


292  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

exercised  an  incalculable  influence  upon  the  Mohammedan 
world.  These  are  the  provisions  of  the  Koran  forbidding  in 
the  most  positive  terms  gambling  and  the  use  of  alcoholic 
drinks.1  These  prohibitions  have  had  a  great  and  undeniable 
influence  in  preserving  Mohammedan  civilization,  in  the  ex- 
tended reach  of  lands  over  which  it  has  spread,  from  those 
inveterate  twin  evils  of  gambling  and  drunkenness  which 
constitute  one  of  the  deepest  stains  on  Christian  civilization. 

Animal  It  has  been  maintained  that  the  place  given  duties  to  lower 

animals  is  a  crucial  test  of  a  moral  code.2  Tried  by  this 
standard,  the  code  of  Islam  must  be  accorded  a  high  place 
among  the  ethical  systems  of  the  world.  In  the  department 
of  animal  ethics  it  is  on  a  level  with  that  of  the  old  Hebrew 
Testament.  Indeed,  the  tender  solicitude  of  the  code  for 
dumb  animals  is  one  of  its  most  admirable  features.  The 
whole  animal  creation  is  here  brought  within  the  pale  of 
ethics.  Thus  at  the  outset  Islam  took  up  a  position  respect- 
ing man's  duty  toward  the  animal  world  which  Christianity 
is  only  just  now  tardily  assuming. 

a  concrete  Taken  as  a  whole  the  ethical  rules  and  commands  of  the 
morality04  Koran  constitute  an  admirable  code,  one  which  has  been  an 
efficient  force  in  the  moral  improvement  and  uplift  of  the 
peoples  of  vast  regions  of  the  earth.  The  morality  incul- 
cated has  been  succinctly  characterized  as  a  concrete  and 
practical  one.  It  is  particularly  well  adapted  to  races  in  a 
low  stage  of  culture.  The  very  fact  that,  notwithstanding 
some  serious  defects  and  limitations,  the  code  has  been  ac- 
cepted by  so  large  a  part  of  the  human  race,  and  has,  for  over 
a  thousand  years,  given  moral  guidance  and  inspiration  to 
such  vast  multitudes,  goes  to  prove  that  the  great  body  of 
its  rules  and  prescriptions  of  conduct  are  in  general  in  line 
with  the  elemental  laws  of  the  moral  world. 

1  Suras  ii.  216;  v.  93. 

2  R.  Bosworth  Smith,  Mohammed  and  Mohammedanism  (1875),  P-  204- 


THE  ETHICS  OF  ISLAM  293 

III.  The  Moral  Life 

In  any  comparison  instituted  between  Christianity  and  Monamme- 
Islam  as  moral  regenerators  of  society  there  is  need  that  ^pressed 
the  difference  in  the  fields  entered  by  these  rival  creeds  be  j^fluenoes 
kept  carefully  in  mind.  Islam  was  placed  at  a  disadvantage 
in  that  it  went  among  the  morally  degenerate  and  dissolute 
peoples  of  the  Orient,  while  Christianity  had  for  its  field  the 
classical  peoples  and  particularly  the  fresh  German  race.  In 
those  same  Eastern  lands  and  among  those  same  Oriental  or 
semi-Hellenized  races  Christianity  had  not  only  signally  failed 
morally  to  reform  and  uplift  society,  but  in  that  unfavorable 
environment  had  itself  become  lamentably  degenerate  and 
corrupt.  In  pointing  out  this  disadvantage  to  which  Islam 
has  been  subjected,  a  discerning  Moslem  writer  says,  "  Like 
rivers  flowing  through  varied  tracts,  both  these  creeds  have 
produced  results  in  accordance  with  the  nature  of  the  soil 
through  which  they  have  found  their  course."  x  There  is 
here  the  necessary  recognition  of  the  influence  which  the 
historical  environment  exercises  upon  the  moral  standard. 
The  prerequisite  of  a  good  harvest  in  the  field  of  morals, 
as  in  the  physical  world,  is  not  only  good  seed  but  also  a 
good  soil. 

The  whole  history  of  Islam,  as  already  remarked,  has  been  consequence 
molded  by  the  fact  that  fighting  for  the  extension  of  the  true  Jeifgiouf  * 
religion  was  made  by  Mohammed  a  chief  duty  of  the  faithful.  Swar"1 
Islam's  wonderful  career  of  conquest  during  the  first  century 
after  its  rise  was  in  large  measure  the  result  of  the  Prophet 
having  made  war  against  infidels  a  pious  duty.    Hitherto  war 
among  the  Arabs  had  been  for  the  most  part  merely  a  raid 
or  hunt.    Now  it  was  given  an  ethical-religious  motive  and 
thus  made  a  crusade.   In  the  space  of  a  single  century  a  large 
part  of  the  countries  which  had  formed  the  historic  lands  of 

1  Ameer  Ali,  The  Spirit  of  Islam,  2d  ed.,  p.  283. 


294  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

antiquity  had  been  brought  by  the  Arabian  warriors  under 
the  sway  of  Islam. 

But  this  was  not  all.  These  conquests  brought  Islam  in 
contact  with  Christendom  along  all  its  extended  frontier  from 
the  Straits  of  Gibraltar  to  the  Bosporus,  and  thus  created 
the  conditions  which  led  to  the  Holy  Wars  between  Moslem 
and  Christian,  which  filled  the  eleventh  and  twelfth  centuries. 
Such  were  the  momentous  and  far-reaching  consequences  of 
the  giving  by  the  Arabian  Prophet  of  a  religious  sanction  to 
war,  and  the  reenforcing  of  the  war  spirit  among  a  martial 
race  by  making  warfare  a  duty  and  death  in  battle  a  sure 
passport  to  the  bliss  of  paradise. 

Mitigation  While  adopting  and  sanctifying  the  war  system,  Islam  did 
barbarities  something  in  the  way  of  mitigating  its  savagery.  Up  to  this 
in  war  tjme  ^  war  coc|e  0f  tke  ^sian  peoples  had  lost  little  or  none 
of  its  primitive  barbarity.  The  indiscriminate  slaughter  of  the 
vanquished,  without  regard  to  age  or  sex,  had  been  a  common 
practice.  But  when  the  second  Arabian  caliph,  Omar,  sent 
out  his  warriors  to  effect  the  conquest  of^Re  world  for  the 
true  religion,  he  strictly  enjoined  them  to  spare  the  women 
and  children  and  the  old  men.  This  injunction  became  a  part 
of  the  Mohammedan  war  code,  and,  though  not  always  ob- 
served, it  did  much  to  make  the  earlier  wars  waged  for  the 
spread  of  Islam,  compared  with  most  of  the  recorded  wars 
among  the  Oriental  races,  merciful  and  humane. 


intolerance  Intimately  related  to  the  subject  of  the  Mohammedan  ethics 
Sr?  of™ "  of  war  is  the  subject  of  toleration.  As  we  have  seen,  the  natu- 
prlncipies  ra*  tendency  of  the  teaching  that  right  religious  belief  is  nec- 
essary to  salvation,  and  that  fighting  for  the  spread  of  the  true 
religion  is  a  paramount  duty,  is  to  foster  intolerance,  indeed, 
is  to  make  intolerance  a  virtue.  These  doctrines  of  Islam 
have  in  the  main  restricted  to  the  faithful  the  outgoings  of 
the  moral  sympathies.  To  the  moral  consciousness  of  the 
Moslem  masses  tolerance  has  not  presented  itself  as  a  virtue 


THE  ETHICS  OF  ISLAM  295 

at  all,  but  rather  as  a  reprehensible  disposition  of  mind,  since 
it  argues  lack  of  zeal  for  the  true  faith.  There  is  to-day  more 
religious  intolerance  in  Moslem  lands  than  in  any  other  regions 
of  the  earth.  In  this  respect  the  Mohammedan  world  is  about 
at  the  standpoint  held  by  Christendom  in  the  Middle  Ages. 

But  fortunately  it  is  the  same  with  a  bad  principle  as  with 
a  good  one  —  it  never  produces  its  full  logical  consequences. 
There  is  that  in  the  constitution  of  things  and  in  human  nature 
which  prevents  this.  Hence  there  has  been  in  Mohammedan 
lands  a  larger  measure  of  toleration  than,  in  view  of  the  teach- 
ings of  Islam,  we  should  have  looked  for.  But  the  toleration 
enjoyed  by  non-Moslems  under  Mohammedan  rule  has  been 
at  best  precarious.  With  lamentable  frequency,  in  lands  where 
large  sections  of  the  population  are  ignorant  and  debased, 
outbursts  of  fanaticism  have  resulted  in  terrible  massacres 
of  "  unbelievers." 

Not  until  Moslem  civilization  has  felt  the  broadening  effect 
of  those  material,  intellectual,  and  moral  revolutions  which 
have  finally  brought  in  toleration  in  a  once  intolerant  Christen- 
dom, will  this  virtue,  without  which  a  true  and  progressive  moral 
life  is  impossible,  find  a  place  in  the  ethical  code  of  Islam. 

The  slave  trade  in  Mohammedan  lands  has  been  fostered  the  slave 
through  the  consecration  of  the  war  system  by  Mohammed  isiam 
and  his  recognition  of  slavery  as  a  part  of  the  established 
social  order.  Throughout  the  first  century  of  the  career  of 
Islam  the  propaganda  of  the  faith  by  the  sword  provided  an 
unfailing  source  of  slaves,  such  as  had  not  been  opened  up 
since  the  completion  of  the  conquest  of  the  world  by  the 
Roman  legions.1  This  religious  legitimatizing  of  the  slave 
trade  filled  Moslem  lands  with  slave  markets,  and,  when  the 
wars  of  the  religious  propaganda  had  ceased,  tended  to  give 

1  According  to  the  principles  of  the  Koran,  though  no  Moslem  captive 
might  be  reduced  to  servitude,  all  non-Moslem  prisoners  could,  as  spoils  of 
war,  be  enslaved :  w  We  make  lawful  for  ye  .  .  .  what  thy  right  hand  possesses 
[slaves]  out  of  the  booty  God  has  granted  thee"  (sura  xxxiii.  49). 


296  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

a  fresh  impulse  to  the  African  slave  traffic,  which  had  been 
in  existence  from  time  immemorial.  This  trade  by  Moham- 
medans has  been  just  such  a  curse  to  eastern  and  central 
Africa  as  the  European  Christian  slave  traffic  —  which,  be- 
ginning in  the  fifteenth  century,  continued  till  its  final  sup- 
pression in  the  nineteenth  —  was  to  the  west  African  coast 
and  the  hinterland.  The  Moslem  trade  is  still  carried  on 
clandestinely,1  since  there  has  as  yet  been  little  or  no  moral 
disapprobation  of  the  traffic  awakened  in  Mohammedan  lands. 

The  absolute  prohibition  in  the  Koran  of  the  use  of  all 
intoxicating  liquors  has  been  wonderfully  effective  in  preserv- 
ing Mohammedan  lands  from  the  great  evil  of  drunkenness. 
This  vice,  so  common  in  Christian  lands,  is  almost  unknown 
in  countries  where  the  faith  of  the  Koran  is  really  dominant 
and  the  influence  of  Europeans  has  not  been  felt. 

In  Afghanistan  the  penalty  inflicted  for  drunkenness  is 
death.  So  rigorously  is  the  law  of  Islam  in  this  matter  en- 
forced that  persons  in  a  state  of  intoxication  are  almost  never 
seen.  Nor  is  the  evil  simply  driven  under  cover ;  there  is 
practically  very  little  drinking  going  on  in  the  privacy  of 
the  home. 

Islam  has  been  only  less  effective  than  Buddhism  and 
Christianity  in  fostering  the  attractive  virtue  of  charity.  The 
precepts  of  the  Koran  respecting  almsgiving  and  other  deeds 
of  benevolence  have  greatly  promoted  the  habit  of  giving 
among  the  followers  of  the  Prophet.  The  giving  of  direct 
relief  to  the  poor  in  the  form  of  alms  is  probably  quite  as 
general  as  among  Christians,  though  much  of  this  charity  is 
indiscriminate  and  tends  to  foster  that  mendicity  which  is 
such  an  ever-present  evil  in  Mohammedan  lands.  The  build- 
ing of  caravansaries,  the  construction  of  aqueducts,  the  opening 

1  "  The  recognition  of  the  slave  traffic  by  Mohammedanism  has  been, 
and  is  to  this  day,  a  curse  to  Africa  and  a  source  of  disturbance  to  the 
world's  politics."  —  Hobhouse,  Morals  in  Evolution  (1906),  vol.  i,  p.  307. 


THE  ETHICS  OF  ISLAM  297 

of  fountains  along  the  routes  of  travel,  and  the  founding  of 
asylums  are  forms  of  benevolence  which  recall  similar  works  of 
philanthropy  in  the  later  period  of  the  pagan  Roman  Empire. 
Respecting  this  charity,  however,  it  must  be  said  that  much 
of  it  has  the  taint  of  self-interest.  Many  of  these  good  works 
are  performed  not  so  much  from  genuine  philanthropy  as 
from  self-regarding  motives,  the  dominant  thought  of  the 
doer  being  to  gain  religious  merit  for  himself. 

The  spread  of  Islam  has  been  almost  from  the  first  largely  Moral 
among  tribes  and  peoples  low  in  the  scale  of  civilization.   In  islam  on 
the  earlier  centuries  of  its  career,  besides  its  conquests  among  [o"sin 
the  peoples  of  ancient  culture,  it  won  over  a  great  part  of  the  civilization 
uncivilized  clans  and  tribes  of  Asia,  and  to-day  is  making 
constant  and  rapid  progress  among  the  negro  tribes  of  cen- 
tral Africa.  What  renders  this  fact  of  significance  to  the  his- 
torian of  morals  is  that  Islam  has  shown  itself  to  be  one 
of  the  most  potent  forces  at  work  in  the  world  to-day  for 
the  moral  elevation  of  peoples  still  on  or  near  the  level  of 
savagery.    Canon  Isaac  Taylor  affirms  that  it  "  causes  the 
negro  tribes  of  Africa  to  renounce  paganism,  devil  worship, 
fetishism,  cannibalism,  human  sacrifices,  infanticide,  witch- 
craft, gambling,  drunkenness,  unchastity,  cruelty,  and  personal 
uncleanliness."  * 

That  the  moral  code  of  Islam  should  be  even  more  effective 
than  the  Christian  in  lifting  savages  to  a  higher  moral  level 
is  attributed  by  Canon  Taylor  to  the  fact  that  the  moral 
standard  of  Christianity  is  so  high  that  "  its  virtues  are  only 
vaguely  understood  and  not  generally  practiced,  while  the 
lower  virtues  which  Islam  enforces  are  understood  and 
generally  practiced." 

In  a  word,  it  is  with  Islam's  morality  the  same  as  with  its 
theology.    Its  doctrine  of  one  God  is  simple,  concrete,  and 

1  In  an  address.  Cf.  R.  Bosworth  Smith,  Mohammed  and  Mohammedan- 
ism (1875),  PP-  59  ft- 


298  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

easily  understood,  and  for  this  reason  Islam  is  admittedly 
more  readily  accepted  by  races  low  in  culture  than  Chris- 
tianity with  its  metaphysical  doctrine  of  the  Trinity.  As  the 
simplicity  and  concreteness  of  its  teachings  respecting  deity 
adapt  its  creed  to  the  savage  mind,  so  do  the  lower  concrete 
practical  virtues  of  its  moral  code  adapt  it  to  the  rudimentary 
moral  sense  of  the  primitive  man. 

Effects  upon  One  of  the  most  striking  and  instructive  phenomena  of 
dan  morality  universal  history  is  the  contrasted  fortunes  of  Mohammedan 
piianuaw  an^  Christian  civilization.  In  the  eighth  century  of  our  era 
Mohammedan  culture  was  in  many  respects  superior  to  that 
of  Christendom.  It  held  forth  great  promises  for  the  future. 
But  these  promises  were  not  kept.  Stagnation  quickly  fol- 
lowed the  period  of  brilliant  achievement,  and  a  blight  fell 
upon  the  Moslem  world,  while  the  history  of  Christendom 
has  been  a  record  of  wonderful  development  and  progress, 
until  to-day  the  two  worlds  cannot  be  placed  in  comparison 
with  one  another,  but  only  in  contrast. 

Beyond  question  many  agencies,  such  as  race,  religion,  and 
government,  have  concurred  to  produce  this  contrast  in  history 
and  fortune,  but  equally  certain  is  it  that  a  potent  contributory 
cause  is  the  difference  in  the  moral  systems  which  the  two 
civilizations  respectively  inherited.  The  moral  life  of  the 
Christian  world,  happily  freed  from  the  bondage  of  the  rigid 
Mosaic  law,  an  outer  law  of  positive  minute  commands,  has 
expatiated  under  the  comprehensive,  flexible  law  of  the  Gos- 
pel, a  law  of  love  and  liberty.  As  a  result  the  moral  life  of 
Christendom  has  been,  on  the  whole,  notwithstanding  certain 
Mohammedanizing  tendencies,  an  expansive  growth  under 
the  guidance  of  a  moral  consciousness  gradually  purified  and 
refined  by  experience  and  advancing  culture.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  moral  life  of  the  Mohammedan  world  has  been 
subjected  to  the  authority  of  an  external,  unchanging  law,  a 
law  conceived  to  have  been  given  for  all  time,  a  republication 


THE  ETHICS  OF  ISLAM  299 

practically  of  that  rigid  Mosaic  law  from  the  bondage  of 
which  the  Christian  world  had  fortunately  escaped.  But  the 
moral  life  cannot  be  thus  subjected  to  a  rigid  external 
authority  without  resulting  inanition  and  death.  "  The 
blight  that  has  fallen  on  the  Moslem  nations,"  declares  a 
well-informed  and  thoughtful  Mohammedan  writer,  "  is  due 
to  the  patristic  doctrine  which  has  prohibited  the  exercise  of 
individual  judgment."  x  The  ethical  code  of  a  people,  like  its 
civil  code,  must  be  elastic  and  responsive  to  the  ever-changing 
needs  and  demands  of  the  growing  moral  life. 

1  Ameer  Ali,  The  Spirit  of  Islam,  2d  ed.,  p.  328.  The  author  maintains 
that  Mohammed  himself  did  not  intend  that  his  rules  should  be  binding 
for  all  time. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE   MORAL   LIFE   OF  EUROPE   DURING  THE 
AGE   OF  CHIVALRY 

I.  The  Church  consecrates  the  Martial  Ideal 
of  Knighthood 

introduc-  From  the  third  to  the  ninth  century  the  ideal  of  asceticism 

absorbed  a  great  part  of  the  moral  enthusiasm  of  Christen- 
dom. During  the  later  part  of  this  period,  however,  as  we 
have  noted,  there  was  growing  up  alongside  the  ascetic  ideal 
another  of  a  very  different  character  —  the  martial  ideal  of 
•  knighthood.    In  the  present  chapter  we  shall  first  make  a 

'  brief  survey  of  the  various  causes  that  gave  this  new  trend 

to  the  moral  feelings  and  convictions  of  the  age,  and  then 
shall  glance  at  some  of  the  more  important  historical  out- 
comes of  the  vast  enthusiasm  evoked  by  this  new  ideal  of 
character. 

The  ideal  of  knighthood,  a  product  in  the  main  of  feu- 
dalism, grew  up  outside  the  Church,  and  only  later  was 
recognized  by  ecclesiastical  authority  and  approved  as  com- 
patible with  the  ethical  spirit  of  Christianity.  Had  not 
the  ideal  been  thus  approved  by  ecclesiastical  authority,  and 
advantage  taken  of  the  enthusiasm  it  evoked  to  promote 
through  it  the  cause  of  the  Church,  it  would  never  have 
become  the  significant  force  it  did  in  European  history. 
Therefore  we  must  first  inquire  what  were  the  influences 
that  engendered  a  military  spirit  in  the  Church  and  led  it 
to  approve  the  martial  ideal  of  the  knight  and  give  the  con- 
secration of  religion  to  the  institution  of  chivalry  which  was 
its  embodiment. 

300  . 


EUROPE  DURING  THE  AGE  OF  CHIVALRY     301 

If  at  the  advent  of  Christianity  one  reflecting  upon  the  The  genius 
genius  of  the  new  religion  and  the  teachings  of  its  Founder  tianity " 
had  ventured  to  forecast  the  influence  of  the  new  faith  upon  JJJww* 
the  different  departments  of  morality,  he  would  almost  cer-  sPirit 
tainly  have  predicted  that  this  influence  would  be  felt  most 
decisively  upon  the  ethics  of  war.    The  attitude  assumed  by 
the  early  Christians  toward  the  military  life  would  have  justi- 
fied this  forecast,  for  Christianity  brought  into  the  world  the 
new  principle  of  nonresistance.1    This  teaching  made  the 
primitive  Christian  community  almost  a  Quaker  body ;  but 
barely  three  centuries  had  passed  before  this  religion  which 
had  entered  the  world  as  a  gospel  of  peace  and  good  will 
had  become  a  martial  creed  and  its  emblem  been  made  a 
battle  standard. 

The  causes  that  produced  this  amazing  transformation  in  causes 
the  Christian  Church  were  various  and  so  interrelated  as  to  teredth?" 
make  it  difficult  to  determine  just  what  influence  was  exer-  Seckureh: 
cised  by  each.    Yet  it  is  possible  to  note  the  character  of  the  (fl) theher- 

J  r  itage  of  the 

different  agencies  at  work,  and  to  form  at  least  some  general  war  ethics 
idea  of  the  way  in  which  the  transformation  was  wrought.        cient  world 

First,  there  was  the  inheritance  from  the  past.  War  had  of  culture 
always  been  one  of  the  leading  occupations  of  men.  It  had 
scarcely  ever  occurred  to  any  one  to  question  its  legitimacy. 
It  was  looked  upon  as  a  part  of  the  constitution  of  things. 
The  ideas,  feelings,  habits,  engendered  by  its  practice  through 
uncounted  millenniums  of  history  had  become  ingrained  in 

1  This  teaching  is  one  which  does  not  show  itself  as  a  generally  recog- 
nized principle  in  the  pre-Christian  centuries,  as  does  the  principle  of  love, 
or  self-devotion  to  the  common  good,  or  universal  benevolence.  M  Chris- 
tianity at  its  inception  did  not  take  over  this  moral  principle,  ready-made, 
from  any  of  the  older  cults  or  cultures  from  which  the  Christian  movement 
was  in  a  position  to  draw.  It  is  not  found,  at  least  in  appreciable  force,  in 
the  received  Judaism ;  nor  can  it  be  derived  from  the  classical  (Greco- 
Roman)  cultures,  which  had  none  of  it "  (Thorstein  B.  Veblen,  "  Christian 
Morals  and  the  Competitive  System,"  The  International  Journal  of  Ethics 
for  January,  1910). 


302  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

every  tissue  and  fiber  of  man's  being.  Set  in  the  midst  of 
the  world,  the  Church  yielded  to  the  influence  of  this  baneful 
pagan  heritage.  It  incorporated  with  its  own  moral  code, 
wholly  alien  to  the  essential  spirit  of  Christianity  as  these  ele- 
ments were,  the  war  ethics  of  the  pre-Christian  world,  and  thus 
made  this  pagan  international  morality  a  permanent  part  of 
Christian  ethics.1  It  will  be  instructive  for  us  to  follow  some- 
what closely  this  reaction  upon  the  ethics  of  the  Church,  first 
of  the  war.  code  of  the  civilized  world  of  the  south,  and  then 
later  of  the  war  spirit  of  the  barbarian  world  of  the  north. 

The  early  Fathers  of  the  Church  in  general  condemned 
the  military  service  as  incompatible  with  the  Christian  life.2 
Not  till  the  second  century  of  the  Empire  do  we  find  any  record 
of  Christian  soldiers  serving  in  the  Roman  armies.  By  this  time 
the  early  rule  of  the  Church  forbidding  a  member  to  serve  in 
the  army  had  become  relaxed ;  but  members  of  the  Christian 
body  who  entered  the  Roman  legions  were  required  to  under- 
take a  prescribed  penance  and  to  seek  absolution  before  par- 
taking of  the  Eucharist.  By  the  time  of  Diocletian  Christians 
appear  to  have  entered  with  little  or  no  scruple  upon  the  mili- 
tary life.3  A  significant  way  mark  of  this  gradual  transforma- 
tion is  the  great  victory  won  by  the  Emperor  Constantine  over 
his  rival  Maxentius  at  the  battle  of  Milvian  Bridge,  312  a.d. 
Upon  that  field  the  soldiers  of  Constantine  fought  beneath  the 
Labarum,  a  standard  which  bore  as  an  emblem  the  Christian 
cross.  The  fortunate  issue  of  the  battle  for  Constantine  seems 
to  have  greatly  confirmed  the  feeling  in  the  Christian  com- 
munity as  to  the  legitimacy  of  war.    The  Church  conformed 

1  "  Christian  mores  in  the  Western  Empire  were  formed  by  syncretism 
of  Jewish  and  pagan  mores.  Christian  mores  therefore  contain  war,  slavery, 
concubinage,  demonism,  and  base  amusements,  together  with  some  abstract 
ascetic  doctrines  with  which  these  things  are  inconsistent."  —  Sumner, 
Folkways  (1907),  p.  116. 

2  For  opinions  of  early  Christian  writers  and  the  attitude  of  the  Church 
on  the  soldier's  profession  and  the  rightfulness  of  war,  see  Grotius,  Rights 
of  War  and  Peace,  tr.  Whewell,  pp.  49  ff. 

8  Harnack,  The  Expansion  of  Christianity  (1904),  vol.  ii,  p.  205. 


race 


EUROPE  DURING  THE  AGE  OF  CHIVALRY     3°3 

more  and  more  positively  its  teachings  and  discipline  to 
the  requirements  of  the  military  service.  Saints  Augustine 
(354-430  a.d.)  and  Ambrose  (340-397  a.d.),  in  opposition 
to  most  of  the  earlier  Fathers,  were  open  apologists  and 
defenders  of  war  and  of  the  military  life. 

Thus  during  the  very  period  when  the  Church  was  putting 
under  its  ban  the  cruel  and  sanguinary  amusements  of  the 
Romans  by  the  suppression  of  the  gladiatorial  games,1  and 
thus  lifting  domestic  morality  to  a  new  and  higher  plane, 
through  a  strange  inconsistency  it  was  first  condoning  and 
then  finally  consecrating  the  international  pagan  war  system 
of  which  these  sports  were  only  a  mild  imitation. 

After  the  fifth  century  the  influence  upon  the  ethics  of  the  (»)  The  war 
Church  of  the  war  system  of  the  civilized  world  of  the  south  German 
was  reenforced  by  the  martial  spirit  of  the  barbarian  world  of 
the  north.  That  world  was  now,  largely  through  the  missions 
of  the  monastic  Church,  being  rapidly  brought  within  the  pale 
of  Christianity.  But  all  these  northern  peoples  were  the  very 
incarnation  of  the  war  spirit.  Their  favorite  deities  were  gods 
who  delighted  in  battle  and  bloodshed.  Fighters  these  men 
were,  and  fighters  they  remained  even  after  conversion  and 
baptism.  The  mingling  of  moralities  which  followed  their 
conversion  is  well  illustrated  by  the  passionate  outburst  of 
the  Frankish  chieftain  Clovis  as  he  listened  to  the  story  of 
the  Crucifixion  :  "  Oh,"  he  exclaimed,  "  if  only  I  could  have 
been  there  with  my  trusty  warriors  ! "  The  soul  of  Clovis  lived 
on  in  his  race.  Four  centuries  later  these  Frankish  warriors, 
as  knight  crusaders,  were  on  the  spot  of  the  Crucifixion,  re- 
deeming with  lance  and  sword  the  tomb  of  the  slain  Christ> 
from  the  hands  of  infidels.  It  was  this  ineradicable  war  spirit 
of  the  northern  barbarians  to  which  was  due,  perhaps  more 
than  to  any  other  agency,  the  infusion  of  a  military  spirit  into 
that  church  of  which  the  Founder  was  the  Prince  of  Peace. 

1  See  above,  p.  277.  * 


304  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

Among  the  customs  of  the  early  Germans  there  was  one 
which  had  such  a  positive  influence  upon  the  evolution  we 
are  tracing  in  Church  morality  that  we  must  here  make  special 
note  of  it.  This  was  the  ordeal  by  fire,  by  water,  or  by  wager  of 
battle  to  determine  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  an  accused  person. 
The  prominent  place  held  by  this  institution  among  savage  or 
semicivilized  peoples  is  familiar  to  the  student  of  primitive 
society.  Now  the  German  folk  brought  with  them  this  institu- 
tion, and  with  it  the  belief  which  made  the  ordeal,  and  particu- 
larly the  ordeal  by  combat,  a  solemn  judicial  matter  in  which 
God  rendered  decision  and  gave  victory  to  the  one  whose  cause 
was  just.  This  barbarian  conception  of  the  wager  of  battle  be- 
tween individuals  became  incorporated  with  the  common  body 
of  Christian  ideas  and  beliefs.  The  same  manner  of  think- 
ing was  perforce  applied  to  war.  A  conflict  between  great 
armies  was  conceived  as  a  wager  of  battle  in  which  God  gave 
victory  to  the  right.  Thus  was  war  consecrated  and  made  an 
agency  whereby  God  executes  judgment  among  the  nations. 

(c)  The  war  This  interpretation  of  the  nature  and  mission  of  war  was 
the  ow  reenf orced  by  a  like  unfortunate  interpretation  of  the  records 
Testament  of  the  01d  Testament.  The  good  bishop  Ulfilas  was  right 
when,  in  translating  the  Hebrew  Bible  into  the  Gothic  tongue, 
he  omitted  the  war  chronicles  through  fear  that  these  records 
of  wars  and  massacres  would  fan  into  too  fierce  a  flame  the 
martial  zeal  of  his  Gothic  neophytes.  To  these  terrible  chron- 
icles, which  represent  God  as  commanding  the  Israelites  to 
wage  war  against  his  enemies,  and  even  as  ordering  the  most 
horrid  atrocities  upon  war  captives,  is  due  in  large  part  the 
idea  so  dominant  even  to-day  among  Christian  nations  that 
God  is  a  God  of  War,  and  that  through  the  ordeal  of  battle 
he  gives  judgment  on  the  earth.1 

1  Throughout  the  medieval  ages  and  down  almost  to  our  own  day  these 
Old  Testament  records,  misread,  were  used  to  justify  many  of  the  cruelties 
of  war,  and  other  atrocities  : 

,  Plunder  and  pillage  were  supported  by  reference  to  the  divinely  approved  "  spoil- 
ing of  the  Egyptians  "  by  the  Israelites.   The  right  to  massacre  unresisting  enemies 


Islam 


EUROPE  DURING  THE  AGE  OF  CHIVALRY     305 

The  transformation  taking  place  in  the  ethical  standard  of  (</)  The 
the  Church  under  the  various  influences  we  have  named  was  agTndaTf5" 
hastened  and  completed  by  the  reaction  upon  Christian  ethics 
of  the  martial  ethics  of  Islam.1  This  new  influence  began 
to  be  exerted  in  the  seventh  century.  By  infection  the  cru- 
sading spirit  of  the  Mohammedan  zealots  was  communicated 
to  the  Christian  Church.  Toward  the  close  of  the  eleventh 
century  the  spiritual  head  of  Christendom,  Pope  Urban  II, 
summoned  the  Christian  nations  of  Europe  to  arms  for  the 
recovery  of  the  Holy  Sepulcher  from  the  hands  of  the  un- 
believers. 

Feudalism  by  this  time  had  flowered  in  chivalry.  The 
Christian  lands  were  filled  with  brave  young  knights,  espe- 
cially knights  of  Norman  descent,  aflame  with  martial  enthu- 
siasm and  eager  for  warlike  adventure.  It  was  the  ancestors 
of  these  very  men,  instinct  with  the  military  spirit,  that  Rome 
had  once  enlisted  in  her  legions  to  fight  the  battles  of  the 
Empire ;  it  is  the  children  of  those  legionaries  that  the 
Christian  Church  now  summons  in  the  name  of  Christ  to  her 
standard  to  fight  the  battles  of  the  Cross. 

The  transformation  of  that  Church  was  now  complete. 
The  age  of  the  Crusades  had  opened.    Christ  and  Mars  were 

was  based  upon  the  command  of  the  Almighty  to  the  Jews  in  the  twentieth  chapter 
of  Deuteronomy.  The  indiscriminate  slaughter  of  whole  populations  Was  justified 
by  a  reference  to  the  divine  command  to  slaughter  the  nations  round  about  Israel. 
Torture  and  mutilation  of  enemies  was  sanctioned  by  the  conduct  of  Samuel  against 
Agag,  of  King  David  against  the  Philistines,  of  the  men  of  Judah  against  Adoni- 
bezek.  Even  the  slaughter  of  babes  in  arms  was  supported  by  a  passage  from  the 
Psalms,  "  Happy  shall  he  be,  that  taketh  and  dasheth  thy  little  ones  against  the 
stones."  Treachery  and  assassination  were  supported  by  a  reference  to  the  divinely 
approved  Phinehas,  Ehud,  Judith,  and  Jael ;  and  murdering  the  ministers  of  unap- 
proved religions,  by  Elijah's  slaughter  of  the  priests  of  Baal.  —  Andrew  D.  White, 
Seven  Great  Statesmen  (1910),  pp.  85  f. 

1  Lecky  believes  this  to  have  been  the  main  cause  of  the  transformation 
in  the  Church.  "  The  transition,"  he  says,  w  from  the  almost  Quaker  tenets 
of  the  primitive  Church  to  the  essentially  military  Christianity  of  the  Cru- 
sades was  due  chiefly  ...  to  the  terror  and  the  example  of  Mohammedan- 
ism "  {History  of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  ii,'p.  252).  But,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  transition  was  already  nearly  complete  before  the  rise  of  Islam. 


306  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

co-sovereigns  in  Christian  Europe.  The  teachings  of  the 
Prince  of  Peace  and  the  war  spirit  of  the  civilization  of  antiq- 
uity and  of  the  German  barbarians  were  reconciled.1  As 
Lecky  finely  portrays  it,  "  At  the  hour  of  sunset  when  the 
Christian  soldier  knelt  down  to  pray  before  his  cross,  that 
cross  was  the  handle  of  his  sword."  2 


II.  The  Composite  Ideal  of  Knighthood 

The  com-  The  foregoing  brief  account  of  the  reconciliation  and 
acSr^the  commingling  in  later  Roman  and  early  medieval  times  of 
pogan-ltS     tne  Pagan  ethics  of  war  and  the  Christian  ethics  of  peace 

christian  jias  aireadv  acquainted  us  with  what  was  the  distinctive  char- 
virtues  J       * 

acteristic  of  the  ethical  ideal  of  knighthood,  the  ideal  which 

resulted  from  this  mingling  of  these  two  strongly  contrasted 
moralities.  It  was  a  composite  ideal,  a  combination  of  pagan 
and  Christian  virtues.  The  true  knight,  who  was  the  incar- 
nation of  the  ideal,  must  possess  all  the  admired  moral  qualities 
of  the  pagan  hero,  and,  together  with  these,  all  the  essential 
virtues  of  the  Christian  saint.  Among  the  pagan  virtues  we 
find  a  set  of  moral  qualities  that  are  attributes  of  character 
which,  with  possibly  one  or  two  exceptions,  were  assigned  a 
high  place  either  in  the  barbarian  German  or  in  the  classical 
ideal  of  excellence.  Chief  among  these  qualities  are  personal 
loyalty,  courage,  truthfulness,  justice,  magnanimity,  courtesy, 
and  self-respect. 

The  first  duty  and  virtue  of  the  true  knight  was  absolute 
loyalty  to  his  superior,  to  his  comrades  in  arms,  and  to  the 
cause  espoused.    This  virtue  of  loyalty  is  the  virtue  which 

1  In  a  portrayal  of  the  character  of  the  Scandinavians,  the  Church  his- 
torian Schaff  observes  :  "  Their  only  enthusiasm  was  the  feeling  of  duty ; 
but  the  direction  which  had  been  given  to  this  feeling  was  so  absolutely 
opposed  to  that  pointed  out  by  the  Christian  morality,  that  no  reconciliation 
was  possible  "  {History  of  the  Christian  Church,  vol.  iv,  p.  no).  Yet  in  the 
important  domain  of  ethics  which  we  are  here  examining  this  is  exactly  what 
did  happen. 

2  History  of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  ii,  p.  253. 


EUROPE  DURING  THE  AGE  OF  CHIVALRY     307 

Professor  Royce  makes  the  root  from  which  all  other  virtues 
spring.1  Without  doubt  it  is,  if  not  the  central  virtue  of  every 
true  moral  system,  one  of  the  most  attractive  of  all  ethical 
traits,  and  one  most  sacredly  held  from  taint  by  every  person 
with  a  nice  sense  of  what  constitutes  true  nobility  of  character. 

A  second  and  indispensable  virtue  was  courage.  The 
knight  must  be  brave  as  well  as  loyal.  Cowardice  and 
knighthood  were  wholly  incompatible  things. 

Another  moral  quality  was  veracity,  absolute  fidelity  to  a 
promise.  The  pledged  word  of  the  true  knight  was  sacrosanct 
and  inviolable.2 

Still  another  indispensable  trait  in  the  character  of  the 
ideal  knight  was  love  of  justice.  The  true  knight  must  be 
just ;  an  unjust  knight  could  not  be  a  true  knight  any  more 
than  an  unjust  judge  can  be  a  true  judge. 

Again,  the  knight  who  would  be  loyal  to  the  ideal  of  knight- 
hood must  be  magnanimous.  One  of  the  elements  of  this 
virtue  is  unwillingness  to  take  an  unfair  advantage  of  another, 
especially  of  an  enemy.  It  was  a  disgraceful  thing  for  a  knight 
to  attack  his  foe  when  at  a  disadvantage,  as  when  disarmed  or 
fallen.   He  must  always  meet  his  enemy  in  fair  and  open  fight. 

Furthermore,  the  true  knight  must  be  courteous.  It  was  as 
much  his  duty  to  be  courteous  as  to  be  truthful.  Now  courtesy 
is  not  a  trait  or  feeling  which  inspires  lofty  action,  but  one 
which  induces  gentleness,  kind  consideration,  and  gracious 
deference  toward  all  alike  —  rich  and  poor,  high  and  low. 

Lastly,  the  knight  must  possess  dignity  or  self-respect. 
The  age  of  chivalry  interpreted  this  virtue  or  duty  as  requiring 

1  Josiah  Royce,  The  Philosophy  of  Loyalty  (1908). 

2  M  So  great,  it  is  said,  was  the  knights'  respect  for  an  oath,  a  promise, 
or  a  vow,  that  when  they  lay  under  any  of  these  restrictions,  they  appeared 
everywhere  with  little  chains  attached  to  their  arms  or  habits  to  show  all 
the  world  they  were  slaves  to  their  word ;  nor  were  these  chains  taken  off 
till  their  promise  had  been  performed,  which  sometimes  extended  to  a  term 
of  four  or  five  years.  It  cannot  be  expected,  of  course,  that  reality  should 
have  always  come  up  to  the  ideal."  —  Westermarck,  The  Origin  and 
Development  of  Moral  Ideas  (1908),  vol.  ii,  p.  102. 


308  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

the  knight  to  stand  on  his  rights  as  a  man.  He  must 
not  let  an  injury  to  himself  or  to  a  friend  go  unpunished. 
He  must  resent  every  insult  and  return  blow  for  blow.  Not 
to  do  so  argued  cowardice  and  pusillanimity.  All  this  was 
of  course  directly  opposed  to  the  Christian  requirements  of 
humility,  meekness,  nonresistance,  and  forgiveness  of  injuries, 
and  was  distinctly  a  part  of  the  moral  code  of  chivalry  which 
was  borrowed  from  pre-Christian  or  non-Christian  morality. 

To  these  essentially  pagan  virtues  the  knight,  after  the 
institution  of  chivalry  had  been  approved  and  consecrated  by 
the  Church,  must  add  all  the  distinctly  Christian  virtues, 
particularly  the  virtue  of  right  religious  belief.  Only  the  true 
believer  could  be  a  true  knight. 

A  striking  illustration  of  the  mixture  of  moralities  with 
which  we  have  to  do  in  the  period  of  chivalry  is  afforded  by 
the  celebrated  religious  military  orders  of  the  Hospitalers 
and  Templars,  which  were  formed  just  before  the  Second 
Crusade,  when  the  enthusiasm  for  the  chivalric  ideal  was  at 
its  height,  while  that  for  the  ascetic  had  not  yet  sensibly 
abated.  The  Hospitalers  were  monks  who,  to  their  monastic 
yows  of  poverty,  chastity,  and  obedience  or  humility,  added 
the  martial  obligations  of  knighthood ;  the  Templars  were 
knights  who  to  their  military  vows  added  those  of  the  monk. 
Thus  in  these  remarkable  orders  of  knight-monks  we  see 
incongruously  united  the  monastic  and  military  ideals,  two  of 
the  most  sharply  contrasted  conceptions  of  worthy  life  that  it 
\s  possible  to  find  in  the  whole  history  of  ethical  ideals. 

Defects  of  The  ideal  of  chivalry  had  serious  defects.  First,  the  mili- 
tary spirit,  borrowed  from  paganism,  which  the  ideal  apotheo- 
sized, was  in  absolute  opposition  to  the  spirit  of  Christianity, 
so  that  the  perfect  reconciliation  and  fusion  of  the  different 
moral  qualities  entering  into  the  ideal  was  impossible. 

Second,  from  feudalism,  with  its  sharply  defined  social 
classes,   the  ideal  received  an  aristocratic  stamp.     In  this 


the  ideal 


EUROPE  DURING  THE  AGE  OF  CHIVALRY     309 

respect  it  was  the  direct  opposite  of  the  monastic  ideal.  Any 
person,  freeman  or  slave,  king  or  peasant,  could  become  a 
monk,  and  by  following  the  more  excellent  way  gain  the 
homage  of  men  and  win  the  crown  of  sainthood.  But  the 
chivalric  ideal  was  one  to  which  no  plebeian  might  aspire. 
Only  a  person  of  noble  birth  could  become  a  knight.  This 
exclusive  aristocratic  character  of  the  ideal  constituted  one  of 
its  most  serious  defects.  Yet  in  spite  of  this  and  other  defects 
it  was  a  noble  and  attractive  ideal,  and  one  which  not  only 
left  a  deep  stamp  upon  medieval  history,  but  contributed 
precious  elements  to  the  ethical  heritage  which  the  modern 
world  received  from  the  Middle  Ages. 

III.  The  Chief  Moral  Phenomena  of  the  Period 

Just  as  the  moral  enthusiasm  awakened  by  the  monastic  influence  of 
ideal  gave  a  special  character  and  trend  to  much  of  the  his-  0f  chivalry 
tory  of  the  age  of  its  ascendancy,  —  inspiring  or  helping  to  ^twyof 
inspire  the  missionary  propaganda  among  the  barbarian  tribes  the  eP°ch 
of  Europe,  giving  birth  to  a  special  literature  (the  Lives  of 
the  Saints),  and  fostering  the  spirit  of  benevolence  and  self- 
renunciation, — so  did  the  unmeasured  enthusiasm  created  by 
the  chivalric  ideal  give  a  distinctive  character  to  much  of  the 
history  of  the  age  of  its  predominance  —  lending  a  romantic 
cast  to  the  Crusades,  creating  a  new  form  of  literature,  and 
giving  a  more  assured  place  in  the  growing  European  ideal 
of  character  to  several  attractive  traits  and  virtues.    Respect- 
ing each  of  these  matters  we  shall  offer  some  observations  in 
the  immediately  following  pages,  and  then  shall  proceed  to 
speak  briefly  of  some  reform  movements  which  belong  to  the 
general  moral  history  of  the  epoch  under  review. 


The  Crusades  of  the  eleventh  and  twelfth  centuries  against  chivalry 
the  Moslems  of  the  East,  in  so  far  as  those  enterprises  were  crusades 
inspired  by  moral  feeling,  —  and  religious-ethical  feeling  was 


3io 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


the  chief  motive  force  behind  them,  —  were  largely  the  trans- 
lation into  action  of  the  ideal  of  chivalry  now  commended 
and  consecrated  by  the  Church.  The  oath  of  the  Knights 
of  Malta,  who  were  a  perfect  incarnation  of  the  spirit 
of  chivalry,  was  "  to  make  eternal  war  upon  the  Turks  ;  to 
recognize  no  cessation  of  hostilities  with  the  infidel,  on  any 
pretext  whatsoever." 

It  is  an  amazing  change  that,  in  the  course  of  a  few  gen- 
erations, has  come  over  the  ethical  spirit  and  temper  of  the 
peoples  of  Christendom.  In  the  earlier  medieval  time  the 
best  conscience  of  the  age  was  embodied  in  the  monk-saints 
Augustine,  Columba,  Winfrid,  and  a  great  company  of  other 
unarmed  missionary  apostles  to  the  pagan  Celts  and  Ger- 
mans ;  in  this  later  time  the  best  conscience  of  the  age  is 
incarnated  in  the  armor-clad  warriors  Godfrey  of  Bouillon, 
Raymond,  Bohemond,  Tancred,  and  a  multitude  of  other 
knightly  leaders  of  the  hosts  of  Crusaders  who  go  forth  to 
redeem  with  blood  and  slaughter  the  tomb  of  their  martyred 
Lord. 


Romance 
literature 
as  an  ex- 
pression of 
the  ethical 
spirit  of 
the  age 


No  element  of  civilization  responds  more  quickly  to  the 
changing  ethical  ideal  of  a  people  than  its  literature.  The 
change  that  passed  over  the  popular  literature  of  Christendom 
in  the  transition  of  Europe  from  the  age  of  asceticism  to  the 
age  of  chivalry  is  finely  summarized  by  Lecky  in  these  words  : 
"  When  the  popular  imagination  [in  the  earlier  age]  embodied 
in  legends  its  conception  of  humanity  in  its  noblest  and  most 
attractive  form,  it  instinctively  painted  some  hermit-saint  of 
many  penances  and  many  miracles.  ...  In  the  romances  of 
Charlemagne  and  Arthur  we  may  trace  the  dawning  of  a  new 
type  of  greatness.  The  hero  of  the  imagination  of  Europe  is 
no  longer  the  hermit  but  a  knight."  l 

An  interesting  monument  of  this  new  species  of  litera- 
ture, in  what  we  may  view  as  a  transition  stage,  is  the  Gesta 


1  History  of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  ii,  p.  272. 


EUROPE  DURING  THE  AGE  OF  CHIVALRY  31 1 

Romanorum,1  a  collection  of  moral  stories  invented  by  the 
monks  in  their  idle  hours.  These  tales  are  a  curious  mixture 
of  things  Roman,  monastic,  and  knightly. 

But  for  a  true  expression  of  this  romance  literature  we  must 
turn  to  the  legends  of  the  Holy  Grail,  in  which  a  lofty  imagi- 
nation blends,  in  so  far  as  they  can  be  blended,  all  the  varied 
elements  of  the  knightly  ideal  in  a  consistent  whole.  No  age 
save  the  age  of  Christian  knighthood  could  have  produced 
this  wonderful  cycle  of  tales. 

But  it  is  neither  in  the  crusading  enterprises  nor  in  the  contribu- 

literary  products  of  the  age  of  chivalry  that  we  are  to  look  for  cSvairy  to 

the  real  historical  significance  of  the  ideal  of  chivalry.    Its  JieriSg^of 

chief  import  for  the  moral  evolution  of  the  European  nations  *he  Chris" 

.   m         *  r  tian  world 

lies  in  the  fact  that  it  helped  to  give  fuller  and  richer  content 
to  the  Christian  ideal  by  contributing  to  it,  or  by  giving  a 
surer  place  in  it,  certain  nontheological  virtues,  some  of 
which  the  Church  had  laid  little  emphasis  upon  or  had  entirely 
neglected. 

Thus  the  enthusiasm  for  the  ideal  of  chivalry,  like  the 
Church's  veneration  of  the  Holy  Virgin,2  tended  to  elevate 
and  refine  the  ideal  of  woman,  and  thus  to  counteract  certain 
tendencies  of  the  ascetic  ideal.  It  helped  to  give  a  high  valu- 
ation to  the  moral  qualities  of  loyalty,  truthfulness,  magna- 
nimity, self-reliance,  and  courtesy.  We  designate  these 
attractive  traits  of  character  as  chivalrous  virtues  for  the 

1  First  printed  in  1873,  from  MSS.  compiled  probably  as  early  as  the 
twelfth  or  thirteenth  century.  There  is  an  English  translation  by  Charles 
Swan  (1877). 

2  w  There  can  be  little  doubt,"  says  Lecky,  "  that  the  Catholic  reverence 
for  the  Virgin  has  done  much  to  elevate  and  purify  the  ideal  of  woman  and 
soften  the  manners  of  men  "  {History  of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  ii, 
p.  367).  And  so  Professor  Nathaniel  Schmidt:  "The  chivalry  of  the  medi- 
eval knight  from  which  our  modern  treatment  of  woman  so  largely  is  de- 
rived cannot  be  regarded  as  solely  a  product  of  Christianity,  for  it  has  a 
deep  root  in  the  dreamy  reverence  for  woman  characteristic  of  our  pagan 
ancestors.  Yet  it  would  not  have  become  what  it  was  but  for  the  venera- 
tion accorded  to  the  Virgin  Mary"  {The  Prophet  of  Nazareth  (1905),  p.  324). 


312  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

reason  that  we  recognize  that  knighthood  made  precious  con- 
tributions to  these  elements  of  the  moral  inheritance  which 
the  modern  received  from  the  medieval  world. 

Restrictions  Very  closely  connected  ethically  and  historically  with  chiv- 
of  private  airy  is  the  movement  during  the  later  medieval  time  for  the 
Truce  of  Sod  abolition  of  the  right  of  private  war.1  In  the  tenth  century,  as 
feudalism  developed  and  the  military  spirit  of  knighthood 
came  more  and  more  to  dominate  society,  the  right  of  wag- 
ing war,  with  which  privilege  every  feudal  lord  of  high  rank 
was  invested,  resulted  in  a  state  of  intolerable  anarchy  in  all 
those  lands  where  the  feudal  system  had  become  established. 
Respecting  this  right,  claimed  and  exercised  by  the  feudal 
prince,  of  waging  war  against  any  and  every  other  chieftain, 
even  though  this  one  were  a  member  of  the  same  state  as  that 
to  which  he  himself  belonged,  there  was  in  these  medieval 
centuries  precisely  the  same  moral  feeling,  or  rather  lack  of 
moral  feeling,  that  exists  to-day  in  regard  to  the  fight  claimed 
and  exercised  by  the  different  independent  nations  of  waging 
war  against  one  another. 

As  a  result  of  this  practice  of  private  war,  Europe  reverted 
to  a  condition  of  primitive  barbarism.  Every  land  was  filled 
with  fightings  and  violence.  "  Every  hill,"  as  one  pictures  it, 
V  was  a  stronghold,  every  plain  a  battlefield.  The  trader  was 
robbed  on  the  highway,  the  peasant  was  killed  at  his  plow, 
the  priest  was  slain  at  the  altar.  Neighbor  fought  against 
neighbor,  baron  against  baron,  city  against  city." 

In  the  midst  of  this  universal  anarchy  the  Church  lifted  a 
protesting  voice.  Toward  the  end  of  the  tenth  century  there 
was  started  in  France  a  movement  which  aimed  at  the  com- 
plete abolition  of  private  war.  The  Church  aspired  to  do 
what  had  been  done  by  pagan  Rome.  It  proclaimed  what  was 
called  the  Peace  of  God.    It  commanded  all  men  everywhere 

1  See  Curtis  M.  Geer,  The  Beginning  of  the  Peace  Movement  (191 2). 


EUROPE  DURING  THE  AGE  OF  CHIVALRY     313 

to  refrain  from  fighting  and  robbery  and  violence  of  every 
kind  as  contrary  to  the  spirit  and  teachings  of  Christianity. 

But  it  was  found  utterly  impossible  to  make  the  great  feu- 
dal barons  refrain  from  fighting  one  another  even  though 
they  were  threatened  with  the  eternal  torments  of  hell.  They 
were  just  as  unwilling  to  surrender  this  highly  prized  privi- 
lege and  right  of  waging  private  war  as  the  nations  of  to-day 
are  to  surrender  their  prized  privilege  and  right  to  wage 
public  war. 

Then  the  leaders  of  the  clergy  of  France,  seeing  that  they 
could  not  suppress  the  evil  entirely,  resolved  to  attempt  to 
regulate  it.  This  led  to  the  proclamation  of  what  was  called 
the  Truce  of  God.  The  first  certain  trace  of  this  movement 
dates  from  the  year  1041  *  In  that  year  the  abbot  of  the  mon- 
astery of  Cluny  and  the  other  French  abbots  and  bishops 
issued  an  edict  commanding  all  men  to  maintain  a  holy  and 
unbroken  peace  during  four  days  of  every  week,  from  Wed- 
nesday evening  till  Monday  morning.2  Every  man  was  re- 
quired to  take  an  oath  to  observe  this  Truce  of  God.  The 
oath  was  renewed  every  three  years,  and  was  administered  to 
boys  on  their  reaching  their  twelfth  year. 

This  movement  to  redeem  at  least  a  part  of  the  days  from 
fighting  and  violence  came  gradually  to  embrace  all  the  coun- 
tries of  Western  Europe.  The  details  of  the  various  edicts 
issued  by  Church  councils  and  popes  vary  greatly,  but  all 
embody  the  principle  of  the  edict  of  1041.  Holy  days,  and 
especially  consecrated  periods,  as  Easter  time  and  Christmas 
week,  came  to  be  covered  by  the  Truce.  The  Council  of  Cler- 
mont, which  inaugurated  the  First  Crusade,  extended  greatly 
the  terms  of  the  Truce,  forbidding  absolutely  private  wars 
while  the  Crusade  lasted,  and  placing  under  the  aegis  of  the 
Church  the  person  and  property  of  every  crusader. 

1  Kluckhohn,  Geschichte  des  Gottesfriedens  (1857),  p.  38. 

2  This  part  of  the  week  was  chosen  because  these  days  had  been  con- 
secrated by  Christ's  passion,  burial,  resurrection,  and  ascension. 


314 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


Progress  in 
the  ethics 
of  war: 
sale  into 
slavery  of 
Christian 
captives 
condemned 


The  Truce  of  God  was  never  well  observed,  yet  it  did 
something  during  the  eleventh  and  twelfth  centuries  to  miti- 
gate the  evils  of  private  war  and  to  render  life  more  secure 
and  tolerable.  After  the  twelfth  century  the  kings  of  Europe, 
who  were  now  strengthening  their  authority  and  consolidating 
their  dominions,  took  the  place  of  the  Church  in  maintaining 
peace  among  their  feudal  vassals.  They  came  to  regard  them- 
selves as  responsible  for  the  "  peace  of  the  land,"  which  phrase 
now  superseded  those  of  the  "  Peace  of  God  "  and  the  "  Truce 
of  God."  Thus  the  movement  to  which  moral  forces  had  given 
the  first  impulse  was  carried  to  its  consummation  by  political 
motives.  To  the  Church,  however,  history  will  ever  accord 
the  honor  of  having  begun  this  great  reform  which  enforced 
peace  upon  the  members  of  the  same  state,  and  which  has 
made  private  wars  in  civilized  lands  a  thing  of  the  past. 

The  abolition  of  private  warfare  was  the  first  decisive  step 
marking  the  advance  of  Europe  toward  universal  peace. 
Public  war,  that  is,  war  between  nations,  is  still  an  established 
and  approved  institution  of  international  law  ;  but  in  the  moral 
evolution  of  humanity  a  time  approaches  when  public  war 
shall  also,  like  private  war,  be  placed  under  the  ban  of  civili- 
zation, and  will  have  passed  upon  it  by  the  truer  conscience 
of  that  better  age  the  same  judgment  that  the  conscience  of 
to-day  pronounces  on  that  private  warfare  upon  which  the 
Truce  of  God  laid  the  first  arresting  hand. 

Although  the  Church  has  done  little  in  a  direct  way  to 
abolish  public  war,  or  even  directly  to  create  in  society  at 
large  a  new  conscience  in  regard  to  the  wickedness  of  war  in 
itself  as  an  established  method  of  settling  international  dif- 
ferences, its  influence  has  been  felt  from  early  Christian  times 
in  the  alleviation  of  its  barbarities  and  cruelties.  One  of  the 
first  ameliorations  in  the  rules  of  war  effected  through  Chris- 
tian influence  concerned  the  treatment  of  war  captives. 

Among  the  ancient  Greeks,  as  we  have  seen,  under  the  in- 
fluence of  the  sentiment  of  Panhellenism,  there  was  developed 


EUROPE  DURING  THE  AGE  OF  CHIVALRY  31 5 

a  vague  feeling  that  Greeks  should  not  enslave  Greeks. 
But  aside  from  this  Panhellenic  sentiment,  which  had  very 
little  influence  upon  actual  practice,  there  was  in  the  pre- 
Christian  period  seemingly  little  or  no  moral  feeling  on  the 
subject,  and  the  custom  of  reducing  prisoners  of  war  to 
slavery  was  practically  universal. 

But  the  custom,  in  so  far  as  it  concerned  Christian  pris- 
oners, was  condemned  by  the  Christian  conscience  as  incom- 
patible with  the  spirit  of  Christianity,  and  the  rule  was 
established  that  such  captives  should  not  be  enslaved.1  We 
observe  the  first  clear  workings  of  this  new  war  conscience 
in  Britain  after  the  conversion  of  the  Saxon  invaders.  The 
Celts  of  Britain  were  Christians,  and  the  Saxons,  after  they 
themselves  had  been  won  over  to  Christianity,  ceased  to  sell 
into  slavery  their  Celtic  captives.  Gradually  this  new  rule  was 
adopted  by  all  Christian  nations.  No  other  advance  of  equal 
importance  marks  the  moral  history  of  public  war  during  the 
medieval  period. 

This  humane  rule,  however,  did  not,  as  we  have  intimated, 
embrace  non-Christians.  Our  word  "  slave"  bears  witness  to 
this  fact.  This  term  came  to  designate  a  person  in  servitude 
from  the  circumstance  that  up  to  the  eleventh  century,  which 
saw  the  evangelization  of  Russia,  the  slave  class  in  Europe 
was  made  up  largely  of  Slavs,  who,  as  pagans,  were  without 
scruple  reduced  to  slavery  by  their  Christian  captors. 

But  the  earlier  rights  which  the  immemorial  laws  of  war 
conferred  upon  the  captor  were  not  wholly  annulled  in  the 
case  of  Christian  captives.  The  practice  of  holding  for  ran- 
som took  the  place  of  sale  into  slavery.  This  custom  prevailed 
throughout  the  feudal  period,  but  gradually  during  the  seven- 
teenth and  eighteenth  centuries  this  practice  finally  yielded 
to  the  more  humanitarian  custom  of  exchange  of  prisoners.2 

1  Hobhouse,  Morals  in  Evolution  (1906),  vol.  i,  p.  314. 

2  The  last  instance  of  an  arrangement  for  ransom  of  prisoners  was  an 
agreement  between  England  and  France  in  1780.  See  Hall,  International 
Law,  5th  ed.,  p.  414,  n.  1. 


316  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

Thus  in  this  department  of  ethics  there  is  to  be  traced  a 
gradual  humanization  of  the  code,  which,  beginning  in  sav- 
agery with  gross  cannibalism  and  torture,  advances  through 
killing  in  cold  blood,  sale  into  slavery,  and  holding  for  ransom, 
to  equal  exchange. 

Morality  in  During  the  age  of  chivalry  the  ideal  of  the  knight  over- 

teries:      "  shadowed  the  ideal  of  the  monk.   Nevertheless  throughout  the 

Sflcancfof  wn°le  period  the  monastic  ideal  inspired  a  great  deal  of  moral 

!Jeise^  enthusiasm.    The  founding  and  endowment  of  monasteries 

the  Mendi-  ° 

cant  orders  divided  with  the  equipping  of  knightly  expeditions  for  the  Cru- 
sades the  zeal  and  efforts  and  sacrifices  of  the  European  peoples. 

In  the  old  orders  of  monks,  however,  zeal  for  the  ascetic 
ideal  would  often  grow  cold,  and  the  high  moral  standard  of 
the  earlier  time  would  be  lowered.  Then  some  select  soul, 
set  aflame  by  a  fresh  vision  of  the  ideal,  would  draw  together 
a  group  of  devoted  followers,  and  thus  would  come  into  ex- 
istence a  new  order  of  monks,  among  whom  the  flame  of  a 
holy  enthusiasm  would  burn  brightly  for  a  time.1 

Among  the  numerous  new  orders  called  into  existence  by 
these  reform  movements  there  were  two  which,  in  the  ideal 
of  duty  which  they  followed,  stand  quite  apart  from  the  ordi- 
nary monastic  orders.  This  new  ideal  had  its  incarnation  in 
St.  Francis2  and  St.  Dominic,  the  founders  respectively  of 
the  Franciscan  and  the  Dominican  order  of  friars. 

In  this  new  conception  of  what  constitutes  the  worthiest  and 
most  meritorious  life,  the  quietistic  virtues  of  the  earlier  ascetic 
ideal,  which  had  developed  during  the  period  of  terror  and 
suffering  which  followed  the  subversion  of  classical  civilization 
by  the  northern  barbarians,  gave  place  to  the  active,  benevo- 
lent virtues.    In  the  earlier  monastic  movement  there  was  a 

1  One  center  of  these  reform  movements  was  the  celebrated  French 
monastery  of  Cluny.  The  influences  which  radiated  from  the  cloisters  of 
this  convent  had  a  profound  effect  for  centuries  upon  the  moral  life  of 
Christendom. 

2  See  Sabatier,  Life  of  St.  Francis  of  Assist. 


EUROPE  DURING  THE  AGE  OF  CHIVALRY     317 

self -regarding  element.  The  monk  fled  from  the  world  in 
order  to  make  sure  of  his  own  salvation.  The  world  was  left 
to  care  for  itself.  In  the  new  orders,  the  brother,  in  imitation 
of  the  Master  who  went  about  among  men  teaching  and  heal- 
ing, left  the  cloister  and  went  out  into  the  world  to  rescue 
and  save  others.  In  its  lofty  call  to  absolute  self-forgetfulness 
and  complete  consecration  to  the  service  of  humanity,  the 
early  ideal  of  the  Mendicants  was  one  of  the  noblest  and 
most  attractive  that  had  grown  up  under  Christian  influence. 
The  loftiness  of  the  ideal  attracted  the  select  spirits  of  the 
age  —  for  noble  souls  love  self-sacrifice.  "Whenever  in  the 
thirteenth  century,"  says  the  historian  Lea,  "we  find  a  man 
towering  above  his  fellows,  we  are  almost  sure  to  trace  him 
to  one  of  the  Mendicant  Orders."  * 

It  is  in  the  exaltation  of  this  virtue  of  self-renunciation 
that  we  find  one  of  the  chief  services  rendered  by  the  Mendi- 
cant Orders,  especially  by  the  Franciscan,  to  European  moral- 
ity. Just  as  the  early  monks,  through  the  emphasis  laid  on 
the  virtue  of  chastity,  made  a  needed  protest  against  the 
sensuality  of  a  senile  and  decadent  civilization,  so  did  the 
friars,  through  the  stress  laid  on  the  virtue  of  self-denial  for 
others,  make  a  needed  protest  against  the  selfishness  and 
hardness  of  an  age  that  seemed  to  have  forgotten  the  claims 
of  the  poor  and  the  lowly.2  It  can  hardly  be  made  a  matter 
of  reasonable  doubt  that  the  slowly  growing  fund  of  altruistic 
feeling  in  Christendom  was  greatly  enriched  by  the  self- 
devoted  lives  and  labors  of  the  followers  of  Saints  Francis 
and  Dominic. 

But  the  value  of  the  ideal  of  the  friars  as  an  ethical 
force  in  the  evolution  of  European  civilization  was  seriously 

1  History  of  the  Inquisition  (1887),  vol.  i,  p.  266. 

2  "  There  was  need  of  the  exaggeration  of  self-sacrifice  taught  by  Francis 
to  recall  humanity  to  a  sense  of  its  obligations.  .  .  .  The  value  of  such  an 
ideal  on  an  age  hard  and  cruel  can  scarce  be  exaggerated"  (Lea,  History 
of  the  Inquisition  (1887),  vol.  i,  pp.  260  f.).  See  also  Nathaniel  Schmidt, 
The  Prophet  of  Nazareth  (1905),  p.  325. 


318  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

impaired  by  certain  theological  elements  it  contained.  It  was 
an  ideal  in  which,  as  in  the  ordinary  monastic  ideal,  the  duty 
of  correct  opinion  came  to  be  exalted  above  all  others.  The 
ethics  of  belief  took  precedence  of  the  ethics  of  service.  Thus 
the  friars,  particularly  the  Dominicans,  through  their  zeal  for 
orthodoxy,  fostered  the  grave  moral  fault  of  intolerance.  The 
growth  of  this  conception  of  Christian  duty,  concurring  with 
other  causes  of  which  we  shall  speak  in  the  next  chapter, 
ushered  in  the  age  of  the  Inquisition. 

The  ethics  The  ethical  history  of  the  friars  or  the  preaching  orders 
ticfsm°laS"  mingles  with  the  ethical  history  of  Scholasticism.  The  ethics 
of  the  Schoolmen  was  a  syncretism  of  two  moral  systems,  the 
pagan-classical  or  Aristotelian  and  the  Christian.  With  the 
four  classical  virtues  of  wisdom,  prudence,  temperance,  and 
justice  were  combined  the  three  Christian  virtues  of  faith, 
hope,  and  love.  But  these  two  moral  types,  the  classical  and 
the  theological,  each  being  taken  in  its  entirety,  were  mutu- 
ally inconsistent  ideals  of  virtue.  The  pagan  code  was  a 
morality  based  on  the  autonomy  of  the  individual  reason ; 
the  Church  code  was  based  on  an  external  authority.  The 
one  was  inner  and  natural,  the  other  outer  and  supernatural. 
The  scholastic  system  was  thus  an  incongruous  combination 
of  naturalism  and  supernaturalism  in  ethics,  of  native  virtues 
and  "  virtues  of  grace."  This  dualism  is  the  essential  fact  in 
the  history  of  the  ethics  of  Scholasticism. 

As  it  was  the  great  effort  of  the  Schoolmen  in  the  domain 
of  dogma  to  justify  the  doctrines  of  the  Church,  to  show  their 
reasonableness  and  consistency,  so  was  it  their  great  effort 
in  the  domain  of  ethics  to  justify  the  Church's  composite 
moral  ideal,  to  show  all  its  duties  and  virtues  to  form  a 
reasonable  and  consistent  system.  .  The  best  representative 
of  this  effort  of  reconciliation  was  the  great  Schoolman 
Thomas  Aquinas.  But  a  perfect  fusion  of  the  diverse  ele- 
ments was  impossible.  There  were  ever  striving  in  the  system 


EUROPE  DURING  THE  AGE  OF  CHIVALRY     319 

two  spirits  —  the  spirit  of  Greek  naturalism  and  the  spirit  of 
Hebrew-Christian  supernaturalism. 

But  there  was  another  line  of  cleavage  in  the  system  which 
was  still  more  fateful  in  its  historical  consequences  than  the 
cleavage  between  the  Aristotelian  and  the  Church  morality. 
This  cleavage  was  created  by  the  twofold  ethics  of  the  Church, 
for  the  ecclesiastical  morality,  considered  apart  from  the  Aris- 
totelian element,  was  itself  made  up  of  two  mutually  incon- 
sistent ethics,  namely,  Gospel  ethics  and  Augustinian  ethics.1 
The  saving  virtue  of  the  first  was  loving,  self-abnegating 
service ;  the  saving  virtue  of  the  second  was  faith,  which 
was  practically  defined  as  "  the  acceptance  as  true  of  the 
dogma  of  the  Trinity  and  the  main  articles  of  the  creed." 
Such  was  the  emphasis  laid  by  certain  of  the  Schoolmen 
upon  the  metaphysical  side  of  this  dual  system  that  there 
was  in  their  ethics  more  of  the  mind  of  Augustine  than  of 
the  mind  of  Christ.  This  making  of  an  external  authority 
the  basis  of  morality,  this  emphasizing  of  the  theological 
virtues,  especially  the  virtue  of  right  belief,  had  two  results 
of  incalculable  consequences  for  the  moral  evolution  in  Chris- 
tendom. First,  it  led  naturally  and  inevitably  to  that  system 
of  casuistry  2  which  was  one  of  the  most  striking  phenomena 
of  the  moral  history  of  the  later  medieval  and  earlier  modern 
centuries  ;  and  second,  it  laid  the  basis  of  the  tribunal  of  the 
Inquisition.  Thus  does  the  theological  ethics  of  Scholasti- 
cism stand  in  intimate  and  significant  relation  to  these  two 
important  matters  in  the  moral  history  of  Europe. 

1  See  above,  p.  262. 

2  H  Ethics  on  the  basis  of  authority  becomes  a  mere  legal  casuistry."  — 
Hall,  The  History  of  Ethics  within  Organized  Christianity  (1910),  pp.  296, 
326. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

RENAISSANCE  ETHICS  :    REVIVAL  OF  NATURALISM  IN 

MORALS 

I.  Determining  Influences 


The  Renais- 
sance: the 
new  intel- 
lectual life 


Toward  the  close  of  the  medieval  ages  came  that  impor- 
tant movement  in  European  society  known  as  the  Renais- 
sance, a  main  feature  of  which  was  the  restoration  of  classical 
culture.  Since  the  incoming  of  the  northern  barbarians  with 
their  racial  traits  and  martial  moral  code  there  had  been  no 
such  modifying  force  brought  to  bear  upon  the  moral  evolu- 
tion of  the  European  peoples,  nor  was  there  to  appear  a 
greater  till  the  rise  of  modern  evolutionary  science. 

The  Renaissance  exerted  its  transforming  influence  on  the 
moral  life  of  the  West  chiefly  through  the  new  intellectual 
life  it  awakened  by  bringing  the  European  mind  in  vital  con- 
tact with  the  culture  of  the  ancient  world ;  for  intellectual 
progress  means  normally  moral  progress.  Hence  as  the 
Renaissance  meant  a  new  birth  of  the  European  intellect,  so 
did  it  mean  also  a  new  birth  of  the  European  conscience. 
Just  as  the  conscience  of  the  medieval  age  had  its  genesis  in 
the  new  religion  which  superseded  the  paganism  of  the  an- 
cient world,  so  did  the  common  conscience  of  to-day  have  its 
genesis  in  the  new  science,  the  new  culture,  which  in  the 
Renaissance  superseded  medieval  ideas  and  theological  modes 
of  thought.  A  chief  part  of  our  remaining  task  will  be  to 
make  plain  how  the  new  intellectual  life  born  in  the  revival 
of  the  fifteenth  century,  and  expressing  itself  since  in  every 
department  of  human  life,  thought,  and  activity,  has  reacted 
upon  the  moral  feelings  and  judgments  of  men  and  taught 

320 


RENAISSANCE  ETHICS  321 

them  to  seek  the  ultimate  sanctions  of  a  true  morality  in  the 
deep  universal  intuitions  of  the  human  heart  and  conscience. 

Running  parallel  throughout  the  later  medieval  time  with  The  decay 
the  classical  revival,   whose   significance  was  so  great  for  umud 
European  morality,  there  was  going  on  a  political  and  social  monarchy: 
revolution  which  exerted  an  influence  on  the  ethical  evolution  court  life 
only  less  potent  and  far-reaching  than  that  of  the  intellectual 
movement.    During  this  period  the  petty  feudal  states  in  the 
different  countries  of  Europe  were  being  gathered  up  into 
larger  political  units.    The  principle  of  monarchy  was  every- 
where triumphing  over  that  of  feudalism.    The  multitude  of 
feudal  castles,  in  which  had  been  cradled  the  knightly  ideal 
of  manhood,  were  replaced  by  the  palaces  and  courts  of  rich 
princes  and  powerful  kings.    This  meant  a  great  change  in 
the  social  and  political  environment  of  the  higher  classes. 

In  the  first  place,  in  these  later  courts  there  was  a  brilliancy 
of  life,  a  culture  and  a  refinement  rarely  found  in  the  earlier 
feudal  castles.  In  the  next  place,  the  relation  which  every  mem- 
ber of  the  court  sustained  to  the  prince  or  sovereign  was  funda- 
mentally different  from  that  which  the  vassal  had  sustained  to 
his  lord  under  the  feudal  regime.  This  relation,  it  is  true,  was 
still  a  personal  one  ;  but  independence  was  gone,  and  with 
this  were  gone  the  pride  and  self-sufficiency  which  it  engen- 
dered.   In  these  princely  courts  the  knight  became  a  courtier. 

The  effect  of  these  changes  in  surroundings  and  relation- 
ships upon  the  standard  of  conduct  was  profound,  as  we 
shall  see  when,  a  little  farther  on,  we  come  to  inquire  what 
were  the  ethical  feelings  and  judgments  awakened  in  this 
new  environment. 

Three  institutions — the  monastery,  the  castle,  and  the  town  The  growth 

—  dominated  successively  the  life  of  the  Middle  Ages.    Each  towns:  the 

developed  a  distinct  ethical  ideal.    The  monastery  cradled  the  JSaSS9 

conscience  of  the  monk  ;   the  castle,  the  conscience  of  the  ""J***  asx 

'  molders  of 

knight ;  and  the  town,  the  conscience  of  the  burgher.  morals 


322 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


What  particular  virtues  were  approved  by  the  moral  sense  of 
the  town  dweller  we  shall  note  a  little  farther  on.  We  here 
merely  observe  that  in  the  atmosphere  of  the  town,  in  the 
relationships  of  the  workshop  and  the  market,  were  nourished 
the  lowly  lay  virtues  of  the  artisan  and  the  trader,  virtues 
which,  though  disesteemed  by  classical  antiquity,  regarded 
as  of  subordinate  worth  by  the  monk,  and  held  in  positive 
contempt  by  the  knight,  were  yet  to  constitute  the  heart  and 
core  of  the  ethical  ideal  of  the  modern  world. 


Revival  of 
the  classical 
conception 
of  life:  the 
new  birth 
of  the 
European 
conscience 


II.  Some    Essential    Facts    in    the    Moral    History 
of  the  Age 

When  Christianity  entered  the  Greco-Roman  world  with 
its  new  moral  ideal,  the  old  classical  ideal  of  character,  as  we 
have  seen,  was  practically  superseded.  There  were,  it  is  true, 
certain  elements  of  this  pagan  morality  which  were  con- 
sciously or  unconsciously  absorbed  by  Christianity ;  but  the 
classical  ideal  as  a  whole  was  rejected,  just  as  the  greater  part 
of  the  cultural  elements  of  Greco-Roman  civilization  were  cast 
aside.  For  a  thousand  years  Hebrew- Christian  conceptions 
of  the  world  and  of  life  shaped  the  thought  and  conduct  of 
men.    Then  came  the  Renaissance.1 

In  the  study  of  this  movement  the  attention  of  the  histo- 
rian has  ordinarily  been  centered  on  the  literary,  artistic,  and 
intellectual  phases  of  the  revival,  while  the  ethical  phase  has 
been  given  but  slight  attention  or  has  been  dismissed  with 
the  facile  observation  that  the  movement  induced  a  revival 
of  pagan  immorality.  This  is  true.  But  the  really  significant 
thing  was  not  the  revival  of  pagan  immorality  but  the  revival 
of  pagan  morality.    For  just  as  this  classical  revival  meant  a 

1  "  But  meanwhile  by  alternations  of  Hebraism  and  Hellenism,  of  a  man's 
intellectual  and  moral  impulses,  of  the  effort  to  see  things  as  they  really  are, 
and  the  effort  to  win  peace  by  self-conquest,  the  human  spirit  proceeds ; 
and  each  of  these  two  forces  has  its  appointed  hours  of  culmination  and 
seasons  of  rule." —  Matthew  Arnold,  Culture  and  Anarchy  (1875),  P-  x43- 


RENAISSANCE  ETHICS  323 

new  enthusiasm  for  the  artistic,  literary,  and  cultural  elements 
of  the  earlier  Greco- Roman  civilization,  so  did  it  also  mean 
a  new  enthusiasm  for  the  Greco-Roman  ideal  of  character. 
To  many  it  was  no  longer  the  Church  ideal  but  the  classical 
that  seemed  the  embodiment  of  what  is  ethically  most  noble 
and  worthy.  Such  persons  gave  up  the  practice  of  the  dis- 
tinctively Christian  theological  virtues,  or,  if  they  still  out- 
wardly observed  the  Church  code,  this  was  merely  insincere 
conformity  suggested  by  prudence  or  policy ;  the  code  of 
morals  which  their  minds  and  hearts  approved  and  which  they 
observed,  if  they  observed  any  at  all,  was  the  code  of  pagan 
antiquity.  It  is  in  this  secularization  of  the  ethical  ideal,  in 
this  divorce  of  morality  from  theology,  in  this  announcement 
of  the  freedom  and  autonomy  of  the  individual  spirit,  that  is 
to  be  sought  the  real  significance  of  the  classical  revival  of 
the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries  for  the  moral  history 
of  the  Western  world. 

In  two  ways  chiefly  did  the  Renaissance  exert  its  trans- 
forming influence  upon  European  morals  :  first,  by  awak- 
ening a  new  intellectual  life,  for,  as  we  have  had  repeatedly 
shown  us,  a  new  mental  life  means  a  new  moral  life ;  and 
second,  by  the  direct  introduction  of  various  elements  of 
Greco-Roman  morals  into  the  Christian  ideal  of  character. 
Thus  at  the  same  time  that  the  cultural  life  of  Europe  was 
being  enlarged  and  enriched  by  the  incorporation  of  those 
literary  and  art  elements  of  classical  civilization  which  had 
been  rejected  or  underestimated  by  the  Middle  Ages,  the  moral 
life  of  Christendom  was  being  profoundly  modified  by  the  in- 
corporation of  those  ethical  elements  which  constituted  the 
precious  product  of  the  moral  aspirations  and  achievements  of 
the  best  generations  of  the  ancient  world.  The  conscience 
of  those  persons  in  the  modern  world  who  are  imbued  with 
the  true  scientific  spirit,  that  is  to  say,  with  the  humanistic 
spirit  of  the  Renaissance,  is  quite  as  largely  Greek  as  Hebraic. 
A  recent  writer  reviewing  the  life  of  a  distinguished  personage 


324  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

(Julia  Ward  Howe)  recognized  this  mingling  in  modern  cul- 
ture of  these  diverse  elements  in  these  words :  "  She  has 
blended  and  lived,  as  no  other  eminent  American  woman, 
the  humanistic  and  the  Christian  ideals  of  life.  She  has 
preached  love  and  self-sacrifice,  and  she  has  loved  beauty 
and  self-realization." 

Theological       In  the  domain  of  theological  morality  the  history  of  the 
Serethicsof  Renaissance  affords  one  of  the  most  painful  chapters  in 
persecution   frur0pean  history.  This  chapter  has  to  do  with  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Inquisition  to  maintain  uniformity  of  religious 
belief. 

It  is  not  an  accident  that  this  chapter  should  form  an  inte- 
gral part  of  the  history  of  the  Renaissance.  The  spread  of 
heresy,  which  threatened  the  unity  of  the  medieval  Church, 
was  largely  the  outgrowth  of  the  new  intellectual  life  awakened 
by  the  revival  of  learning.1  Hence  it  was  inevitable  that  the 
age  of  the  Renaissance  should  be  also  the  age  of  persecution. 
It  is  not  a  recital  of  the  history  of  the  Holy  Office  during 
the  period  under  review  which  is  our  concern  in  this  place, 
but  only  a  consideration  of  the  motives  of  Christian  perse- 
cution. That  intolerance  should  ever  have  been  regarded 
by  the  followers  of  the  tolerant  Nazarene  as  a  virtue  and 
persecution  of  misbelievers  as  a  pious  duty,  challenges 
the  attention  of  the  historian  of  morals  and  incites  earnest 
inquiry  into  the  causes  of  such  an  aberration  of  the  moral 
sentiment. 

It  cannot  be  made  a  matter  of  reasonable  doubt  that  one 
of  the  chief  causes  of  Christian  intolerance  is  the  theological 
doctrine  that  salvation  is  dependent  upon  right  belief  in  re- 
ligious matters,  and  that  error  in  belief,  even  though  honest, 
is  a  crime  that  merits  and  receives  eternal  punishment.2  This 

1  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  spirit  of  the  Renaissance  was  at 
work  long  before  the  Renaissance. 

2  In  this  there  is  substantial  agreement  among  historians  of  the  Inqui- 
sition:   consult  Lea,    The  Inquisition  of  the  Middle  Ages  (1887),  vol.  i, 


RENAISSANCE  ETHICS  3^5 

dogma  leads  logically  and  inevitably  to  intolerance  and  perse- 
cution ; 1  for  if  wrong  belief  is  a  crime  of  so  heinous  a  nature 
as  justly  to  subject  the  misbeliever  to  everlasting  and  horrible 
torments,  and  if  the  misbeliever  is  likely  to  bring  others  into 
the  same  fatal  way  of  thinking,  then  it  follows  that  heresy 
should  be  extirpated,  just  as  the  germs  of  a  dreaded  contagion 
are  stamped  out,  by  any  and  every  means  however  seemingly 
harsh  and  cruel.  Thus  St.  Thomas  Aquinas  and  other  theo- 
logians logically  "argued  that  if  the  death  penalty  could  be 
rightly  inflicted  on  thieves  and  forgers,  who  rob  us  only  of 
worldly  goods,  how  much  more  righteously  on  those  who  cheat 
us  out  of  supernatural  goods  —  out  of  faith,  the  sacraments, 
the  life  of  the  soul."2 

It  was  this  theological  teaching  that  heresy  is  a  fault  of 
unmeasured  sinfulness,  an  "insidious  preventable  contagion," 
which  was  the  main  root  that  fostered  Christian  intolerance 
and  persecution.3  The  activities  of  the  Holy  Office  were  main- 
tained not  by  bad  men  but  by  good  men.  "  With  such  men 
it  was  not  hope  of  gain,  or  lust  of  blood,  or  pride  of  opinion, 
or  wanton  exercise  of  power  [that  moved  them],  but  sense 
of  duty,  and  they  but  represented  what  was  universal  public 
opinion  from  the  thirteenth  to  the  seventeenth  century."  4 


pp.  236  ff. ;  Lecky,  History  of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  i,  pp.  98,  395  f. ; 
Pollock,  Essays  in  Jurisprudence  and  Ethics  (1882),  essay  vi,  "The  Theory 
of  Persecution  " ;   Catholic  Encyclopedia,  vol.  viii,  article  on  "  Inquisition." 

1  M  The  case  for  theological  persecution  is  unanswerable  if  we  admit  the 
fundamental  supposition  that  one  faith  is  known  to  be  true  and  necessary 
for  salvation."  —  Pollock,  Essays  in  Jurisprudence  and  Ethics  (1882),  p.  155. 

2  Catholic  Encyclopedia,  vol.  viii,  under  *  Inquisition." 

3  Besides  the  doctrine  of  the  criminality  of  misbelief,  Lecky  finds  a 
secondary  cause  of  Christian  persecution  in  the  medieval  teaching  re- 
specting hell.  That  vision  of  the  awful  and  eternal  torments  prepared 
for  misbelievers,  he  says,  "  chilled  and  deadened  the  sympathies  and  pre- 
disposed men  to  inflict  suffering"  {Rationalism  in  Europe,  new  ed.  (1890), 
vol.  i,  p.  347). 

4  Lea,  History  of  the  Inquisition  in  the  Middle  Ages  (1887),  vol.  i,  p.  234. 
"  The  representatives  of  the  Church  were  children  of  their  own  age.  .  .  . 
Theologians  and  canonists,  the  highest  and  the  saintliest,  stood  by  the  code 


326 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


Reflecting  on  these  facts,  we  readily  give  assent  to  the 
charitable  judgment  of  the  historian  Von  Hoist  in  comment- 
ing on  the  acts  of  the  Terrorists  in  the  French  Revolution, 
that  "  wrongdoing  to  others  lies  not  so  much  in  the  will  as 
in  the  understanding."  The  greatest  crime  of  history  was 
committed  by  men  who  knew  not  what  they  did.1  It  was  a 
theological  doctrine  which  is  to-day  rejected  by  the  reason 
and  conscience  of  a  large  section  of  the  Church  itself,  that 
caused  the  loss  for  centuries  of  the  virtue  of  toleration,  which 
in  the  ethical  systems  of  the  classical  world  had  been  assigned 
a  prominent  place  among  the  virtues,  and  which,  could  it  have 
found  a  place  in  the  standard  of  goodness  of  the  Church, 
would  have  saved  Christendom  the  horrors  of  the  Albigensian 
crusades,  the  pious  cruelties  of  the  Inquisition,  and  the  mutual 
persecutions  of  Catholics  and  Protestants  throughout  the  age 
of  the  Reformation. 


Political 
morality: 
Machiavel- 
lian ethics 


The  matter  of  dominant  importance  in  the  sphere  of  polit- 
ical morality  during  the  Renaissance  was  the  creation  of  a 
code  of  morals  for  princes.  This  was  a  system  formulated 
by  the  Italian  philosopher  Machiavelli,  who  wrote  under  the 
secularizing  influences  of  the  classical  revival  and  of  the  pagan- 
ized courts  of  the  Italian  princes  of  his  time.2  It  was  a  code 
which  the  ruling  class,  for  whom  it  was  designed,  eagerly 
adopted,  for  the  reason  that  it  harmonized  with  their  desires, 
ambitions,  and  practices,  and  sanctioned  as  not  only  morally 
permissible,  but  even  as  obligatory  and  meritorious,  policies  and 


of  their  day  and  sought  to  explain  and  justify  it"  {Catholic  Encyclopedia, 
vol.  viii,  under  "  Inquisition  "). 

1  "  It  was  strange  that  one  almost  swooning  with  pain  should  have  said 
the  gentlest-hearted  and  truest  thing  about  human  nature  that  has  ever 
been  said  since  the  world  began."  —  Gerald  Stanley  Lee,  "  Business, 
Goodness,  and  Imagination,"  Hibbert  Journal  for  April,  1912,  p.  651. 

2  On  Machiavellism  see  The  Prince,  and  introductions  to  different  edi- 
tions by  Macaulay,  Lord  Acton,  and  Henry  Morley ;  Figgis,  Studies  of 
Political  Thought  from  Gerson  to  Grotius  (1907),  pp.  81-107;  John  Morley, 
Machiavelli  (Romanes  Lecture  for  1897). 


RENAISSANCE  ETHICS  327 

acts  which,  without  such  sanction,  might  have  awakened  in  some 
at  least  inconvenient  and  hampering  scruples  of  conscience. 

This  princely  ideal,  notwithstanding  that  the  conduct  of 
the  prince  who  acted  in  accordance  with  it  was  generally  con- 
doned, was  not  one  which,  like  the  ascetic  or  the  knightly 
ideal,  awakened  moral  enthusiasm.  It  was  a  standard  of  con- 
duct never  approved  by  the  best  conscience  of  Christendom. 
On  the  contrary,  the  work  in  which  Machiavelli  embodied 
this  ideal  for  princes  was,  on  its  first  appearance,  fiercely 
assailed  as  grossly  immoral,  and  ever  since  has  called  forth 
the  severest  condemnation  of  moralists. 

The  fundamental  principle  of  Machiavelli's  system  is  that 
the  moral  code  binding  on  the  subject  is  not  binding  on  the 
ruler ;  or  rather  that  ethics  has  nothing  to  do  with  politics.1 
With  the  prince  the  end  justifies  the  means.  He  is  at  liberty 
to  lie,  defraud,  steal,  and  kill,  in  fine,  to  employ  all  and  every 
form  of  deception,  injustice,  cruelty,  and  unrighteousness  in 
dealing  with  his  enemies  and  with  other  princes  or  states. 

This  moral  standard  set  for  princes  by  Machiavelli  was  the 
dominant  force  in  international  affairs  from  the  middle  of  the 
sixteenth  to  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century.  During 
this  period  it  debased  the  public  morals  not  only  of  Italy  but 
of  every  other  land  in  Christendom.    Its  vicious  principles 

1  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  Machiavelli's  age  politics  had  been 
secularized,  that  is,  divorced  from  theology,  and  this  with  the  approval  of 
most  men.  Machiavelli  would  now  go  farther  and  separate  politics  and 
morality.  This  is  Lord  Morley's  interpretation  of  The  Prince.  He  thinks 
we  shall  best  understand  Machiavelli,  yet  without  for  a  moment  approving 
his  teaching,  H  if  we  take  him  as  following  up  the  divorce  of  politics  from 
theology,  by  a  divorce  from  ethics  also.  He  was  laying  down  certain  maxims 
of  government  as  an  art ;  the  end  of  that  art  is  the  security  and  permanence 
of  theruling  powder ;  and  the  fundamental  principle  from  which  he  silently 
started,  without  shadow  of  doubt  or  misgiving  as  to  its  soundness,  was  that 
the  application  of  moral  standards  to  this  business  is  as  little  to  the  point 
as  it  would  be  in  the  navigation  of  a  ship.  The  effect  was  fatal  even  for 
his  own  purpose,  for  what  he  put  aside,  whether  for  the  sake  of  argument 
or  because  he  thought  them  in  substance  irrelevant,  were  nothing  less  than 
the  living  forces  by  which. societies  subsist  and  governments  are  strong" 
{Machiavelli,  Romanes  Lecture  for  1897). 


328  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

were  acted  upon  by  every  court  of  Europe.1  Even  to-day 
Machiavellism,  though  condemned  in  theory,  is  still  too  often 
followed  in  practice.  It  would  not  be  an  exaggeration  to  say 
that  The  Prince  has  exercised  a  more  baneful  influence  over 
the  political  morals  of  Europe  than  any  other  book  ever  written. 
It  is  instructive  to  contrast  the  influence  of  Machiavellism 
with  that  of  Stoicism.  Among  the  good  effects  of  Roman 
Stoicism  was  its  ennobling  influence  upon  the  imperial  gov- 
ernment. It  gave  the  Roman  Empire  such  a  succession  of 
high-minded  and  conscientious  rulers  as  scarce  is  shown  by 
the  history  of  any  other  state  ancient  or  modern.  In  contrast 
to  the  influence  of  this  noble  philosophy  which  apotheo- 
sized duty  and  exalted  in  rulers  the  virtues  of  clemency, 
truthfulness,  magnanimity,  and  justice,  Machiavellism  filled, 
or  contributed  to  fill,  the  thrones  of  Christendom  with  rulers 
whose  moral  sense  was  so  blunted  by  its  sinister  doctrines 
that  for  generations  truth  speaking,  sincerity,  regard  for  the 
obligations  of  treaties,  and  respect  for  the  rights  of  sister 
states  were  almost  unknown  in  the  diplomacy  and  mutual 
dealings  of  the  governments  of  Europe.  It  is  only  after  the 
lapse  of  more  than  three  centuries  that  Christendom  is  free- 
ing itself  from  the  evil  influence  of  Machiavelli's  teachings, 
and  that  there  has  been  generated  a  new  public  conscience 
which  recognizes  that  states  like  individuals  are  subjects  of 
the  moral  law,  and  that  the  code  which  is  binding  on  individ- 
uals is  binding  likewise  on  governments  and  communities. 

The  ethical       We  have  already  mentioned  the  ideal  of  the  courtier  as 

ideal  of  the  one  of  the  ethical  or  semi-ethical  products  of  the  age  of  the 

courtier        Renaissance.     This  was  a  conception  of  perfect  manhood 

which  was  nurtured  in  the  socially  brilliant  and  refined  courts 

of  the  Italian  princes  of  this  period.     It  was  a  fusion  and 

1  H  Catherine  de  Medici,  Philip  II,  Alva,  Des  Adrets,  Tilly,  Wallenstein 
were  simply  incarnations  of  the  Machiavellian  theories  which  ruled  this 
period."  —  Andrew  D.  White,  Seven  Great  Statesmen  (1910),  pp.  86  f. 


RENAISSANCE  ETHICS  329 

modification  of  selected  virtues  and  qualities  of  the  knight 
and  of  the  scholar.  The  Christian  theological  virtues  had 
no  necessary  place  in  it. 

It  was  the  distinctive  virtues  of  the  knight,  elevated  and 
refined,  which  formed  the  heart  and  core  of  the  ideal.  Like 
the  ideal  of  knighthood,  the  courtly  ideal  was  an  aristocratic 
one ;  the  courtier,  like  the  knight,  must  be  "  nobly  born  and 
of  gentle  race."  1  Martial  exploits  were  accounted  to  him  as 
virtues  ;  "his  principal  and  true  profession  ought  to  be  that 
of  arms."  2  As  loyalty  to  his  superior  was  a  supreme  virtue 
in  the  knight,  so  was  absolute  loyalty  to  his  prince  the  pre- 
eminent virtue  of  the  courtier.  Not  less  prominent  was  the 
place  accorded  in  the  ideal  to  the  knightly  virtues  of  courage 
and  courtesy.3 

But  to  these  qualities  and  virtues  of  the  knight  the  courtier 
must  needs  add  those  of  the  scholar.  The  ordinary  knight 
despised  learning  and  held  the  virtues  of  the  scholar  in  con- 
tempt. But  the  ideal  of  courtliness  grew  up  in  a  land  where 
humanistic  studies  had  become  a  ruling  passion,  and  in  an  age 
when  the  highest  ambition  of  many  an  Italian  prince  was  to 
be  known  as  a  patron  of  learning.  It  was  natural  that,  devel- 
oping in  the  atmosphere  of  these  courts,  the  new  standard 
of  perfect  manhood  should  give  a  prominent  place  to  the 
qualifications  and  virtues  of  the  scholar. 

This  ideal  of  the  courtier  was  never  such  a  moral  force 
in  history  as  that  of  the  monk  or  of  the  knight,  but  there 
were  in  it  ethical  elements  of  positive  value  to  the  moral  life 
of  the  world.  It  was  the  inspiration  of  many  of  the  finest 
spirits  of  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries.4    Of  the 

1  Castiglione,  The  Book  of  the  Courtier  (1903),  p.  22.        2  Ibid.  p.  25. 

8  Special  emphasis  was  laid  upon  this  virtue  of  courtesy  in  the  ideal  of 
courtliness.  And  rightly  so,  for,  as  has  been  well  said,  "  To  be  courteous 
is  just  as  much  a  duty  as  to  be  "honest,  for  rudeness  rouses  more  hatred 
and  bitterness  than  good  honest  cheating." 

4  In  many  lives  of  this  period  there  was  a  combination  of  the  ideal  of 
the  courtier  and  that  of  the  monk.  There  is  a  fine  portrayal  of  such  a 
character  in  Shorthouse's  John  Inglesant. 


330  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

noble-minded  Sir  Philip  Sidney  a  biographer  says,  "  He  con- 
scientiously molded  his  life  on  the  model  of  the  perfect  cour- 
tier of  Cortelliani."  Nor  has  the  ideal  ever  ceased  to  appeal 
to  the  imagination,  or  lost  its  power  to  soften  and  refine  man- 
ners and  ennoble  conduct.  It  inspires  gentle  consideration 
for  others  of  whatsoever  estate,  incites  to  unselfish  service, 
and  induces  absolute  good  faith  and  self-forgetting  loyalty  to 
friends  and  to  the  cause  espoused,  all  of  which  are  moral  quali- 
ties of  high  value,  and  all  of  which  have  entered  or  are  enter- 
ing as  permanent  elements  into  the  growing  world  ideal  of 
perfect  manhood. 

The  ethics        In  the  medieval  town  was  developed  a  moral  ideal  as  dis- 

thenmediZ'  tinct  and  individual  as  that  of  the  monastery  or  of  the  castle. 

thecradiTof  Central  in  this  type  of  goodness  were  the  homely  virtues  of 

the  modem    industry,  carefulness  in  workmanship,  punctuality,  honesty, 

conscience    faithful  observance  of  engagements,  and  general  fair  dealing. 

To  these  lay  virtues  were  added  all  those  which  made  up  the 

Church  ideal  for  the  ordinary  life,  for  there  had  not  yet  been 

effected  that  divorce  of  business  from  theology  which  had 

been  effected  in  the  case  of  politics. 

The  development  of  this  ideal  of  goodness  was  a  matter  of 
immense  importance  for  the  moral  life  of  the  West,  because, 
acted  upon  by  the  practical  ethical  spirit  of  Protestantism  and 
other  agencies,  it  was  destined  to  supersede  the  ascetic  and 
chivalric  ideals  of  life,  which  for  more  than  a  thousand  years 
had  been  the  ruling  moral  forces  in  the  life  of  Christendom, 
for  neither  of  these  ideals  of  goodness  could  be  more  than  a 
partial  and  passing  form  of  the  moral  life.  The  ascetic  ideal, 
having  for  its  distinctive  qualities  such  virtues  as  celibacy,  pov- 
erty, solitary  contemplation,  vigils,  fastings,  and  mortifications 
of  the  body,  could  not  possibly  become  the  standard  for  all  men. 
It  was  confessedly  a  standard  of  perfection  for  the  few  only. 
As  to  the  knightly  ideal,  this  was  too  exclusively  a  martial 
one  to  become  the  supreme  rule  of  life  and  conduct  for  the 


RENAISSANCE  ETHICS  331 

multitude.  Furthermore,  it  was  an  aristocratic  ideal,  an  ideal 
for  the  noble  born  alone.  This  precluded  the  possibility  of  its 
becoming,  as  a  distinct  type,  a  permanent  force  in  civilization. 
But  the  ethical  type  of  the  towns,  embracing  those  native 
human  virtues  which  spring  up  everywhere  out  of  the  usual 
and  universal  relationships  of  everyday  life  and  occupations, 
was  sure  of  a  permanent  place  among  the  ethical  types  of  the 
classes  and  professions  of  modern  society.  In  the  same  sense 
that  the  medieval  towns  (as  the  birthplace  of  the  third  estate) 
were  the  cradle  of  modern  democracy,  were  they  the  cradle  of 
modern  business  morality.  Just  as  through  the  medieval  mon- 
astery passes  the  direct  line  of  descent  of  the  present-day 
social  conscience  of  Christendom,1  just  so  through  the  medie- 
val town  passes  the  direct  line  of  descent  of  the  present-day 
business  conscience  of  the  Western  world. 

The  influence  of  the  spirit  generated  in  the  medieval  Disuse  of 
towns  is  seen  in  that  important  reform,  the  abolition  of  the  Mge/ot 
judicial  duel,  which  was  one  of  the  most  noteworthy  matters 
in  the  moral  history  of  the  Middle  Ages.2 

It  was  the  military  spirit  of  the  German  barbarians  which, 
as  we  have  seen,  was  a  chief  agency  in  the  introduction  of 
the  wager  of  battle  or  trial  by  combat  in  the  jurisprudence  of 
the  European  peoples.3  Besides  the  influence  of  the  towns, 
a  number  of  other  causes  concurred  in  gradually  effecting  the 
abrogation  of  this  method  of  settling  disputes,  among  which 
the  most  efficient  were  the  opposition  of  the  Church,  the 
revival  of  the  Roman  law  in  the  eleventh  century,  and  the 
advance  in  general  intelligence.  Into  every  one  of  these  agen- 
cies there  entered  an  ethical  element,  so  that  we  may  regard 
this  great  reform,  in  its  causes  as  well  as  in  its  effects,  as  dis- 
tinctively a  moral  reform.    Thus  the  influence  of  the  towns 

1  See  above,  p.  276. 

2  The  best  authority  on  this  subject  is  Lea,  Superstition  and  Force, 
4th  ed.,  pp.  101-247. 

3  See  above,  p.  304. 


battle 


332  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

was  essentially  ethical,  for  the  rise  of  these  communities,  as 
we  have  just  seen,  meant  the  superseding  of  the  ethics  of 
aristocracy  and  war  by  the  ethics  of  democracy  and  industry. 
Consequently  the  influence  exerted  by  the  towns  was  largely 
that  of  a  new  ideal  of  character. 

The  opposition  of  the  Church  was  motived  chiefly  by  moral 
feeling,  the  pontiffs  and  the  bishops  who  opposed  the  practice 
doing  so  on  the  ground  that  the  ordeal  by  battle  was  "  brutal, 
unchristian,  and  unrighteous." 

The  advocates  of  the  civil  law  opposed  the  practice  not 
only  because  it  interfered  with  the  royal  and  imperial  admin- 
istration of  justice,  but  because  it  was  a  practice  based  on  igno- 
rance and  superstition  and  "  incompatible  with  every  notion 
of  equity  and  justice,"  since  brutal  force  was  allowed  to  usurp 
the  place  of  testimony  and  reason.  Thus  the  Roman  law,  as 
the  embodiment  of  right  reason,  was  here  as  everywhere  else 
a  moral  force  making  for  what  is  reasonable  and  just. 

The  influence  of  the  general  progress  in  enlightenment 
was  also  profoundly  ethical,  since  this  movement  resulted,  as 
intellectual  advance  always  normally  does,  in  a  growing  re- 
finement of  the  moral  feelings,  in  progress  in  moral  ideas, 
and  in  truer  ethical  judgments. 

By  the  opening  of  the  modern  age  trial  by  combat,  acted 
on  by  these  various  influences,  had  become  obsolete  or  obso- 
lescent in  most  of  the  countries  of  Europe.1  Strangely  enough, 
the  international  duel  or  public  war,  resting  on  substantially 
the  same  basis  as  the  private  judicial  duel,  has  held  its  place 
as  the  instituted  and  legalized  method  of  settling  controver- 
sies between  nations  down  to  the  present  time,  without,  till 
just  yesterday,  being  seriously  challenged  by  the  awakening 
conscience  of  the  world  as  equally  repugnant  to  the  moral 
law  and  incompatible  with  every  principle  of  reason,  humanity, 
and  justice. 

1  The  last  judicial  duel  in  England  was  fought  in  1492,  but  the  practice 
was  not  abrogated  in  Russia  till  1649. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

ETHICS  OF  THE  PROTESTANT   REFORMATION 
I.  Principles  of  the  Reformation  of  Ethical  Import 

In  its  essential  principle  the  Protestant  Reformation  was  Principle 
a  protest  against  the  principle  of  authority  in  the  realm  of  sovereignty" 
the  spirit.    It  proclaimed  the  right  of  individual  judgment  in  Jjdwliili  " 
matters  of  religion  and  morals.    There  was  in  this  proclama-  ?etJj2!Jta 
tion  an  ethical  implication  of  revolutionary  significance.    It  in  morals 
was  a  recognition  of  the  truth  V  that  duty  in  the  last  analysis 
is  imposed  upon  the  individual  ...  by  himself ;  that  there 
is  no  authority  in  moral  matters  more  ultimate  than  a  man's 
rational  conviction  of  what  is  best."  1 

Of  all  the  agencies  which  during  recent  times  have  been 
at  work  moralizing  morality  and  creating  for  the  moral  life  a 
permanent  and  indestructible  basis  in  reason  and  conscience, 
this  Protestant  principle  of  the  autonomy  of  the  individual 
soul  in  the  spiritual  domain  has  been  one  of  the  most  efficient 
and  pervasive. 

Though  the  chief  significance  of  the  Protestant  revolution  The  prin- 
and  its  ultimate  import  for  morality  lay  in  this  assertion  of  the  salvation  by 
self-sovereignty  of  the  individual,  still  the  full  ethical  conse-  nght  belief 
quences  of  this  revolutionary  principle  did  not  become  clearly 
manifest  till  after  the  lapse  of  more  than  three  centuries. 

Throughout  the  earlier  periods  of  the  Reformation  era  the 
moral  evolution  in  Protestant  lands  was  influenced  less  by 

1  Ralph  Barton  Perry,  The  Moral  Economy  (1909),  p.  34.  And  so 
Thomas  Cuming  Hall :  "  The  glory  of  Protestant  ethics  as  founded  by 
Luther  and  developed  by  Kant  is  the  autonomous,  democratic,  unpriestly 
character  stamped  upon  it "  {History  of  Ethics  within  Organized  Christi- 
anity (1910),  p.  527). 

333 


334  '  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

the  announcement  of  this  principle  than  by  that  of  certain 
other  principles  less  fundamentally  important,  or  by  certain 
minor  modifications  effected  by  the  reformers  in  the  body  of 
doctrines  and  practices  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church. 

Among  these  principles  was  that  of  salvation  by  faith, 
which  meant  practically  salvation  by  right  belief.  This  was 
no  new  principle  in  Christian  theology.  The  Church  had 
always  insisted  upon  acceptance  of  the  main  articles  of  its 
creed  as  necessary  to  salvation.  But  by  reason  of  the  em- 
phasis which  had  been  placed  upon  the  doctrine  of  the  meri- 
toriousness  of  works,  many  had  come  to  believe,  and  to  act 
upon  the  belief,  that  a  man  is  justified  by  what  he  does.  The 
assertion  of  the  doctrine  of  justification  through  faith  alone 
had  important  consequences  for  morality,  since  it  implied  the 
denial  of  the  ethical  value  of  works,  which  meant  specifically 
the  repudiation  of  the  principles  of  asceticism,  on  which  the 
monastic  system  rested,  as  well  as  the  rejection  of  the  doc- 
trine of  purgatory,  which  afforded  basis  and  sanction  for  a 
considerable  part  of  the  moral  code  of  the  medieval  Church. 

II.  Some  Important  Moral  Outcomes  of  the  Sixteenth- 
Century  Religious  Reform 

The  reform  Though  the  immediate  results  of  the  Reformation  were 
reinforces  disastrous  to  Humanism,  the  ultimate  effect  of  the  religious 
£ZH!!?!!f2    movement  was  to  reenforce  the  true  ethical  tendencies  of  the 

tendencies 

of  the  intellectual  revival.    As  we  have  seen,  the  thing  of  deepest 

import  for  morals  in  the  Renaissance  of  the  fourteenth  and 
fifteenth  centuries  was  the  announcement  of  the  freedom  and 
self-dependence  of  the  individual  spirit,  since  such  self-sover- 
eignty is  the  prerequisite  of  a  true  and  vital  morality.  Like- 
wise the  essential  proclamation  of  the  Reformation  was  the 
autonomy  of  the  individual  in  matters  religious  and  moral. 
It  is  true  that  the  reformers,  though  proclaiming  liberty  of 
conscience,  the  right  of  individual  judgment,  did  not,  as  has 


THE  PROTESTANT  REFORMATION  335 


already  been  said,  at  once  recognize  all  the  ethical  implications 
of  this  principle.  "  The  Reformation,"  as  Dr.  Arnold  truly 
observes,  M  was  weak  in  that  it  never  consciously  grasped  or 
applied  the  central  idea  of  the  Renaissance  —  the  Hellenic 
idea  of  pursuing,  in  all  lines  of  activity,  the  law  and  science, 
to  use  Plato's  words,  of  things  as  they  really  are."  x 

But  the  assertion  of  the  right  of  individual  judgment  in 
matters  religious  and  moral  was  bound  sooner  or  later  to  lead 
to  the  recognition  of  the  duty  of  inquiry,  of  investigation  of 
the  law  and  science  of  things  as  they  really  are,  and  of  abso- 
lute loyalty  to  the  truth  when  found.  The  final  outcome 
within  the  Church  of  this  new  mental  attitude  has  been 
the  "  Higher  Criticism,"  which  is  simply  the  continuation  by 
modern  scholars  within  the  reformed  denominations  of  the 
scientific  criticism  of  the  Bible  begun  by  the  distinguished 
humanist  Erasmus.  In  this  remoter  issue  of  the  Reformation 
the  essential  oneness  of  its  spirit  with  that  of  the  Renais- 
sance is  revealed,  and  the  ground  for  the  assertion  that  the 
ultimate  moral  results  of  the  religious  reform  were  a  rein- 
forcement of  the  deepest  ethical  tendencies  of  the  intellectual 
revival  is  disclosed. 

Had  all  the  implications  of  the  principle  of  the  right  of  substitu- 
individual  judgment  in  matters  of  religion  and  morals  been  inerrant 
seen  and  frankly  accepted  by  the  reformers  of  the  sixteenth  ^°e0rran°t  an 
century,  the  Protestant  revolution  would  have  effected  at  once  Church 
the  transfer  of  morality  from  a  supernatural  to  a  natural  basis. 
But  for  an  inerrant  Church  the  reformers  substituted  an  in- 
errant  Book,  which  every  one  should  accept  as  an  infallible 
guide  and  rule  of  conduct.    The  ultimate  sanctions  of  moral- 
ity were  still  looked  for  in  the  historic  past,  in  an  outer  revela- 
tion and  an  outer  authority.    Consequently  the  moral  ideal  of 
Protestantism  retained  the  essentially  theological,  supernatural 
character  of  the  ideal  of  Roman  Catholicism. 

1  Culture  and  Anarchy  (1875),  P-  T45- 


336 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


New  rank- 
ing of  vir- 
tues in  the 
moral  type 


But  the  changes  effected  by  the  reformers  in  the  body  of 
the  teachings  of  the  old  Church  resulted  necessarily  in  a  cer- 
tain displacement  and  shifting  of  the  virtues  in  the  moral 
type,  and  in  a  new  estimation  of  ethical  values.  Various  vir- 
tues or  duties  hitherto  regarded  as  essential  to  excellence  of 
character  were  assigned  a  lower  place  in  the  rank  of  virtues 
or  were  excluded  altogether  from  the  ideal,  while  new  moral 
qualities  or  attributes  were  added,  the  outcome  being  what  we 
must  regard  as  a  new  moral  type.  In  the  following  pages  we 
shall  comment  briefly  upon  the  more  important  of  the  changes 
effected  in  several  domains  of  the  religious-ethical  life. 


Protestant- 
ism brings 
into  dis- 
esteem  the 
monastic 
ideal 


We  proceed  now  to  notice  some  of  the  immediate  and 
special  moral  effects  of  the  Reformation.  In  the  first  place 
Protestantism  discredited  the  monastic  type  of  goodness.  The 
meritoriousness  of  celibacy  was  denied.  The  austerities  of  the 
ascetic  were  declared  to  be  not  only  useless  but  positively 
wrong.  Instead  of  being  an  object  of  profound  veneration 
and  homage,  the  saint  of  medieval  times  became  to  the  Prot- 
estant reformers  an  object  of  the  deepest  moral  detestation. 

The  immediate  consequences  of  this  change  in  men's 
conceptions  of  what  constitutes  the  highest  moral  excellence 
was  that  throughout  one  half  of  Europe  the  monasteries, 
which  the  religious-moral  enthusiasm  of  the  earlier  centuries 
of  Christianity  had  created,  were  dismantled  and  razed  to 
the  ground,  and  an  institution  which  had  dominated  Chris- 
tian Europe  for  a  thousand  years  was  suppressed  in  all  the 
northern  lands. 

This  revolution,  we  believe,  effected  on  the  whole  a  great 
gain  for  morality  and  marked  a  forward  movement  in  the 
moral  evolution  of  the  Western  world  ;  but  at  the  same  time 
it  must  be  recognized  that  the  destruction  of  this  system, 
which  throughout  a  full  historical  period  had  fostered  some 
of  the  most  admirable  of  Christian  virtues  and  nurtured  un- 
numbered saintly  lives,  resulted  in  the  exclusion  of  valuable 


THE  PROTESTANT  REFORMATION  337 

ethical  elements  from  the  moral  life  of  Protestant  communi- 
ties. There  are  types  of  character  nourished  by  the  conven- 
tual system  that  society  can  ill  afford  to  spare.  Very  few  will 
dissent  from  Lecky's  view  that  M  in  the  Sisters  of  Charity  the 
religious  orders  of  Catholicism  have  produced  one  of  the  most 
perfect  of  all  types  of  womanhood."  x 

In  destroying  monasticism  the  Protestant  reformers  de-  Effects  upon 
stroyed  an  anti-industrial  type  of  character,  and  thus  helped  morais  of 
to  clear  the  ground  for  the  great  industrial  development  which  t^fthe" 
during  the  last  three  centuries  has  given  a  new  aspect  and  out-  monastenes 
look  to  civilization.  The  reformed  Church  gave  prominence 
to  the  active  masculine  virtues  as  opposed  to  the  passive 
feminine  virtues  exalted  by  the  conventual  system.    Hence  it 
was  more  favorable  than  the  old  Church  to  the  development  * 
of  civilization  on  its  material  side.    It  hardly  admits  of  doubt 
that  in  these  opposed  tendencies  of  the  ethical  ideals  of  the  two 
churches  is  to  be  sought  one  cause  of  the  amazing  contrast, 
industrially  viewed,  long  observed  between  the  distinctively 
Protestant  and  the  distinctively  Catholic  countries  of  Europe. 
It  is  true  that  the  line  of  demarcation  once  so  observable  is 
now  becoming  blurred,  and  that  modern  industrialism  with 
its  ideal  of  industrial  virtues  is  fast  becoming  equally  char- 
acteristic of  all  lands  of  advancing  culture,  whether  Protestant, 
Catholic,  or  pagan. 

The  Protestant  denial  of  the  Catholic  doctrine  of  purgatory,  Effects  upon 
which  followed  as  a  direct  logical  result  of  the  reformers'   the'aboiition 
doctrine  of  justification  by  faith,  had  consequences  for  moral-  of  Purgatory 
ity  no  less  positive  than  those  that  followed  the  denial  of  the 
Catholic  teaching  of  the  meritoriousness  of  the  ascetic  life. 

It  is  undoubtedly  true  that  the  doctrine  of  purgatory, 
conceived  as  part  of  a  system  of  future  rewards  and  punish- 
ments, has  exerted  on  the  whole  an  influence  favorable  to  mor- 
ality.   But  the  institution  lends  itself  easily  to  misuse.   In  the 

1  History  of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  ii,  p.  370. 


338  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

Middle  Ages  the  doctrine  of  indulgences  was  applied  to  souls 
in  purgatory,  and  the  shortening  of  the  period  of  their  suffer- 
ing there  made  dependent  not  alone  upon  the  prayers  of  their 
friends  on  earth,  but  often  practically  upon  the  payment  of 
sums  of  money,  designated  as  alms  to  the  poor  or  gifts  to  the 
Church.  The  forgiveness  of  sins  was  thus  too  often  made  a 
commercial  transaction.  Thus  the  doctrine  of  purgatory,  be- 
yond controversy,  contributed  essentially  to  that  despiritual- 
izing  of  religion  and  that  deadening  in  wide  circles  of  the 
moral  sense  which  characterized  the  later  medieval  period 
and  which,  through  inevitable  reaction,  helped  to  provoke  the 
Protestant  revolt. 

The  effect  upon  morals  of  the  abolition  of  purgatory  by 
the  reformers  was  immediate  and  far-reaching.  Many  specific 
duties  were  at  once  dropped  from  the  moral  code.  Prayers 
for  the  dead  ceased  to  be  a  pious  duty ;  they  were  not  even 
morally  permissible.  Furthermore,  the  performance  of  such 
good  works  as  the  making  of  pilgrimages  and  the  giving  of 
alms  for  the  benefit  of  souls  in  purgatory  not  only  ceased  to 
be  regarded  as  meritorious,  but  came  to  be  looked  upon  as  pos- 
itively wrong.  Besides  these  direct  ethical  consequences  of 
the  abolition  of  purgatory  there  were  indirect  ethical  results 
which  we  shall  notice  in  another  connection.1 

Effects  of  Ultimately  the  Reformation,  largely  through  the  outwork- 

reform  upon  ings  of  the  principle  of  the  right  of  private  judgment  in. 
toieraSon°2f  matters  of  conscience,  was  destined  to  foster  the  growth  of 
the  important  virtue  of  toleration.  But  throughout  the  first 
three  centuries  of  Protestantism,  owing  mainly  to  the  great 
emphasis  laid  by  the  reformers  on  the  doctrine  of  the  supreme 
ethical  value  of  correctness  of  religious  belief,  this  principle  of 
the  right  of  private  judgment  exerted  little  appreciable  influ- 
ence upon  the  moral  evolution.    Holding  fast  to  the  doctrine 

1  See  below,  p.  362. 

2  On  this  subject  see  Andrew  D.  White,  Seven  Great  Statesmen  (1910), 
chapter  on  Thomasius. 


THE  PROTESTANT  REFORMATION  339 

of  the  criminality  of  wrong  belief,  the  new  Church  like  the 
old  was  necessarily  intolerant.  It  regarded  heresy  with  dread, 
looked  upon  toleration  as  a  fault,  and,  whenever  circumstances 
favored,  engaged  in  persistent  and  unrelenting  persecution  to 
maintain  uniformity  of  religious  belief.  It  was  not  till  late 
in  the  modern  period  that  religious  toleration  came  generally 
to  be  recognized  by  the  Protestant  conscience  as  a  virtuous 
disposition  of  supreme  worth. 


CHAPTER    XVIII 

THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  SINCE  THE  INCOMING  OF 
DEMOCRACY :    THE  NEW  SOCIAL  AND  INTER- 
NATIONAL CONSCIENCE 

I.  Forces  determining  the  Trend  of  the  Ethical 
Movement 

The  incom-  Of  all  the  forces  which  since  the  rise  of  Christianity  have 
mocracy  given  fresh  impulse  to  the  ethical  movement  inaugurated  by 
the  new  religion,  none  has  exerted  a  greater  influence  than 
modern  democracy.  This  is  so  because  in  its  essential  spirit 
democracy  is  at  one  with  Christianity.  It  is  merely  "  a  prin- 
ciple which  continues  .  .  .  over  a  wider  range  of  institutions 
the  same  principle  as  Christianity  introduced."  1  It  extends 
the  Christian  principle  of  equality  from  the  spiritual  to  the 
political,  the  social,  and  the  economic  domain.  It  makes  all 
men  equal  before  Caesar  as  well  as  before  God. 

And  like  Christianity,  democracy  extends  the  range  of  per- 
sons who  are  brothers  until  not  only  all  classes  within  the 
same  state  but  all  peoples  and  races  are  included.  "In  the 
democratic  union  of  nations,"  in  the  words  of  Lecky,  "  we 
find  the  last  and  highest  expression  of  the  Christian  ideal 
of  the  brotherhood  of  mankind."  2 

It  is  this  identity  of  the  essential  spirit  of  democracy  with 
the  essential  spirit  of  Christianity  which  makes  the  incoming 
of  democracy  a  revolution  of  such  supreme  importance  in  the 
moral  history  of  the  world.  To  truly  democratize  society,  as 
to  truly  christianize  it,  is  to  moralize  it. 

1  S.  Alexander,  Moral  Order  and  Progress  (1889),  p.  391. 

2  History  of  Rationalism  in  Europe  (1890),  vol.  ii,  p.  220. 

340 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  AND  DEMOCRACY      341 

"The  causes,"  observes  Lecky,  "which  most  disturbed  or  Modem  in- 

,     ,  .  r  .  ,        ventionsand 

accelerated  the  moral  progress  of  society  in  antiquity  were  the  the  new  in- 
appearance  of  great  men ;  in  modern  times  they  have  been  us  na  lsm 
the  appearance  of  great  inventions."  * 

In  no  department  of  morals,  save  the  international,  have 
modern  inventions  exerted  a  greater  influence  than  in  the 
department  of  industrial  ethics.  In  this  sphere  these  inven- 
tions have  reacted  on  morals  in  two  ways  :  first,  they  have 
changed  fundamentally  for  the  masses  in  all  civilized  lands 
the  economic  conditions  of  life,  which  conditions,  as  we  have 
seen,  are  the  great  molders  of  morals ;  and  second,  through 
the  changes  they  have  wrought  in  the  processes  of  production, 
and  through  the  immense  development  they  have  given  to 
the  whole  industrial  system,  they  have  caused  principles  and 
institutions  once  just  and  beneficent  in  their  outworkings  to 
become  instruments  of  inequity  and  oppression,  and  have 
thus  awakened  new  moral  judgments  respecting  these  maxims 
and  conventions.  The  growth  of  these  new  ethical  feelings 
and  convictions  constitute  an  important  part,  perhaps  the  most 
important  part,  of  the  moral  history  of  recent  times.  They 
are  the  motive  force  in  several  of  the  most  significant  moral 
movements  of  to-day  in  the  industrial  world.  Preeminently 
true  is  this  of  the  present-day  labor  movement.  "  Its  form," 
as  Professor  Peabody  says,  M  is  economic,  but  its  motives  are 
moral.  It  is  an  effort  —  often  blind  and  groping,  sometimes 
pitifully  misdirected,  yet  none  the  less  proceeding  from  the 
conscience  of  the  time  —  to  shape  economic  life  into  an  instru- 
ment of  social  justice  and  peace."  2  Socialism,  too,  with  all  its 
ethical  aspirations  and  enthusiasms,  is  in  large  part  a  product 
of  the  new  industrialism. 

Not  less  disturbing  to  morals  than  the  political  and  indus-  The 
trial  revolutions  has  been  the  revolution  in  scientific  thought  evolution 

1  History  of  European  Morals,  3d  ed.,  vol.  i,  p.  126. 

2  The  Approach  to  the  Social  Question  (1909),  p.  84. 


342  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

effected  by  the  doctrine  of  evolution.  This  theory  has  been 
not  only  a  powerful  dissolvent  of  a  large  part  of  the  body  of 
medieval  theology  and  hence  of  that  part  of  morality  depend- 
ent upon  this  system  of  thought,  but,  through  the  dominant 
place  which  this  interpretation  of  the  cosmic  process  assigns 
to  the  self-regarding  motives,  it  has  exercised  in  wide  circles 
of  society  an  unfavorable  influence  upon  morals  by  seeming 
to  give  nature's  sanction  to  self-assertive,  antisocial  conduct. 
There  are  drifts  in  both  the  public  and  the  private  morality 
of  the  last  half  century  which,  as  we  shall  see,  find  their 
explanation  in  the  disturbance  of  ethical  values  created  by 
the  general  acceptance  of  the  Darwinian  theory  of  progress 
through  "  the  survival  of  the  fittest."  But  we  shall  also  see 
this  same  theory,  better  interpreted  in  its  profoundest  intima- 
tions, giving  strong  support  to  the  best  ethical  instincts  of 
humanity  and  supplying  new  incentives  and  encouragement 
to  humanitarian  endeavor. 

General  The  moral  history  of  the  Western  world  since  the  Renais- 

progress  sance  affords  a  striking  illustration  of  the  dependence  of  prog- 
ress in  morals  upon  progress  in  general  intelligence.  It  is 
undoubtedly  true  that,  fostered  by  a  free  press,  by  the  public- 
school  system,  and  by  various  other  agencies,  the  average  of 
intelligence  in  the  modern  democratic  state  is  higher  than  it 
was  in  any  of  the  states  —  save  possibly  in  some  of  the  small 
city  states  of  Greece  —  of  ancient  or  medieval  times.  This 
new  intellectual  life,  speaking  broadly,  has  reacted  favorably 
upon  the  moral  life.  It  has  dispelled  superstition,  destroyed 
prejudices,  widened  the  outlook  of  men,  and  broadened  their 
moral  sympathies.  In  a  word,  the  seeing  of  life  and  things 
as  they  really  are  has  tended  to  clarify  the  moral  sense  and 
to  render  clearer  and  truer  the  vision  of  the  ethical  ideal. 


The  decline       The  body  of  hereditary  ethical  convictions  and  judgments 

theology  1C  upon  which  modern  influences  have  been  especially  at  work 

was,  as  has  been  seen,  shaped  and  molded  largely  by  theology. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  AND  DEMOCEACY      343 

Hence  nothing  has  influenced  more  positively  the  moral  evo- 
lution in  recent  times  than  the  profound  modification  which, 
during  the  period,  has  taken  place  in  men's  religious  beliefs. 
Under  the  influence  of  advancing  intelligence,  of  evolutionary 
science,  of  ever  closer  relations  between  the  different  races 
and  nations,  and  the  resulting  contact  and  comparison  of  dif- 
ferent religions,  there  has  gone  on  a  rapid  disintegration  of 
old  creeds.  The  effect  of  this  upon  many  has  been  the  elimi- 
nation from  their  moral  code  of  all  purely  theological  elements, 
the  erection  of  a  new  standard  of  moral  values,  and  the  adop- 
tion of  an  ideal  of  character  which  may  best  be  described  as 
being  in  the  main  a  composite  of  Greek  and  gospel  ethics. 

The  dependence  of  moral  progress  in  modern  times  upon  Growing 
inventions,  as  Lecky  observes,  is  shown  perhaps  even  more  inter^Cy° 
strikingly  in  the  domain  of  international  than  in  that  of  indus-  relations 
trial  ethics.  As  in  antiquity  it  was  the  world-wide  extension 
of  the  Roman  rule  through  conquest  which  broke  the  primal 
isolation  of  the  Mediterranean  peoples  and  created  that  cos- 
mopolitanism in  life  and  thought  from  which  arose  the  ethical 
universalism  characterizing  the  cultured  circles  of  Roman 
society  in  the  later  centuries  of  the  Empire,  so  in  this  modern 
age  it  is  the  great  inventions  of  the  steamship,  the  steam  rail- 
way, the  electric  telegraph,  the  ocean  cable,  the  telephone, 
wireless  telegraphy,  and  the  rest,  which  have  broken  the 
isolation  of  the  nations,  bound  them  together  by  a  thousand 
commercial,  social,  and  intellectual  ties,  and  created  that  cos- 
mopolitanism in  life  and  thought  from  which  have  naturally 
sprung  those  ethical  feelings  and  convictions  which  form  the 
growing  international  conscience  of  to-day. 

Thus  it  is  that  inventions,  whose  aims  were  primarily  to 
promote  civilization  on  its  material  side,  have  become  the 
most  efficient  agencies  in  creating  a  sense  of  ethical  oneness 
among  the  nations,  and  thus  in  opening  a  new  epoch  in  the 
moral  evolution  of  mankind. 


344 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


II.   Expressions    of    the    New   Moral    Consciousness 
in  Different  Domains  of  Life  and  Thought 


The  dem- 
ocratic 
revolution 
a  moral 
movement 


/.    The  Ethics  of  Democracy 

The  great  history-making  upheavals  and  readjustments  in 
human  society  are  moral  in  their  causes  as  well  as  in  their 
effects.  They  arise  from  a  divergence  between  what  is  and 
what  ought  to  be.  The  democratic  revolution  which  began  in 
France  in  1 789  affirms  with  emphasis  the  correctness  of  this 
ethical  interpretation  of  the  great  passages  of  human  history. 
What  superficially  viewed  appears  to  have  been  primarily  a 
political  or  economic  revolution  was  in  truth,  in  its  deepest 
motives  and  impulses,  a  moral  revolution.  "  It  was  moral 
enthusiasm  for  the  rights  of  man  .  .  .  and  not  the  breakdown 
of  an  economic  system,  which  created  modern  democracy."1 
The  watchwords  of  the  Revolution  —  Liberty,  Equality,  Fra- 
ternity—  are  all  words  of  moral  import.  They  are  tremu- 
lous with  righteous  wrath  at  age-long  oppression,  contempt, 
and  abuse ;  and  they  are  instinct  with  the  living  forces  of  a 
noble  moral  ideal.  They  express  the  essential  spirit  of  the 
Revolution,  which  each  day,  where  it  has  free  course,  finds 
fuller  embodiment  in  political,  social,  and  moral  reforms,  in 
humanitarian  institutions  and  altruistic  effort. 


The  ethics  Democracy  tends  in  various  ways  to  purify  and  ennoble 
racy  rejects  morality,  but  especially  by  destroying  all  invidious  class  dis- 
moraiity  tinctions,  and  thereby  destroying  that  class  morality  which 
through  all  periods  of  history  has  hampered  the  moral  prog- 
ress of  the  race.  All  the  civilizations  known  to  history  before 
the  incoming  of  modern  democracy  had  their  superior  class, 
including  only  the  few,  who  alone  were  regarded  as  pos- 
sessing capacity  for  the  highest  virtues;  and  their  inferior 
classes,  embracing  the  many,  —  sudras,  slaves,  or  serfs,  — 

1  Muirhead,  The  Elements  of  Ethics  (1909),  p.  232. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  AND  DEMOCRACY      345 

persons  regarded  as  created  for  the  use  of  others  and  capable 
of  nothing  more  than  a  qualified  or  servile  morality. 

Now  democracy,  recognizing  "  human  capacities  in  all  and 
not  merely  in  a  few,"  throws  down  the  partition  walls  between 
classes  and  puts  all  on  the  same  level  of  opportunity  and  priv- 
ilege. It  thus  establishes  the  conditions  of  a  common  moral 
life  and  of  a  progressive  moral  evolution ;  for  if  history  teaches 
any  truth,  it  teaches  that  a  civilization  dominated  by  a  privi- 
leged class  that  uses  the  masses  selfishly  or  thoughtlessly  for 
the  enhancement  of  its  own  interests  and  pleasures  is  fore- 
doomed to  moral  stagnation  and  decadence — so  true  is  it  that 
society  is  an  organic  body  and  that  if  one  member  suffers  the 
whole  body  suffers  with  it. 

Again,  democracy  has  deep  significance  for  morality  on  The  ethical 
account  of  its  relation  to  education.    Despotic  bureaucratic  education 
monarchy  is  indifferent  or  positively  opposed  to  the  education  bythestate 
of  the  masses  because  the  safest  basis  of  such  a  government 
is  sodden  ignorance.   On  the  other  hand,  general  intelligence 
is  the  very  breath  of  life  of  a  democracy.    Hence  the  educa- 
tion of  the  masses  is  the  foremost  task  of  the  modern  free 
state.    The  public-school  system  of  the  modern  world  is  the 
outcome  of  this  imperious  demand  of  democracy. 

Now  this  relation  of  the  democratic  state  to  popular  educa- 
tion has  immense  importance  for  the  moral  life,  first,  for  the 
reason  that  advance  in  general  intelligence  means  a  better 
maintenance  of  the  moral  standard.  To  increase  the  number 
of  schools  in  a  community  is  to  lessen  the  need  of  prisons 
and  reformatories.  More  than  a  century  ago  Beccaria  pre- 
visioned  this  relation  of  popular  education  to  crime.  "  The 
most  certain  method  of  preventing  crime,"  he  maintained, 
"is  to  perfect  the  system  of  education."  * 

And  second,  education  in  the  modern  democratic  state  has 
special  significance  for  the  moral  development  going  on  in 

1  An  Essay  on  Crimes  and  Punishments,  tr.  Voltaire  (1793),  P-  l57' 


346  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

Western  civilization,  for  the  reason  that  it  means  not  merely 
a  better  maintenance  of  the  moral  standard,  but  also  an  essen- 
tial modification  of  the  moral  type  itself.  For  in  the  establish- 
ment of  its  system  of  education  the  state  has  assumed  what 
formerly  was  one  of  the  chief  functions  of  the  Church.  This 
transference  of  the  business  of  education  from  the  Church  to 
the  state  has  rightly  been  pronounced  "  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant movements  in  the  history  of  education  since  the  Dark 
Ages."  What  renders  it  of  such  importance  in  the  view  of 
the  historian  of  morals  is  that,  in  the  hands  of  the  state,  edu- 
cation has  become  or  is  becoming  wholly  secularized.  In  some 
countries  even  the  reading  of  the  Bible  in  the  schools  or  the 
giving  of  any  religious  instruction  whatsoever  is  prohibited. 
Now  this  secularization  of  education  results  inevitably  in 
the  secularization  of  morality.  That  portion  of  the  moral  code 
which  derives  its  sanction  from  theological  or  special  religious 
doctrines  is  neglected.  Thus  one  outcome  of  the  transfer  of 
the  function  of  education  from  the  Church  to  the  state  has 
been  the  imparting  of  a  fresh  impulse  to  that  naturalistic 
movement  in  morals  whose  point  of  departure  was  the  clas- 
sical revival  of  the  fifteenth  century.  And  thus  the  three 
dominant  movements  in  modern  European  civilization  —  the 
Renaissance,  the  Reformation  (in  its  ultimate  effects),  and 
the  democratic  revolution  —  have  all  worked  together  in  de- 
termining the  general  trend  of  the  moral  evolution  in  the 
Western  world. 

The  demo-        The  ethical  import  of  the  incoming  of  democracy  is  shown 

assumes*1  *  again  in  the  assumption  by  the  democratic  state  of  the  philan- 

ethicaiial"    thropic  WOI"k  of  society.    Throughout  the  Middle  Ages  the 

thnCchnSnf  Church  was  the  almoner  of  society,  the  builder  of  hospitals, 

asylums,  and  poorhouses.    Since  the  advent  of  democracy 

much  of  this  humanitarian  work  has,  like  education,  been 

taken  over  by  the  state.    This  assumption  by  the  state  of  these 

former  functions  of  the  Church  is  one  of  the  most  noteworthy 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  AND  DEMOCRACY      347 

ethical  movements  in  modern  history.1  What  makes  it  signif- 
icant is,  first,  the  fact  that  the  work  is  undertaken  by  modern 
governments  largely  from  purely  philanthropic  motives.  This 
means  that  with  the  coming  to  political  power  of  the  people  a 
new  spirit  has  entered  into  government,  which  means,  further, 
that  those  altruistic  sentiments  which  it  has  been  a  chief  func- 
tion of  religion  to  foster  have  come  to  inspire  society  at  large. 
And  second,  this  assumption  by  the  state  of  the  philan- 
thropic functions  of  the  Church  is  significant  because  of  what 
has  made  its  undertaking  of  these  tasks  necessary.  This  ne- 
cessity has  arisen  not  merely  by  reason  of  the  possession  by 
the  state  of  the  taxing  power  and  hence  of  the  means  needed 
for  carrying  on  this  humanitarian  work,  but  also  because  of 
its  relation  to  modern  science.  Much  of  this  work  of  rescue 
and  cure  is  dependent  for  its  successful  administration  upon 
scientific  knowledge  and  skill.  It  is  largely  because  the  state 
is  in  closer  alliance  than  the  Church  with  modern  science, 
and  therefore  is  the  more  efficient  agent  for  carrying  on 
this  humanitarian  work,  that  society  makes  it,  instead  of  the 
Church,  its  chief  almoner  and  trustee. 

2.    The  Ethics  of  Industrialism 

A  distinctive  characteristic  of  modern  industry  is  its  al-  The  alliance 
liance  with    science.     This    union  dates  from  the   French  industry 
Revolution.    One  aim  of  the  revolutionists  was  to  put  exact  and  science 
knowledge  at  the  service  of  the  industrial  arts,  and,  by  thus 
increasing  the  productive  forces  of  society,  to  create  an  abun- 
dance for  all,  banish  poverty  from  the  earth,  and  advance 
civilization  to  a  higher  point  than  ever  before  reached. 

And  this  alliance  of  industry  and  science  has,  in  so  far  as 
mere  production  is  concerned,  more  than  met  every  expec- 
tation.   Through  the  application  of  inventions  and  scientific 

1  See  Sisson,  M  The  State  absorbing  the  Functions  of  the  Church," 
International  Journal  of  Ethics  for  April,  1907,  p.  341. 


348  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

knowledge  to  the  various  industrial  processes,  society's  powers 
of  production  have  been  increased  threefold,  tenfold,  fifty- 
fold,  in  some  arts  even  a  thousandfold.  Surely  now  all  will 
be  fed  and  clothed  and  sheltered.     • 

But  this  vision  of  a  millennium  of  well-being  for  all  as  the 
result  of  the  union  of  science  and  industry  has  not  come  true. 
The  great  mass  of  the  world's  toilers  are  underfed,  ill-clad, 
and  improperly  housed.  From  the  slums,  from  the  dark  and 
noisome  tenements  of  our  great  cities,  arises  the  bitter  cry  of 
children,  ragged,  wan,  and  hungry,  robbed  through  the  parents' 
poverty  of  every  delight  and  right  of  childhood.  "  The  poverty 
of  the  workers,"  cries  Henry  Demarest  Lloyd  in  passionate 
protest,  "  is  the  sin  of  our  age."  l 

The  divorce  The  causes  of  this  pitiful  failure  of  the  new  industrialism, 
industry11  notwithstanding  its  capacity  for  enormous  production,  to  pro- 
ecodnornYcS '  v^e  ^or  tne  wants  of  all  is  not  far  to  seek.    Our  age,  while 

Machia-  uniting  science  and  business,  has  divorced  ethics  and  business, 
vellism  e  '  ' 

just  as  in  the  time  of  the  Renaissance  in  Italy  there  was 
effected  a  divorce  of  ethics  and  politics.  Political  economists 
have  taught  that  ethics  has  nothing  to  do  with  economics. 
And  this  economic  Machiavellism  of  the  schools  has  not  been 
merely  an  academic  thing  ;  it  has  probably  exerted  as  sinister 
an  influence  upon  the  modern  industrial  order  as  the  political 
doctrines  of  Machiavelli  exerted  upon  the  diplomacy  and  gov- 
ernmental policies  of  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries. 
Dominated  by  this  philosophy  our  business  life  has  become 
frankly  unmoral  —  large  sections  of  it  grossly  immoral. 

The  break-        But  economics  and  ethics  can  no  more  be  divorced  than 

system        politics  and  ethics.    Machiavellism  has  succeeded  no  better 

in  economics  than  in  politics.    "  The  system  based  on  [this 

1  "  It  won't  do  any  longer  to  lay  the  blame  for  poverty  wholly  upon  its 
victims.  These  cruel  theories  cannot  face  a  growing  suspicion  that  poverty 
is  somehow  involved  in  the  ethics  of  distribution."  —  Louis  F.  Post,  in 
address;  see  The  Public  for  June  21,  1912,  p.  593. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  AND  DEMOCRACY      349 

philosophy]  is  breaking  down  all  over,  in  strikes,  riots,  panics, 
gluts,  unemployed  idleness,  and  class  murder.  It  is  breaking 
down  not  because  the  task  of  getting  plenty  for  the  body  — 
and  the  soul  —  for  every  one  out  of  the  fruitful  earth  and  the 
fellowship  of  man  is  an  impossible  task,  but  because  the  task 
is  an  impossible  one  of  accomplishment  —  that  or  anything 
else  in  human  affairs  —  by  the  devil's  code  of  selfishness 
instead  of  love,  of  solitary  advantage  instead  of  the  good  of 
all.  By  such  a  philosophy  there  could  be  no  government,  no 
family ;  and  if  it  continues,  there  will  ere  long  be  no  business. 
But  it  cannot  continue."  x 

It  cannot  continue  because  there  is  a  fast-growing  convic-  Reforms 

tion  of  the  falsity  of  the  philosophy  of  economic  Machiavellism  mthe 

—  an  ever-growing  recognition  of  the  truth  that  the  relation-  ^ITo/the 

ships  of  men  in  business,  like  all  other  human,  relationships,  |J*Jr8*rial 

are  conditioned  bv  the  moral  law  of  human  brotherhood,  (a)  sociaii- 

J  i«i  r  zationofthe 

There  are  profound  changes  taking  place  in  the  moral  teel-  unearned 
ings  and  judgments  of  men  respecting  many  of  the  customs,  to  !*,* 
principles,  and  institutions  of  the  modern  industrial  order. 
There  is  a  growing  recognition  of  the  fact  that  though  these 
conventions  and  arrangements  may  in  past  periods  of  history 
have  been  promotive  of  human  welfare  and  therefore  moral, 
they  are,  as  applied  to  the  more  complex  social  and  economic 
relations  of  modern  society,  the  very  embodiment  of  unreason 
and  injustice. 

Among  the  economic  institutions  respecting  which  there 
is  taking  place  such  a  change  in  moral  judgment  is  that  of 
absolute  private  property  in  land.  Although  this  is  an  insti- 
tution unknown  to  primitive  peoples,  in  all  the  great  civili- 
zations of  the  past  we  find  society  based  upon  it."  That  the 
system,  since  it  inevitably  results  in  private  monopoly,  has 
contributed  largely  to  the  creation  of  that  gross  inequality  in 
wealth  which  has  characterized  every  advanced  civilization 

1  Lloyd,  Man  the  Social  Creator  (1906),  p.  135. 


values 


350  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

known  to  history,  and  which  has  helped  to  prepare  its  down- 
fall, does  not  admit  of  reasonable  doubt.  The  monopolization 
of  land  by  a  class  has  been  one  source,  and  probably  a  main 
source,  of  the  phenomenon  in  modern  society  of  deepening 
poverty  in  the  midst  of  growing  wealth,  of  dehumanizing  want 
for  the  many  along  with  demoralizing  luxury  for  the  few.  That 
in  countries  of  large  and  thickening  population  a  private  mo- 
nopoly in  the  arable  land  is  the  embodiment  of  a  colossal  and 
cruel  wrong  is  incontrovertible.  That  a  single  class  should  be 
allowed  to  become  the  absolute  owners  of  the  soil  and  thereby 
acquire  the  legal  right  to  exclude  all  others  from  it  save  on 
the  condition  that  practically  all  that  can  be  got  from  it  by 
the  hardest  toil,  save  just  enough  for  the  bare  subsistence 
of  the  laborer,  shall  be  given  over  as  rent  to  the  holder  of  the 
land,  is  as  great  a  moral  wrong  as  to  take  directly  from  the 
worker  the  product  of  his  toil  by  reducing  him  to  bodily 
slavery.  It  is  this  gross  inequity  which  has  made  the  his- 
tory of  many  countries,  like  much  of  the  history  of  Ireland, 
a  harrowing  tragedy.  The  wrong,  if  not  greater,  is  at  least 
more  obvious  when  the  land  thus  monopolized  is  the  site 
of  a  great  city  where  the  enormous  ground  values  have  been 
created  not  by  any  labor  or  expenditure  on  the  part  of  the 
owners,  but  by  the  growth  and  enterprise  of  the  community 
as  a  whole. 

Just  as  the  world  has  got  a  new  conscience  in  regard  to  the 
wrong  of  slavery,  so  is  it  getting  a  new  conscience  in  regard 
to  this  "great  iniquity,"  as  Tolstoy  calls  it,  of  private  mo- 
nopoly in  land.  This  growing  ethical  conviction  will  ultimately 
destroy  the  illusion  that  the  earth  and  its  resources  may, 
without  moral  wrong,  be  monopolized  by  a  fortunate  or 
favored  few  and  the  great  masses  be  dispossessed.1  The  new 

1  The  most  practicable  proposal  for  the  undoing  of  this  ancient  and 
ever-augmenting  wrong  of  private  monopoly  in  land  is  that  presented  with 
singular  force  and  clarity  by  Henry  George  in  his  epochal  work,  Progress 
and  Poverty.  His  proposal  is  to  exempt  from  taxation  industry  and  all  forms 
of  property  save  land,  and  to  lay  upon  land  values,  or,  in  other  words,  upon 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  AND  DEMOCRACY      351 

conscience  will  decree  that  all  of  nature's  gifts  in  land  and 
all  increments  in  its  value  created  by  society  shall  belong  to 
society  and  shall  be  the  common  heritage  of  the  successive 
generations  of  men. 

Another  of  the  conventions  of  our  industrial  system  in  (»)  Limita- 
which  the  moral  sense  of  mankind  is  beginning  to  recognize  inheritance 
an  element  of  inequity  is  the  right  of  unlimited  inheritance. 
So  long  as  land  remains  the  common  property  of  the  com- 
munity, or  so  long  as  there  exists  substantial  equality  in 
wealth  among  the  members  or  families  of  a  social  group,  the 
injustice  of  this  is  not  apparent.  But  after  great  extremes  of 
poverty  and  wealth  have  appeared,  as  in  present-day  civiliza- 
tion, then  the  essential  injustice  of  the  institution  is  disclosed  ; 
for  there  is  thus  created  an  idle  class  living  on  the  labor  of 
others.  When  a  single  child  through  the  accident  of  birth 
becomes  the  heir  of  millions,  while  hundreds  of  other  chil- 
dren come  into  the  world  absolutely  portionless  and  at  the 
same  time  shut  out  from  the  use  of  any  bit  of  the  earth  even 
as  standing  room,  then  the  system  becomes  a  crass  denial  of 
human  solidarity  and  brotherhood.  And  there  is  in  this  law 
of  unlimited  bequest  a  double  wrong.  The  child  of  over-great 
wealth  is  wronged  as  well  as  the  child  of  poverty.  One  is  born 
to  a  life  of  luxurious  leisure,  and  the  other  to  a  life  of  unre- 
mitting toil.  Now,  as  Professor  Dewey  observes,  there  is  moral 
value  in  work  and  there  is  moral  value  in  leisure,  but  **  it  is 
beginning  to  be  seen  that  their  values  cannot  be  divided  so 

actual  or  potential  ground  rents,  a  tax  that  would  reclaim  practically  the 
whole  of  these  for  society,  and  secure  to  the  public  all  future  increments 
in  land  values  created  by  communal  growth  and  enterprise.  Since  this  tax 
is  to  take  the  place  of  all  other  forms  of  taxation  it  has  become  known  as 
"  the  single  tax."  Such  a  change  in  the  tax  system  would  inevitably  create 
a  hardship  in  a  few  cases,  but  a  hardship  almost  infinitesimal  as  compared 
with  that  now  inflicted  upon  the  many  by  the  preemption  of  the  earth  by 
a  class.  The  reform  would  undoubtedly,  as  claimed  by  its  advocates,  destroy 
private  monopoly  in  land,  the  root  which  nourishes  most  other  monopolies, 
and  secure  to  all  equal  right  of  access  to  the  earth  and  its  resources. 


352 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


(c)  Social- 
ism: the 
democrati- 
zation of 
industry 


that  one  social  class  shall  perform  the  labor  and  the  other 
enjoy  the  freedom."  * 

Therefore  the  ethical  demand  for  the  modification  of  our 
laws  of  inheritance  in  such  a  way  that  they  shall  recognize 
the  social  as  well  as  the  individual  element  in  wealth  must 
be  heeded  as  much  out  of  regard  for  the  children  of  the 
overrich  as  out  of  regard  for  the  children  of  the  very  poor. 

Still  another  institution  of  modern  industrialism  which  has 
come  or  is  coming  under  the  reprobation  of  the  present-day 
conscience  of  a  rapidly  growing  number  is  private  capitalism, 
that  is,  private  ownership  of  the  instruments  of  production, 
together  with  competition  and  the  wage  system,  the  necessary 
concomitants  of  this  capitalistic  regime.  These  new  ethical 
feelings  and  convictions  form  the  real  motive  force  in  the 
propaganda  of  modern  socialism.  The  presupposition  of  social- 
ism is  that  not  merely  ground  rents  but  all  returns  (interest, 
dividends,  profits)  on  every  form  of  private  capital  embody  an 
unearned  increment,  and  that  this  element  should  determine 
the  ownership  and  control  of  capital.  Hence  socialists  demand 
that  all  the  material  instruments  of  production  now  owned 
by  individuals  or  by  a  class  shall  be  held  in  common  ;  that 
there  shall  be  common,  democratic  management  of  production; 
that  competition,  as  inherently  unethical,2  shall  be  replaced 
by  cooperation  ;  and  that  the  wage  system  shall  be  replaced 
by  a  system  of  distribution  by  public  authority  which  shall 
give  the  manual  workers  of  the  world  a  more  equitable  share 
of  the  products  of  industry. 

Socialism  embodies  one  of  the  largest  funds  of  ethical 
feeling  that  have  become  active  in  Western  civilization  since 
the  incoming  of  Christianity.  In  truth,  in  its  real  essence 
and  purified  form  it  is  the  spirit  of  primitive  Christianity  at 


1  Dewey  and  Tufts,  Ethics  (1908),  p.  162. 

2  See  Ira  Woods  Howerth,  "  Competition,  Natural  and  Industrial,"  The 
International  Journal  of  Ethics  for  July,  1912. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  AND  DEMOCRACY      353 

work  in  the  industrial  domain.  It  is  a  recognition  of  human 
fraternity.  It  is  an  effort  to  unite  economics  and  ethics,  to 
make  business  life  a  realization  of  the  moral  ideal.  The  aim 
of  true  socialists  is  to  make  the  benefits  of  science,  invention, 
and  civilization  a  common  heritage.  They  recognize  that  soci- 
ety can  continuously  progress  only  as  these  benefits  become 
the  possession  not  merely  of  a  few  but  of  all.  In  the  disregard 
of  this  immutable  law  of  human  progress  they  discern  the 
main  cause  of  the  retrogression,  decay,  and  failure  of  every 
great  civilization  of  the  past ;  in  its  solicitous  fulfillment  they 
find  the  only  ground  of  hope  for  the  constant  improvement 
of  human  society  as  a  whole  and  the  uninterrupted  moral 
progress  of  the  world. 


J.    The  Ethics  of  Modern  Science 

We  have  already  referred  to  the  influence  of  modern  science  science 
upon  morals.    This  influence  has  been  felt  in  the  fostering  virtue  of 
of  specific  virtues  and  in  the  creation  of  a  certain  attitude  of  sincerity™1 
mind  toward  life  and  its  ethical  problems. 

Among  the  particular  virtues  which  science  has  fostered 
is  philosophical  veracity  or  love  of  truth.  This  virtue  of  intel- 
lectual sincerity  is  to  the  scientist  what  the  virtue  of  faith  or 
belief  is  to  the  churchman.  Without  it  there  is  no  salvation 
in  the  world  of  science.  The  man  of  science  must  be  a  truth- 
lover,  a  truth-seeker,  and  a  truth-teller.  He  must  take  every 
pains  to  find  out  what  is  the  exact  fact,  and  then  make  a 
scrupulously  veracious  report  of  what  he  has  found.  He  must 
be  loyal  to  the  truth  at  all  hazards. 

This  reverent  regard  for  the  truth,  this  intellectual  sin- 
cerity, which  is  the  cardinal  virtue  of  the  man  of  science,  is 
fostered  in  him  partly  by  the  recognition  of  the  supreme 
importance  of  exactness  when  it  comes  to  the  application  of 
scientific  knowledge  to  the  arts  of  life.  The  least  departure 
here  from  the  truth  of  the  matter  means  dire  disaster  and 


354 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


loss.  Then  also  the  veraciousness  of  nature  reacts  upon  the 
student  of  her  laws.  Nature  is  not  only  infinitely  exact  in  all 
her  movements,  but  punctual  in  the  fulfillment  of  all  her  en- 
gagements. She  keeps  her  word  with  us,  as  Emerson  says. 
She  is  the  same  yesterday,  to-day,  and  forever.  The  careless, 
unveracious  man  can  enter  into  no  partnership  with  her. 

Open-mindedness  and  impartiality  are  elements  of  this 
virtue  of  intellectual  veracity.  The  wide  divergence  between 
philosophical  and  theological  morality  is  here  impressed  upon 
the  student  of  moral  ideals  and  standards.  In  the  ethics  of 
theology  doubt,  even  sincere  doubt,  is  reckoned  as  an  unfor- 
tunate infirmity,  or  often  as  positive  and  fatal  sin.  Science, 
on  the  other  hand,  reckons  it  a  cardinal  duty.  Hardening 
oneself  in  belief  when  there  are  circumstances  calculated  to 
awaken  doubt,  even  the  slightest  conceivable  doubt,  is  justly 
regarded  by  the  man  of  science  as  treachery  to  truth  and 
an  unpardonable  sin. 

It  is  in  the  creation  of  this  scientific  conscience,  which 
pronounces  the  habit  of  accuracy,  open-mindedness,  impar- 
tiality of  judgment,  love  of  truth  for  truth's  sake  a  supreme 
virtue,  that  science  has  rendered  one  of  its  greatest  services 
to  morality. 


Egotistic 
tendencies 
of  the 
doctrine  of 
evolution: 
the  philos- 
ophy of 
Nietzsche 


The  scientific  doctrine  of  evolution,  which  teaches  that 
life  has  advanced  from  lower  to  higher  forms  through  strug- 
gle and  competition,  resulting  in  the  survival  of  the  fittest, 
has  exercised  a  profound  influence  upon  all  the  sciences  re- 
lating to  man,  but  upon  none  has  it  left  a  deeper  impress 
than  upon  the  science  of  ethics.1    Nor  have  its  effects  here 


1  M  We  may  fairly  ask  whether  there  is  a  single  moral  question  of  any 
magnitude  which  intelligent  and  educated  men  would  answer  to-day  in  pre- 
cisely the  same  fashion  as  they  would  have  done  before  the  publication  of 
Darwin's  Origin  of  Species  "  (Taylor,  The  Problem  of Conduct (1901),  pp.  57  f.). 
See  also  Huxley,  Evolution  and  Ethics  (1899).  Huxley  maintains  that  the 
"cosmic  process"  is  nonethical  and  in  direct  opposition  to  the  ethical 
evolution  going  on  in  human  society. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  AND  DEMOCRACY      355 

been  confined  to  ethical  speculation ;  it  has  largely  shaped 
and  molded  actual  conduct. 

In  some  respects  this  influence  has  been  harmful  to  both 
ethical  theory  and  practice.  In  the  domain  of  philosophy  it 
may  best  be  traced  in  the  teachings  of  Nietzsche.  Nietzsche 
insists  that  man  must  follow  the  lead  of  nature ;  that  the 
struggle  for  existence  must  be  kept  up  on  the  human  plane 
just  as  it  goes  on  in  the  lower  realms  of  life  ;  that  the  strong 
should  use  for  their  own  advancement  the  weak ;  that  the 
nurture  and  care  of  the  defective  and  weak  is  a  crime  against 
humanity1  —  for  "the  hope  of  the  future  lies  in  perfecting 
the  strong,  not  in  strengthening  the  weak  "  ;  that  only  through 
the  struggle  for  existence  has  nature  produced  her  highest 
type,  man,  and  that  it  is  only  through  obedience  to  this  great 
cosmic  law,  in  accordance  with  which  the  higher  prey  upon 
the  lower,  that  "the  superman,"  the  highest  possible  type 
of  mankind,  can  be  brought  into  existence. 

This  teaching  tends  to  steel  the  heart  against  human  sym- 
pathy and  to  blunt  all  the  finer  sensibilities.  It  seems  to 
justify  and  excuse  all  kinds  of  antisocial  action.  And,  indeed, 
the  doctrine  has  been  used  as  a  justification  and  excuse  not 
only  of  individual  self-assertion  and  egotism  but  of  national 
and  race  self-assertion  and  egotism  as  well.  Modern  impe- 
rialism has  sought  to  justify  aggression  upon  weaker  and  so- 
called  "  inferior  races  "  by  an  appeal  to  this  law  of  evolution 

1  w  The  best  is  wanting  when  selfishness  begins  to  be  deficient "  ("  The 
Twilight  of  the  Gods,"  The  Works  of  Friedrich  Nietzsche,  ed.  Alexander 
Tille,  vol.  xi,  p.  191).  "The  weak  and  ill-constituted  shall  perish.  .  .  .  What 
is  more  injurious  than  any  crime  ?  Practical  sympathy  for  all  the  ill-consti- 
tuted and  weak  —  Christianity"  ("The  Antichrist,"  ibid.  vol.  xi,  p.  238). 
This  way  of  thinking  and  talking  is  by  no  means  exclusively  modern.  Cal- 
licles,  in  Plato's  Gorgias,  says  to  Socrates:  "And  therefore  this  seeking  to 
have  more  than  the  many  is  conventionally  said  to  be  shameful  and  unjust, 
and  is  called  injustice,  whereas  nature  herself  intimates  that  it  is  just  for 
the  better  to  have  more  than  the  worse,  the  more  powerful  than  the  weaker; 
and  in  many  ways,  among  men  as  well  as  among  animals,  and  indeed  among 
whole  cities  and  races,  that  justice  consists  in  the  superior  ruling  over  and 
having  more  than  the  inferior  "  (Jowett's  Dialogues  0/  Plato,  vol.  iii,  p.  72). 


356 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


Altruism 
versus 
egotism  in 
the  cosmic 
process 


as  it  works  on  the  lower  levels  of  life.  Thus  the  doctrine  has 
in  a  certain  measure  fostered  national  egotism,  and  has  stood 
right  in  the  way  of  the  development  of  a  true  international 
morality. 

But  these  drifts  toward  egotism  in  modern  philosophy  and 
life  induced  by  evolutionary  science  are  more  than  compen- 
sated by  opposing  movements  of  ethical  thought  created  by 
a  truer  interpretation  of  the  facts  of  evolution  and  a  deeper 
insight  into  the  cosmic  process.1 

The  philosophy  of  Nietzsche  is  a  strange  misreading  of 
nature.  To  say  that  self-sacrifice  is  "in  open  defiance  of 
nature,"  is  to  overlook  the  dominant  fact  in  evolution,  namely, 
maternity ;  for  maternity,  motherhood,  is  only  another  name 
for  self-sacrifice.  And  it  is  further  to  overlook  the  fact  that 
the  principle  of  cooperation  is  even  more  dominant  and  con- 
trolling in  the  cosmic  process  than  the  principle  of  compe- 
tition. Social  animals,  those  in  which  the  altruistic  instincts 
are  most  strongly  developed,  greatly  outnumber  the  unsocial, 
solitary  animals.2  The  Carnivora,  those  animals  that  live  by 
preying  upon  others,  are  becoming  extinct.  On  the  plane  of 
human  life  this  principle  of  cooperation,  of  mutual  helpful- 
ness, has  supplanted,  or  is  gradually  supplanting,  the  lower 
principle  of  competition.  In  the  struggle  for  existence  be- 
tween tribes  and  peoples  those  groups  have  gained  suprem- 
acy that  have  developed  the  strongest  social  instincts ;  that 
is,  those  within  which  the  principle  of  cooperation  and  the 
virtue  of  the  self-devotion  of  the  individual  to  the  welfare 
of  the  whole  have  been  dominant  forces  in  the  life  of  the 
community.  From  these  facts  we  are  justified  in  assuming 
that  it  is  the  altruistic  and  not  the  egoistic  instincts  and 

1  See  Kropotkin,  Mutual  Aid. 

2  "  The  animal  species  in  which  individual  struggle  has  been  reduced 
to  its  narrowest  limits,  and  the  practice  of  mutual  aid  has  attained  the 
greatest  development,  are  invariably  the  most  numerous,  the  most  pros- 
perous, and  the  most  open  to  further  progress"  (Kropotkin,  Mutual  Aid 
(1909),  p.  293).    See  also  Bixby,  The  Crisis  in  Morals  (1891),  p.  235. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  AND  DEMOCRACY      357 

motives  that  nature  aims  to  make  the  permanent  and  con- 
trolling factors  in  the  cosmic  evolution. 

Again,  that  nature  is  ethical  in  her  aim  is  disclosed  by  the 
fact  that  she  has  brought  forth  such  a  being  as  man.  Her 
preferences  are  shown  in  the  preferences  of  the  being  she 
has  produced.1  Man  prefers  good  to  evil ;  he  loves  justice 
and  hates  injustice ;  he  reveres  the  truth  and  detests  false- 
hood ;  he  recognizes  that  self-sacrifice  is  nobler  than  selfish- 
ness ;  he  divines  the  final  triumph  of  his  ethical  ideals.  In 
man  —  at  his  best  —  nature  reveals  her  preferences.  Man  is 
the  answer  to  the  question,  "  Is  Nature  good  ?  "  2 

Viewed  thus  from  a  higher  standpoint  the  cosmic  process 
of  evolution  has  reenforced  faith  in  a  moral  order  of  the 
universe  and  has  been  an  inspiration  and  an  incentive  to 
humanitarian  effort.3 

In  Brahmanic  India  and  in  all  Buddhist  lands  religious  Evolution 
beliefs  have,  as  we  have  seen,  placed  the  whole  animal  ere-  ethics  4 
ation  under  the  protection  of  the  moral  feelings.    In  ancient 

1  See  Dewey,  "  Is  Nature  Good,"  Hibbert  Journal  for  July,  1909. 

2  "'Ye  have  compassion  on  one  another':  this  struck  me  much  :  Allah 
might  have  made  you  having  no  compassion  on  one  another,  —  how  had  it 
been  then  ?  This  is  a  great  direct  thought,  a  glance  at  first  hand  into  the 
very  fact  of  things"  (Carlyle,  Heroes  and  Hero  Worship,  "The  Hero  as 
Prophet").  The  Gdthas  have  the  same  thought:  "Who,  O  Great  Creator! 
is  the  inspirer  of  the  good  thoughts  (within  our  souls)  ?  Who  .  .  .  hath 
made  the  son  revering  the  father  ?  "  ( Yasna  xliv.  4,  7,  Sacred  Books  of  the 
East,  vol.  xxxi). 

3  "  In  the  new  way  of  looking  at  things,  which  came  to  the  world  from 
Darwin,  there  is  hope  and  cheer,  if  we  but  take  the  matter  aright.  Only 
consider  what  his  doctrine  pi  the  shaping  power  of  environment  is  leading 
us  to  do  in  bettering  the  conditions  of  the  poor,  the  defective,  the  prone 
to  crime.  His  demonstration  that  circumstances  may  make  or  break  a  man, 
is  a  clarion  call  to  humanitarian  zeal.  And  his  teaching  of  the  infinite  vari- 
ability of  species,  and  of  the  indefinite  progress  which  man  may  make  in 
the  cultivation  of  humane  and  moral  qualities,  is  one  that  looks  distinctly 
to  the  perfectibility  of  the  race."  —  The  New  York  Nation  for  January  7, 
1909,  p.  7. 

4  On  this  subject  see  Evans,  Evolutional  Ethics  and  Animal  Psychology 
(1898). 


358  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

Persia  it  was  religious  ideas  which  caused  one  half  of  the 
lower  animal  world  to  be  regarded  as  sacred  and  thus  to  be 
brought  within  the  protective  pale  of  morals. 

Dogmatic  Christianity,  falling  far  short  of  the  ethics  of 
Judaism  in  this  domain,  created  a  vast  rift  in  the  organic 
world  between  man  and  the  lower  animals.  The  dumb  crea- 
tures were  declared  to  be  made  solely  for  man's  use  and 
enjoyment.  Psychical  relationship  between  them  and  man 
was  denied,  though  the  ancient  world  had  very  generally 
assumed  this.  Indeed,  this  attitude  of  the  Christian  dogma- 
tists toward  the  animal  creation  was  made  a  matter  of 
reproach  by  their  pagan  critics. 

These  teachings  were  not  without  their  influence  on  prac- 
tice. Humanity  to  animals  became  a  less  prominent  virtue 
than  it  had  been  in  pre-Christian  times.  The  closeness  to 
nature  of  the  lives  of  the  medieval  hermits  and  monks  often 
caused,  it  is  true,  a  feeling  of  tenderness  to  be  awakened  in 
them  for  their  "  brothers,"  the  birds  and  animals,  which 
found  expression  in  many  beautiful  legends.  But  in  general 
the  attitude  of  the  Christian  world  toward  the  lower  animals 
has  been  unsympathetic. 

The  doctrine  of  evolution,  however,  teaching  the  kinship 
of  all  life,  has  bridged  the  gulf  between  man  and  the  lower 
animal  world,  and  has  brought  all  dumb  creatures  more  pos- 
itively than  ever  before  in  the  Western  world  under  the  pro- 
tection of  the  moral  sentiment.  Societies  for  the  prevention 
of  cruelty  to  animals  have  sprung  up  and  increased  in  number 
as  in  no  other  epoch  of  the  Christian  era.  The  new  moral 
feeling  condemns  all  inhumanity  to  dumb  creatures,  and  looks 
with  disapproval  upon  such  sports  as  cockfighting,  bear  bait- 
ing, and  bullfights,  which  were  favorite  amusements  only  a 
few  generations  ago.1    Hunting  for  pastime  is  also  coming 

1  When  in  1654  matches  for  cockfighting  were  forbidden  in  England 
the  reason  for  the  prohibition  was  not  that  it  was  cruel  to  the  birds,  but 
for  the  reason  that  the  matches  were  "  commonly  accompanied  with  gam- 
ing, drinking,  swearing,  quarreling,  and  other  dissolute  practices  "  (Pike, 


research 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  AND  DEMOCRACY      359 

under  the  condemnation  of  this  growing  moral  sentiment. 
Thus  "  through  the  portals  of  spiritual  kinship,"  in  the  words 
of  Professor  Evans,  ..."  our  elder  brothers  enter  into  the 
temple  of  justice,  and  enjoy  the  privilege  of  sanctuary  against 
the  wanton  or  unwitting  cruelty  hitherto  authorized  by  the 
assumptions  and  usurpations  of  man."  1 

It  is  undeniable  that  the  earlier  tendency  of  modern  science  import  for 
was  agnostic  and  materialistic.  It  caused  in  many  minds  an  psychical 
attenuation  or  an  absolute  destruction  of  the  belief  in  a  super- 
sensuous  world  and  a  life  after  death.  The  practical  effect  of 
this  fading  from  the  eyes  of  men  of  the  vision  of  another 
world  was,  upon  certain  temperaments,  a  loss  of  faith  in  the 
ethical  character  of  the  cosmic  process  and  a  consequent 
lessening  of  moral  enthusiasm. 

This  attitude  of  mind,  which  is  still  that  of  a  large  class, 
can  be  changed  only  by  the  reaffirmation  by  science  of  the 
assumptions  and  teachings  of  all  the  great  world  religions 
respecting  the  existence  of  a  supersensuous  world  and  a  fu- 
ture life.  It  is  therefore  a  matter  of  immeasurable  import  to 
morality  that  these  assumptions  of  religion  are  coming  to  be 
regarded  by  an  ever-growing  number  of  scientists  as  well 
founded  in  reality.  Psychical  research  has  given  a  new  trend 
to  large  sections  of  scientific  speculation.2    It  is  no  longer 

A  History  of  Crime  in  England  (1873),  v°l-  "»  P-  186).  Consult  further, 
Lecky,  Rationalism  in  Europe  (1890),  vol.  i,  pp.  307  f. 

1  Evolutional  Ethics  and  Animal  Psychology  (1898),  p.  18.  Darwinism 
has  without  doubt  also  aided  the  vegetarians  in  their  crusade  against  the 
use  of  animal  flesh  for  food,  and  in  conjunction  with  the  influence  of  East- 
ern ideas  and  convictions  may  cause  ultimately  a  great  change  in  the  ethi- 
cal feelings  of  the  Western  peoples  respecting  this  practice.  They  may 
come  to  regard  it  with  the  same  deep  moral  reprobation  as  is  now  felt  by 
Eastern  moralists.  "  For  my  part,"  says  the  Japanese  writer  Nitobe,  M  the 
surprising  thing  is  that  Europ*ean  ethics  can  be  so  atavistic  as  to  stoop  to 
a  sort  of  cannibalism  "  {Fifty  Years  of  New  fapan  (1909),  vol.  ii,  p.  462). 

2  See  Frederic  W.  H.  Myers,  Human  Personality  (1903),  2  vols.;  Sir 
Oliver  Lodge,  The  Survival  of  Man  (1909) ;  James  H.  Hyslop,  Enigmas  of 
Psychical  Research  (1906);  W.  F.  Barrett,  Psychical  Research  (191 2). 


360  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

crassly  materialistic.  It  even  assumes  the  existence  of  a  super- 
sensuous  world.  Thus  at  the  conclusion  of  a  careful  survey 
of  the  evidence  of  man's  survival  gathered  by  the  English 
Society  for  Psychical  Research,  the  distinguished  physicist 
Sir  Oliver  Lodge  writes  :  "  The  boundary  between  the  two 
states  —  the  known  and  the  unknown  —  is  still  substantial, 
but  it  is  wearing  thin  in  places ;  and  like  excavators  engaged 
in  boring  a  tunnel  from  opposite  ends,  amid  the  roar  of  water 
and  other  noises,  we  are  beginning  to  hear  now  and  again  the 
strokes  of  the  pickaxes  of  our  comrades  on  the  other  side."  * 
Incontrovertible  proof  of  man's  survival  after  bodily  death 
would  mark  the  opening  of  a  new  era  in  the  moral  life  of 
humanity  ;  for,  in  the  minds  of  many,  u  ethics  can  be  ren- 
dered ethical  only  on  the  assumption  that  there  is  a  reality 
deeper  than  the  phenomenal  world  of  sense,  truer  than  the 
world  we  know  and  better."  2  It  was  doubtless  a  conviction 
that  the  future  of  both  religion  and  morality  is  in  large  meas- 
ure dependent  upon  a  firm  belief  in  a  future  life  which  led 
William  Ewart  Gladstone  to  say  of  psychical  research  that  it 
is  "  the  most  important  work  which  is  being  done  in  the  world 
—  by  far  the  most  important."  Indisputably,  the  reaction  of 
another  world  lying  clear  and  distinct  in  the  light  of  science 
beyond  the  frontiers  of  earth  would  give  new  meaning  to  life 
and  a  fresh  impulse  to  the  moral  progress  of  the  race.  The 
effect  upon  the  moral  life  of  the  modern  world  would  be  not 
less  profound  than  that  produced  upon  the  moral  life  of  the 
ancient  world  by  the  incoming  of  Christianity  with  its  glad 
affirmation  of  a  life  beyond  the  tomb. 

4.   The  Ethics  of  Theology 
The  pro-  In  an  admirable  chapter  entitled  "  Ethics  and  Theology  " 

2TCSS1V© 

moraiiza-     the  author  of  Moral  Evolution,  after  noting  how  religious 

tion  of  the 

idea  of  God  1  The  Survival  of  Man  (1909),  p.  341. 

2  George  William  Knox,  "  Religion  and  Ethics,"  International  Journal 
of  Ethics  for  April,  1902. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  AND  DEMOCRACY      361 

ideas  and  beliefs  exert  an  influence  on  moral  ideas  and  con- 
duct, remarks  :  "  Now  we  are  to  observe  that  moral  ideals 
have,  in  their  turn,  modified  and  clarified  doctrine,  or,  in  other 
words,  that  there  has  been  an  ethical  development  of  theology, 
and  that  contempt  of  creed  is  really  the  substitution  of  a  moral 
for  an  immoral  or  a  nonmoral  theology."  *  The  same  truth  is 
expressed  by  Newman  Smyth  in  these  words :  "  Reformations 
have  grown  out  of  the  ethical  protest  of  the  Christian  mind 
against  inherited  dogmas.  Old  theology  is  always  becoming 
new  in  the  vitalizing  influence  of  ethics."  2 

As  a  result  of  the  growth  and  refinement  of  the  moral 
feelings,  there  has  been  going  on  in  wide  circles  in  Western 
Christendom  just  such  a  change  in  men's  conception  of  the 
character  of  God  as  marked  the  best  Hebrew  thought  during 
the  later  centuries  of  the  history  of  the  people  of  Israel.  The 
idea  of  God  inherited  by  the  modern  from  the  medieval  age 
was  an  incongruous  blending  of  ideas  derived  from  three 
different  sources.  There  was,  first,  the  crude  archaic  notion 
of  deity  derived  from  the  Old  Testament  records  of  what  con- 
duct in  his  chosen  people  Yahweh  approved ;  second,  the 
dogmas  of  Augustinian  theology  respecting  imputed  sin, 
election,  everlasting  punishment,  and  other  supposed  prin- 
ciples of  the  divine  government ;  and  third,  conceptions 
wholly  inconsistent  with  these  drawn  from  the  New  Testa- 
ment narratives  of  the  life  and  teachings  of  the  Prophet  of 
Nazareth. 

Gradually,  through  the  growth  of  the  moral  feelings,  this 
conception  of  the  divine  character  has  been  purged  of  its 
grosser,  archaic,  and  immoral  elements.  The  early  Hebrew 
ideas  have  been  rejected  as  the  immature  and  unworthy 

1  George  Harris,  Moral  Evolution  (1896),  p.  392. 

2  Christian  Ethics  (1892),  p.  11.  Lecky  makes  a  similar  observation: 
"  Generation  after  generation  the  power  of  the  moral  faculty  becomes 
more  absolute,  the  doctrines  that  oppose  it  wane  and  vanish,  and  the  vari- 
ous elements  of  theology  are  absorbed  and  recast  by  its  influence"  {History 
of  Rationalism  in  Europe  (1890),  vol.  i,  pp.  351  f.). 


362  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

notions  of  deity  of  a  race  still  on  a  low  plane  of  religious 
development;  the  Calvinistic  idea  of  God  has  become  "the 
supreme  incredibility  "  ;  while  the  Gospel  teaching  of  deity 
has  been  received  by  the  instructed  reason  and  conscience 
as  the  only  credible  ideal  of  the  divine.1 

Since,  as  we  have  repeatedly  had  brought  to  our  attention, 
religious  ideas  exert  a  profound  influence  on  moral  ideas  and 
on  conduct,  this  moralization  of  the  conception  of  the  divine 
character  has  deep  significance  for  the  progressive  purification 
and  refinement  of  the  moral  life  of  man. 

The  moral-  Closely  connected  with  these  changes  in  men's  idea  of 
the  concep-  God,  indeed  forming  a  part  of  that  conception,  are  the 
future*  changes  which  have  taken  place  in  their  ideas  of  the  divine 
punishment  government  in  the  hereafter. 

At  different  stages  of  our  study  we  have  noted  how  the 
classifications  and  arrangements  of  the  invisible  world  are  the 
work  of  the  moral  faculty,  and  how  the  developing  moral 
feelings  of  the  historic  peoples  have,  with  the  lapse  of  time, 
ever  modified  anew  the  topography  and  moralized  afresh 
the  government  of  the  world  of  spirits.2 

Now  one  of  the  most  important  modifications  ever  effected 
in  man's  conceptions  of  the  other  world  was  brought  about  by 
the  Protestant  Reformation.  The  reformers  abolished  purga- 
tory, and  thus  left  only  two  separate  realms,  heaven  and  hell, 
in  the  world  of  souls.  But  in  abolishing  purgatory  and  thereby 
making  all  suffering  in  the  hereafter  punitive  and  eternal,  and 
in  failing  to  recognize  gradations  of  guilt  in  human  sin  by 
consigning  all  evildoers,  unbelievers,  and  misbelievers  to  the 

1 "  It  is  because  the  ethical  ideals  of  Christendom  have  become  so 
wonderfully  enlarged  and  perfected  within  the  last  half  century  that  the 
character  of  God  has  taken  on  such  new  and  glorious  forms.  The  God 
whom  Christian  people  generally  believe  in  and  worship  is  a  very  different 
being  from  the  one  they  were  thinking  about  and  praying  to  when  I  began 
my  ministry."  —  Washington  Gladden  (in  report  of  address). 

2  See  above,  pp.  35,  164,  and  187. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  AND  DEMOCRACY      363 

same  awful  and  everlasting  torments,  the  reformers  made  still 
more  unethical  the  government  which  the  popular  medieval 
imagination  had  created  for  the  unseen  world. 

The  gradual  clarification  and  growing  sensitiveness  of  the 
moral  feelings  could  not  long  leave  unchallenged  such  a 
grossly  immoral  notion  of  the  divine  government.  During 
the  last  two  generations  a  notable  change  has  passed  over 
men's  conceptions  of  the  netherworld  of  spirits.  The  hell 
of  the  reformers'  imagination  has  become,  like  much  else  in 
the  Augustinian  theology,  "  the  supreme  incredibility."  The 
blurring  of  that  awful  vision  is  one  of  the  most  significant 
changes  which,  during  the  Christian  era,  have  passed  over 
that  world  which  is  at  once  the  creation  and  the  creator  of 
human  morality. 

The  advance  in  religious  ethics  during  the  last  few  decades  Exchange 
is  registered  again  in  the  exchange  in  rank  of  the  theological  0f  the  theo- 
and  the  natural  gospel  virtues  in  the  moral  ideal  of  Protes-  S?a*toSa 
tant  Christendom.    During  this  period  there  has  taken  place  G?spei 
here  a  genuine  "  transvaluation  of  moral  values."   Many  rep- 
resentative religious  teachers  have  come  to  assign  a  dominant 
place  in  the  ethical  standard  to  the  natural  social  virtues,  and 
have  relegated  to  a  lower  place  the  purely  theological  virtues, 
such  as  right  religious  belief  and  ritual  observances.    In  the 
case  of  many  the  rejection  of  that  part  of  the  moral  code 
resting  upon  theological  dogmas  is  as  complete  as  was  the 
rejection  by  Christianity  of  the  morality  based  on  the  ceremo- 
nial laws  of  the  Jews.    With  these  the  saving  virtue  is  no 
longer  acceptance  of  a  prescribed  creed,  but  loving,   self- 
denying  service  of  humanity.1 

This  transvaluation  of  moral  values  within  the  Church  it- 
self is  one  of  the  most  important  movements  going  on  in 
the  moral  life  of  the  modern  world. 

1  Cf.  Borden  Parker  Bowne,  The  Essence  of  Religion  (1910),  chap,  iv, 
"  Righteousness  the  Essence  of  Religion." 


364 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


Extension 
to  theologi- 
cal ethics 
of  the 
principle  of 
individual 
responsi- 
bility 


Further  illustration  of  progress  in  Church  ethics  in  recent 
times  is  found  in  the  extension  of  the  principle  of  individual 
responsibility  to  the  domain  of  religion.1  It  will  be  recalled 
how  completely  the  law  of  collective  responsibility  dominates 
the  morality  of  primitive  peoples.2  With  the  growth  and  clear- 
ing of  the  moral  sense  the  injustice  of  this  is  perceived,  and  the 
principle  of  individual  responsibility  comes  to  be  established. 

This  moral  movement  is  consummated  earlier  in  the  civil 
than  in  the  religious  domain  ;  that  is,  the  civil-law  codes  are 
first  modified  in  accordance  with  the  demands  of  the  truer 
ethical  feeling,  and  not  until  later  does  the  religious  code, 
more  conservative,  undergo  a  like  change.  Thus  gradually 
during  the  medieval  time  the  civil  law  of  the  more  advanced 
nations  of  Western  Christendom  abrogated  the  principle  of  col- 
lective responsibility,  while  the  ecclesiastical  code  retained  it  far 
into  the  nineteenth  century.  During  the  last  fifty  years,  how- 
ever, the  best  conscience  of  the  Church  has  rejected  the  princi- 
ple as  the  embodiment  of  a  gross  inequity.  The  doctrine  that 
all  the  generations  of  men  sinned  in  the  first  parent  and  justly 
suffer  for  his  transgression  has  been  repudiated  by  the  modern 
instructed  conscience  as  incredible,  untrue,  and  immoral. 

This  repudiation  of  the  principle  of  collective  responsibility 
by  the  ethics  of  religion  harmonizes  in  this  respect  Church 
morality  with  the  morality  of  the  civil  codes  of  the  civilized 
world,  and  marks  the  consummation  of  an  ethical  evolution 
which,  commencing  in  the  dawn  of  civilization,  covers  all  the 
millenniums  of  human  history. 


5.    Social  Ethics:    the  New  Social  Conscience 

(a)  As  man-       By  the  phrase  "  social  conscience,"  as  we  shall  use  it  here, 

the  history  we  mean  those  ethical  feelings  and  judgments  which  cover 

African  the  relations  of  master  and  slave  and  the  relations  of  society 

slave  trade  to  jts  unf0rtunate  and  erring  members. 

1  Westermarck,  The  Origin  and  Development  of  the  Moral  Ideas  (1908), 
vol.  i,  p.  72.  2  See  above,  p.  18. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  AND  DEMOCRACY      3^5 

In  the- entire  history  of  the  moral  evolution  of  humanity 
there  is  no  chapter  which  reveals  so  plainly  the  upward  trend 
of  the  ethical  movement  in  civilization  as  that  which  tells  the 
story  of  the  beginnings  and  the  final  suppression  of  the  Afri- 
can slave  trade,  and  of  the  rise  and  fall  of  the  institution  of 
negro  slavery  among  Christian  peoples.1  Restricting  our  sur- 
vey for  the  moment  to  the  slave  trade  as  distinct  from  slavery, 
the  amazing  fact  which  meets  us  here  at  the  outset  is  that 
until  late  in,  the  modern  period  the  peoples  of  Western  Chris- 
tendom had  practically  no  conscience  whatsoever  in  regard  to 
the  African  slave  trade,  and  this  notwithstanding  that  the 
conscience  of  the  age  was  in  many  other  matters  true  and 
sensitive.  The  whole  subject  lay  practically  outside  the  realm 
of  morals.  The  slave  trade  was  looked  upon  as  a  perfectly 
legitimate  business.2  Practically  no  one  thought  it  wrong  to 
go  to  Africa,  kidnap  or  purchase  a  shipload  of  the  natives, 
bring  them  in  stifling  holds  —  where  sometimes  half  the  un- 
happy victims  died  on  the  passage  —  to  the  West  Indies  or  to 
the  Spanish  and  English  mainland  of  the  Americas  and  sell 
them  as  slaves.3  What  little  opposition  to  the  traffic  existed, 
arose  in  general  from  other  than  feelings  of  moral  disapproval.4 

1  w  Along  with  the  gloomy  record  of  the  two  hundred  fifty  years  of  negro 
slavery  we  find  the  history  of  its  abolition ;  perhaps  the  most  impressive 
history  on  record  of  the  origin  and  completion  of  a  purification  of  the 
moral  consciousness  of  peoples."  —  Caldecott,  English  Colonization  and 
Empire  (1891),  p.  196. 

2  "  In  Elizabeth's  time  Sir  John  Hawkins  initiated  the  slave  trade,  and 
in  commemoration  of  the  achievement  was  allowed  to  put  in  his  coat  of 
arms  '  a  demi-moor,  proper  bound  with  a  cord ' ;  the  honorableness  of  his 
action  being  thus  assumed  by  himself  and  recognized  by  Queen  and  pub- 
lic."—  Spencer,  Principles  of  Ethics  (1892),  vol.  i,  p.  468. 

8  By  a  provision  of  the  Peace  of  Utrecht  (17 14)  England  secured  the 
contract  known  as  the  Assiento,  which  gave  English  subjects  the  sole 
right  for  thirty  years  of  shipping  annually  4800  African  slaves  to  the 
Spanish  colonies  in  America. 

4  In  the  Southern  colonies  the  opposition  to  the  further  importation  of 
negroes  sprang  in  general  from  the  fear  of  the  insurrection  of  the  slaves, 
should  they  become  too  numerous.  The  little  opposition  that  existed  in 
some  of  the  Middle  States  was  based  almost  wholly  on  economic  grounds. 


366 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


(6)  As  man- 
ifested in 
the  anti- 
slavery 
movement 


The  movement  for  the  abolition  of  the  trade  constitutes  an 
important  phase  of  the  social  and  moral  life,  particularly  of 
England  and  of  the  English  colonies  in  America,  during  the 
latter  part  of  the  eighteenth  century  and  the  earlier  part  of 
the  nineteenth.  In  England  the  wave  of  humanitarian  feel- 
ing which  swept  away  the  obstacles  set  in  the  way  of  the 
abolition  of  the  traffic  by  selfish  interests  was  raised  by  the 
great  religious  revival  led  by  Whitefield  and  the  Wesleys. 
The  leaders  of  the  reform  were  Thomas  Clarkson  and  William 
Wilberforce.  After  twenty  years  of  agitation  a  bill  was  passed 
abolishing  the  trade  (1807).  This  marked  as  great  a  moral 
victory  as  ever  was  won  in  the  English  Parliament,  for  it  was 
the  aroused  moral  sentiment  of  the  nation  which  was  the  main 
force  that  carried  the  reform  measure  through  the  Houses. 

In  America  there  had  arisen  among  the  Quakers  of  Penn- 
sylvania, even  before  the  Revolution,  a  protest  against  the 
trade  on  purely  moral  grounds.  By  the  time  the  Federal 
Convention  met  in  1787  sufficient  sentiment  had  been  de- 
veloped in  the  matter  to  secure  the  adoption  of  a  provision 
in  the  Constitution  to  the  effect  that  the  importation  of  slaves 
should  cease  in  1808.  From  that  year  on,  the  slave  trade,  as 
distinct  from  slavery,  was  under  the  ban  both  of  the  law  and 
of  the  public  conscience ;  but  it  continued  to  be  carried  on 
clandestinely  until  the  Civil  War. 

Even  before  the  consummation  of  the  movement  for  the 
suppression  of  the  negro  slave  trade  there  had  sprung  up  an 
agitation  for  the  suppression  of  the  negro-slave  system  itself. 
England  abolished  slavery  in  her  colonies  in  1833,  paying 
^20,000,000  for  the  emancipation  of  800,000  slaves  in  her 
West  India  possessions.  In  the  United  States  there  was 
very  little  antislavery  feeling  prior  to  1830.1  At  that  time 

1  The  first  abolition  paper  was  established  in  1821,  but  the  movement 
it  represented  soon  died  out.  The  movement  started  anew  with  the  ap- 
pearance of  The  Liberator 'in  1831.  See  Albert  Bushnell  Hart,  Slavery  and 
Abolition  (1906),  pp.  173  ff. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  AND  DEMOCRACY     367 

the  great  majority  of  the  peoples  of  the  Northern  as  well 
as  of  the  Southern  states,  if  they  did  not  look  upon  negro 
slavery  as  wholly  proper  and  right,  at  least  regarded  as 
reprehensible  any  interference  with  the  institution  where 
established.  Even  the  Church  in  general  denounced  the  abo- 
litionists as  infidels  and  pronounced  their  conduct  fanatical 
and  wicked.1  But  notwithstanding  this  opposition  the  abo- 
lition movement  and  the  movement  for  the  restriction  of  slav- 
ery to  the  states  where  already  established  gained  impetus 
steadily,  and  the  heated  debate  led  up  quickly  to  the  Civil  War. 

The  most  significant  thing  in  that  passage  of  our  history 
is  not  the  revolt  of  the  South,  but  the  revolt  of  the  conscience 
of  the  North.  Had  there  been  no  moral  revolt  in  the  North, 
there  would  have  been  no  slaveholders'  revolt  in  the  South. 

The  development  of  moral  feeling  respecting  the  wrong- 
fulness of  slavery  did  not  cease  with  the  emancipation  of  the 
slaves  as  a  result  of  the  Civil  War.  Indeed,  with  the  reform 
an  accomplished  fact,  the  clarification  of  the  moral  sense  of 
the  people  has  gone  on  uninterruptedly  until  a  gulf  has  come 
to  separate  the  present-day  conscience  of  the  great  majority 
of  the  instructed  and  thinking  classes  in  both  sections  of  the 
Union  from  the  conscience  of  the  same  classes  one  or  two 
generations  ago. 

1  H  When  Garrison  began  his  work,  he  thought  nothing  was  more  like 
the  spirit  of  Christ  .  .  .  than  to  bring  a  whole  race  of  people  out  of  sin 
and  debasement,  .  .  .  but  he  soon  found  that  neither  minister  nor  church 
anywhere  in  the  lower  South  continued  to  protest  against  slavery ;  that  the 
cloth  in  the  North  was  arrayed  against  him,  and  that  many  northern  divines 
entered  the  lists  against  abolition,  especially  Moses  Stuart,  Professor  of 
Hebrew  in  Andover  Theological  Seminary,  who  justified  slavery  from  the 
New  Testament;  President  Lord  of  Dartmouth  College,  who  held  that 
slavery  was  an  institution  of  God,  according  to  natural  law ;  and  Hopkins, 
Episcopal  bishop  of  Vermont,  who  came  forward  as  a  thick  and  thin  de- 
fender of  slavery.  The  positive  opposition  of  churches  soon  followed" 
(Albert  Bushnell  Hart,  Slavery  and  Abolition  (1906),  p.  211).  In  1832  took 
place  the  secession  of  students  from  Lane  Seminary,  Cincinnati,  because 
the  trustees  and  Dr.  Lyman  Beecher  had  forbidden  them  to  discuss  the 
slavery  question.    Four  fifths  of  the  student  body  withdrew. 


368 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


(c)  As  man- 
ifested in 
society's 
treatment 
of  its  un- 
fortunate 
and  delin- 
quent 
members 


The  record  of  society's  treatment  of  its  dependent  and  err- 
ing members  forms  another  inspiring  chapter  in  the  history 
of  the  growth  of  the  new  social  conscience.  In  a  little  over 
one  hundred  years  the  Christian  world  has  advanced  from 
harsh  vagrant  laws  to  associated  charities  ;  from  the  burning 
of  witches  to  asylums  for  the  insane  ;  from  noisome  dungeons 
to  penitentiaries  and  institutions  of  rescue  and  correction.1 
The  numerous  and  costly  private  and  public  institutions  es- 
tablished and  maintained  by  the  new  humanitarian  sentiment 
is  one  of  the  most  distinctive  characteristics,  ethically  viewed, 
of  modern  civilization.  So  multiform  are  the  expressions  of 
this  new  spirit  that  it  is  impossible  in  so  brief  a  survey  as 
the  present  to  exhibit  in  more  than  barest  outline  this  phase 
of  the  ethical  evolution. 

The  recent  history  of  charity,  taken  in  the  sense  of  relief 
given  to  the  poor,  is  a  record  of  change  both  in  motive  and 
method.  There  has  always  been  a  great  deal  of  almsgiving 
in  the  world,  since  this  has  been  a  duty  especially  enjoined 
by  religion.  But  because  charity  has  had  this  religious  motive, 
it  has  often  been  sullied  by  self-love,  alms  being  given  not  so 
much  for  the  sake  of  the  poor  as  for  the  benefit  of  the  soul  of 
the  donor.  In  recent  times  this  religious  motive  has  become 
less  operative,  but  the  amount  of  almsgiving  has  undoubtedly 
increased,  and  we  are  justified  in  the  conclusion  that  it  is 
motived  as  never  before  by  genuine  altruistic  feeling.  It 
is  probably  true,  however,  that  there  is  less  indiscriminate, 
emotional  almsgiving  now  than  formerly.  But  there  is  greater 
"social  compunction,"  a  deeper  sense  of  society's  responsi- 
bility for  the  existence  of  poverty,  and  an  earnest  inquiry 
respecting  the  primary  social  causes  of  it.  Hence  effort  is 
directed  not  merely  to  the  immediate  relief  of  want  and 
misery  through  organized  charity,  but  to  the  cure  of  poverty 
through  the  removal  of  the  causes  of  destitution.    At  this 


1  Cf.  Henderson,  Dependents,  Defectives,  and Delinquents  (1893);  Zebulon 
R.  Brockway,  Fifty  Years  of  Prison  Service  (191 2). 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  AND  DEMOCRACY      369 

point  the  investigations  and  labors  of  the  philanthropist 
merge  with  those  of  the  sociologist,  the  economist,  and 
the  statesman. 

In  society's  treatment  of  the  defective  and  the  insane,  as 
compared  with  its  treatment  of  these  same  classes  scarcely 
more  than  a  century  ago,  is  registered  an  ethical  progress 
truly  remarkable.  A  hundred  years  or  less  ago  in  England 
and  in  all  the  European  countries  the  idiot  and  the  oddly 
formed  human  prodigy  were  exhibited  to  afford  amusement 
to  the  people.  The  growth  in  humanitarian  feeling  has  ren- 
dered all  this  a  thing  of  the  past.  "  The  passing  of  the  freak 
is  not  a  casual  incident  in  the  history  of  the  circus,  but  a 
striking  illustration  of  the  tendency  which  has  been  in  prog- 
ress for  centuries  toward  the  humanizing  of  our  amusements. 
...  To  spend  a  merry  afternoon  at  the  madhouse  watching 
the  antics  of  the  maniacs  in  their  chains  seemed  natural  and 
reasonable  to  civilized  Englishmen  not  so  many  generations 
ago.  It  has  become  absolutely  unthinkable."  x  The  history 
of  the  stage  offers  like  testimony.  M  Not  so  very  long  ago," 
writes  David  Belasco,  in  giving  advice  to  the  amateur  play- 
wright, "  the  entrance  of  a  cripple  or  a  hunchback  was 
sufficient  to  get  a  laugh  from  the  audience.  In  these  hu- 
manitarian times  there  is  no  fun  to  be  made  out  of  physical 
deformity."  2 

But  it  is  in  society's  treatment  of  the  criminal  class  that 
there  is  to  be  traced  the  greatest  progress  in  humanitarianism. 
In  the  pre-Norman  period  in  England  the  punishments  for 
crime  were  characterized  by  a  barbarity  incredibly  callous. 
"  Men  branded  on  the  forehead,  without  hands,  without  feet, 
without  tongues,  lived  as  an  example  of  the  danger  which 
attended  the  commission  of  petty  crimes,  and  as  a  warning  to 
all  who  had  the  misfortune  of  holding  no  higher  position  than 
that  of  a  churl.  .  .  .    The  eyes  were  plucked  out ;  the  nose 

1  The  New  York  Nation  of  March  19,  1908,  p.  254. 

2  The  Century  Magazine  for  September,  191 2,  p.  886. 


370  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

the  ears,  and  the  upper  lips  were  cut  off ;  the  scalp  was  torn 
away  ;  and  sometimes  even,  there  is  reason  to  believe,  the 
whole  body  was  flayed  alive."  1 

What  was  true  of  English  law  was  true  of  the  laws  of 
every  other  European  country.  And  there  was  little  or  no 
essential  amelioration  of  these  savage  law  systems  before 
the  last  quarter  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Seventy  thou- 
sand executions  took  place  in  England  during  the  reign  of 
Henry  VIII.2  "  In  the  reign  of  William  III  there  does  not 
appear  to  have  been  any  consciousness  that  the  penal  laws 
were,  in  many  respects,  disgraceful  to  any  community  but  a 
tribe  of  savages."  3 

If  a  definite  point  of  departure  of  the  movement  for  the 
humanizing  of  the  criminal  laws  of  Europe  and  the  putting 
of  the  treatment  of  criminals  on  an  ethical  basis  be  sought, 
it  will  be  found  in  the  life  and  writings  of  the  Italian  jurist 
Beccaria,4  who  maintained  that  the  effect  of  cruel  punish- 
ments is  to  increase  crime  by  indurating  the  sensibilities  of 
the  people.5 

A  great  impulse  to  the  humanitarian  movement  initiated 
by  Beccaria  was  given  by  the  devoted  labors  of  the  great  phil- 
anthropist John  Howard  (i  726-1 790),  who,  with  his  eyes 
opened  to  the  awful  conditions  of  prison  life  through  official 
connection  with  Bedford  jail,  where  Bunyan  dreamed,  spent 
his  life  in  visiting  all  lands  inspecting  prisons  and  jails  and 
dungeons  and  lazar  houses,  and  "  taking  the  gauge  and 
dimension  of  misery,  depression,  and  contempt." 


1  Pike,  A  History  of  Crime  in  England  (1876),  vol.  i,  p.  50. 

2  Wines,  Punishment  and  Reformation,  6th  ed.,  p.  103. 

8  Pike,  A  History  of  Crime  in  England  (1876),  vol.  ii,  p.  287. 

4  His  Essay  on  Crimes  and  Punishments  appeared  in  1764  and  produced  a 
profound  impression.  It  did  much  to  abolish  torture  in  judicial  proceedings. 

5  "  In  proportion  as  punishments  become  more  cruel,  the  minds  of  men, 
as  a  fluid  rises  to  the  same  height  with  that  which  surrounds  it,  grow  hard- 
ened and  insensible."  —  Beccaria,  An  Essay  on  Crimes  and  Punishments 
(1793)1  P- 95- 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  AND  DEMOCRACY     371 

The  crusade  of  John  Howard  marks  the  real  beginning 
of  practical  prison  reform,  which  has  ■*  transformed  prisons 
from  hells  into  hospitals  for  recovery,"  and  revolutionized 
the  entire  theory  and  administration  of  judicial  punishment.1 
The  aim  and  purpose  of  the  modern  penitentiary  system  is 
to  develop  self-respect  and  manhood.2  To  this  end  the  lock- 
step  and  striped  clothing  have  been  abolished  in  many  prisons, 
and  along  with  them  all  cruel  and  humiliating  punishments. 
The  establishment  of  reform  schools,  reformatories,  and  peni- 
tentiaries, the  introduction  of  the  indeterminate  sentence,  the 
proposed  creation  of  courts  of  rehabilitation,  and  the  found- 
ing of  the  juvenile  court,3  mark  the  ethical  advance  which 
the  last  century  has  witnessed  in  this  domain.4 

6.  International  Ethics :  the  New  International  Conscience 

One  of  the  most  significant  of  phylogenetic  laws  is  for-  Thedeveiop- 

mulated  by  Haeckel  in  these  words  :  "  The  short,  quick  his-  temationai 

tory  of  an  individual  organism  is  a  compressed  story  of  the  Sreshad-   ' 

long,   slow  history  of  the  species  to  which  the  organism  JJJJffi?* 

velopment 

1  Wines,  Punishment  and  Reformation,  6th  ed.,  pp.  122  ff.  of  intra- 

2  The  penitentiary  system  was  inaugurated  in  1704  by  Pope  Clement  XI,    national 
who  in  that  year  established  the  Hospital  of  St.  Michael  at  Rome.    For   morallty 
the  history  of  the  penitentiary  movement  see  Wines,  Punishment  and 
Reformation. 

8  w  The  whole  conception  and  method  of  these  courts  suggests  the  reli- 
gious spirit  and  almost  startles  us  with  its  indication  of  the  spiritualizing  of 
the  civil  power."  —  Edward  O.  Sisson,  "  The  State  absorbing  the  Func- 
tions of  the  Church,"  International  fournal  of  Ethics  for  April,  1907,  p.  344. 

4  The  progressive  purification  of  the  social  conscience  may  be  traced 
further  in  the  changed  feeling  in  regard  to  dueling,  lotteries,  gambling,  and 
the  use  of  intoxicating  liquors.  Less  than  a  century  ago  dueling  was  com- 
mon among  all  the  European  peoples.  To-day  in  all  Anglo-Saxon  lands 
the  duel  is  condemned  by  the  common  conscience  and  prohibited  by  law. 
During  the  last  few  decades  in  the  United  States  lotteries  have  been  trans- 
ferred M  from  the  class  of  respectable  to  a  class  of  criminal  enterprises." 
So  too  is  it  the  growing  moral  disapproval  of  the  use  of  alcoholic  drinks 
that  has  caused  drunkenness  both  in  England  and  in  our  country  to  become 
much  less  common  among  the  reputable  members  of  society  than  it  was 
only  two  or  three  generations  ago. 


372  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

belongs."  Now  this  law  holds  good  for  the  history  of  the 
human  species  as  well  as  for  that  of  the  lower  tribes  of  life. 
And  here  it  embraces  not  only  the  history  of  the  bodily 
but  also  that  of  the  psychical  development.  Consequently 
the  law  under  which  the  moral  evolution  of  man  is  going  on 
may  be  stated  in  this  way :  The  history  of  the  development 
of  conscience  within  a  social  group  (clan,  tribe,  nation)  is  a 
compressed  story  of  the  long,  slow  history  of  the  development 
of  conscience  in  humanity  at  large,  that  is  to  say,  between 
the  groups  composing  the  human  race.  And  since  law  codes, 
'  private  and  public,  are  essentially  embodiments  of  the  grow- 
ing and  clarifying  conscience,  this  mode  of  the  ethical  evolu- 
tion may  be  expressed  in  strictly  juristic  terms  as  follows : 
"  The  development  of  international  law  follows  step  by  step 
the  earlier  development  of  municipal  law."  1 

With  this  law  in  mind  we  may  define  moral  progress  in 
the  international  domain  as  the  gradual  assimilation  of  inter- 
national to  intranational  ethics,  or,  in  other  words,  the  grow- 
ing conformity  of  the  standard  of  public  morality  to  that  of 
private  morality. 

The  gradual  As  thus  defined,  a  special  expression  of  progress  in  inter- 
of  the  reia-  national  morality  is  found  in  the  growing  recognition  by  gov- 
ad°vancedhe  ernments  that  the  obligations  of  the  strong  toward  the  weak 
backward  are  tne  same  f°r  nations  as  for  individuals.  A  public  con- 
races:  The  science  that  is  like  the  best  private  conscience  is  constantly 
Burden  becoming  more  and  more  a  regulative  force  in  the  relations 
of  the  superior  to  the  inferior  races.2  Unhappily  that  exploi- 
tation of  the  weaker  by  the  stronger  races,  which  makes  up  so 

1  Thus  formulated  by  the  distinguished  jurist  James  Brown  Scott.  Cf. 
Report  of  the  Seventeenth  Annual  Lake  Mohonk  Conference  (1911),  pp.  35  ff- 
Professor  Scott  here  shows  how  the  growth  of  juridical  institutions  between 
nations  is  similar  to  that  within  nations,  only  later  and  slower.  The  stages 
of  this  growth  are  self-redress,  arbitration,  courts  of  justice. 

2  See  Sir  Charles  Bruce,  M  The  Modern  Conscience  in  Relation  to  the 
Treatment  of  Dependent  Peoples  and  Communities,"  Papers  on  Inter- 
Racial  Problems  (191 1),  pp.  279  ff. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  AND  DEMOCRACY      373 

large  a  part  of  the  history  of  the  past  ages,  still  goes  on  ;  but 
it  is,  in  general,  less  grossly  unethical  than  ever  before,  while 
with  each  succeeding  generation  the  protest  of  the  common 
conscience  of  the  civilized  world  against  all  unfair  and  oppres- 
sive treatment  of  the  backward  by  the  more  advanced  races 
grows  more  earnest  and  insistent. 

Good  illustrations  of  this  quickening  of  the  public  con- 
science are  found  in  England's  dealings  with  India  and 
China.  In  the  year  181 3  a  resolution  declaring  that  Eng- 
land's first  duty  in  legislating  for  India  was  to  promote  the 
interests  of  the  people  of  India  was  proposed  in  Parliament, 
but  was  defeated.  Twenty  years  later  (in  1833)  this  principle 
was  definitely  embodied  in  a  Government  of  India  Act.1  In 
1 841-1842  England,  at  the  end  of  what  has  been  justly  char- 
acterized as  "  one  of  the  most  dishonorable  and  detestable  wars 
that  ever  stained  her  annals,"  compelled  China  to  keep  her 
ports  open  to  the  iniquitous  opium  traffic.  Two  generations 
later  (in  1906)  the  House  of  Commons  by  resolution  unan- 
imously declared  the  Indian  opium  trade  with  China  to  be 
"morally  indefensible,"  and  requested  the  Government  to 
bring  it  to  a  speedy  end.2  Five  years  later  England  entered 
into  an  agreement  with  China,  according  to  the  terms  of 
which  the  importation  of  Indian  opium  into  China  will  cease 
on  or  before  191 7.  This  is  a  notable  triumph  of  the  new 
international  conscience. 

Our  dealings  with  the  island  of  Cuba  since  its  liberation — 
opinions  may  differ  in  regard  to  the  Tightness  of  our  original 
act  of  intervention  —  affords  another  encouraging  illustration 
of  the  progress  the  world  has  made  in  international  morality. 
And  the  same  is  true  of  our  dealings  with  the  Filipinos, 
notwithstanding  the  utterly  painful  character  of  the  earlier 
chapters  of  the  story.    There  has  been  no  responsible  official 

1  Papers  on  Inter- Racial  Problems  (1911),  ed.  G.  Spiller,  p.  286. 

2  For  this  subject  viewed  from  a  Chinese  standpoint,  see  Edward 
Alsworth  Ross,   The  Changing  Chinese  (191 1),  p.  170. 


374  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

utterance  on  this  subject  that  has  represented  our  task  in 
our  acquired  dependency  as  other  than  a  public  trust,  as  a 
guardianship  to  be  exercised  solely  in  the  interest  of  the 
Filipinos  as  the  nation's  wards.  The  better  moral  feeling 
of  the  nation,  intensified  in  many  by  deep  compunction,  has 
indignantly  repudiated  all  those  unofficial  utterances  which 
have  cynically  represented  the  islands  as  an  inviting  field  for 
selfish  exploitation  by  American  capitalists,  and  has  demanded 
that  our  government  in  the  islands  should  be  inspired  and 
controlled  by  the  spirit  of  unselfish  service.  And  this  ethical 
spirit  has  in  general  marked  our  administration  of  the  affairs 
of  the  islanders.  "  I  believe  that  I  am  speaking  with  historic 
accuracy  and  impartiality,"  declares  ex- President  Roosevelt, 
"when  I  say  that  the  American  treatment  of  and  attitude 
toward  the  Filipino  people,  in  its  combination  of  disinterested 
ethical  purpose  and  sound  common  sense,  marks  a  new  and 
long  stride  forward  in  advance  of  all  steps  that  have  hitherto 
been  taken  along  the  path  of  wise  and  proper  treatment  of 
weaker  by  stronger  races."  This  ethical  purpose  is  especially 
manifested  in  the  sending  out,  in  the  early  period  of  our  rule, 
of  five  hundred  young  American  teachers  to  carry  to  this 
deeply  wronged  people  the  best  we  have  to  give  —  a  national 
act  without  a  parallel  in  all  the  history  of  the  past. 

It  inspires  hope  in  the  future  to  note  how  far  this  last  step 
forward  carries  us  away  from  the  starting  point  on  this  line 
of  ethical  advance.  At  first  the  fate  of  the  weaker  race  was 
extermination  or  slavery ;  then  its  fate  was  to  be  reduced 
to  the  condition  of  a  tributary ;  still  later,  to  be  subjected 
to  commercial  and  industrial  exploitation  by  the  conquering 
people ;  and  lastly,  to  be  made,  in  theory  if  not  yet  in  actual 
practice,  the  beneficiaries  of  a  benevolent  self-sacrificing 
service,  which  finds  lofty  expression  in  Kipling's  The  White 
Mans  Burden : 

Go,  bind  your  sons  to  exile 
To  serve  your  captives'  need. 


Grotius 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  AND  DEMOCRACY      375 

This  sentiment  would  scarcely  have  found  any  such  re- 
sponse in  the  common  heart  and  conscience  of  any  past  age 
of  human  history  as  it  finds  in  the  heart  and  conscience  of 
our  own.  But,  it  must  be  admitted,  the  sentiment  embodies 
an  ideal  yet  to  be  realized,  rather  than  something  already 
attained. 

But  it  is  in  the  changes  effected  in  men's  feelings  respecting  Progress  in 
what  is  morally  permissible  in  warfare  that  is  to  be  observed  Hugo 
the  most  encouraging  progress  in  international  ethics  in  mod- 
ern times.  This  progressive  clarification  of  the  moral  consci- 
ousness may  be  distinctly  traced  from  the  close  of  the  Thirty 
Years'  War  in  Germany.  In  no  period  of  Christian  history 
had  war  been  waged  with  greater  ferocity  or  with  greater 
contempt  of  moral  rules  than  during  the  so-called  religious 
wars  of  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries.  What  little 
gains  had  been  made  in  the  humanization  of  war  during 
preceding  eras  seem  to  have  been  lost. 

This  barbarizing  of  war,  however,  produced,  as  all  retro- 
gressions in  morality  do  if  the  moral  life  is  still  on  the  whole 
virile  and  sound,  a  reaction  which  found  expression  in  the 
.epoch-making  work,  De  Jure  Belli  et  Paris,  by  the  distin- 
guished Dutch  jurist  Hugo  Grotius1 — a  work  that  has  been 
pronounced  "  the  most  beneficent  of  all  volumes  ever  written 
not  claiming  divine  inspiration."  2  The  aim  of  Grotius  was 
not  to  abolish  war,  —  he  did  not  think  universal  peace  an 
attainable  ideal,  —  but  simply  to  moderate  its  excesses  and 
lessen  its  atrocities,  to  set  limits  to  the  rights  of  the  victor. 
The  age  of  nationalism  had  come,  and  an  ethics  for  nations 
in  their  mutual  relations  must  be  formulated.  Grotius  sought 
a  law  that  all  would  recognize  as  binding.    The  law  to  which 

1  Grotius  (Hugo  de  Groot),  The  Rights  of  War  and  Peace,  tr.  Campbell 
(1901-1903).  On  Grotius  see  Hill,  History  of  Diplomacy  (1905-1906),  vol.  ii, 
pp.  569  ff . ;  Andrew  D.  White,  Seven  Great  Statesmen  (1910),  pp.  55  ff. ; 
Dunning,  A  History  of  Political  Theories  (1905),  vol.  ii,  chap.  v. 

2  Andrew  D.  White,  Seven  Great  Statesmen  (1910),  p.  79. 


376  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

he  appealed  was  the  Stoic  Law  of  Nature.1  As  the  Stoics 
had  made  this  law  the  instrument  for  the  reform  of  the  Roman 
civil  law,  so  now  would  Grotius  make  it  the  instrument  for 
the  reform  of  the  laws  of  war.2 

The  influence  of  the  work  of  Grotius  was  profound  and 
widespread.  From  the  time  of  its  appearance  dates  a  new 
departure  in  the  humanization  of  war,  and  a  fresh  moral  ad- 
vance in  international  law.3  "  His  ideas,"  says  Dr.  Andrew 
D.  White,  "  found  their  way  into  current  discussion,  into  sys- 
tems of  law,  into  treaties ;  and  as  generations  rolled  by,  the 
world  began  to  find  itself,  it  hardly  knew  how,  less  and  less 
cruel,  until  men  looked  back  on  war  as  practiced  in  his  time 
as  upon  a  hideous  dream  —  doubtless  much  as  men  in  future 
generations  will  look  back  upon  the  wars  of  our  times."  4 

The  humane  provisions  of  the  Geneva  Convention  of  1 864 
and  the  establishment  of  the  Red  Cross  Society,  which 
on  the  field  of  battle  cares  without  discrimination  for  the 
stricken,  are  inspiring  illustrations  of  the  growth  of  this  new 
humanitarianism. 

Movement  Now  this  growing  sensitiveness  of  the  public  conscience 
abolition  of  which  has  effected  so  many  mitigations  of  the  barbarities  of , 
moraTlsue  war  nas  resulted  in  a  widespread  and  insistent  demand  that 
war  between  civilized  nations  shall  not  merely  be  humanized 
but  that  it  shall  be  abolished,  that  disputes  between  nations 
shall  be  settled  as  disputes  between  individuals  are  settled  — 
by  courts  of  .justice. 

Without  doubt  many  influences,  political,  social,  and  eco- 
nomic,5 have  concurred  in  creating  this  great  world-wide  move- 
ment, and  in  calling  into  existence  the  Hague  Conferences 

1  See  above,  p.  240. 

2  James  Bryce,  Studies  in  History  and  Jurisprudence  (1901),  vol.  ii,  p.  167. 
8  Hill,  History  of  Diplomacy  (1905-1906),  vol.  ii,  p.  573. 

4  Seven  Great  Statesmen  (1910),  p.  73. 

6  We  cannot  concur  with  the  author,  Norman  Angell,  of  The  Great 
Illusion  in  his  contention  that  there  will  be  no  change  in  the  practice  of 
nations  regarding  war  and  preparations  for  war  till  there  is  a  change  in 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  AND  DEMOCRACY      377 

and  the  international  and  national  peace  congresses  of  the 
last  decade  or  two ;  but  among  all  these  forces  and  motives 
the  one  of  greatest  potency  is  the  awakened  and  instructed 
conscience  of  the  world  in  regard  to  the  criminality  of  war  as 
an  established  and  legalized  method  of  settling  controversies 
between  civilized  nations.  It  is  this  new  conscience  and  not 
the  new  dreadnought  to  which  we  must  look  to  abolish  war 
and  to  keep  it  abolished.  For,  like  the  question  of  slavery 
two  generations  ago,  this  question  of  war  has  become  a  moral 
issue,  and,  like  the  slavery  question,  it  will  give  the  world  no 
rest  until  settled  in  accordance  with  the  demands  of  the  new 
conscience. 

Especially  intolerable  to  the  more  sensitive  conscience  of  war  an 
to-day  is  the  assumption  that  nations  may  at  will  suspend  or  of  tke  V 
abrogate  the  ordinary  moral  code.  For,  as  Lord  Morley  truly  morafcode 
says,  "To  declare  war  is  to  suspend  not  merely  habeas  corpus 
but  the  Ten  Commandments,  and  some  other  good  command- 
ments besides."  x  That  is  to  say,  war  is  a  suspension  of  a 
great  part  of  those  rules  of  morality  which,  slowly  and  pain- 
fully formulated  by  the  growing  moral  consciousness  of  man, 
have  become  the  guide  and  standard  of  ordinary  conduct.  In 
war  the  conscience  of  the  commander  is  inhibited.  M  The 
commander  who  lost  a  battle  through  the  activity  of  his 
moral  nature,"  once  cynically  declared  United  States  Sen- 
ator Ingalls,  "  would  be  the  derision  and  jest  of  history." 
And  that  is  so.  The  world  has  not  yet  ceased  to  deride  those 
Jews  who  lost  their  city  to  the  Romans  because  their  con- 
sciences forsooth  would  not  let  them  fight  on  the  Sabbath  day. 
War  cannot  be  conducted  by  the  rules  of  ordinary  morality. 

ideas  respecting  the  economic  advantage  to  be  derived  from  successful 
war.  Moral  idealism,  finding  expression  in  revolutions  and  reforms,  is  con- 
stantly giving  denial  to  the  validity  of  the  economic  or  materialistic  inter- 
pretation of  history  when  the  economic  motive  is  thus  made  the  dominant 
motive  in  human  action.  War  will  become  a  thing  of  the  past  only  when 
men  can  no  longer  fight  with  a  good  conscience. 
1  Machiavelli  (The  Romanes  Lecture  for  1897). 


378  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

With  a  great  part  of  the  ordinary  moral  code  suspended, 
there  is  substituted  for  it  a  war  code  every  maxim  of  which 
reveals  its  archaic,  vestigial  character,  stamps  it  as  a  survival 
from  an  early  savage  stage  of  human  development,  as  a  legacy 
from  a  long-past  age  of  the  historical  evolution  when,  morality 
was  as  yet  only  an  intratribal  thing,  that  is,  when  men  felt 
that  they  owed  duties  only  to  members  of  their  own  tribe  or 
social  group.1 

unfavorable       In  many  ways,  some  obvious  and  others  subtle  and  hidden, 
the  ethics     war  works  "moral  damage"  to  society,  but  we  here  confine 
Ji™hicsn  ourselves  to  emphasizing  merely  the  moral  loss  and  hurt  re- 
of  peace       suiting  from  the  reaction  of  its  low  archaic  code  upon  the 
more  advanced  peace  code.    For,  as  Professor  J.  Neville 
Figgis  justly  observes,  "It  is  impossible  to  remove  the  very 
notion  of  morality  from  international  affairs  without  in  the 
long  run  undermining  it  in  private  life."  2   What  is  regarded 
as  right  and  proper  in  war  will  come  to  be  regarded  as  right 
and  proper  in  peace.    That  is  to  say,  the  maintenance  of  a 
double  standard  in  morals  is  just  as  impossible  as  the  mainte- 
nance of  a  double  standard  in  money.  By  a  sort  of  Gresham's 
Law  the  lower  standard  will  drive  out  the  higher  or  drag  it 
down  to  its  own  low  level. 

This  reaction  of  the  war  code  upon  the  ordinary  moral  code 
is  well  illustrated  by  what  takes  place  when  society  metes  out 
to  persons  convicted  of  crime  ferocious  and  barbarous  punish- 
ments. In  the  medieval  centuries  in  Europe  when  the  penal- 
ties for  offenses  were  often  fiendishly  cruel  mutilations  of  the 

1  This  archaic  nature  of  the  code  is  shown  especially  in  its  retention  as 
a  survival  of  the  principle  of  collective  responsibility,  which,  long  outgrown 
by  ordinary  morality,  still  forms  the  very  basis  of  the  war  system.  Again, 
the  true  nature  of  the  war  code  as  a  heritage  from  the  low  level  of  savagery 
is  shown  in  its  retention  of  the  primitive  rule  that  the  one  suffering  an 
injury  shall  be  the  judge  of  his  own  cause  and  the  avenger  of  his  wrong, 
a  principle  of  self-redress  long  since  discarded  by  the  private  law  of  all 
civilized  peoples. 

2  Studies  of  Political  Thought  from  Gerson  to  Grotius  (1907),  p.  94. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  AND  DEMOCRACY      379 

body,  such  as  cutting  off  the  ears,  the  hands,  the  lips,  or  the 
nose,  this  judicial  procedure  was  imitated  to  such  a  degree  by 
individuals  seeking  private  vengeance  that  mayhem,  that  is, 
the  mutilation  of  an  enemy  by  depriving  him  of  a  member, 
became  a  crime  of  such  frequent  occurrence  that  it  was  neces- 
sary to  make  special  and  severe  enactments  against  it.1  After 
society  stopped  mutilating  the  bodies  of  offenders  against  its 
laws,  this  offense  of  mayhem  virtually  dropped  out  of  the 
calendar  of  private  crimes. 

In  a  similar  way  does  the  war  ethics  of  the  nations  react 
disastrously  upon  private  morality.  The  slow  moral  progress 
of  European  civilization  during  the  last  two  or  three  centuries, 
compared  with  its  wonderful  intellectual  and  material  prog- 
ress, may  with  little  hesitation  be  attributed  in  large  part  to 
the  unfavorable  influence  of  its  war  ethics  upon  its  everyday 
moral  code.  The  war  code  is  applied  to  politics,  to  ordinary 
business,  and  to  the  relations  of  industrial  classes.  The  poli- 
tician as  a  politician  does  a  hundred  things  he  would  not  think 
of  doing  as  a  man,  and  justifies  his  acts  by  appealing  to  the 
adage,  "  Politics  is  war."  The  business  man,  citing  the  like 
maxim,  "  Business  is  business,"  which  means  that  competition 
is  a  species  of  war  and  must  be  conducted  on  war  principles, 
flings  his  Christian  code  to  the  winds  and,  pitilessly  pushing 
his  competitor  to  the  wall,  compasses  his  financial  ruin.  It  is 
the  same  in  the  struggle  between  labor  and  capital.  In  this 
struggle  acts  of  violence,  like  those  of  the  McNamaras,  are 
committed,  and  the  persons  who  do  these  things  absolve 
themselves  in  the  forum  of  their  own  consciences  on  the  plea 
that  a  state  of  war  exists  between  capital  and  labor  and  that 
this  justifies  the  adoption  of  war  methods.  Here  doubtless 
we  have  the  moral  psychology  of  the  suffragette  movement 
in  England.  Indeed,  the  leaders  of  this  startling  propaganda 
tell  us  frankly  that  they  are  waging  war,  and  that  this  justifies 
their  suspension  of  the  ordinary  rules  of  conduct.   In  the  light 

1  Pike,  A  History  of  Crime  in  England  (187 3),  vol.  i,  p.  21 1 ;  vol.  ii,  p.  414. 


380  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

of  this  avowal  the  alleged  inscrutability  of  their  acts  disappears. 
The  movement  is  simply  another  illustration  of  the  truth  that 
so  long  as  nations  act  under  the  illusion  that  they  may  with- 
out moral  wrong  employ  violence  to  obtain  justice,  just  so 
long  will  there  be  individuals  who  with  good  conscience  will 
seek  justice  through  violence. 

At  the  same  time,  however,  these  same  classes  and  persons 
who  thus  in  various  important  spheres  of  activity  adopt  the 
lower  standard  of  war  ethics,  in  all  other  domains  and  re- 
lationships —  in  the  family,  in  the  Church,  and  in  social  inter- 
course —  act  in  accordance  with  the  higher  moral  code.  The 
result  is  a  loose  synthesis  of  the  two  systems,  the  establish- 
ment of  a  sort  of  bi-moral  code  made  up  of  rules  and  prac- 
tices mutually  inconsistent  and  irreconcilable.  The  moral 
damage  resulting  from  such  moral  confusion  is  beyond  esti- 
mate. It  is  the  inconsistencies  and  hypocrisies  involved  in 
such  a  bi-moral  code  that  is  one  ground  of  Nietzsche's  bitter 
attack  on  the  ethics  of  Christendom.  Yet,  as  Professor  Figgis 
says,  "  Nietzsche  deserves  the  gratitude  of  all  friends  of  hu- 
manity for  the  service  he  has  done  in  .  .  .  showing  that  the 
whole  sphere  of  private  life  cannot  in  the  long  run  be  different 
from  the  ideals  accepted  in  public  affairs."  * 

obsoies-  /*  The  arraignment  of  the  war  system  by  the  awakening  con- 
as  a  school  science  of  the  civilized  world  has  led  its  advocates  to  lay  the 
Sewar*  stress  of  their  argument  on  the  moral  uses  of  war.  They  eulo- 
system  an  gjze  war  as  fae  nurse  0f  the  sturdy,  heroic  virtues,  and  hence 
nism  in        as  an  indispensable  agency  in  the  moral  education  of  the  race. 

modern  . r  .  ?     ■  ..    , 

civilization  War  has,  it  is  true,  in  past  ages  been  the  supreme  theater 
of  human  strenuousness, "  and  it  may  be  true,  as  is  assumed 
by  Professor  William  James  in  his  Moral  Equivalent  of  War, 
that  the  qualities  of  courage,  fortitude,  and  self-devotion  to 
common  interests  were  in  the  beginning  evoked  and  fostered 
in  the  race  by  war ;  but  whatever  may  have  been  the  moral 

1  Studies  of  Political  Thought  from  Gerson  to  Grotius  (1907),  p.  96. 


THE  MORAL  EVOLUTION  AND  DEMOCRACY      381 

uses  of  war  in  the  past  stages  of  human  development,  the  time 
is  past  when  the  war  system  can  serve  the  highest  ends  of 
civilization.  It  is  an  anachronism  in  the  modern  world.  It 
has  become  a  drag  upon  the  moral  progress  of  the  race.  By 
an  ethical  necessity  the  day  of  its  abolition  approaches.  At  a 
time  not  remote,  as  history  reckons  time,  the  common  con- 
science of  the  world  will  brand  war  between  civilized  nations 
as  the  greatest  of  crimes,  and  will  regard  the  nation  that 
assaults  another  with  intent  to  commit  general  slaughter  as 
a  criminal  nation  —  as  a  common  enemy  of  the  human  race. 
In  that  coming  and  better  age  men  will  look  with  the  same 
incredulous  amazement  upon  our  infernal  engines  and  de- 
vices for  wholesale  man-killing  that  we  of  this  age  look  upon 
"the  iron  virgin  of  Nuremberg"  and  the  other  medieval 
instruments  of  torture  in  the  museums  of  Europe. 

To  many  this  optimistic  forecast,  in  the  face  of  the  prevail- 
ing war  spirit  and  the  ever-growing  armaments  of  the  nations, 
may  seem  oyersanguine  and  incredible.  But  to  think  despair- 
ingly of  the  future  argues  a  failure  to  discern  what  is  really 
most  significant  in  the  international  situation  to-day.  The 
most  significant  thing  in  the  ongoings  of  life  at  Rome  on  that 
memorable  day  of  the  year  404  of  our  era  which  saw  the  last 
gladiatorial  combat  in  the  Colosseum  was  not  that,  four  hun- 
dred years  after  the  incoming  of  Christianity  with  its  teachings 
of  the  sanctity  of  human  life,  gladiators  fought  on  the  arena 
to  make  a  holiday  for  Rome ;  the  significant  thing  was  the 
protest  made  by  the  Christian  monk  Telemachus  and  sealed 
by  his  martyr  death,1  for  that  announced  the  birth  into  the 

1  Telemachus  was  an  Asiatic  monk  who  journeyed  to  Rome  for  the  pur- 
pose of  making  a  protest  against  the  bloody  spectacles.  H  The  Romans  were 
provoked  by  the  interruption  of  their  pleasures ;  and  the  rash  monk,  who 
had  descended  into  the  arena  to  separate  the  gladiators,  was  overwhelmed 
under  a  shower  of  stones.  But  the  madness  of  the  people  soon  subsided ; 
they  respected  the  memory  of  Telemachus,  who  had  deserved  the  honors 
of  martyrdom ;  and  they  submitted  without  a  murmur  to  the  laws  of 
Honorius,  which  abolished  forever  the  human  sacrifices  of  the  amphi- 
theatre "  (Gibbon,  Decline  and  Fall  of  the  Roman  Empire,  chap.  xxx). 


382  HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 

Roman  world  of  a  new  conscience,  and  that,  through  an 
ethical  necessity,  meant  the  speedy  abolition  of  "  the  human 
sacrifices  of  the  amphitheater." 

And  so  to-day  the  significant  thing  is  not  that  nineteen 
hundred  years  after  the  advent  of  a  religion  of  peace  and 
good  will  among  men,  gladiator  nations  still  wet  the  earth 
with  fratricidal  blood ;  the  significant  thing  is  the  constantly 
growing  protest  against  it  all,  for  that  announces  the  birth  into 
the  modern  world  of  a  new  international  conscience,  and 
that,  through  an  ethical  necessity  like  that  which  abolished 
forever  the  bloody  sacrifices  of  the  Colosseum,  means  the 
certain  and  speedy  abolition  of  war  as  a  crass  negation  of 
human  solidarity  and  brotherhood,  and  a  venturous  denial  of 
a  moral  order  of  the  world  and  the  sovereignty  of  conscience. 


INDEX 


iEgospotami,  slaughter  of  Athenian 

prisoners  at,  194 
^Eschylus,  191 
Ahriman,  124 
Ahura  Mazda,  124 
Almsgiving,  281,  368 
Altruism,  Greek  and  Roman,  175, 

215  ;  Christian,  279 
Amelineau,  44 
Amos,  145 

Amphictyonic  League,  194 
Amusements,  humanizing  of,  369 
Ancestor  worship,  as  a  moral  force, 

13  ;  in  China,  54;  in  Japan,  78 
Angell,  Norman,  376  n.  5 
Animal    ethics,     Brahmanic,     103; 

Buddhist,   119;  Zoroastrian,  129; 

Mohammedan,     292 ;     Christian, 

357 ;    influence    of   evolutionary 

science  upon,  358 
Aphrodite,  171 
Aquinas,  Thomas,  318,  325 
Arbitration  among  the  Greeks,  195 
Arhat,  the,  113 
Aristotle,  views  of,  on  war  against 

non-Greeks,  1 80;  ethical  system  of, 

202-204 ;  views  of,  on  slavery,  203 
Asceticism,  general  fostering  causes 

of,  267;  Christian  fostering  causes 

of,  268 
Assur-natsir-pal,  51 
Athleticism,  Greek  moral  elements 

in,  177 
Aurelius,    Marcus,   Meditations    of, 

239,  247 
Autolycus,  185 

Bagehot,  287 

Beccaria,  345,  370 

Benevolence,  Roman,  236 

Blood  feud,  20 

Brahma,   the   impersonal,   96;   the 

personal,  96 
Brahmans,  the,  97,  101,  102 
Breasted,  Professor,  31,  39  n.  3 


Buckle,  Henry  T.,  1,  2 

Buddha,  1 1 1  ;  ethical  content  of  his 
message,  116 

Buddhism,  in  Japan,  79 ;  the  four 
truths  of,  106 ;  the  eightfold  path 
of,  no;  influence  of,  on  the  mil- 
itary spirit,  120 

Bury,  J.  B.,  174 

Bushido,  ideal  of,  79,  80-82  ;  influ- 
ence of,  87  ;  in  action,  88,  89 

Cannibalism,  26 ;  celestial,  26  n.  3 

Castes,  Hindu,  97 

Charity, Christian,  279-282;  Moslem, 
296 

Chinese  cashiers  in  Japan,  90  n.  2 

Christianity,  doctrinal,  ethical  ideal 
of,  261  ;  limitations  of  the  ideal 
of,  264 

Chrysostom,  Dion,  243 

Cicero,  215;  contempt  of,  for  manual 
labor  and  merchandizing,  224 

City  state,  as  the  mold  of  Greek 
morality,  169;  Roman,  213  ;  effect 
of  decay  of,  on  Greek  and  Roman 
morals,  204,  221 

Class  morality,  344 

Clemency,  Roman  virtue,  249 

Clovis,  Frankish  chieftain,  303 

Cluny,  313 

Collective  responsibility,  18-20; 
doctrine  of,  repudiated  by  Hebrew 
prophets,  1 59  ;  principle  of,  as  em- 
bodied in  Church  code  rejected 
by  the  modern  conscience,  364 ; 
a  survival  of,  in  modern  war  code, 
378  n.  1 

Competition,  in  primitive  society,  14 

Confucianism,  53 

Confucius,  60 

Conscience,  new  social,  nurtured  in 
the  medieval  towns,  330,  331 ; 
purification  in  modern  times,  364- 
371  ;  new  international,  371-382 

Constantine  the  Great,  302 


383 


384 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


Continuance  'theory,  35-37  ;  in  the 
Greek  moral  evolution,  187 

Corn,  moral  effects  of  free  distribu- 
tion of,  at  Rome,  224 

Cosmopolitanism,  growth  of,  in  Hel- 
lenistic Age,  209 ;  in  the  Roman 
Empire,  236-240 

Courage,  altruistic  element  in,  22, 175 

Courtier,  ideal  of  the,  328-330 

Criticism,  higher,  335 

Crusades,  as  ideal  of  knighthood  in 
action,  309 

Cuba,  our  dealings  with,  373 

Customary  morality,  18 

Cynics,  210 

Darius  I,  inscriptions  of,  134 
Davids,  Rhys,  109,  114,  120 
Delphi,  relation  of,  to  Greek  moral- 
ity, 172 
Democracy,  effect  of  its  incoming 
upon  moral  evolution,  340 ;  ethics 

of,  344-347 
Demonax,  208 
Demonism,  Babylonian,  46;  Chinese, 

55 
De  Officiis  "of  Cicero,  238 
Deuteronomy,  dual  morality  of,  151 
Dionysus,  171 

Double  standard  in  morality,  22-24 
Dualism,   religious,    Egyptian,   32; 

Persian,  123 
Duel,    international,    332;    judicial, 

see  Wager  of  battle 

Education,  in  Japan,  91-93 ;  its  re- 
lation to  morality,  345  ;  transferred 
from  Church  to  State,  346 

Election,  race,  174 

Elijah,  143 

Elis,  consecrated  to  peace,  197 

Elisha,  143 

Elysian  Fields,  187,  188 

Envy  of  the  gods,  doctrine  of,  189 

Epictetus,  247,  248,  250 

Epicureanism,  207 

Evolution,  disturbing  effects  of  doc- 
trine upon  morals,  341  ;  egoistic 
tendencies  of  the  doctrine,  354 ; 
altruistic  factor  in,  350 

Fabiola,  281 

Fall  of  man,  dogma  of,  2  59 
Family  ethics,  Greek,  181  ;  Roman, 
212,  214;  Mohammedan,  291 


Festivals,  Hebrew,  moralization  of, 

149 
Figgis,  J.  Neville,  378,  380 
Filial  piety,  Chinese  virtue,  61 
Filipinos,   American   treatment  of, 

373-375 

Gambling,  prohibited  by  the  Koran, 
291 

Geneva  Convention  of  1864,  376 

George,  Henry,  350  n.  1 

Gesta  Romanorum,  310 

Gladiatorial  combats,  demoralizing 
effects  of,  225;  suppression  of, 
277  ;  the  last  in  Colosseum,  381 

Gladstone,  William  E.,  360 

Golden  Rule,  as  stated  by  Confu- 
cius, 67 

Green,  T.  H.,  11 

Gresham's  Law  in  morals,  378 

Grotius,  Hugo,  375 

Group,  kinship,  12 

Guatama,  see  Buddha 

Hades,  gradual  moralizing  of,  187- 
189 

Hammurabi,  code  of,  49 

Hearn,  Lafcadio,  84 

Heresy,  viewed  as  a  contagion,  325 

Higher  criticism,  335 

Hillel,  168 

Holy  Grail,  311 

Holy  Virgin,  moral  influence  of  ven- 
eration of,  311 

Homeric  Age,  morals  of,  185 

Hopkins,  Edward  W.,  114 

Hosea,  146 

Hospital,  first  Christian,  281 

Hospitalers,  the,  308 

Hospitality,  24 

Howard,  John,  370 

Howe,  Julia  Ward,  324 

Humanitarianism,  growth  of,  in  Hel- 
lenistic Age,  208 ;  in  pre-Christian, 
of  Roman  Empire,  234-236;  ad- 
vance of,  in  modern  times,  369- 
37i 

Ideal,    moral,     defined,    5 ;    causes 

which  determine,  7-10 
Ilus,  prince  of  Ephyra,  172 
Immortality,  emergence  of  doctrine 

of,  in  Israel,  164-166;  its  ethical 

value,  257 
India,  Government  of  India  Act,  373 


INDEX 


385 


Industrial  virtues,  Persian,  128  ;  dis- 
esteemed  by  the  Greeks  and 
Romans,  182,  223  ;  cradled  in  the 
medieval  towns,  330 ;  effects  upon, 
of  the  dissolution  of  the  monas- 
teries, 337 

Industrialism,  modern,  relation  to 
morals,  341;  ethics  of,  347-353; 
modern,  alliance  of  industry  and 
science,  347  ;  divorce  of  industry 
and  ethics,  348 

Infanticide,  in  China,  73 ;  con- 
demned by  Christian  teaching, 
278  ;  in  Greece,  181 

Inheritance,  limitation  of,  351 

Inquisition,  324-326 

Insanity,  regarded  as  demon  pos- 
session, 282 

Intellectual  progress,  relation  of,  to 
moral  progress,  342 

International  law,  relation  of,  to 
municipal  law,  372 

Intertribal  morality,  beginnings  of, 
22-29 

Intolerance,  Jewish,  163;  Christian, 
265,  324  ;  Mohammedan,  294 

Intoxicating  liquors,  use  of,  pro- 
hibited by  Koran,  292,  296 

Inventions,  relation  of,  to  moral 
progress,  341 

Iona,  280 

Iron  virgin  of  Nuremberg,  381 

Isaiah,  147;  the  Second,  157,  161 

Isis,  worship  of,  in  Roman  Empire, 
252 

Ixion,  187 

Jeremiah,  151 

Jesus    of  Nazareth,   relation  of,  to 

moral  history  of  West,  260 
Judgment  of  Dead,  Egyptian,  36 ; 

Persian,  130 
Justice,  Greek  virtue  of,  176 
Juvenal,  235 

Karma,  108 

Ka-statues,  34 

Kidd,  Benjamin,  2 

Knighthood,  ideal  of,  306-309 ;  con- 
tribution of,  to  moral  heritage  of 
Christendom,  311 

Koran,  ethics  of,  289-292 

Labarum,  302 

Land  values,  property  in,  349 


Legge,  James,  68,  69 
Leonidas,  176 
Lex  talionis,  21 
Lindisfarne,  280 

Machiavelli,  326-328 
Machiavellism  in  politics,  326-328  ; 

in  economics,  348 
Malta,  Knights  of,  310 
Mandarin  morality,  69 
Melians,  192 
Mencius,  60 

Mendicant  Orders,  316-318 
Micah,  148 

Milvian  Bridge,  battle  of,  302 
Mithra,  125 
Mithraism,  propaganda  of,  in  Roman 

Empire,  253 
Mohammed,  288,  290 
Mohammedanism,   moral   code    of, 

289-292 
Monasteries,  cradle  of  modern  social 

conscience,    276;   dissolution  of, 

336 

Monastic  ideal,  270  ;  discredited  by 
Protestant  Reformation,  336 

Monasticism,  Buddhist,  118;  Chris- 
tian, 267-287 

Monopoly  in  land,  350 

Monotheism,  ethical,  emergence  ot, 
in  Israel,  158,  159 

Morley,  Lord,  377 

Nature,  Law  of,  240 
Negative  Confession,  37 
Nemesis,  doctrine  of,  190-192 
Nietzsche,  355,  356 
Nirvana,  109 

Nonresistance,  Christian  teaching 
of,  301,  302 

Occupation,  influence  of,  on  morals, 

9 

Oisin,  272  n. 

Opium  trade  with  China,  373 
Ordeals,  304 
Orphic  doctrines,  174 
Orthodoxy,  regarded  as  saving  vir- 
tue, 261 
Osiris,  myth  of,  32 

Pachomius,  44 
Patria  potestas,  212 
Paulsen,  Friedrich,  5  n.  1 
Peace  of  God,  312 


386 


HISTORY  AS  PAST  ETHICS 


Peace,  universal,  an  ideal  of  Hebrew 

prophets,  146,  147 
Peloponnesian  War,  effects  of,  on 

Greek  morality,  194,  195  n.  1 
Penitential  psalms,  Babylonian,  47 
Penitentiary  system,  371 
Persecution  of  Christians  by  pagan 

Roman  emperors,  245 
Pessimism,    in    Brahmanic   system, 

99 ;  in  Buddhist,  107 
Petrie,  Flinders,  39 
Philipson,  David,  168  n.  1 
Philo,  168 

Pindar,  179,  186,  188 
Plato,  200-202 
Plutarch,  210,  249 
Poisoned  arrows,  disuse  of,  27,  172 
Polygamy,   accepted  as   ethical  by 

Mohammed,  291 
Private  war,  restrictions  on,  312-314 
Prophetism,  Hebrew,  different  ele- 
ments of,  142 
Psychical  research,  import  of,  for 

morals,  359 
Ptah-hotep,  40 
Purgatory,    effect   of    abolition    of, 

upon  morals,  337,  362 
Pythagoras,  186 
Pythagoreanism,  115 

Ra,  son-god,  31 

Ransom  of  war  captives,  315 

Red  Cross  Society,  376 

Reformation,  Protestant,  333-339 

Refuge,  cities  of,  154 

Religion,  relation  of,  to  morals,  9, 14 

Renaissance,  influence  of,  on  the 
moral  evolution,  320,  322-324 

Retribution  theory,  35-37  ;  in  Greek 
moral  evolution,  188 

Revenge,  duty  of,  20;  a  Greek  vir- 
tue, 183  ;  how  regarded  by  Roman 
moralists,  249 

Right  belief   regarded  as  a  virtue, 

334 
Ritual   morality,    in   India,  106;  in 

Israel,  151-154,  162 
Ruth,  the  Moabitess,  1 56 

Sabbath,  150,  260 

Sacrifice,  in  Brahmanic  system,  100; 

in  Israel,  138 
St.  Ambrose,  303 
St.  Augustine,  284,  303 
St.  Boniface,  280 


St.  Columba,  280 

St.  Dominic,  316,  317 

St.  Francis,  316,  317 

St.  Gall,  280 

St.  Patrick,  272 

St.  Wilfred,  280 

Saints,  Lives  of  the,  309 

Samurai,  80,  82,  87-91 

Sappho,  178 

Schmidt,  Nathaniel,  154  n.  2,  260 
n.  1 

Scholasticism,  ethics  of,  318 

Science,  ethics  of,  353-360 

Scott,  James  Brown,  372  n.  1 

Self-redress,  a  survival  of,  in  inter- 
national law,  378  n.  1 

Seneca,  239,  243,  247,  249,  250 

Set,  Egyptian  god,  32 

Shammai,  168 

Sheol,  139 

Shinto  cult,  78 

Single  tax,  350  n.  1 

Slave  trade,  suppression  of,  364-366 

Slavery,  in  ancient  Egypt,  41  ; 
among  the  Hebrews,  156;  in 
Greece,  180,  203 ;  Roman,  223 ; 
ameliorations  of,  under  pagan 
Roman  emperors,"  243  ;  influence 
of  Christianity  upon,  282  ;  under 
Islam,  290,  295  ;  prisoners  of  war 
sold  as  slaves,  314;  origin  of 
word  "slave,"  315;  abolition  of 
African,  366 

Smith,  W.  Robertson,  12 

Social  ethics,  364-371 

Socialism,  352 

Socrates,  197-200 

Stoicism,  206,  209 ;  influence  of, 
upon  Roman  government  and  law, 
241-243;  as  a  moral  force,  241; 
teachings  of,  Christian  in  tone, 
246-248 ;  insufficiency  of,  as  guide 
to  the  masses,  251  ;  contrasted 
with  Machiavellism,  328 

Stoics,  views  of,  on  slavery,  203 

Suicide,  among  the  Japanese,  85  ; 
among  the  Romans,  250 ;  con- 
demned by  Christianity,  279 

Synagogue,  163,  164 

Tantalus,  187 

Taoism,  56 

Telemachus,    Christian  monk,  381 

n.  1 
Temperance,  Greek  virtue  of,  176 


INDEX 


387 


Templars,  the,  308 

Terence,  238 

Theology,  moralization  of,  360,  361 

Thirty  Years'  War,  37  5 

Thucydides,  192 

Toleration,  under  Buddhism,  112, 
120;  influence  of  doctrinal  Chris- 
tianity upon  virtue  of,  285 ;  how 
affected  by  the  Protestant  Refor- 
mation, 338 

Towns,  medieval,  as  molders  of 
morals,  321,  330 

Transmigration,  98 

Truce  of  God,  312-314 

Truthfulness,  virtue  of,  Japanese 
lack  of  reverence  for,  85  ;  highly 
esteemed  by  the  Persians,  128, 
132-134;  low  estimation  of,  among 
Greeks,  184 

Tyrannicide,  among  Japanese,  86; 
views  of  Roman  moralist  on,  249 

Ulfilas,  bishop,  304 
Unearned  increment,  349 
Universalism,  ethical,  pre-Christian, 

236 
Urban  II,  Pope,  305 
Usury,  155 

Veracity,  fostered  by  science,  353 
Vergil,  235 

Vicarious  suffering,  doctrine  of, 
160 


Wager  of  battle,  304 ;  disuse  of,  331, 
332 

War,  abolition  of,  a  moral  issue,  376 ; 
abrogation  of  the  ordinary  moral 
code  by,  377  ;  obsolescence  of,  as 
school  of  morals,  380 

War  ethics,  as  group  morality,  20 ; 
as  survival  from  barbarism,  20; 
beginning  of  rules  of,  2  5-29 ;  Egyp- 
tian, 42;  Assyrian,  51  ;  Chinese, 
65;  Brahmanic,  104;  Greek,  193- 
195 ;  Roman,  245  n.  1  ;  Moham- 
medan, 290,  294 ;  syncretism  of 
pagan  war  ethics  and  Christian 
peace  ethics,  300-306 ;  influence 
of  martial  ethics  of  Islam  upon 
Christian  ethics,  305 ;  progress 
in,  in  Middle  Ages,  3 1 4-3 1 6 ;  prog- 
ress in,  in  modern  times,  375,  376 ; 
atavistic  character  of  war  code, 
378 ;  unfavorable  reaction  of,  upon 
peace  code,  378-380 

Wealth,  moral  effects  of  unequal  dis- 
tribution of,  228 

Wedgwood,  Julia,  9 

Wellhausen,  3 

Wisdom,  Greek  virtue  of,  176 

World  state,  ethical  basis  of,  220 

Wundt,  Wilhelm,  5 

Zarathustra,  126 

Zeno,  206 

Zoroaster,  see  Zarathustra 


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